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ABSTRACT
This thesis concerns the development of health policy-making
in India, in the context of theories of the State in under¬
developed countries. In order better to understand the structures
and processes which characterise health policy and implementation
after Independence in 1 947 , a historical approach is used. The
thesis falls into two parts. Part A (Chapters 1-4) deals with
health status and health policy under British rule, and Part B
(Chapters 5-11) covers the same topics for Independent India.
Both Parts start by locating health policy in the context of
levels, differentials and changes in morbidity and mortality, and
looking at some of the 'non-health policy' factors which might
contribute to the decline in basic levels of mortality since
1881. Under the British, this relates particularly to famine
relief policies, accompanied by commercialisation of agriculture
and trade in food products; for Independent India, the role of
welfare policies which provide a 'floor' to consumption seems
important. In neither period can rising real incomes in them¬
selves provide a satisfactory explanation for mortality decline.
The likely role of health services is considered in the following
chapters, though the focus of this account is on the processes by
which health policies emerge, rather than with their outcomes.
Part A addresses a number of arguments which claim that the
effect of Imperialist rule was to destroy local healing
traditions (Chapter 2), and that Imperialist health services were
narrowly conceived in terms of social control, in the provision
of services for the Army and the protection of the health of the
ruling elite (Chapters 3 and 4). Both arguments are criticised
for being too partial. It is suggested that Imperialist interests
did not totally dominate health activities, but nonetheless, the
impact of services was restricted by their urban, curative focus.
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Part B looks closely at the evidence for the pattern of
health expenditures by the Central and State Governments since
19^7, and suggests that there has been more space for preventive
and public health measures than has usually been recognised
(Chapter 6). Chapter 7 explores the national context of policy¬
making, noting the relatively weak role of the Indian Medical
Association, and Chapter 8 provides an international focus,
looking at pharmaceuticals companies, migration and foreign aid.
Chapter 9 takes a close look at policy regarding medical and
paramedical personnel, and Chapter 10 discusses the structures
and processes of the Government medical bureaucracy. The
Conclusion (Chapter 11) considers the 'new approaches' to health
provisions, in the private sector and in Government, and suggests
that their impact will be much less than has been claimed.
In general, it is argued that populist health policies have
increasingly replaced 'top-down socialist' ones. Neither have
been particularly successful, because they have been permeated by
clientelist political institutions. But an adequate account of
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medicine introduced to India by Muslim invaders and drawing its
inspiration from Greek authors and Avicenna; often transliterated
as Unani medicine.
> xaidxa A practitioner of medicine
ABBREVIATIONS
A.I.I.M.S. All-India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi.
G.O.I. Government of India
G.0.0. Government of Orissa
I.A.M.S. Indian Academy of Medical Sciences
I.M.A. Indian Medical Association
I.M.C. Indian Medical Council (1933-56)
I.M.G. Indian Medical Gazette
I.M.S. Indian Medical Service
I.O.L. India Office Library
M.C.I. Medical Council of India (1956 onwards)
N.A.I. National Archives of India
C.D.R. Crude Death Rate (deaths per 1000 population)
I.M.R. Infant Mortality Rate (deaths of children before their
first birthday, per 1000 live-births in the same period)
X«»
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
As will become clear, I have been very dependent on the help
of many people, including a large number of librarians, for which
I am very grateful. In particular I would mention the assistance
given by Margaret Dowling and the Inter-Library Loan staff in
Edinburgh University, for their assistance in searching for books
and articles from inaccessible sources. I am also grateful to the
Social Science (now Economic and Social) Research Council in
London, who funded my research in India in 1975-76 and in 1982-3;
and to the Overseas Development Agency, for allowing me to use
some material collected while I was a consultant to them; to the
British Council, whose scholarship took me to India in 1973-4;
and to my colleagues in Edinburgh University, for travel funds on
several occasions and for permission to take leave of absence
during my research trips to India. None of these bears any
responsibility for the views expressed here. My debt to Patricia
Jeffery is enormous; without her stimulus I would probably never




The health services of India deserve extended treatment,
for a number of good reasons. To begin with, they affect the
lives of some 700 million people in one of the world's poorest
countries, and this by itself would make it a worthy subject for
study. But in addition, the literature on comparative health
systems, or on the health systems of individual countries or
regions, surprisingly does not include a good account of the
Indian health system.
A comparison with China is instructive. Far less is known
about the detailed patterns of health care provision or its
development in China than in India. This has stimulated almost
every visitor to write an article describing what was shown to
him/her, and a number of books surveying what is known and
placing it into a perspective for a wider audience (e.g.
Bowers,[ed.] 1973; Quinn [ed.], 1972; Sidel, 1972). There are
also several more analytic accounts, of which those by Lampton
(1 977; 1974-) are the most detailed (see also Hillier and Jewell,
1 983). In addition, of course, China is seen as a success story,
with potential relevance for the rest of the world, whereas India
is regarded as a failure. Thus, in the appendixes to the W.H.O.
and U.N.I.C.E.F. books outlining alternative approaches to
meeting health care needs, there is a case study on the Chinese
system as a whole, whereas from India there are accounts of a
small voluntary-sector project in Maharashtra and of Ayurvedic
medicine (Newell [ed.], 1975; Djukanovic and Mach, 1975).
Furthermore, several of the acounts which do exist are
severely flawed. Jaggi's many-volumed history of medicine in
India is little more than a compilation of reports and accounts,
with no serious attempt to put these into a broader perspective
(1972-6). On the other hand, Elling (1979) contains a short
section on India which is so concerned with the context that very
little emerges about the health services themselves. I would
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argue that most accounts of health and health services in India
fall into one of two categories:
- descriptive/uncr i tica1 accounts, essentially within the
'modernisation' tradition, seeing health services moving towards
a Western model through technological transfer and culture
contact (e.g. Dutt, 1963); ££
- radical/Marxist critiques, seeing health services being
warped and made irrelevant (if not positively harmful) because of
the imper i al i stic/dependency relationships within which
technologies are transferred and indigenous elites retain power
to control changes in their own interests (e.g. Doyal, 1 978).
Here I will argue that the former approach, when applied to
India, is insufficiently critical but that the latter approach is
too sweeping (ignoring variations between countries), too
deterministic in simple economistic ways, and incapable of
theorising change. In these pages, then, my concern will be first
to provide some empirical evidence about changes in health
services in India, and secondly to analyse the significance and
causes of these patterns while avoiding the two extremes
described above - that is, neither to exclude a political economy
of health care services nor to make it the sole element in the
account.
Of course, this simple distinction between 'facts' and
'theory' should not be read as a claim that the 'facts' are free
from theoretical presuppositions. I have made a number of
decisions which have guided what material to look for, and to
present, and in the rest of this Introduction I shall spell out
some of these theoretical concerns. To begin with, I decided to
divide this work into two parts, one dealing with the period from
the beginnings of health policy during British rule (particularly
from the 1830's onwards) up to Independence, and the second
looking at aspects of health policy after 19^7. A second decision
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was to focus on the State: to use the recent discussions on the
nature of the State in 'developing societies' to provide a
framework for the material I am considering. A third decision
concerns the treatment of relationships between health services
and 'health'. I have taken the view that for most purposes it is
possible to 'bracket off' the issue, and not to try to assess
whether particular health services improve the health of the
population or not. Thus I have considered changes in 'health' as
results of wider social changes (and not only the systematic
attempts to heal or cure, or protect people from illness and
disease), and have argued that it is worthwhile to investigate
health policy in itself, rather than trying too hard to
distinguish the effective from the dignified. Other decisions
will become clearer as the material unfolds, but these three
require some discussion here.
The first two decisions are interrelated. I have split the
analysis into two historical sections - 1800 to 1 947, and 1947 to
the present. The starting point is largely set by my interest in
health policy-making: there are few sources, and little evidence
of such policy concerns prior to 1800. However, by taking this
starting point it could be argued that I am too 'generous' to
Imperialism, effectively ignoring the period of conquest and
rapacious plunder. I will return to this point in the conclusion
to Part A. The decision to break the account at 1947 is not just
because the historical sources for the two periods are very
different, nor just because it is traditional to divide modern
histories of India at this point - the point at which two
successor countries (India and Pakistan) replaced direct British
rule for 3/4 of the population, and indirect rule through the
Native States for the rest. It is also because the end of British
rule does have some significance for health service provision,
and this significance has to be assessed in part through an
understanding of the nature of the pre- and post-Independence
State. The division also reflects something of the natural
history of my research into this topic, since I began by looking
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at post-Independence policy and have come to believe that it is
impossible to understand what happened after 1947 without
locating it in its historical roots.
Many discussions of the State in modern India are derived
from the debates within Marxism on the character of capitalist
States. In particular, they try to deal with the problems posed
for Marxism by the different kinds of capitalist States, and the
uncertain tendencies of these States, towards Fascism or not, or
towards the conditions necessary for socialist transformations.
As Urry (1980) has recently argued, much discussion of the State
by Marxists has tended to be reductionist and attempts to deal
with the State solely in terms of the class dominance of the
bourgeoisie - in Marx's own phrase, the State as the executive
committee for managing their common affairs. The difficulties
with this position are enormous. It is clear that politics and
ideology are not determined in a close way by the demands of
capital; that social institutions (such as health services) vary
quite dramatically between different capitalist States; and that
the 'needs of capital' are rarely unambiguous, self-evident or
followed with relentless logic. Althusser and others responded to
this kind of problem by theorising degrees of autonomy from the
economic base for political and ideological 'instances' (levels);
an alternative response (such as that of E.P. Thompson) is to
return to class struggle and the conscious aims of historical
actors as the central element in an account (Althusser, 1981;
Thompson, 1979). However, we cannot get very far in explaining
the developments in social policy by referring to the twin
concepts of 'capital's needs' and 'labour's demands' (Harris,
1980). While these formulations may seem plausible, they do not
explain well why welfare States developed when they did, at
different times and in different ways in different countries, and
in the State rather than the private sector in some countries but
not in others (ibid.).
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Marxists and others are also now pointing to the
similarities in these discussions with those within orthodox
sociology. Orthodox sociology has seen a long-running debate
about the relationship between structure and action, which some
have seen as underpinning 'two sociologies', of functions and
systems on the one hand and processes on the other (Dawe, 1970).
Urry argues that Marxist accounts are similarly polarised,
between Marxist functionalists (those concerned with seeing the
way that the State in terms of its functions for capitalism) and
Marxist humanists (who focus on class struggles, without looking
at the effects of these strugg1es)(Urry, 1980:5; Harris,
1980:245).
If we turn to discussions of the nature of the State in
India, or more generally in the Third World, we can see two
general categories of discussions. The first is a pluralist view,
which sees power as exercised through alliances forged by groups
on the basis of a number of common and competing characteristics
- caste, language, religion, education, for example, all
providing bases for common action as well as (and often over¬
riding) narrow economic interests. This literature discusses
State bureaucracies, in terms which suggest that bureaucratic
structures are central to an understanding of the chances of any
policy being implemented - such as the accounts which came out of
the school around Ralph Braibanti in the early 1 960's (Braibanti,
1961). The two strands in this kind of account are often poorly
integrated. The issues for those who focus on the State involve
the quality of recruitment policies, structure of control, or the
quality of bureaucratic procedures, as if the bureaucracy is
divorced from the every-day political world and just 'holds the
ring'. Failures to maintain this divorce are then castigated by
calling the result 'corruption', without posing questions about
the interests of the bureaucrats, or the social groups favoured
by these 'corrupt practices'.
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The alternative view of the State draws on Marxist
traditions, presuming that the State reflects or is an instrument
of dominant classes: debate (as, for example, between the various
Marxist parties in India) focusses on which classes are aligned
together, and the attitude which should be taken over
collaboration with the so-called 'national bourgeoisie', seen as
particularly powerful in the.Congress Party (Kurien, [ed.] 1975;
Hawthorn, 1983). Much of the recent Marxist discussion of the
Third World State looks to the seminal work of Alavi ( 1 972), in
which he argued essentially that the State in post-colonial
societies is over-developed because it inherited from the
colonial State bureaucratic and military institutions designed
largely with a concern to maintain order and control. Alavi
suggested that these institutions are strong enough to be
relatively autonomous of the propertied classes within post-
Colonial societies, and of their metropolitan allies abroad. In
Alavi's view, what distinguishes the colonial State from post-
Colonial one was its 'alien' character, not its institutions or
primary concerns.
Alavi's formulation has come under attack from a number of
quarters. For my purposes, the following points seem most
crucial. To begin with, some writers have pointed out that Alavi
seems to exaggerate the extent of the colonial State's control
over civil society. Saul (1973), for example, argued that in the
African context it is difficult to sustain the case, certainly
without more clear-cut indicators of what might count as an
'over-developed' State. In the Indian context, following the work
of Frykenberg (1965), a number of authors have stressed the
limits to State control over local politics (Bayly, 1979;
Washbrook, 1978), local economies (Whitcombe, 1972) or local
social structures (Kumar, 1965). Washbrook, for example, argues
that if anything the British State in India was less 'developed'
in the range of modes of control over civil society which it
could exercise than were the States which preceded it in South
India - to such an extent that land revenue collection became
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almost the only connection between the State and the local
population (Washbrook, 1977; see also Moore, 1981). It can also
be argued that the reason why Indians were incorporated into
positions of influence, and eventually power, from the 1880's
onwards, was because the British recognised the limits to the
control which their State apparatus could wield. Of course, this
line of argument cannot be taken too far: in terms of the control
of legitimate force, and the ability to coerce agreement in the
last resort, the Indian Army (with the British Army in India),
the Indian Police, and the Indian Civil Service, could still
together forge an instrument of domination more efficient and
flexible than any previously seen on the sub-continent. But since
Alavi's case seems to be based on the ability to manage everyday
politics and bureaucratic matters without reliance on landed
classes, the objections have considerable validity.
The second weakness in Alavi's account is his assumption
that the Imperial State was fairly directly a tool of the 'Metro¬
politan bourgeoisie'. While there is obviously a sense in which
the Imperial State alien, and answerable to its masters in
Britain, it is also clear that the extent of that control was
restricted by distance and lack of knowledge. Furthermore, the
interests of the 'Metropolitan bourgeoisie' were rarely clear,
unambiguous or unchanging. Even in the extreme case - 'ensuring a
stable environment for trade, commodity production and revenue
collection' (Wood, 1 980) - by the 1 920s this gave few guidelines
to Indian bureaucrats attempting to cope with world recession and
Japanese competition (Charlesworth, 1982). Further, there is
little that can be gained from Alavi's formulation if we wish to
understand not only the pressure on the State to provide for the
needs of 'capital'; for example, in trying to understand the
social policy innovations of the British, such as the suppression
of satl. female infanticide, general education (but particularly
female education) or in the field of health. Here, elements of
imperial ideology (and variations in the form this took between
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imperialists and at different times in different places) have to
be considered seriously.
The third difficulty with Alavi's formulation is the meaning
to be attached to the transfer of power at Independence. It is
relatively easy to characterise the Indian Congress Party as
being ' step-in-your-shoes' nationalists - concerned to get access
to the levers of power but without clear ideas of what to do when
they were there (contra the Chinese Communist Party) (Maddison
1970). It is also clear that both for the Chinese Communists and
for Congress, in taking over the existing bureaucracy they were
able to cope with the immediate problems of maintaining an
administration in desperate times, but were also constrained in
the policy innovations they were then able to take. Whereas the
Communists did have an idea of the limitations they were facing,
and developed ways of overcoming bureaucratic inertia through a
policy of increasing political control at all levels, the
Congress Party was largely content with what they had. But Alavi
argued that this was because of their own ineffectiveness. The
bureaucracy had developed ways of by-passing political leaders
and Wood (1980) suggests that the main technique was to increase
the complexity of bureaucratic routine as a way of coping with
political pressures.
Alavi is, of course, talking specifically about Pakistan and
Bangladesh, where the very short periods of political rule have
made his case more plausible. The bureaucracy and the military
obviously can work well together in situations where 'political'
interference is minimised. But the Indian case is more
complicated, and Wood's willingness to carry Alavi's argument
over is more difficult to defend. In particular, it is clear that
ministerial office in the Indian States does give scope for the
exercise of a number of controls which the bureaucracy is almost
powerless to prevent - in, for example, the transfer and
promotion of State (rather than all-Indian) civil servants. The
Departments with the largest employment (such as Education and
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Health) are often prized Ministerships, because they offer such
scope for patronage and corruption (Wade, 1984). Yet they are
also Ministries where policies change. In trying to understand
this we do not get very far by referring to bureaucratic methods
of coping with politicians, nor with the competing classes whose
interests are (or are not) articulated by the post-Colonial
State.
Alavi provides some answers to these issues in a recent
article (1982). Here he argues the case for distinguishing
between four different levels of analysis of the State. The first
draws on the so-called 'capital-logic' school and focuses on the
role of the State in creating and reproducing a social order
which permits the economy to function - in Alavi's terms, India
is a 'peripheral capitalist' economy, so the minimal role the
State must fulfil is to make it possible for capitalists to make
a profit, to benefit personally, and to continue to invest. The
second level relates to the questions Alavi raised in 1972, on
the classes and groups who can be said to control the State: at
this level issues of the actions of the State in specific spheres
have to be considered. The third level is the analysis of the
bureaucracy, its social origins and interests, and the extent of
its autonomy, while the fourth level is that of the State as an
arena for competing interests - party and pressure group
politics.
Alavi argues that State action (at the second level) is set
by a context in which a "structural imperative" exists; in which
the basic notions of profitability, calculation, and capital
accumulation affect the consequences of State action but do not
determine those actions in advance. Rather, aspects of the other
two levels (the bureaucracy and the 'political') have a role to
play, making for deviations from what might be considered the
strict logical requirements of capitalist enterprises or capital
in general. Of course it may still be very difficult to define
what that strict logic might require in any particular historical
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situation. This model of political and social life is very
similar to models of equilibrium in economics - an equilibrium
which is never reached but towards which the economy is believed
to tend in the long run.
The significance of Alavi's recent position is that it makes
provision for the possibility that 'mistakes' can be made, and
that not everything done by the State can be understood in terms
of meeting the needs of dominant classes. In addition, it
provides a space for sociological analysis of the ideas and
interests of bureaucratic and other groups without making them
seem either hypocrites or idiots - either consciously dissembling
about the real reasons for policy, or unaware of the benefits to
particular classes - which is all that tends to be permitted in
classical Marxist analyses. Alavi's position also makes it
possible to clarify some of the differences between the two kinds
of accounts of health policy in India which I outlined at the
beginning. In general, the uncritical accounts focus on Alavi's
third and fourth levels, taking very much at face value what
doctors and bureaucrats say they are doing and their reasons for
doing so, and using a similar framework for looking at the
pressure groups which try to influence policy. The critical
schools, on the other hand, tend to look mainly at Alavi's first
and second levels, the structural imperatives of capitalism and
the class interests of powerful groups. Plausibly, a fuller
account, encompassing all four levels, will be more satisfactory.
The obvious problem is in how to relate the levels together, and
(as I shall argue more fully later, for health policy) how to
avoid seeming to argue that the links are unimportant. It is in
this framework that I shall look at health policy in India.
My third 'prior decision' was to look at health services and
their relationship to health in a particular way. Health services
in any country do not emerge solely in response to the diseases
suffered by the population. To begin with, those diseases are
experienced and interpreted as social events (illnesses), and the
1 0
demands people make of healers are on the basis of these cultural
processes. The classic (and over-generalised) example from India
is of the tendency to explain smallpox as a curse from a
particular goddess, and thus to respond to a sufferer very
differently from the way those with plague, or cholera, are
treated. Some writers have argued that the cultural specificity
of disease categories makes it impossible to use 'Western'
categories in the discussion of other populations. However
desirable it might be in principle to use Indian disease
categories in what follows, there are considerable problems.
Firstly, it is not clear that there is a uniform set of Indian
disease categories, but variations at least regionally and
culturally. Secondly, the sources I am consulting all use a
version of Western categories, even if these change through time.
Finally, I (and most of my readers) implicitly order their view
of the world of health and illness using these categories, and
any attempt to use an alternative set would be partial and not
genuine. But it should always be remembered that for most Indians
a 'humoral' view of health and illness, sometimes extended by the
use of concepts derived from the classical Indian traditions,
gives a closer approximation to how they see the world.
Health services respond to the demands of some groups rather
than others - men's complaints rather than women's or children's,
town-dwellers' rather than villagers', ruling races', classes' or
parties' rather than those of the ruled. These groups will
probably experience different disease spectrums, and also
interpret their experiences differently. Therefore, even if
health services were to respond in a direct manner to the
effective demands made on them, they would not necessarily
reflect any 'real' disease pattern. But of course, there are
other interests affecting health services. The interests of the
State may be paramount. But they are likely to be mediated by the
interests of the occupational group which dominates the medical
division of labour, whose views of appropriate patterns of health
services will be conditioned by their theories of disease
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causation and treatment as well as their views of their own
proper position in society. In a colonial situation, such as
India before 1947, there may be considerable mismatch between
indigenous and colonial views: and many would argue that this
mismatch continues in the post-Independence world as a result of
processes of neo-colonialism. However, State interests, and those
of medical occupations, cannot be assumed once a particular
country has been identified as 'peripheral capitalist'. There are
considerable variations amongst such countries in the form health
services have taken, and these forms have changed through time.
There is, therefore, an historical and a bureaucratic
context to be understood. Health services in India today are
conditioned in important ways by the legacy of health services
established under British rule. ' Incrementalism' is a major
feature even of change in 'revolutionary' contexts, as Lampton's
painstaking accounts of medical policy in post-Liberation China
make clear ( 1 977). Even workers near the bottom of a hierarchy
have interests in restricting changes which may mean they lose
their jobs, or have them radically redefined, or require
retraining and uncertainty: those workers near the top are likely
to have scarce skills (socially defined) which give them power to
limit proposals which might reduce or change their positions.
Finally, of course, these different elements are linked in
ways which are usually mutually supporting, though occasionally
contradictory. The model that I am using to attempt to understand
these relationships is not very different from that of Roemer,
who distinguishes historical determinants, economic levels,
political policies and other cultural influences, as the
'determinants of health care systems' (1977:1). However, he
classes all non-Socialist 'underdeveloped' health care systems
together, solely on the basis of economic levels - but then
places India in a 'transitional' category (ibid.:198). By
contrast, I want to discuss the extent to which India is unlike
the patterns described for other countries in the 'capitalist
1 2
periphery', and this needs a more sophisticated discussion of the
State than the 'political policies' and 'ideology' described by
Roemer.
In all this, there is no presumption that saying anything
about health services will let us say very much about what
affects health. The debates in Western Europe and North America
concerning the causes of mortality decline in the 19th century,
and the relationships between health services and the current
level of life expectancy, are well known (McKeown, 1966; Powles,
1972; Illich, 1976; Lalonde, 1975). Except for a few
interventions directly under medical stimulus (such as clean
water supplies, or one or two mass preventive campaigns) it can
be shown that the major killers of the 19th century declined in
significance well before specific remedies or protections were
provided by medical science. The relevance of this debate for
20th century changes in the rest of the world is more uncertain
(see, e.g. Ruzicka, 1984). I shall discuss this issue in more
detail, when I consider the impact of changes in living
standards, the control of famine, and the role of good nutrition
in reducing mortality. But in general I maintain an agnostic
position: in most cases, we have little evidence that hospital
attendances, vaccination campaigns, or town water supplies made a
marked difference to people's health, and in general it will not
be my concern to try to assess 'impact' measured in this kind of
way. In other words, I would suggest that it is worth knowing how
services were provided, at what cost, when and in what form, even
if we do not know what benefit people received from using them.
In these pages I hope to tease out some of these
relationships in the Indian context, and in particular to throw
light on how the current patterns of health services in India
took the forms that they have. There is general agreement that
these patterns are inadequate, both for dealing with the needs of
the Indian population today and as a basis for any serious
attempt to reach the goal of 'Health for All by the Year 2000'.
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Understanding better the historical roots of these patterns and
their significance for present-day policy-making may help those
trying to overcome these inadequacies.
THE ORGANISATION OF THE ARGUMENT
In what follows, I look at these arguments in two periods -
pre- and post-1947 - and take a series of themes in each case.
The four chapters in Part A address the issues of what were the
health problems facing Indians in about 1800, and how did these
change under British rule; what were the local forms of medical
services in India at the time, and how did British rule affect
them; who controlled medical policy in India under the British,
and how much money was spent on health matters; and what were the
dominant forms of British health care provision in India. These
four chapters together argue that the major health problems of
India predated British rule and were not substantially affected
by British health policies, either negatively (the erosion of
indigenous systems of medicine, or the 'diseases of development'
- notably the spread of malaria) or positively (medical services
or public health provisions). The limits to health progress under
the British, it will be argued, were less the colonial structure
of Government and racist/Imperialist goals than the very real
constraints of resources and of the models of disease which were
current at the time; and the major positive benefit of British
rule on health was probably the changes in famine arrangements
which had a dramatic impact on famine-related mortality despite a
probable increase in the frequency of food scarcity.
In Part B, chapters 5 to 10 focus on health services and
health since 1947. Chapter 5 looks at health problems at
Independence, and trends since then, with an assessment of the
most common explanations for changes in observed morbidity and
mortality. I will argue that the organisation of health services
to deal separately with different diseases (the so-called
'vertical' disease control programmes, notably in malaria) and
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further progress in welfare systems (providing a floor of
consumption at times of food scarcity) seem to account for most
of the decline in mortality. However, the slow decline in
mortality (especially child mortality) since 1970, despite record
grain harvests and rising per capita real incomes, suggests that
the health services are not contributing to further declines as
they could.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 discuss health policy-making in India at
three levels of analysis. The first is the narrowly bureaucratic,
and chapter 6 sets out the structure of health expenditures and
the nature of public sector health provisions. This involves
looking briefly at the role of planning and State-Central
relationships in a policy field which is constitutionally the
reponsibi1ity of the State. It will be argued here that the
Planning Commission has consistently pressed 'appropriate'
policies on Ministries of Health, both Central and State, but
that its inability to control expenditure has led to two
unfortunate results:
_ 'slippage' from rural, preventive, primary care objectives
but a tendency to achieve or over-achieve targets which directly
affect urban medical care facilities;
- an increasing significance of the Centrally-funded Family
Welfare Programme (for other reasons as well) which has come to
be the main channel by which the Central Government attempts to
achieve changes in the primary care system. Some of the
consequences of this pattern are explored in the following
chapt ers.
Chapters 7 and 8 widen the approach to policy-making by
looking at the politics of medicine within India and in an
international context. Chapter 7 looks at the policy context for
the public-sector health services, and argues that there is no
evidence of concerted lobbies by 'organised interests': the
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medical profession is poorly organised and claims but little in
the way of successes, and the major pressures on Ministers seem
to relate to the health sector as employer (transfers,
promotions, recruitment etc.) These pressures have specific
consequences, not actively sought by any of the actors involved.
The empirical material is drawn from an analysis of the impact of
the Indian Medical Association (I.M.A.) on a number of policy
issues in the 1960s and the 1970s - tracing the background of
medical associations in India from the mid-19th century and
looking at data on membership and on the mode of internal
organisation of the I.M.A. This material on the politics of
health is set in the context of material on the internal politics
of India.
Chapter 8 locates health policy internationally. To see
health provisions as an entirely internal matter is obviously
inadequate, but the potential scope of 'international effects' is
enormous, ranging throughout the international agencies and the
politics of the Cold War and the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as
the full range of multinational corporations. I have chosen to
limit the discussion to three areas where the impact of the
international context is most direct and identifiable:
1. Foreign aid - its distribution by donor, by area
supported, and changes through time, and the significance of
overseas assistance in overall public sector health expenditures;
2. Medical migration - to show the extent of such migration,
its approximate direction, the changes through time, the impact
of 'medical dependency' and the relationships with the General
Medical Council from the 1920's through the impact of 1976
'derecognition'; and
3. Multinational corporations, especially pharmaceuticals
companies - to show the scale of these companies within the
commercial sphere, their mode of operation and any impacts on
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decision-making. In addition, there will be a brief discussion of
the argument that such companies take advantage of the laxer
'environmental' controls in India to impose greater disease risks
on the Indian population.
In general I argue that the more sweeping criticisms of the
international health economy, derived largely from naive
dependency analyses, are inadequate to cope with the variety of
Third World experience, and the particular Indian case. Medical
emigration from India, while substantial on a world scale, has
had little noticeable impact on Indian health care provisions;
despite multinational control over drugs, Indian production
capacity is almost unique in the Third World for its scope and
size; and foreign aid has contributed in no small measure to the
most 'appropriate' as well as the less 'appropriate' aspects of
Indian health provisions.
Chapters 9 and 10 are case studies of particular aspects of
medical policy. Chapter 9 focusses on medical 'man'power policy.
I argue that the Government was well aware of the weaknesses of
the strategy followed in the 1950s and 1960s, which focussed on
doctors and made no significant allowance for health assistants
or village-level workers. In general, policy attempted to meet
conflicting criteria: to ensure international acceptability for
Indian qualifications (which demanded only one category of
'doctor'); to provide within India the full range of 'modern'
medical services; to incorporate 'indigenous' personnel within
bureaucratic health service provision; and to extend health
services as rapidly and effectively as possible to the mass of
the rural population. The reforms of the late 1970's (multi¬
purpose health workers to replace uni-purpose, vertical programme
workers; and community health workers with a revived programme of
training traditional birth attendants) are shown to have been
proposed and argued down several times since 19^7, and some of
the special reasons which led to their final success are
discussed.
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Chapter 10 deals with the development of medical
institutions and programmes, and considers the evidence on their
mode of working. I argue that the major problems with their
organisation lie less in their ability to discriminate against
the poor and the disadvantaged in the distribution of scarce
resources (though this occurs) than in two other facts: they have
very few resources to distribute; and they do so within a
bureaucratic framework which offers no incentives for
'appropriate' work and effort.
Chapter 11 forms the conclusion, with an assessment of the
new approaches in health provisions and their likely impact.
Since 1977, in the context of changes in the rhetoric of world
discussions (Health By the People; Alma-Ata; Illich etc.), it
might seem that past failures will be turned into future
successes. Indian health provision in the voluntary sector, and
new health sector aid policies, all point in the same direction.
This chapter will argue that for most Indians, these 'new
approaches' are unlikely to cause a break with the past.
SOURCES AND METHODS
The material reported here comes from a variety of sources,
and has been collected over the course of the last 15 years or
so. My interest in the topic was stimulated during a stay in
Pakistan in 1970-71, when I carried out fieldwork in Lahore
hospital casualty departments but also collected data on health
policy and planning in Pakistan (Jeffery, 1973; 1974). I visited
Punjab (India) in 1974, and made some preliminary analysis of
Punjab Government materials available in Chandigarh, but more
substantial data collection took place in 1975-76 when I was
based in New Delhi.
In this period I had to wait for research clearance from the
Government of India, because my application was received soon
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after the General Medical Council had 'derecognised' Indian
medical degrees; at the same time a team from the Institute of
Development Studies at the University of Sussex was refused
research clearance. While I was waiting I collected material from
the reports of the Central Council of Health, newspapers held in
the Nehru Memorial Library, other documents from the National
Medical Library in the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences,
and eventually, archival material from the National Archives of
India, New Delhi. I also used sources provided by the Indian
Medical Association at their national headquarters as well as the
Delhi Branch, and interviewed office-holders. The terms of my
research clearance did not permit me to interview current holders
of office in the Ministries in Delhi, but I did interview one
former Minister of Health (Dr Sushila Nayyar) and a former
Director-General of Health Services (Dr K.N. Rao). I then created
a listing of doctors in Delhi, and interviewed a 2% sample.
After returning to the U.K. I consulted materials held by
the India Office Library in London, and by the Edinburgh
University Library, as well as undertaking several more shorter
trips to India, to investigate conditions on tea estates in Assam
and to advise on a U.K. health aid programme in Orissa. These
visits widened my understanding of Government processes. Finally,
in 1 982-3 I spent a year carrying out a joint research project
(with Patricia Jeffery and Andrew Lyon) on childbearing in rural
Uttar Pradesh, providing a new perspective on health services as
seen by a 'villager', however privileged and temporary. Material
on various aspects of this research has already been published:
the bibliography includes a complete listing. In particular, the
data on foreign aid used in chapter 8 has appeared in the
ln£££IL£li£Iial J-flUEJial Ql tizalhh (Jeffery, 1985); some of
the material in Chapters 2 and 4 have appeared in Social _2nifiD.fi.fi
fifii HS-difiina (Jeffery, 1 983) and in UndnEU inifiD iiniififi (Jeffery
1979).
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In what follows I shall be transgressing a number of
disciplinary boundaries, most notably between sociology, history
and health economics, and I shall not satisfy specialists in any
of these fields. In developing the material for this case study I
have been restricted by the availability of sources. In
particular, the material drawn from Orissa was available only
because of my regular visits to that State in a semi-official
capacity, and I did not select the State on any theoretical
grounds. Some of the gaps in the arguments reflect these
problems; and some of my arguments may reflect the existence of
sources which I have been able to use, rather than the most
important arguments which one might want to make. Nonetheless, I
hope these pages will shed light on an area much discussed, but
not much studied.
A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
In the following pages I have generally referred to doctors
trained in the medical colleges and schools established by the
British as 'Western doctors', and the medicine in which they were
educated as 'Western medicine'. This is contentious; Leslie, for
example, has urged the use of the term 'cosmopolitan medicine',
to denote the fact that this no longer has its roots solely in
Europe and North America (Leslie, 1975). It is also problematic
in India, since Unani ('Greek') and homoeopathic medicine also
both came from the West. On the other hand, it reflects usage in
India, especially in the period before 19 97 when this system of
medicine was identified with the British, and when 'cosmopolitan'
strikes an anachronistic note. The alternative terminology in
India is 'allopathic', a tern; derived from homoeopathy, and
contested by 'Western' doctors as being too narrow. I do not feel
that there is an ideal solution, but I feel happiest with
'Western medicine' and 'Western doctors', and have used the terms
in this way.
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INTRODUCTION TO PART A
"It was and is a basic trait of imperialism that the
capital it has invested in retarded areas develops them
only in a very lop-sided and inadequate fashion. They
have for the most part lingered in a broken-backed
condition, a limbo between old and new, with a money
economy but not an industrial one, and forming a passive
appendage to the advanced countries." (Kiernan 197^ 11-
1 2)
"There is, however, no room for equivocation over this
matter, over the results of imperialism's forceful
incorporation of the bulk of humanity into the modern
world. As Marxists we must accept the view that the
epochal imperialist sweep was indeed a titanic step
towards human unity (on the basis of the greatest
cultural and material achievements so far attained by
humanity)." (Warren, 1 980, 1 37)
Many writers (not only Marxists like the two quoted above)
have wrestled with the attempt to disentangle and evaluate what
Marx called England's double mission in India - one destructive
and one regenerative - and what others have regarded as a
characteristic of industrial capitalism in general (Marx,
1973:320). The achievement of formal political control by the
British over much of what we now call India undoubtedly
facilitated the inclusion of India in a world economy: the State
which oversaw the construction and operation of the new economic
order was one which was finally responsible to political control
outside India, and this undoubtedly had specific consequences. In
the field of tarriff control and land revenue this may have been
decisive. But in many other areas it becomes a hopeless task to
try and assess how things might have been different had political
control remained in India. It is notable that some Marxists have
returned to themes which Weberian writers have stressed - the
need for changes in social and political institutions and
cultural patterns before economic changes can take hold (Worsley,
1980; Warren, 1979). So there is support from many sides for the
argument that the absence of colonial rule in India would not
thereby have led to faster, more thorough-going , or more
equitable processes of social and economic change.
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Similarly, historians are increasingly stressing the extent
of integration in pre-British India, the level of monetisation of
the economy, or the extent of agrarian landlessness (Kumar, Ced.]
1982). Colonial rule was neither as all-encompassing nor as
destructive as many early writers claimed; and the social and
cultural impact was perhaps as important in the long run as the
'drain' of booty to England in the 18th century, or the lack of
protection for the hand-loom cotton industry in the 18th and
early 19th centuries (Charlesworth, 1982). Warren, in his attempt
to refocus Marxist thought on the generative side of imperialism
and modern capitalism stresses the improvement in health brought
about by the colonisers, indicated by rapid population growth and
declines in mortality rates following within a few decades of
colonial rule: this is a view which runs directly counter to most
Marxist analyses, in which an expansion of misery and a decline
in the quality of life are more usually associated with
colonialism (1 980: H3).
But it would be a mistake to treat the whole Imperial period
as if it were subject to little change, as Frank, for example, in
some of his writings appears to do (Frank, 1967). In looking at
the history of the Imperial State in India it is possible to see
three main periods for analysis, with qualitative changes around
i 860, and 1 920. Prior to 1 860, the State was a curious amalgam of
commercial, administrative and military machines; from 1860 to
1920 we can see the 'High Noon' of the British State in India;
from 1920 onwards the process of Indianisation begins in earnest,
and Independence in 19^7 ushers in a further set of changes.
These dates are of course only approximations: not only are the
'stages' reached at different times in different parts of the
sub-continent (Punjab often seeming to lead the way) but the
turning points are often spread out over several years. Thus the
changes of 1 920 can be traced back to Curzon's attempt to
partition Bengal in 1906, and to the Morley-Minto reforms of
1907, which culminated in the new order established by the 1919
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Government of India Act.
The history of the British annexation of India does not need
much rehearsal: the main signposts of the political history are
listed in the Timeline in the Appendix. From the founding of the
trading company, the East India Company, in 1601, roughly until
the military campaigns of 1757, which included the Battle of
Plassey and Olive's victorious march on Calcutta, British power
was largely confined to control over different aspects of foreign
trade. The European competitors - the Dutch and the French - were
not obviously inferior in military strength or trading ability,
and the ebb and flow of competition between the European powers
was over-shadowed by the growth and decline of the Moghals, who
reached their furthest geographical spread in the reign of the
Emperor Aurangzeb, who died in 1707. But the events of 1757
established the superiority of the British over the other
European powers, and demonstrated their ability to intervene
effectively in Indian politics, setting in train an almost
irresistible chain of conquests and advances, culminating in the
overthrow of the Sikh kingdom in the Punjab in 1847, and the
takeover of Oudh in 1856. The Company developed into a 'ruling'
body partly to defend and extend its commercial interests; but
one result of conquering territory, or taking on the collection
of land revenue, was to reduce steadily the relative significance
of its trading activities. The problems and rewards offered by
rulership and land revenues led the British Parliament, in Acts
of 1833 and 1853, to begin to exercise increasing supervision of
events in India.
By 1800 (the starting point for much of what follows in Part
A) the processes of territorial spread and institutional
transformation were still under way; by the 1850's they were all
but complete. This was symbolised by the British crown taking
over formal control after the upheavals of 1857/8; and by the
ending of the policies of aggressive conquests of new territory
in the core of the Indian subcontinent. In the last half of the
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18th century, the British in India had acted in a rapacious
manner, looting and laying waste the lands of defeated enemies,
using force to insist on unequal contracts or the payment of
penal fines, and extorting very high land revenues. But the
British Government of India was steadily bureaucratised (in
almost the classical Weberian sense) over the first four or five
decades of the 19th century: by 1860 the process was almost
complete. Private functions and finances were steadily separated
from public ones, efforts were made to establish recruitment
procedures which were free from elements of purchase and sale of
office, and clear lines of control were set up between London and
Calcutta, and on down into the countryside.
The events of 1857 (the Mutiny or Sepoy Rebellion) hastened
the changes. The 1858 Government of India Act required regular
reporting of Indian financial affairs, and efforts to promote
•moral and material progress' in the country, which tended to
regularise and systematise the organisational structure within
India. The forms of Government established at this time dominated
developments for the next 60 years. Most of the changes
introduced - such as the increasing involvement of Indians at the
higher levels of the Government - were brought in without
changing the basic structure. Others - such as the establishment
of local self-government after 1 882 - only began to have a
serious impact towards the end of the period. This 60-year spell
saw British rule at its most self-confident, and typifies the
image usually held, of racial pride, a concern for official
superiority and efficiency, and mountains of paperwork. It is in
this period that policy in India can be seen most clearly as
stimulated by the changing context of ideas in England, with
Liberal and Conservative Viceroys and Secretaries of State
attempting to influence the course of action in the light of
their ideas of the Imperial role (Moore, 1966, Stokes, 1959). In
some respects, such as the growth of public education and public
health provision, the State took a much more prominent role in
India than in Britain, because of the absence of vested interests
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and of alternative institutions in civil society already
providing such services. But the scope of these innovations was
always limited by the main demands on the State - the maintenance
of law and order, protection of the external boundaries, and
financial rectitude.
The reforms associated with Montagu (as Secretary of State)
and Chelmsford (as Viceroy) in 1918-19, mark a decisive shift in
the pattern of events. They were heralded by the Morley-Minto
reforms of 1907-09, which Moore (1966) characterised as 'the
shadow of reform and the substance of repression'. The main
elements of each reform package were the extensions of the
principles of representation and Ministerial Government
responsible to an elected legislature, but whereas the changes
before the War had a minimal impact, those after it had much
greater long-term significance. From 1919 can be dated the full
flowering of the Provincialisation of most of the major arms of
Government, especially education and public health, and the
division of powers between the Centre and the Provinces. This
division was left virtually unchanged by the reforms of 1935, and
it is the basis of the Indian Constitution after Independence.
The Government of India Act of 1919 drew on the reports of
two Royal Commissions (on Decentralisation and on Public
Services) and on a number of other proposals. It attempted to
widen the spheres of 'Indianisation' and to extend the powers and
autonomy of local government without undermining the basis of
Imperial control. The solution included the establishment of two
divisions of government activity: between the Central and the
Provincial Governments; and between subjects 'transferred' to
ministerial control, and those 'reserved' for official control.
In spite of the fact that the Congress Party never fully
committed itself to working the 1919 Constitution (largely
because it was associated with repression symbolised by Dyer's
massacre of unarmed Punjabis in Amritsar) the inter-War period
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saw real power exercised for the first time by Indian Ministers,
and a dramatic growth in the Indian membership of all the elite
bureaucratic 'services'. London's ability to control events in
India steadily declined, so that Independence became increasingly
predictable and well within the established patterns, despite the
apparently chaotic conditions of 1946 and 1947. Post-1947
policies in many areas followed the lines laid down while the
British were still formally in charge.
Part A, then considers the validity of some elements of the
'critical' arguments about Imperial impact with specific
reference to health and health services in India, produced both
by nationalists and Marxists (eg Naoroji, 1901; Digby, 1901;
Baran, 1958; Banerji, 1975). The 'critical' case against imperial
rule, in its simple version, is that Imperial rule had a number
of negative consequences for Indian society. In the first place,
living standards were reduced (through the working of land
revenue, trading patterns in which the 'surplus' was creamed off
by European traders, and the 'drain' to London in particular).
Following from this, it was argued, was a thwarting of
development potentials, which limited the extent of technical and
social change within India and lowered the technical level in
certain key areas.
What was the effect of British rule on health conditions in
India? In part, this question can be resolved into a conundrum:
what caused the rise in population (especially after 1920) if it
was not an improvement in general living standards? but what was
the result of that population increase, if it was not a decline
in general living standards? It is relatively easy to discern two
strands in writing on this subject. There are those, like Banerji
(1974), who follow the nationalist tradition dating from Naoroji
(1901) and Digby (1901). They argue that Imperialism destroyed
existing balances between people and their environments
(including coping mechanisms like indigenous healing traditions)
and led to a decline in standards of living (indicated by such
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variables as income per head, or by reference to reports about
the rise of urban slums and rural distress). In addition, they
argue, Indian healers were 'deskilled', because they were
deprived of elite patronage, and local village-based society was
destroyed by commercialisation and the creaming off of surplus to
the State. In addition, in some respects, the developments which
did take place had 'unhealthy' consequences, as for example in
the conditions which were permitted in towns, and the spread of
malaria (accompanying canal and road or rail developments) and
the plague (introduced into Bombay along colonial trade paths).
The critique would continue by arguing that the measures
adopted by the Government in India were totally inadequate to
deal with these problems. In part this is to be explained by the
racist basis of rule: the interests of the European minority
received undue concern, while the Indian majority received little
more than the crumbs from the White table. Thus the Indian
Medical Service (I.M.S.) was designed to service the Indian Civil
Service and the Army: only incidentally were services provided
for the mass of the population. Hospitals and dispensaries were
urban, and again designed with the interests of European civil
servants as their highest priority; and the training of medical
practitioners was designed to provide subordinates to Europeans
in the I.M.S. Only the surplus was available to provide private
medical services to the mass of the population, and their
potential was limited not merely by the inadequacies of their
training but also by the way in which medical training denied the
relevance of the local culture, and systematically derided local
medical traditions. The provision of health services was
unwontedly 'medical' in character, with preventive and sanitary
measures of low priority, concerned most with European troops and
the European quarters of towns. In many ways, sanitary measures
were restricted to attempts at social control, most obvious in
the anti-plague measures. Thus what little was spent on health
could have had virtually no benefit for the mass of the local
population. Any improvements in the health of Indians would thus
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have been no more than accidental, and to be explained as the
unintended consequences of quite other policies.
The major weakness of the critics is that they are too
willing to generalise on the basis of very little material: in
fact there are few good discussions of the impact of British rule
on health in India. They are also likely to apply anachronistic
standards - to blame colonial health services for their
inadequacy, when, prior to the 1920's, medical services were
inadequate everywhere, and even public health services had an
uncertain impact on health, particularly on infant and child
health (Powles, 1973; Oakley, 1985).
On the other hand, the apologists for Empire, especially
from the colonial period, focus on the benefits of Imperialism,
including the provision of health services, communications and
peaceful conditions (Griffiths, 1952; Anstey, 1926; Davis, 1951).
From this perspective, British rule brought peace to a sub¬
continent racked by many local wars and a decline in public order
as the Moghal Empire collapsed. In addition, the provision of
railways, roads, canals and trade was seen as leading to
improvements in living standards and economic security. Social
infrastructure included health services, based on 'scientific'
medicine to replace what was seen as 'medieval' medicine or
superstition. Famine policy - the provision of jobs and relief in
times of scarcity - could also be seen as a major benefit of
Imperial rule, leading to major savings of life.
Many of the apologists are guilty of the opposite failings
to those of the critics - assuming the significance of health
services because they were provided at all, rather than assessing
their real contribution. It is too easy to assume that health
services are an unmitigated 'good', and that 'the natives' were
living in benighted squalor before they received the benefit of
such 'civilising' influences as education or medicine. The
temptation to ignore both the positive aspects of existing
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institutions, and the contribution made by foreign rule to the
squalor, was one which few of the British avoided after the
1 820's or the 1 8 3 0's. Prior to that period, there were
influential 'Orientalists', who made efforts to learn Sanskrit
and to find valuable aspects of Hindu culture to preserve and
pass on. The loss of their influence over British ruling ideology
seems to have been almost total, and only isolated commentators
(Leitner, 1882; Digby, 1901) stand out against the complacent
assessments of British superiority.
My response to this debate - an attempt to assess the
validity of the two major viewpoints - will be provided by the
following three chapters, by looking for answers to three
interrelated questions:
what happened to the health of the population in this period?
how did British rule affect the indigenous ways of coping with
illness, with local medical systems and their practitioners?
- and how successful were attempts made by the British to provide
medical care and public health services?
Chapter 1 thus focuses on the history of the Indian
population under Imperial rule, with a particular concern to
isolate evidence about mortality and, where possible, morbidity.
The next chapter will concentrate on the specific nature of the
indigenous healing traditions and the way they were affected by
Imperial rule. In Chapter 3 I will describe the development of
the Indian Medical Service, and patterns of financial
expenditure, and more detailed discussion of the nature of health
services provided by the British will be considered in Chapter 4.
In each case I will focus on the period after 1 800, when more
information is available and reliable, and the impact of British
rule (as opposed to trade or conquest) was more established.
In the Conclusion to Part A I shall deal with the more




HEALTH STATUS IN INDIA BEFORE 1947
m,
"Another by-product of British rule which served to
worsen the position of the peasantry was the increase in
population. .. In the years since (1880) the population
has increased considerably. The amount of land available
to the average peasant family has become less. Because
of the competition for land, the landowners and money¬
lenders have been able to make the peasants agree to
more and more onerous terms for the use of the soil and
of credit" (Thorner and Thorner, 1962:109-10)
This chapter will consider the available information on the
course of mortality and morbidity changes during Imperial rule.
After a consideration of what can be said about the more direct
indicators of health status - morbidity and mortality statistics
and population changes - I will deal with indirect indicators of
health status.' The more important of these are patterns of life-
chances and their distribution (changes in the class structure
and the distribution of income and wealth); living patterns (the
rise of towns, other changes in labour migration); environmental
changes (the effect of the introduction of canals in particular);
and the impact of general programmes and policies followed by the
Government of India (in particular, to mitigate the effects of
famine). These will form the topics of the following sections.
My argument will be as follows. It is tempting to claim that
the decisive shift in population dynamics can be dated from 1921
(because the following decades have seen a steadily rising growth
in population caused by a declining death rate). However, arguing
in this way leads to two problems: firstly, the 1 920s and 1 93 0s
are periods of recession, when almost all commentators agree that
living standards fell; and secondly, it misleadingly suggests
that medical services were an important contributor to the shift.
I would argue one problem is caused by the focus on all-India
patterns, and that the decisive shift probably occurred in stages
30
over the preceding 40 years. After 1 880, there are three major
disasters which disguise the extent of the shift: plague; the
1896-1900 famine (which was affected by the plague epidemic); and
the influenza epidemic of 1919-20. It is obviously not legitimate
to 'ignore' these events, but the population history of some
areas which did not suffer from them lends some support to this
argument. If this argument is accepted, it would suggest that
neither the 'Pax Brittanica' nor public health services played
much part in the decline in mortality (as Davis, 1951, argued),
but that the crucial factors were the control over famine-related
mortality which British policy had mostly achieved by 1880, and
the rising real incomes of the mass of the population in the last
quarter of the 19th century.
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY BEFORE 1947
The first substantial and reliable censuses in India were
held around the middle of the 19th century, with the first
attempt at an All-India census between 1869 and 1872. Decennial
censuses for the whole country taken at one point in time date
from 1881, and while they provide outstandingly good information
compared to many other countries they are only reasonably
reliable. Their main weakness is underenumeration, usually not
random but larger for some age-groups than for others, for some
areas than for others, or of women more than of men: estimating
the extent of this is a tricky and inexact art (Visaria, 1971).
The other demographic sources are much less valuable: the
registration of births and deaths, which started in the main
cities at about the same time, has yet to reach an acceptable
quality, so changes in recorded rates may reflect changes in
coverage rather than changes in underlying processes. Not until
1968 are there more reliable estimates of mortality and
fertility, derived from the Sample Registration Scheme,
instituted by the Government of India in the mid-1960's when the
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inadequacy of the National Sample Survey became obvious.
Similarly, for the period I am considering here, evidence about
causes of death have to be inferred from small surveys or from
special collections of figures during epidemics, for example of
plague or cholera. Even now, the Model Registration Scheme, which
is the main current official source of information about causes
of death, provides estimates known to be seriously inadequate,
and other sources of information (such as hospital in-patient
statistics) report on a very small and atypical sample of deaths.
For estimates of population totals, and of mortality and
fertility levels prior to 1871 there is considerable dispute
about the interpretation of sketchy information (Morris, 1974).
For my purposes (to assess population changes in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries) I need an estimate of the total
population, mortality and fertility rates in 1800. There are two
basic methods used to do this: to extrapolate forwards from 1600,
or backwards from 1871. The sources for 1600 are Akbar's revenue
collection documents (the, used by writers from
Moreland (1920:22) onwards. Habib (1982) has recently argued
plausibly that Moreland's original figure for all-India (100
million) was an underestimate, probably by as much as 50%.
Habib's revised estimate of about 140-150 million seems a
reasonable figure. But what happened to the population between
1600 and 1800?
Das Gupta and his colleagues (1972) produced an influential
estimate of 154 million for the area of present-day India in
1800, arguing that the growth in population was largely between
1 600 and 1 675, with little growth from 1 675 to 1 800. Using
Habib's revised 1600 figure, this would generate an estimate for
1800 of 190-220 million. But there is little evidence to support
this line of argument. It seems that there are no grounds for
any particular set of assumptions. Others have argued that it is
only possible to work back from 1871, and to ensure that the
implications for the period between 1600 and 1871 are reasonable.
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Writers following this line of enquiry have produced a
variety of estimates for 1800. Davis (1951) assumed a population
in 1800 of around 125 million, by trebling an estimate for
British territories then of 41 million. But as he notes himself,
in order to make this compatible with his corrected 1871 Census
figure of 255 million, it is necessary to assume quite dramatic
increases in population from about 1845. The estimates produced
by Das Gupta (1972) assume less substantial population growth in
the 19th century, of around 0.4? per year. This is the result of
using the same regional growth rates for the area of present-day
India as those which occurred between 1871 and 1921, and produces
a figure for 1 800 of 154 million for what is now India. Morris
(1974) has used much the same technique for the whole sub¬
continent, extrapolating backwards from 1871 using the average
annual rate of growth of population between 1871 and 1921
(0.36?), giving an 1800 population of 197 million; and
Mahalonobis and Bhattacharya (1972) by different methods produce
an estimate of 207 million.
As Cassen (1978:3) notes, neither kind of estimate can be
regarded as precise, and all should be treated sceptically.
Visaria and Visaria ( 1 983:464) also note that more recent
estimates of population in 1800 are much higher than the earlier
ones. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the population of all-
India in 1 800 was between 190 and 210 million. This means that in
the preceding 200 years, population might have grown only slowly
and unevenly, by as much as one-third overall. The implication of
the second kind of estimate is that 19th century population
history mirrored that of 1871-1921, in which growth remained
uneven but was at a higher average rate, rising by between 25?
and 33? in only 70 years.
It is usually argued that in populations like this, the key
determinant of population changes is change in the mortality
rate. There might be short-term fluctuations in fertility (caused
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by famines and epidemics affecting the numbers of married couples
in the reproductive age groups and so on) but it seems unlikely
that there would have been a substantial rise in fertility. If we
want to make estimates about mortality and fertility between 1800
and 1870, we have only the data derived from the censuses after
1871 (and more insubstantial material from 1851) to use as a
guide (see Table 1).
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TABLE 1
POPULATION FIGURES FOR INDIA, 1871 -1 941
Year Population Crude Birth Crude Death Life Expectancy
(millions) Rate Rate at Birth
Gujral Davis Males Females
1851 224
1861 241
1 871 253 255
n. a. n. a. 24 26
1881 258 257
49 41 25 26
1891 282 282
46 44 24 24
1 901 285 285
48 43 23 23
1 911 303
49 49 19 21
1 921 306
46 36 27 27
1 931 338
45 31 32 3 1
1 941 389
Source: Gujral '(1 97 3) ; Davis, (1951 : 36 , 62 & 69).
These figures are for what is now India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
The general argument, then, is that from 1800 to 1921 India
had high birth rates (fluctuating to a small extent but over 40
per 1000 population in most years) and high death rates
(fluctuating much more., sometimes above and sometimes below 40
per 1000 population). The peaks in mortality are particularly
associated with drought and famine conditions. In more 'normal'
years, mortality was more affected by endemic diseases and poor
living standards «
In the years when mortality was exceptionally high there
shortages of food interacted with disease: in many cases a famine
was followed by an epidemic whose effect is magnified by the
malnutrition suffered by vulnerable groups in the preceding year.
Drought and famine rarely affected the whole of the country.
Mitra (1978:11, 764-818) lists droughts and famines reported
between 1729 and 1973. From the 1830s on (when reporting
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improved) a famine, scarcity or drought is reported from
somewhere in the country every three years or so. It has been
argued for Bengal in particular, and for India as a whole to a
lesser extent, that the frequency of famines in the nineteenth
century was much higher than in the preceding period, with the
worst experience being the fifty years after 1860 (Bhatia, 1967)-
Widespread and severe famines and droughts occurred in 1877 and
1 878; in 1 897 and 1 898 (accompanied by an epidemic of plague);
and in 1919 and 1 920 (preceded by the influenza epidemic). This
seems to mark a watershed: after 1921 there is only the Bengal
famine of 1943 to compare with these earlier disasters.
Sen's recent detailed re-analysis of excess mortality after
the Bengal famine clarifies the kinds of processes involved (Sen,
1980). The famine, and deaths directly and obviously from
starvation, were over by November 1943, but mortality from
malaria, smallpox and to a lesser extent cholera continued at
above normal levels for the next three years or so. Of the excess
mortality registered between 1943 and 1946, 37% was attributed to
malaria. Thus Sen argues that official estimates were little more
than half the famine-related deaths, because people in the later
stages of malnutrition may contract diseases from which they then
are recorded as dying. The concept of 'excess mortality' is hard
to define, but in general it would seem that famines expand
mortality partly by helping to turn endemic diseases into
epidemic ones. (The exception in India, but not apparently in
Europe, is that tuberculosis deaths do not normally rise during
and after famines. It is not clear why this should be so.)
Famines also affect sanitary arrangements and water supplies, and
diseases spread more easily as desperate populations (usually the
men) search the countryside for work, and public health services
break down (ibid: .
These patterns account to some extent for the peaks of
mortality, but the generally high level had more to do with
malaria - possibly accounting for one death in five at the end of
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the nineteenth century and after (Klein, 1973). A variety of
respiratory diseases (pulmonary tuberculosis, pneumonia,
bronchitis) may have been the next largest contributor to
mortality, and then the digestive tract diseases, of diarrhoea,
dysentery, cholera. Probably as many as 10 million people died
from plague in the 20 years after 1 896 when it spread from
Bombay.
As with other similarly poor populations, infants
contributed most to the mortality levels and were particularly
vulnerable to most of these diseases mentioned. The estimates of
infant mortality suggest a figure over 250 per 1000 live births
in the 19th century, falling to around 160 to 200 by 1941
(Visaria and Visaria, 1982). In general, most estimates suggest
lower infant and early childhood mortality rates for females than
for males, even in North India (where female infanticide was
practised amongst some groups until the 1870s, and where the
neglect of female children remains more common than in South
India). But of those who survived childhood, at each age women
were more likely to die than were men (Visaria and Visaria,
1983:498-500). During the peaks of mortality, the reverse was
often the case, for reasons not yet clear (Mitra, 1978; Sen,
1 980) .
It is difficult to assess the variations in mortality rates
by social groups. It is probable that, as usual, the poor
suffered more than the relatively wealthy, but in India in this
period records were kept (if at all) by caste or community not by
wealth or income. In Bombay and Calcutta in the 1880's and 1890's
(when mortality figures were kept with some degree of accuracy)
in normal periods the registered crude death rates of the low
castes were about 50% above those of the clean caste Hindus, or
twice the European rates. But in the periods of famine and
epidemic the lower castes suffered catastrophically. As late as
1920 low caste Hindus in Bombay had a registered crude death rate
of 120 per 1000, compared with figures for other categories
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ranging from 25 (for Europeans) to 41 (for non-Brahman clean
caste Hindus) (Klein, 1973). Not surprisingly, the class most
likely to appear for famine relief services was that of the
agricultural labourer, often Harijan in caste, and some of the
village artisans, especially weavers (Bhatia, 1967:10-11).
The evidence suggests, then, that in the Indian sub¬
continent as a whole, mortality levels were lower during the
first century or so of British dominance than previously.
However, any tendency for mortality to decline was halted during
the 1890s (usually associated with the plague and famines of
1896-1900) and the 1910s (usually explained by the influenza
epidemic of 1919-20. Other factors have also been used to help
explain the higher mortality at the end of the 19th century,
notably the argument that the potency of some epidemic diseases -
especially malaria - seemed to rise in this period. After 1921,
by contrast, mortality falls quite dramatically.
Before accepting this overall picture too easily, however,
it is necessary to point out that the apparently straightforward
national pattern is made up of quite varied local ones. Some
local patterns are complicated by the results of administrative
decisions - the siting of cantonments, or the choice of a railway
route, might dramatically affect the population of one district
as compared with another. In all cases, migration has a greater
potential significance for total population the smaller the unit
studied. It is now generally argued that there was considerable
short-distance or short-term mobility from the eighteenth century
onwards. After i860 there was substantial longer-distance and
longer-term mobility (e.g. to tea plantations, or as indentured
labour abroad), which affected some regions (notably Chota
Nagpur, Punjab, Gujarat, South India) more than others (Tinker,
1 974-) .
Census commissioners dealing with provincial variations in
population histories often failed to discern any clear pattern:
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in some cases the districts which grew in population were the
most densely populated to begin with, while elsewhere there was
an expansion of cropped land to account for population growth.
The attempt to distinguish changes from other
demographic changes in smaller areas is almost hopeless. Some
long-term studies of individual districts or villages give an
idea of the range involved. In Indapur taluka, near Poona, the
population rose steadily between settlements of land revenue in
1835-36, 1865-66 and 1895-96, showing a rise of 65% in the 60
years (Kumar, 1968:302). Yet this area was particularly badly hit
by the influenza epidemic, and the population which had risen by
almost a further 20% by 1911 was recorded at the same level in
1931. Vilyatpur, in Punjab, was relatively densely populated even
in the nineteenth century, and the population rose steadily from
1855 to 1891 before falling until 1931 and rising again
thereafter. Kessinger (1974:85-93) suggests that the population
decline was largely accounted for by emigration, though there
were also epidemics of cholera in 1 892, plague in 1 897-98, 1 903
and 1915, and influenza in 1918.
These local variations are not restricted to the area of
British India. In the Princely States, those parts of India left
under indirect rule, population changes seem roughly comparable
with the surrounding British areas. There are, however, major
exceptions, especially in the States of Travancore and Cochin -
an exception with particular current interest since in this part
of India (roughly the modern state of Kerala) mortality and
fertility rates are currently much below the levels in the rest
of India. As Table 2 shows, one of the two other sizeable South
Indian Princely States - Mysore - and part of Hyderabad (the
Eastern Telengana) show similar patterns. The other part of
Hyderabad (the Southern Mahratwara) has population changes closer
to those of India as a whole, declines in population between 1 8 91
and 1901, and again between 1911 and 1921.
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TABLE 2
POPULATION GROWTH IN PRINCELY SOUTH INDIA, 1871 TO 1941
State Population in millions
1 871 1 881 1891 1 901 1 911 1 921 1 931 1941


















Mysore 5.1 4.2 4.9 5.5 5.8 6 .0 6.6 7.3
Travancore *2.3 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.4 4.0 5.1 6.1
Sources: Decennial Census reports.
*The Cochin and Travancore census was held in 1875 not 1871.
It would seem that the transition to declining mortality
patterns took place much earlier in Mysore, the Telengana region
of Hyderabad, Travancore and Cochin than it did in the rest of
India. After making allowances for under-enumeration Rayappa and
Prabakhara, (1981:2018-31) estimated that the population of
Travancore rose by over 10% in every decade after 1881, and by
nearly 25% in the decade 1921-1931. They attributed only a small
part of this rise to net immigration. The Cochin rises are only
slightly less dramatic, while for Mysore the steady overall
increase is held down by population decline in some areas in the
forested hills in the West of the State - the 'malnad' - where
malaria and continuing poverty made recovery from famines a slow
affair. Over the 60 years from 1891 to 1951, total population
growth in this area was only about 2%, compared with over 50% in
the rest of the State (U.N., 1961:13-14)
The idea of a 'national' pattern to population change is
thus suspect. This is partly due to ecological variation -
different impacts of epidemic diseases such as plague or
influenza depending on climate or distance from the source of its
introduction into India. But there are also sources of variation
which seem more social in character, and it is some of these that
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I shall now consider.
THE EFFECTS OF BRITISH RULE ON INCOME LEVELS
This is one of the most contested areas in modern Indian
economic and social history, and there was a major debate on the
issue in the 1960's which left the question unresolved (Morris et
al. 1972), and has given rise to a further substantial debate
(Heston, 1982). There are several necessary elements in the
analysis, all of which are difficult to assess and all show
considerable regional variation. Firstly there is total output
(in particular, agricultural output) over the period, affected by
the growth of industry, changes in productivity, changes in
cropping patterns and extensions of cropped area and so on. Then
there is the distribution of the income generated by this output
- a distribution between the State (which transmitted some of its
share to Britain) and the local population, and within the local
population, affected by changes in patterns of rights and
obligations with respect to the land. Then there are changes in
the form of the output - the rise in cash crops, changing exports
and imports, shifts between different sectors of the economy and
between rural and urban settings, or between the different
regions, for example. In one shorthand, we would need to
comprehend the changes in the forces and relations of production
in India over this period of 150 years in order to begin to
assess their likely impact on the health of the Indian
population. Thus per capita income is a crude indicator of
changes in levels of living, but it is still potentially the
indicator which allows for the most useful comparisons between
the beginning of the 19th century and the early 20th century, and
is perhaps the place to start.
The 'classical' view (as Morris terms it) of changes in per
capita income in the period 1800 to 1947 is that it was stagnant
or declined (Morris, 1970). One example is Mukherji's pioneering
work, which goes back no further than 1 857: while it cannot be
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regarded as a final statement, his conclusions appear to have
some general validity. They are that real incomes did rise
between about i860 and about 1885, with some decline thereafter
until around 1900, when a further rise took place until about
1925, followed by stagnation and a further period of decline from
about 1940 to 1950 (Mukherji, 1965:700-02).
However, the main problem of this form of estimate is that
it relies on crop statistics provided by officials who had little
interest in the subject, little support and no training. Blyn's
work depends heavily on these figures, from which he derives a
series for the gross availability of foodgrains which rises
during the 1890's but is stable from then until Indian
Independence - thus implying a steady decline in per capita
availability from 1921 onwards (Blyn, 1961:285). It is not clear
whether these estimates can be regarded as varying randomly, or
whether there might be consistent tendencies for which allowances
could be made (Dewey, 1978:304; Chaudhuri, 1979). Dewey, perhaps
the harshest critic of the use of these figures, nevertheless
suggests that the regional variations disguised by the national
figures can be meaningful, in drawing attention to deteriorating
conditions in Bihar and steady expansion in Punjab, for example
(Dewey, 1978:314; see also Charlesworth, 1982). Some have argued
that the harshness of the criticism is unwarranted, at least in
certain regions for certain purposes: thus Islam (1978) uses
these sources for his study of Bengal, and Mishra (1983) argues
that the statistics for Bombay are more reliable than Dewey and
others have suggested. Blyn's figures in Table 3 must therefore
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Greater Bengal 41 .6 32.5 -22.0
United Provinces 37.1 36.7 - 1 .0
Madras 37.0 37.6 + 1 .5
Greater Punjab 34.4 42.3 +23 .0
Bombay-Sind 38.7 40.7 + 10.5
Central Provinces 58.0 42.9 -26 .0
BRITISH INDIA 41 .5 32.5 -21 .7
Source: Blyn, 1961:309.
Greater Bengal includes Bihar, Orissa and Assam; Greater Punjab
includes North West Frontier Province and Delhi.
However, once again this aggregated picture needs to be
looked at more carefully. Thus for Bengal, Islam agrees with Blyn
that most of the decline in per capita output described above was
attributable to declines in Bihar and Orissa (1978:201). Within
Bengal, very different patterns of per capita crop output seem to
characterise the area round Calcutta, and Rajshahi region, (where
official figures indicated there was an increase from 1920/24 to
1940/44 of over 20%), from the patterns which affected the
Burdwan and Chittagong regions, (where there were declines of
about 20%)(ibid:52). Islam revises these figures and reduces
them by about 20% in each case, giving a picture of stability in
the Calcutta and Rajshahi regions, and around a 40% decline in
Burdwan and Chittagong (ibid.).
These changes in average income need to be complemented by
an account of changes in its distribution. One well established
view is that processes of polarization took place during the
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nineteenth century , impoverishing the small landholders and thus
expanding the rural proletariat. This process was assisted by the
destruction of handicraft manufacturing under competition from
Lancashire textiles and Birmingham metalworks. It is also argued
that the State took an increasing share of the output of the
land, and that the share remaining with actual cultivators was
further reduced by larger shares going to those groups with a
variety of higher rights in the land. Landlord classes were
protected by a legal and State system which buttressed their
position and led to a great growth in intermediate holders of
rights in the land, with the position of the cultivator
stagnating and the number of landless labourers growing where
there were few before (Thorner and Thorner, 1962:109).
The alternative view which Morris propounded in 1963 and
which has found increasing support in different ways, is that
regional variations were considerable; that there is evidence of
considerable numbers of landless labourers in the pre-British
periods and little sign of a proportional increase in the
nineteenth century; and that during that period the rise in total
output and the increasing commercialisation of the economy
suggests a rise in real per capita income which was not
restricted to the landholding classes (Morris, 1963). In the
early twentieth century it is more likely that stagnation in real
levels of output and a rise in the population after 1921 did mean
that real incomes fell, and the condition of the lower groups
deteriorated markedly (Heston, 1982). Thus Islam suggests that in
Bengal, yields for subsistence crops hardly changed, nor did the
acreage devoted to them, whereas there was considerable
fluctuation in the acreage devoted to cash crops (which adjusted
to profitability) and substantial increases in their yields. One
implication of his conclusion is that the population dependent on
these subsistence crops saw its living standards stagnate or
decline, and only landlords able to take advantage of the land
pressure and the uncertain urban markets were likely to have
experienced a rise in real incomes (1978:201-3).
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Similarly, in one area where per capita agricultural output
seems to have risen (Bombay), it seems likely that these benefits
went largely to the landed peasants. Kumar (1965:318-30)
describes how, under the Peshwa rule which the British overthrew
in 1818, differences in levels of living were rare, at least
among the clean castes. Under British rule, processes of
differentiation developed, and the landed peasants came under the
dominance of urban moneylenders. However, after the Deccan Riots
of 1875 the State increasingly protected their position, but in
ways which only the relatively wealthy could take advantage of -
restraint on land transfers, new co-operative institutions, and
so on. The rising real output of the 20th century could thus be
seen as a result of the final establishment of substantial
farmers with access to credit, security of tenure and so on -
probably the group who in turn benefited most from this growth.
Charlesworth has recently suggested that patterns of
inequality in rural India could show rises in the early period of
commercialisation (as the Leninist model predicts) but that the
increasing labour demand for crops like cotton or sugar could
keep rural wage rates rising in real terms. This pattern, he
suggests, characterises the Bombay Presidency, with the heyday of
the rich peasant in the period from 1880 to 1914, and equalising
tendencies becoming more dominant in the 1920's (1 977". 13) But in
some areas (notably Punjab) per capita incomes may have continued
to rise, in a society with a relatively egalitarian distribution
of resources and sufficient mobility that the really poor were
likely to have benefited as well - as in Vilyatpur (Kessinger,
1974). On the other hand, using data on the distribution of
landholdings, Dharma Kumar suggests very little change in
inequality in South India over a longer period, from 1880 to 1951
( 1965) .
Most of the historical discussion has been concerned with
changes in agricultural, or agricultura 1ly-dependent, incomes
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under British rule. We know much less about the non-agricultural
workforce of pre-British times, nor what long-term impact was
created by British rule. Habib (1982) argues that under the
Mughals in North India, the urban population was considerable,
perhaps as much as 15% of the total, and that this declined
relatively little until British rule was established. But one
effect of stable British rule was to reduce the population which
had depended on the urban nobility. He thus argues that the urban
proportion probably began to decline about 1800, till it reached
the 9% recorded in 1891. Dharma Kumar (1965) accepts that in
South India too there may have been a decline in the numbers of
non-agricultural workers, and that they were forced back into
agriculture. However, since there was still an uncultivated
margin of land at the time, they did not necessarily become
landless labourers.
Within this urban population some categories did begin to
grow earlier than 1891, despite the overall decline. While the
industrial workforce of India has still not reached more than a
very small portion of the labour force, there was some steady
growth in numbers from about 1860 onwards, with the establishment
of cotton and jute textile mills. Morris (1970) argues that even
before this an expansion in the domestic market for textiles may
have been sufficient to compensate for the loss of export markets
and the intrusion of Manchester textiles. Material on real wage
rates for the industrial workforce in these new industries
suggests stability over a fairly long period, but as in Europe,
conditions for the new urban labour force were often appalling
(see further below).
The problems of attempting to assess changes in real income
are considerable. However, there is one feature which stands out
about the conflicting accounts. In the period (1860-1920) when
per capita incomes were either declining (as Mukherji, 1965,
argues) or rising (as Morris, 1963 and Heston, 1982 argue)
mortality rates appear to have been fairly stable. But in the
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period (1920-1950) when even the latter authors accept that
income levels probably fell, mortality rates also, apparently,
fell rapidly. A regional analysis is not much more helpful,
partly because output data for the Princely States is not
available. But areas like Central India, where per capita incomes
were falling, grew as fast in the 1920s and 1930s as did Western
India (Bombay-Sind, in Table 3 above), where per capita incomes
were rising (Visaria and Visaria, 1 983:490;505). We therefore
have to look elsewhere to understand how this might have
occurred.
CHANGES IN LIVING PATTERNS
The main change in living patterns which accompanied British
rule was the changing nature of the urban centres, and (after
about 1900) their increasing Significance. At some times British
policy inhibited urbanisation - in the aftermath of the Mutiny,
for example, they operated a deurbanisation policy in Delhi as
ferocious as that attributed to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia
(Klein, 1973). But the colonial cities - Bombay and Calcutta are
the prime examples - grew steadily, as did the new industrial
towns like Kanpur, Ahmedabad, or Howrah. Here mortality rates
were high, not only because of the crowded, unhygienic conditions
where workers lived and worked, but also because of the problems
of water supply and sanitation. Filtered water was introduced
from the end of 1869 in Calcutta, and made a steady impact on
mortality from cholera, dysentery and diarrhoea. Similar water
works were introduced into other large Indian towns during the
next few decades, spurred on by the acceptance of the
relationship between water supply and cholera which occurred
during the 1 8 9 0's (ibid:650). However, as Klein also points out,
drainage systems were slower to improve, and for many towns urban
death rates rose after water supplies were improved, as malaria,
plague and respiratory diseases flourished in the conditions
supported by surplus water and polluted subsoil (ibid:651; see
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also Chapter 3 below).
Under British rule, the population also became more mobile:
not only did people travel on the railways, to fairs and
religious festivals, but they were also transported some distance
to work - and often transported back again. The short-term
movements were generally held to have increased the problems of
controlling a number of communicable diseases, of which cholera
and plague were the most notable.
Of the longer term movements, the most notable and sizeable
was that of workers to the new tea estates of Assam and
Darjeeling, and to a smaller extent, South India. 'Coolie labour'
was hired in Chhota Nagpur or other parts of Central India, taken
to Calcutta and thence up river to Assam in conditions which
ranged from little short of murderous in the 1860's and 1870's to
merely hazardous by the 1920's (Griffiths, 1968). Conditions on
the estates themselves were little better: conditions were
appalling, even by local standards, and mortality rates were high
at least until the 1940's (Rege, 1945). Similarly horrendous
losses of life in coal mining (another industry dependent on
migrant labour in the early period) made it and tea the
industries in which the State first intervened to insist on the
provision of adequate medical facilities; but there is little
evidence that this did much to reduce mortality before
\
Independence (C..O-L, 1946).
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES INTRODUCED BY IMPERIALISM
The major impact of Imperialism on the face of India came in
the construction of roads and railways for communication, and
canals for irrigation. In each case the goal was at least partly
developmental, though railway construction was also affected
strongly by strategic considerations. In some parts of India the
effect of these improvements was to increase agricultural
production dramatically, and to make some areas habitable where a
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shortage of water or poor drainage had made cultivation otherwise
impossible - as in the Canal Colonies of the Punjab or the Terai
in the foothills of the Himalayas.
But canals and improved communications also probably had
negative effects on health and population size - an early case of
the 'development diseases' discussed by Hughes and Hunter (1970)
for Africa but first systematically described by C.A. Bentley
between 1907 and 1925 (Klein, 1972). Bentley, the Director of
Public Health for Bengal, noted that areas which had been known
for their healthy environment in the early 19th century were
infamous for being malarious by the end of the century. His
argument was that canals and roadworks obstructed normal surface
drainage, leaving pools of stagnant water after the monsoon which
were ideal for the breeding of mosquitoes. In addition, the
labour gangs who constructed these engineering works were a
concentrated susceptible population large enough to take the
disease with them as they moved on. For the United Provinces
(U.P.) Ira Klein takes this argument further and suggests that
the deterioration in water supply and drainage laid the
foundations for plague and cholera which ravaged the area in the
latter part of the 19th century (ibid.). Indeed, Whitcombe notes
that canal construction in Western U.P. was halted for a while in
the early 1 850's because of the dramatic increase in 'fever'
which accompanied them. Although preventive measures were taken
before starting again, the districts watered by the Upper Ganges
Canal experienced higher mortality for many years than did
neighbouring districts which remained unirrigated, probably
because the canals produced waterlogging and stagnant pools where
mosquitoes bred easily. These costs were not foreseen to begin
with, though they were increasingly understood, but the appeal of
the benefits of higher productivity seem to have overcome the
caution of those who stressed the costs.
In general, the changing geography of malaria is by far the
most striking example of a 'development disease' in the Indian
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context. Malaria followed the march of the canals into Punjab in
the 1840's as well as in the later developments after 1890; it
made several districts in western and central Bengal lose
population in the fifty years between 1871 and 1921, as did
several districts in U.P., and most of these districts had some
villages almost totally destroyed by the scourge. Klein (1972)
summarises this pattern as follows:
"The spectacle of a great swathe of territory, highly
organised economically, traversed by modern
communication, suffering no local wars, and experiencing
an extremely high birth rate, yet remaining static in
population, reveals compellingly the British inability
to effect any dramatic change in the balance between
life, economic conditions, and nature." (p.13)
South India did not apparently suffer in the same way. Here
canals were less important, and they took different forms. The
canals in the Madras Presidency were on a much smaller scale,
leading to far less water-logging, and there is little evidence
of changes in the location of malaria. Population growth in the
South may have been hindered more by emigration (to Ceylon,
Burma, the West Indies, and Malaya) than by continuing high death
rates.
SOCIAL ARRANGEMENTS TO CONTROL FAMINES
Over and above the general attempts to improve agriculture,
especially through cana1-bui1ding, the Government of India and
the provincial governments made specific attempts to mitigate the
impact of harvest failure. This took a variety of forms: land
revenue assessments could be reduced or set aside when crops
failed (though they may have been less willing to do this than
were the Moghuls); foodgrains were imported from surplus areas;
and there were other attempts to minimise social disruption and
maintain services. In addition, the growth of communications,
especially the railways, helped to provide market mechanisms
which minimised the impact of food shortages. On the other side
of the coin is the possibility that in some areas pauperisation,
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commercialisation and increasing revenue demands from the State
were helping to generate the very problems which these provisions
were supposed to mitigate.
Perhaps the most significant move was the use of public
works as a famine relief measure, in which the poor were offered
work at rates which were reckoned to be sufficient to sustain
them until the return of normal employment prospects, or until
their usual patrons were once again in a position to support them
(Kynch, 1985). In general, official policy was to limit the
numbers and classes of people on relief works, to restrict the
beneficiaries to the 'really' needy (Klein, 1984; McAlpin,
1983:178). The one major exception was the Bihar and Bengal
famine of 1873, when an attempt was made to prevent all famine-
related deaths; the cost of this attempt was the main argument
used against a repetition (Klein, 1984). In addition, gratuitous
relief was provided, to varying degrees and of varying
quantities, to those unable to work. Governments were under
pressure to limit their total expenditure and were wary of the
'demoralising' effects of charity. A third strand in famine
relief was the granting of takavi loans, at low interest and easy
repayments, to allow peasants to employ labour on improvements to
their farms (we11-digging , etc.). There was a general
unwillingness to intervene in the market for grains, after the
expense involved when this was done in 1873, but officials noted
how the spread of railways tended to permit private marketing
arrangements to reduce local shortages (McAlpin, 1983:184-5).
There is some uncertainty about the demographic consequences
of these changes. Davis estimates 19 million excess deaths in
1891-1901 due to famine, by comparing actual population growth in
the decade with the average growth of the 1880s and 1900s.
However, he admits that official estimates of famine deaths in
1898-1901 (the famine years in this decade) were only about 5
million; and even recalculating crude death rates to allow for
underenumerati0n only raises this figure by a million or so
(Davis, 1951:39; Klein, 1984:211-2). The famines of the 1870's
and the 1890's do not seem to have received the same degree of
careful reconstruction of likely mortality which Sen has provided
for Bengal, but McAlpin's figures for Bombay for 1891-1901
suggest that famine and plague together account for a population
loss of about 1 million (in a total population of 15 million)
with famine accounting for 80% of the reduction (1983:80). Since
Bombay accounted for between 15 and 25% of the population
affected by famine in this decade, Davis' estimate of 19 million
deaths seems extreme. On the other hand, there was a general
tendency for British officials to underestimate the impact of
famines by using too early a cut-off date and by ignoring the
excess mortality in epidemics which followed most famines (see
above).
McAlpin (1983:218) produces, for Bombay, the most 'positive'
account of the effect of Imperial rule on the control of famines.
She argues that by the end of the 19th century, famines were
indeed a result of abnormal weather conditions (rather than the
pauperisation resulting from British rule); that it was
Government arrangements to prevent foodgrain shortages, to
encourage better transport and irrigation, and then to limit
famine-related deaths, which had the most substantial claim to
have caused this improvement. If the experience of Bombay can be
generalised, it would suggest that the famines of the late 1890s
and the influenza epidemic and famine of 1919-20 were indeed
'abnormal' disasters, and should be separated analytically from
the earlier ones.
SOCIAL CHANGE UNDER THE BRITISH
The final area I want to consider is that of changes in
behaviour which could have had health impacts. Much has been made
in the British and European contexts of changes in such factors
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as how often, and how well, people washed themselves; or of
changes in human habitation patterns which meant that individuals
had a more distant relationship with animals - no longer sharing
houses and diseases. What evidence is there of similar changes in
India?
The main conclusion has to.be that for rural areas there is
very little information; what there is must be used with care;
but there is little sign of major changes in living patterns of
this kind. Cassen (1978) argues that Indian levels of personal
hygiene were probably well above those of medieval Europe, but
there seems to be no attempt to assess how changes in the kinds
and prices of soap or its use might have played any part in
mortality' decline in India. Similarly, for housing, Islam
(1978:138) discusses the early 20th century, and notes that
figures on occupied houses say nothing on their size, type or
use. He assumes that in a stagnant economy with fast population
growth there would be considerable changes in the types of houses
over a 25 year period, to cope with higher densities of
population, but he has no evidence for this claim, nor to suggest
the ways in which change took place.
Slightly more information is available for urban areas. The
urban proportion of the population probably fell during the 19th
century, as old-established towns (Dacca, Murshidabad, Lucknow)
decayed and new ones (Bombay, Calcutta, Madras) grew too slowly
to outweigh the decline elsewhere. The urban proportion in 1800
was probably 9-10 per cent or more, and it did not exceed that
level until 1931 or 1941 (Gadgil, 1959; Habib, 1932). As in
Europe, towns have a reputation for being more insanitary than
the rural areas, and for having worse housing and diet. Mortality
rates were probably higher in urban areas, despite having a
population concentrated in the 'productive' age-groups, and
relatively few females (Davis, 1951). But in some ways, the
differences from the rural areas have been exaggerated. The
residential densities of villages in some parts of the country
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are nearly as high as those of urban slums, and rural 'slums' can
be as insanitary as urban ones.
Overall, then, it is difficult to argue that British rule
worsened living conditions by the creation of unregulated towns.
The towns grew only slowly, depending mostly on immigration to do
so. While they had high death rates and bad conditions, the
differences from the rural living conditions of most of their
immigrants was probably minimal. Far from suggesting that urban
conditions were bearable, this merely draws attention to the
appalling conditions for the rural poor at the time. Since the
contrasts in living styles between urban and rural areas are
difficult to locate and evaluate, it seems reasonable to conclude
that we cannot look to urbanisation for any evidence of changes
in patterns of living during the 19th and early 20th century.
CONCLUSION
I started this chapter by pointing to the conundrum of
a population rising because of declining death rates, when most
estimates suggest not only no improvement in living standards but
indeed a decline, caused in part by the rise in population
itself. The answer seems to be that mortality decline should be
seen as taking two forms: a decline in the underlying mortality
rate (that applying in normal years); and in the peaks of
mortality, in years when famine and epidemic diseases operated
together.
The decline in the undgrlviri£ mortality rate probably dates
from the middle of the 19th century, and can be understood in
terms of rising real incomes. The benefits provided by this
higher standard of living was possibly sufficient to outweigh the
income declines of the 1920s and 1930s, thus allowing for an
increase in population growth rates from 0.3 or 0.4% per year in
the 19th century to 1 or 1.5% per year by the 1 9 2 0's and 1 93 0's,
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with almost all of the change accounted for by a decline in the
death rate. The most plausible explanation for the cuts in peak
mortality is the operation of famine policies which ensured a
minimum income for the poor in times of scarcity. These famine
policies, and other changes (such as the role of railways in
moving grain) did not become fully developed until the las.t
quarter of the 19th century. This probably helped to reduce the
mortality rate in peak years, except for the unusual late famines
and epidemics of 1 896 — 1 901 and 1919-20. The two processes working
together help to explain why areas which were unaffected by these
disasters saw unhindered population growth from the 1870s.
However, I have not so far considered the impact of social
arrangements specifically designed to deal with health and
disease, which Davis (1951:38) saw as controlling epidemic
diseases at the same time as public disorder and famines were
being brought under control. Chapter 2 will therefore look at the
nature of so-called 'indigenous' medicine, and assess the
arguments which suggest that it lost its ability to contribute to
the control of disease as a result of British rule; while Chapters
and 4
3/^will assess the nature of the medical services introduced by
the British, and supposed (by colonial apologists) to have
caused the decline of epidemic and other diseases.
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CHAPTER 2
INDIGENOUS MEDICINE AND THE STATE BEFORE 1947
Every society has some healing techniques, some explanations
of health and illness, and some members who know more about these
things than do others. But the form these medical systems take
are very variable. The kinds of treatments, the classifications
of diseases, the forms of the division of medical labour, are all
subject to social and other forces which produce very different
results in different parts of the world. These forms, and their
historical development in particular, are imperfectly understood.
Medical anthropologists have developed complex ways of drawing
links between medical and other symbolism, showing parallels
between the structure of religious and medical belief systems,
for example, and ways of distinguishing healers and their inter¬
relationships. These give us some understanding of the
integration of medicine in culture now, but similar evidence for
the past is rarely available.
The major world literary medical traditions are those of
Greece, India and China - all three coming from the Eurasian
cultural systems described (by Boserup, 1970, and Goody, 1976,
among others) as complex stratified structures, and radically
different from African or tribal societies. This is not
surprising, since one defining characteristic of Eurasian
societies is the development of literacy among the elite. Many of
the accounts of the history of medicine have been concerned only
with the comparative assessment of these literary traditions.
Attempts to decide which tradition borrowed from others, and
which generated ideas; to assess which tradition has claims to
'science'; or to decide how far core ideas spread, have been most
prominent.
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For Indian medicine, there are two main traditions to be
considered - Ayurveda, associated with Hinduism, written in
Sanskrit, and practised by vaids; and Unan-i Tibb ('the medicine
of Greece'), associated with the Muslims, written in Persian,
Arabic or Urdu, and practised by hakims. The major Ayurvedic
sources consulted by historians of medicine have been the
compilations of medical principles and therapies known as the
Caraka-samhita and the Susruta-samhita; a third text (the
Astanga-saanhita, associated with Vagbhata) is often regarded as
of less significance. Most commentators suggest that these texts
emerged over the course of several centuries, and received a form
which remained fairly fixed during the first 500 years A.D. For
Unani medicine, the Qanun of Avicenna has been the main textbook,
with commentaries and elaborations published in India in the 13th
century A.D. and frequently reproduced and elaborated (Ullmann,
1978:52). These texts are primarily concerned with diagnosis and
treatment, much like a modern medical textbook. The multitude of
commentaries, drawing to a greater or lesser extent upon these
classical sources, have similarly been concerned to demonstrate
an individual author's skill and breadth of learning. Any
indicators of the social context within which medicine was
practised have to be winnowed very carefully from sources such as
these.
The major questions for a sociologist of medicine in India
are what treatments were available for different groups of the
population and which kinds of practitioners provided them in what
insitutionalised ways. But the literary sources only provide a
way of looking at the practice of high-culture, or learned
medicine. Alternative practitioners are dismissed in these
writings. Thus, in Susruta there are comments that the king's
carelessness has led to quacks being able to practice; and in
Caraka there are several sections which complain of "cheats who
wander about on the streets boasting in the garb of physicians"
(Kutumbiah, 1 962:liii).
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Ullmann (1978:49), dealing with Islamic medicine, also notes
that the names which have survived are those who doctored rulers,
or were perhaps employed in academies. Only the large cities had
resident doctors of this class. Yet, if current patterns are
anything to go by, 'unofficial' practitioners, or others who did
not claim a high status, were the major sources of medical advice
for the mass of the population. They cannot be dismissed, as so
often happens, as 'quacks or very ignorant doctors' (ibid.).
I assume that medical practice in a stratified society is
also stratified, as well as distributed along the kind of
continua described by Leslie (1976). Healers may be located on a
learned-folk continuum, and on a religious-secular dimension.
Individual careers may move some healers from one category to
another, and clientele will tend to have different kinds of
relationships to the different kinds of healers. The elite sector
will include those who serve the centres of economic and
political power, and they characteristically join the 'courts' of
local, regional or national rulers. The rulers thus become
patrons, with healers maintaining their positions by
accommodating their advice to the demands of the patron, and
defending their own positions at court by denigrating the claims
of others (Johnson, 1972). It is the writings of these healers
which have been collected and transmitted, often by their
students and families when they have inherited their positions,
but the picture they give of medical practice is inevitably
restricted and partial. Leslie (1976:3) argues that the complex
reality of bone-setters, midwives, shamans and so on was
'ideologically simplified by the distinction elaborated in the
texts between quacks and legitimate practitioners.' But he quotes
no evidence to support his plausible view. Indeed, there seems to
be very little material available for the period before the mid-
20th century.
In this chapter I will be less concerned with the techniques
of Ayurvedic or Unani physicians than with attempting to portray
58
their position (and those of folk practitioners of various kinds)
in Indian society from the early-19th century onwards. Most
healers, especially in the literate traditions, have been assumed
to have been male, but I will deal with female healers and
women's access to medical care in a separate section. I will then
look at the impact of British rule on these practitioners. Since
the 'revival' of Ayurveda (and to a lesser extent, of Unani Tibb)
after 1900, its supporters have claimed that a major cause of its
decline in status and scientific standing was its loss of
official patronage under British rule. More recently Banerjee
(1974) has argued that village medicine was similarly destroyed
with the collapse of village economy and society under the impact
of commercialisation and alien rule. Assessing the validity of
these arguments will form the conclusion of the chapter.
INDIGENOUS MEDICINE: THE CLASSICAL TEXTS
Ayurvedic medical thought is based on a principle of three¬
fold humors, dosas or dhatus, often translated as wind, fire and
water or as wind, bile and phlegm. Life is in a state of health
when these humors are balanced, and diseased when they are
imbalanced. But individuals at different stages of the life-cycle
are also characterised as being dominated by different humors, as
are different times of the day, and the seasons (Jolly, 1977:49).
Each humor has five kinds, according particularly to where it is
found: and much diagnosis and treatment consists in determining
which kinds of humor are in excess or insufficiency, and in
remedying this. For example , foods have their characteristic
qualities, of which the most important are 'hotness' and
'coldness', 'wetness' and 'dryness', and can thus be used to
counteract imbalances. Other remedies include blood letting,
inducing vomiting, using enemas, or taking in medicines by nose,
or in the form of eye-drops. Susruta also contains sections
describing surgical treatments.
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The causes of humoral imbalances are manifold: not just
errors in diet but also excesses of everyday life - too much, or
too energetic, sexual intercourse, anger, or exertion, for
example. Diagnosis, therefore, should cover all these possible
causes in taking a history, or making a medical examination: but
pulse-taking is the most prominent diagnostic tool described. The
pulse may be taken in particular places for particular kinds of
patients, and not just its speed but many other characteristics
should be noted by the skilled practitioner. Prognosis is also of
some concern, since practitioners should not treat incurable
patients (a position scorned by late-19th century British doctors
as unethical): the signs for prognosis often seem more mystical
(depending on reading omens such as the time the physician is
called, by what kind of messenger, etc.) than the apparently
practical concerns of etiology and diagnosis.
There are considerable similarities between Hindu and Greek
medicine, and there have been a number of discussions of the
possible means by which one might have derived from the other, or
how they might have developed through mutual interaction
(Banerjee, 1981; Kutumbiah, 1962). Indeed, Filliozat (1964)
subtitles his work on Indian medicine 'Its origins and its Greek
parallels'. From the 7th century A.D. onwards the possible
sources of interaction are complicated by the rise of Arab
medicine, (which provided an additional channel of
communication), and increasing contacts with the Chinese. The
Muslim invaders of North India from the 12th century onwards
brought their own physicians with them, and established secular
healing traditions as well as healers associated with the shrines
of Muslim saints. The history of the spread of these healers, and
their typical practices, is less well recorded than that of
Ayurveda, but the idea of humoral balance, and the kinds of
intervention to restore and maintain this balance, are not very
different from those of the vaids. It is probable that both the
pharmacopoeia and the therapeutics of Ayurveda and of Unani Tibb
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changed as a result of the interaction between them, during the
Mughal Empire in particular (Metcalf, 1985:5).
The final category of medicine often now included as
'indigenous' is homoeopathy. This was introduced by British and
other European doctors in the course of the 19th century, and it
excited strong passions: the Bengal Medical Association split and
foundered on opposition to the reading of a homoeopathic paper.
Homoeopathy seems to have appealed to the new urban elite as a
'modern' system of medicine which nonetheless did not demand too
great a break with traditional ideas, referring (as Hahnemann
does) to vital forces and to moral powers (Bhardwaj, 19Si) - The
extent to which Indian homoeopathic practitioners practised a
'pure' version of homoeopathy, or have adapted to other dominant
medical ideas, is unclear. By the 1960's it would seem that many
'homoeopaths' merely used the title and the correspondence
training as a route to registration, before using a variety of
medical traditions in their practice (Montgomery, 1976).
MEDICAL PERSONNEL
'The science of life was to be studied by Brahmans,
Kshatriyas and Vaisyas. Brahmins were to learn it for
doing good to all creatures, Kshatriyas for self-
preservation, and Vaisyas for gain. Susruta asserts that
some say a Sudra of good family and character may be
admitted as a pupil.' (Kutumbiah, 1962:xliv)
It is not clear how far these general statements of Caraka
were important in defining who was admitted as a student of
Ayurvedic medicine. Apart from scattered references to monastic
or university education in medicine, most texts assume that the
study of medicine involved being attached to a teacher as an
apprentice and living as a member of his household (Kutumbiah,
1962:xlix). This must have placed great pressure on teachers to
admit only students of the same, or a closely related caste,
since there would otherwise have been difficulties in the
arrangements for eating and other close contact. Perhaps for this
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reason, different regions tended to have dominant medical castes
(vaidyas, a vaisya caste in Bengal, a Brahman sub-caste in Kerala
[Zimmerman, 1978]). Education, according to the classic texts,
involved memorising a text and its comprehension , alongside
practical experience, and it would take several years before
students would be permitted to establish themselves separately.
It would seem that training in Unani medicine was also carried
out in the "personalistic, informal settings of family homes and
apprenticeship" (Metcalf, 1985:4), and again, quite apart from
the need to learn Arabic, this would have tended to restrict
Unani education to Muslims.
Successful practitioners were those who served successful
rulers, and either through their regular service or because of
some special healing act, were granted an area of land (under the
Mughals, a jagir) to support them and their families. It is not
clear how often these grants were supposed to fund specifically
medical activities - a dispensary, or small medical school - or
were grants to the man and his heirs even if they ceased
practising medicine. The British, on taking over an area, were
prone to try to reappropriate these grants unless there were
special circumstances which warranted their remaining. Leitner
(1882:152-3) campaigned on behalf of indigenous educational
institutions in Punjab, and mentions a family of hakims in
Kalanaur who had previously run a medical school. On the loss of
their jagir they were reduced to a mere 4 or 5 private students.
A family of valds in Amritsar who had lost their jagir still ran
a dispensary.
Not surprisingly, the Ayurvedic texts discuss the
appropriate behaviour of practitioners towards their king. Basham
(1976:31) suggests that to serve a king would have been the
highest ambition of an enterprising vaidya. Both Susruta and
Caraka discuss the proper status of a vaid in a king's household,
and set out what vaids owed their king (to work for his health
and longevity, and to refuse to treat those who hate the king or
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are hated by him) and what they were entitled to in return
(protection from competition by quacks and charlatans) (Wise,
1845:19).
WOMEN'S ACCESS TO ELITE MEDICINE
It is generally assumed from historical accounts that all
these practitioners were male. As Leslie (1976:3) puts it, "Women
were not educated in medicine, and the perspective of the classic
texts was masculine". Learning the secrets of the medical art
required a high level of literacy and usually only males were
supported in education long enough to acquire the necessary
facility in Sanskrit or Arabic; apprenticeship as a chela to a
learned vaid or hakim was almost inevitably a relationship for
young men; and the accounts of practitioners are entirely about
men. Apart from isolated examples (one female vaid reported by
Leitner [1882] in Ambala District, Punjab, for example) the
earliest exception to this pattern seems to be the appearance in
the early Census volumes of women recorded as vaids or hakims.
Unfortunately, the Indian Census is not to be relied on when it
comes to occupation, especially not for women's occupations. Thus
in 1881 and 1891 it is clear that widows were recorded as
following the occupations of their late husbands. These cases
were apparently excluded by 1901, so later examples might be more
significant. However, little credence can be given to the
absolute totals. Women doing such work were likely to be missed
from the returns, because they, or their husbands, might be
ashamed of their need to work, or their association with
pollutions such as those of death; or because their work was only
part-time. On the other hand, others may still be recorded with a
family occupation. Later Censuses record women in different
medical categories, but these figures are 'contaminated' by those
who have received training in the new institutions of modern
medicine, as nurses as well as doctors, and the social process of
recording their occupations remains variable and opaque. The
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fascinating question of the extent to which the wives of
indigenous practitioners were also practising medicine (in
association with their husbands or separately), is an almost
totally closed book.
How far were these male 'learned' medical practitioners in
India able to deal with 'women's diseases'? Kutumbiah (1962)
notes that the 'mythical' Ayurveda (before the main texts were
written) did not apparently contain discussions of either
obstetrics or gynaecology, and he infers that obstetrics was at
that time handled entirely by midwives, with women not readily
seeking the help of physicians. Charaka and Susruta do include
sections on childbirth, but largely confine themselves to
instructions for the preparation of the labour room. It seems to
be regarded as necessary for a Brahman to be present (to carry
out purificatory procedures) as well as experienced women who are
to act as midwives, but there is no specification of the role of
a physician or surgeon. The argument that Ayurvedic medicine was
never able to throw off the superiority of Brahmanic control
suggests that the link between Ayurveda and childbirth was never
a strong one (Chattopadhyaya, 1977). The impurity associated with
childbirth, may have inhibited both women's willingness to
consult male healers, and the healers' willingness to be
involved. It may thus be necessary to distinguish obstetrics
(suitable only for unclean women) from some aspects of
gynaecology: even this distinction may break down when it comes
to disorders of menstruation.
There are descriptions of the diseases of menstrual flows in
the classical Ayurvedic texts, and several sources list 20
diseases of the female organs. But this evidence is inadequate as
a guide to the significance of physicians following these systems
in actually treating female illnesses. We can say even less about
the practice of Unani medicine (probably more widespread in much
of North India than Ayurveda). It could be that there were
thriving male practitioners whose clientele included substantial
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numbers of women, though it seems likely that they would not be
consulting for gynaecological or obstetric reasons. There are
very few accounts of the clientele of vaids and hakims; they
themselves left only codifications of the state of the art as
they knew it, while observers' accounts are sparse and only
develop towards the end of the 19th century. It does seem that
hakims and vaids were largely urban-based, and probably the fees
they expected were high enough to restrict their clientele to the
relatively wealthy. But Western observers were not unbiassed,
since those most concerned to comment on the state of medical
practice in India were British doctors and officials who wanted
evidence to limit the role of indigenous medicine and promote
cosmopolitan medicine.
There is really no evidence to suggest that the high-culture
medical systems had much to offer women, especially for 'women's
illnesses'. The texts are not well-developed, the practitioners
were male, and women would have been inhibited in their access to
them. This does not mean that a sub-world of 'female' medicine
did not exist, but it seems unlikely.
The other major source of 'learned' advice on medical
matters were religious healers, and there are some reports about
the extent to which women approached religious sites for medical
care. Shrines and temples in India are still prime consultation
sources, women usually seeking cures for infertility or the
absence of male children, or for illnesses which may have a
strong psychological component (Kakar, 1982). Muslim divines
(maulvis or mullahs) offer Ta'weez (amulets) at madrassah
(religious schools) or mosques; there are also bhagats (spiritual
healers) who operate in a variety of traditions; and shrines and
temples also attract religious and secular healers who practice
in the courts or surrounding areas (ibid; Pfleiderer, 1981). In
general, South India seems to have a stronger tradition of
healing associated with temples (perhaps because of the absence
of Muslim rule). These patterns which exist today are probably of
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long standing; but of course we have no real evidence of the
extent of consultations nor their distribution by sex or illness
category. It does, however, seem that women use these sources
more than men do: it may be that women's illnesses are more often
regarded as of spiritual origin, but this also raises the
question of why women are able to consult religious practitioners
more than medical ones. The most obvious explanation is that of
parda, or seclusion practices, which not only inhibit women's
access to the public sphere where their modesty might be
compromised, but also limits their access to cash, and to
legitimate reasons for leaving their home.
Parda is more developed in North India than in the South,
and a graphic description of its effects on women's access to
male medical care is provided by one Lala Luchman Narain, who
funded a midwifery class in Bareilly (U.P.) in 1867:
"It is considered indelicate and indecent by us to
allow a doctor to look into a woman's private parts:
most of us would rather let their dear wives and
daughters die than allow them to be examined by a
male." (N.A.I. Home, Public, 1872, 266-7A)
Thus parda probably seriously restricted the access of
'respectable' women to medical care: male practitioners could
diagnose and treat them at a distance but could not do much more,
though this may have excluded relatively few of the traditional
diagnostic techniques. Poverty, high fees, and more general
barriers were more important for the great majority of women.
Probably only female practitioners would be apprached with any
ease by women, but this is the category we know least about.
MALE FOLK MEDICINE
Leslie distinguishes between 'folk' healers (bone-setters,
snake-bite healers and so on, usually part-time); 'popular
culture medicine', using patent drugs, popular astrology and
religion as well as faith in modern science; and 'homoeopathy',
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which has, in Bhardwaj's (1973) term, become 'naturalised' in
India. But it is impossible to draw clear lines between the
different kinds of male practitioners and these distinctions
break down when faced with individuals and groups who not only
straddle these categories, but also merge into the 'learned'
categories, whether indigenous or Western, religious or secular.
Thus as early as 1839 an Indian observer in Bombay described
'English doctors' who were from families of vaids but
administered English medicines, on the basis of no formal
education (Leslie, 1974:97). After 1912, the Medical Registration
Acts produced a clear way of marking off 'registered' doctors,
and forbad the registered from collaborating with the rest.
Indeed, these Acts probably gave indigenous practitioners more
sense of unity than they had before, especially when they were
used to penalise Western doctors who collaborated with indigenous
practitioners, or to withdraw assistance from indigenous clinics
(Steinthal, 1984:77).
There is no account of changes to the position, number or
type of these kinds of practitioner during British rule. Some of
them seem to have been included in the general category of hakim
or vaid. Thus Wise ( 1 8 4 5 : V) suggested that only 4 or 5 vaids in
Bengal outside the cities were acquainted with the Sanskrit
texts. Similarly, the official who began schemes to use hakims in
Punjab in the 1 8 6 0's, T.W. Mercer, included in this term those
who seemed to own no pharmaceutical texts, could not read Arabic,
and were 'profoundly ignorant, superstitious and unscrupulous'
(quoted in Hume, 1979). Professionalising and modernising
practitioners referred to these groups merely to disparage them,
and British reports are little better.
Two points seem crucial in assessing how the positions of
these groups might have changed. Firstly, whatever happened to
the village economy, (i.e., whether or not there was
polarisation) their traditional clientele would have remained,
providing either the small payments of large numbers of the
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relatively poor, or the more substantial fees of the landed
peasantry. Secondly, competition to these groups was limited, and
controllable. Thus few villages had resident allopathic
practitioners before 1960 or had easy access to towns where they
were available; the increasing numbers of commercial sources of
drugs and other remedies would be circulated as much through
these practitioners as by their allopathic competitors; and
village practitioners seem to need a social base within the
village to be successful. Any claim that the condition of these
male folk practitioners was undercut by British rule must remain,
at best, not proven.
FEMALE FOLK MEDICINE
If the Census can be believed, most of the female medical
personnel were midwives (dais). (For more elaboration on the
material in this section, see Jeffery, Jeffery and Lyon, 1985.)
Reports about dais appear in official documents in the later part
of the 19th century, and they all argue that the dai was never
anything other than an illiterate, usually middle-aged or old
woman, whose only qualification was her experience. Furthermore,
because of the pollution associated with childbirth, they were
predominantly drawn from the untouchable castes. British doctors
were adamant that the dais, even those prepared to take courses
in what passed at the time for modern midwifery, were a danger to
their clients, and the records abound in comments on their lack
of intelligence, their dirty habits, and their incapability of
learning new methods.
This evidence about the quality of midwifery is, of course,
inadequate as a basis for much generalisation, but it represents
almost the only kind available. We just do not know the extent to
which the dai offered additional services, such as abortions,
advice and treatments for menstrual problems, massage, or any
other similar services for reproductive disorders. Nor do we know
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much about the efficacy (however defined) of their services.
However, three arguments can be stated. One view would be that
women's knowledge and referral systems would by their very nature
escape the kind of male enquiry which would yield historical
data, and that it is wrong to assume that an oral tradition
cannot develop valuable skills. A second argument would be that
some information would surely have survived, and that the women
involved were drawn from such disadvantaged castes and themselves
regarded midwifery as so dirty, that it would be surprising if
women took up the occupation willingly, or if they were capable
of developing a strong chain for transmitting skills handed down
by mothers or mothers-in-law. A third argument (arguably the most
plausible) is that female healers in stratified societies are
likely to be stratified themselves, and more sophisticated
support would be available to wealthier women than to the rest.
None of these arguments, of course, leads to the conclusion
that most women suffered and died without any assistance. The
issue is really about the extent of their access to public
sources of medical advice, and the quality of the advice they
were able to receive. There are, of course, household medicines.
These are not, of course, insignificant resources, but it seems
likely that both men and women had access to these household
remedies, whereas men also had much better access to the public
sphere when home remedies were felt to be inadequate.
BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS INDIGENOUS MEDICINE
Before the 19th century, there is little evidence of a fixed
British policy towards indigenous medicine. This is partly
because of the main aims of the East India Company: trade and
later the collection of land revenue. Policy, in a wider sense,
only developed as the Company realised that it had to govern
increasing numbers of people as a result of its expanding
territorial control. Not until the end of the 18th century did
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the Company establish hospitals in the Presidency towns; and only
in the course of the 19th century did it establish educational
and medical policies aimed at the wider population (see Chapter
4) .
However, the actions of some of its employees give some
evidence of the kind of direct impact that they might have had on
indigenous medicine. It took three main forms. Firstly, some
Company officials consulted indigenous healers: Crawfurd (1914)
notes that there seemed a general view in the late 17th century
amongst British officials that the diseases of the country were
best taken to the doctors of the country. Secondly, European
doctors were employed as consultants by some members of the
Indian elite, either displacing or competing with indigenous
healers. Thirdly, some Indians were given training in European
medicine, either as part of a deliberate expansion in medical
services for the Army, or in a more informal way. Thus 'native
doctors' attended informal classes at the civil hospital in
Calcutta at the end of the 18th century (Leslie, 1976)
These patterns began to coalesce at the start of the 19th
century. In 1812 the Court of Directors in London encouraged its
employees to find out more about local medicines and medical
texts, on the grounds that these might prove very useful (Basu,
1936). The informal training scheme at Calcutta was
established on much more substantial grounds in 1822, as a
'Native Medical Institution', teaching indigenous and European
medicine. The Muslim Madrassa and the Hindu Sanskrit College
(both established with European patronage) had already
incorporated some European medicine and anatomy into their
courses. But these processes of common involvement were disrupted
by the change in policy in 1 835. This was the year of Macauley's
hlUlilon educational policy, where he argued that European
culture should provide the curriculum of schools and colleges.
This strengthened the opposition to schemes which attempted a
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mixing of European and Indian cultures, or were designed to
restore Indian culture to its presumed glory. In medical educa¬
tion it meant that the N.M.I, ceased teaching aspects of Ayurveda
and of Unani Tibb. The whole institution was remodelled as a
medical school, teaching only European science, for a while only
in English.
While this move had obvious significance, it did not mean a
total ban on such teaching, nor on co-operative relationships
between the British Raj and indigenous practitioners. As Hume
(1977) has demonstrated, for example, in Punjab the Provincial
Government employed hakims (Unani practitioners) in the 1860's
and 1 870*s, usually as vaccinators and health extension workers.
In addition, the Lahore Medical College had taught some hakims
and vaids as part of the courses in Ayurveda based in the
Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College, and Unani Tibb at the Islamia
College, from 1887-98; the University of the Punjab continued to
validate these courses until 1907, when there were very few
students (see also N.A.I. [E.H.L.], 1919:July:26-51 A).
One reason for the tolerance displayed by the State is that
its own services reached a very small section of the population,
and there were very few practitioners who had been fully trained
in its medical schools and colleges, before the end of the
nineteenth century. The graduates from the first four medical
colleges (Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Lahore) were mostly
employed in the growing State bureaucracy - in the army, the
jails, the railways and so on (anon, 1866). The 1872 Census of
Bengal, for example, enumerated only 3,769 physicians, surgeons
and doctors, but over 23,700 'Gobaidyas' and 'Kabirajes'
(vaids)and over 400 'hakeems'; and the 1871 Census of Madras
reported virtually no Indian doctor trained in European medicine
in private practice in the city. The medical bureaucrats were
aware of the strength of the indigenous groups in the 1880s:
plans to introduce medical registration were dropped because the
graduates from the Government colleges and schools were thought
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too weak politically to overcome the expected hostility from the
vaids and the hakims (Seal, 1968).
A change to more self-confident hostility to indigenous
medicine within the medical bureaucracy can be dated from about
the end of the 19th century. By this time the cream of the
Western doctors in India - the Indian Medical Service - was more
conscious of its claims to a scientific legitimation; the number
of Indian medical graduates and licence-holders was substantial,
and they were offering a real challenge to the primacy of
indigenous healers in the major towns; and the growth of a new
middle class provided new financial opportunities for both groups
(Jeffery, 1979). The early twentieth century saw considerable
political conflict over medical issues as the rising bourgeois
nationalist movement embraced the cause of Indian cultural
renaissance as well as the idea of science. Indian practitioners
responded to threats to their position (such as the Medical
Registration Acts passed in all the Provinces between 1912 and
1919) with more assertive claims to their own scientific status,
and the Indian National Congress included leading indigenous
practitioners in its ranks as well as modernisers like Nehru
(Brass, 1972; Croizier, 1972).
The Imperial Government was not united in its views: some of
its members wanted to maximise the distance between themselves
and the 'superstitious mumbo-jumbo1 of indigenous medicine;
others were willing to lend their prestige to new private medical
schools, some of which combined indigenous and Western techniques
in 'integrated' courses, as a way of bringing up their standards.
The hostile position was clearly expressed by the Provincial
Governments' medical advisers (senior members of the I.M.S.) at
the end of the First World War. They argued that the Indian
systems of medicine were archaic, incapable of advance, and based
on unsound principles. The adviser to the U. P. Government argued
"there is no reason to run away from a frank declaration
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of our conviction that Western science includes all that
is of any value in the Ayurvedic and Unani systems; that
it is progressive where they are stationary; and that
its popularity and prestige are continually on the
increase". (N.A.I.[E.H.L.] 1919:July : 26-51 A.)
Most of these administrative doctors equated the Indian
systems with quackery and imposture; but they appreciated that
there were political reasons why this could not be said. The
Director-General of the I.M.S. at the time noted that the
indigenous systems had an advantage in cheapness, with low fees
and low-cost education: but that this should not be regarded as
sufficient grounds to divert funds away from 'scientific
medicine'. However, he recognised the nationalist support for
these systems; and argued the need to counter the view that the
only reason for the decline of the Indian systems was the effect
of European rule, by asserting the greater efficacy of Western
medicine (ibid.).
The more supportive viewpoint was expressed by Sir Pardey
Lukis, (Director-General of the I.M.S.from 1911-17) speaking on
behalf of the Government of India, in 1916:
'The improvement of the training of hakims and vaids is
a part of the present policy of Government .. (because)
.. for many years to come, they will constitute the
medical attendants of by far the largest portion of the
Indian community.' (N.A.I. [E.H.L.] 1919:July:26-51.)
A clearer view of how these divisions affected policy
towards indigenous medicine can be seen from the responses to
attempts between 1910 and 1920 by vaids and hakims to gain
sponsorship from the Imperial State, and to minimise what they
saw as the negative effects of Government policies such as the
Medical Registration Acts (N.A. I. [ E. H.L. ] 1919:July:26 - 51 A). In
1910 vaids in Calcutta unsuccessfully asked for State support for
a new Ayurvedic college, but Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy, agreed
to open the Unani Tibbia College in Delhi in 1916, against the
wishes of his chief medical adviser. This College's moving
spirit, Ajmal Khan, asked for a meeting with the Home Member of
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the Viceroy's Council in 1914, to discuss the Medical Acts, the
employment of vaids and hakims by the Government, and aid to
their institutions. The medical adviser's opinion was expressed
forcefully: he saw the schemes of integrated teaching of European
and Indian medicine as 'farcical'. But Hardinge addressed the
College in 1916, and laid a Foundation stone, largely because of
Ajmal Khan's personal position as a leading Muslim (Metcalfe,
1985:7-8). Much to the embarrassment of many of his medical
advisers, he said that the rural poor would have to be reached by
a modernised indigenous system of medicine; and a resolution in
the 1916 Legislative Council meeting calling for the scientific
investigation of the indigenous systems was enthusiastically
welcomed by Pardey Lukis and later quoted by Ajmal Khan in
support of his position (ibid.)
The reforms of 1919 meant that the nationalists were given
positions where they would, in theory, be able to implement
policies in opposition to the views of their medical advisers.
Indians became Ministers of Health and of Education. The British
expected them to try to implement policies based on nationalist
views. However, in practice, their scope was limited by severe
financial restrictions, and their impact was further reduced by
pressures from the Indian Medical Service, with overseas
pressures being orchestrated by the British Medical Association,
the General Medical Council, and the medical advisers to the
India Office in London. The new Legislative Councils supported
the 'Indian' systems of medicine on both patriotic and economy
grounds, but Ministers in several Provinces (Punjab and Bombay,
for example) resisted this and used their limited funds to
attempt to bring 'modern scientific medicine and surgery within
reasonable reach of all', spending only small sums on research
into the indigenous systems and for improved training (Indian
Statutory Commission, 1928:256-67). As a result, relatively few
indigenous medical colleges were given State patronage; the
schemes of medical registration continued to exclude those who
had not received Western medical training; and the Government of
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India restricted its activities to an investigation into the
pharmacopeia of indigenous drugs.
The Medical Registration Acts drove a wedge between
indigenous and Western doctors after the First World War. Western
doctors who offended the imported British ethical codes and
collaborated with indigenous practitioners, either in the new
colleges or in daily practice, were threatened with
deregistration. The wedge was driven deeper by the disputes over
the recognition of Indian medical degrees by the General Medical
Council in London, which occupied much of Indian medical politics
in the inter-war period (Jeffery, 1979). When the Indian Medical
Association was established in 1928 the early leaders, also
prominent in nationalist politics, called for the admission of
indigenous practitioners (if they were 'sincere'). By the mid-
1 930's, when these leaders were being incorporated into the new
Indian Medical Council and other positions of influence, they had
already drawn back from this support because policies of
integration would have led to a loss of international recognition
for Indian Western doctors.
As a result, when indigenous practitioners were first
registered in Bombay in 1938 they were on a separate register
from that of the Western doctors. They were initially accepted on
the basis of experience or apprenticeship. Only after a four year
delay was qualification to become the sole means of registration
(though an amendment in 1949 made exceptions and led to the
admission of some new practitioners on the basis of experience).
The Bombay Act was held up as the model for legislation after
1 947.
THE IMPACT OF BRITISH RULE ON INDIGENOUS MEDICINE
As I argued in the Introduction to Part A, it is useful to
divide the British period into three phases in order to assess
the course of developments. In the first period (before 1860) the
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main impact of British rule on indigenous medicine would have
come through the disruption and eventual disintegration of much
of the structure of the ruling elite and its courtly life. Here
the most successful indigenous healers could have expected to
earn substantial sums, and to have been rewarded by economic
security during their own lifetime through th.e grant of land
rights. The British greatly reduced the size and income of these
groups, and elite practitioners would have suffered along with
other occupations dependent on them; in addition, competition
from European doctors might also have affected their position. In
the 19th century, it seems unlikely that they would have received
any patronage from the British rulers, so there was probably a
substantial decline in their position. Official policy towards
these healers, beyond their exclusion from official positions,
probably made little difference. The position of folk healers
probably fluctuated more closely with local economic conditions,
benefiting from increasing commercialisation where the new
settled order led to an expansion of output, and suffering when
enhanced revenue demands reduced the surplus held locally.
In the period from about 1860 to 1920, the loss of elite
patronage was steadily compensated by the growing middle class
market for medical services. Indigenous healers seem to have
been able to hold their own against competition in this market
from Western-style doctors, European and Indian. The growth of
this market made possible and also lent support to moves to
institutionalise training and provide a clearer pattern of
requirements and standards than was possible under the older
system. Thus elite practice began to emulate British models not
merely because the British institutions had higher prestige, and
State backing, but also because the market conditions for
indigenous medicine permitted this kind of occupational
organisation (Johnson, 1972). Official policy, while increasingly
hostile, and based on growing arrogance amongst medical
bureaucrats, was probably limited in its impact. Once again, we
have little information about folk healers, though if (as I
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suggested in Chapter 1) agricultural incomes generally rose in
this period, there is little reason to believe that they would
have suffered.
The inter-war period showed gains and losses for indigenous
practitioners. On the one hand, colleges were established,
beginning to replace the less respectable guru-chela form of
apprenticeship which had previously been the sole training
method. Several of these colleges were well-funded, especially in
Delhi, Madras, and the Princely States of Mysore and Hyderabad,
for example. Indigenous practitioners also had the support of the
reports of special Government committees set up to consider
policy towards them (summarised in the Chopra Committee Report,
1948). On the other hand, their subordinate position relative to
cosmopolitan medicine was reinforced by registration patterns.
Previous strategies of raising status (e.g. through joint
teaching and practice with cosmopolitan doctors) had received a
severe blow, and the nationalist Health Ministers proved
incapable of channeling substantial public funds in their
direction. Official policy now lost most of its coherence, with
the muting of criticism because of the strength of nationalist
political groups. But one of the underlying principles of medical
policy - to spread 'scientific medicine' to the mass of the
population - continued to operate. There were increasing numbers
trained in the medical colleges and schools, and they found
employment and income in private practice as well as in the
growing State bureaucracy, as hospitals and dispensaries spread
and were used by more and more people.
REASONS FOR THE DECLINE OF INDIGENOUS MEDICINE
The 'fact' of decline seems to be relatively well
established, but only in a social sense. It seems to be highly
likely that the average social position of the more successful
vaids and hakims deteriorated during British rule. This may be
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correlated with a decline in the 'quality' of care and services
offered, but this link is not so clearly established. Three main
reasons can be advance for the decline: the lack of unity of
indigenous practitioners; the active policy of the State; and the
fact that indigenous treatments were seen by their clientele to
be less effective than the Western alternatives.
The weakness of the indigenous practitioners was partly a
result of their own internal divisions. Not only were the two
main groups separated by linguistic, theoretical and religious
differences, but there was also the newer group of homoeopaths,
established particularly strongly in Calcutta and Bengal. With
the rise of communal politics in the 1 930's it was increasingly
difficult for the vaids and hakims to act together. There were
also tendencies within each group leading to divisions. Each
elite group had a variety of career patterns, usually locally
specific, with little agreement about diagnosis or techniques.
Often, a noted local teacher would prepare his own commentary on
the traditional texts, and the school which grew up around one
teacher would deride and vilify that around another (Leslie,
1978:412). In addition, the process of professionalisation led
the elite groups to attempt to distance themselves from the
others - the practitioners of unsystematic folk medicine or
partly-trained Unani and Ayurvedic healers. Finally, there was
the growing ideological split between those who wanted integrated
teaching of cosmopolitan science and indigenous therapeutics, and
those who considered the indigenous training sufficiently
scientific. This divide dominates the post-Independence debates
(Brass, 1972).
The modernising nationalists used one main argument to
attack British rule and to defend their own position: that the
withdrawal of State patronage led to a decline in the
'scientific' level of most Indian healers. As Leslie (1 9 74-)
notes, this is poor history, since there is little evidence of a
consistent pattern of hostility to indigenous medicine on the
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part of the British, nor much evidence of a more 'scientific'
indigenous medicine being practised in the Princely States, where
patronage was not lost. However, given the relationships which
existed between elite practitioners and their patrons, the loss
of patronage would have had a considerable impact on
practitioners' ability to maintain their traditions - a large
household of students or assistants, substantial fees from a
relatively small number of clients, and a generally 'cultured'
lifestyle. This kind of establishment may have been necessary for
a healer to maintain the full range of herbs and more
sophisticated treatments. Many British doctors in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries wanted to deprive indigenous healers of
this kind of status, but the damage was probably done much
earlier, in the course of the establishment of British rule.
It is difficult to assess the 'efficacy' of these sources of
medical or semi-medical advice. It is relatively easy to argue
that high rates of morbidity and mortality, indicated by the data
discussed in Chapter 1, mean that indigenous treatments were not
very powerful. But it is likely that jia medical treatments would
have made much difference to mortality rates so closely linked to
poverty, famine and environment. On the other hand, it is
possible to argue (with Young, 1976) that efficacy should be
judged not in terms of any impact on morbidity or mortality, but
in social terms - does the ceremony work to reintegrate a society
and help it to cope with disaster. Young's position lends itself
to a functionalist account, in which (for example) beliefs and
practices which reinforce the subordination of women by excluding
many of their illnesses from the medical domain, are nonethless
judged 'efficacious'. But following this viewpoint, there are few
plausible indicators of 'efficacy' defined in this way: two might
be the willingness of patients to consult, or of candidates to
apply for training as cosmopolitan doctors, since there was no
form of compulsion involved. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, there was
a steady increase in patients attending Government dispensaries
and hospitals, and it seems at least plausible that indigenous
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practitioners were not adequately meeting the medical demands of
the mass of the population. But this tells us little about why
this might be so.
CONCLUSION
British rule had a complex impact on indigenous medicine,
and probably had different effects on the different sectors. The
elite practitioners probably suffered most through a loss of
patronage and the associated status they used to derive from
servicing the courts; a decline in their social status may well
have affected the more general efficacy of their practice. The
impact on the folk sector is more difficult to assess. Most
arguments tend to shade into arguments about the impact of
British rule more generally, in the absence of specific evidence
about any impact on healers. For example, Banerjee (1974), quoted
above, depends solely on claims about what commercialisation,
polarisation and pauperisation would have done to folk medical
practice, without any evidence. We do not know how many folk-
healers there were before 1800, in which categories, how they
earned their living, were recruited, nor how well they lived. We
know very little more about their condition in 1947.
In one case, that of dais, we know at least that the State
attempted to train them and to use them as agents in the delivery
of maternity services. As I shall argue in Chapter 4, these
schemes all seem to have had a limited impact, perhaps because of
the ritual pollution of many of the tasks involved, and because
membership of the category 'midwife' was restricted to low caste
women, was fleeting and generally unwanted. There is no evidence
to suggest that State training either materially improved the
quality of maternity care for the mass of the population, nor
that these attempts (or other changes under colonial rule)




PUBLIC SECTOR HEALTH PROVISION UNDER THE BRITISH
"The peaceful and civilising influence of the work done
in the dispensaries and by regimental surgeons on the
frontiers of India has been in political importance
equivalent to the presence of some thousands of
bayonets. .. It is because of such unexpected
philanthropy that, as conquerors, we hold a position in
the minds of the people which would not otherwise be
possible." (General Sir Neville Chamberlain in 1887,
cited by Crawford, 1914:134-5)
The provision of 'modern' health services is a cardinal
plank of the arguments which focus on the benefits of British
rule in India, and some authors have believed these services to
be a major explanation of the decline in mortality after 1921.
However, this claim has not been based on a detailed examination
of what actually was provided, for which groups in the
population, at what cost, and with what likely effect. In
addition, there has been little discussion of the principles
which seem to have underpinned health policy, derived either from
statements about its purposes, or from an analysis of patterns of
expenditure and provisions.
The chief architects of medical policy under the British
were the doctors, all male, of the Indian Medical Service
(I.M.S.). This chapter will therefore start with a discussion of
the origins of the I.M.S. and how it developed, with particular
reference to the social origins of its recruits, their medical
training, and the formal organisation of the service. I will then
consider the patterns of public health expenditure, especially
after 1860, and show how the Provinces and the towns became
increasingly important elements in the total. The following
chapter will deal with the three main areas of health policy
controlled by the I.M.S. and financed by these expenditures:
medical and paramedical education; curative medical services
(including the attempts to provide separately for women); and
preventive medicine, known as sanitary work, with special
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reference to plague control.
I shall argue here that there were three main elements in
the development of health policy. The first was that of social
control, in three senses. Health policy for the masses was used
(in Punjab, for example, as quoted above) to forestall and to
respond to demands of new subjects for some tangible benefits of
British rule. But the I.M.S. was primarily a- military service,
with the maintenance of the health of the fighting forces a major
concern. The I.M.S. also provided services for European civil and
military servants to help maintain their morale and their
strength in a hostile environment. The second underlying
principle was the desire to spread 'enlightenment', or scientific
medicine, as a virtue in its own right. The third source of
dynamism was 'charity', part of the 'muscular Christianity' of
many British officers in India in the 19th century. But these
latter pressures were subordinate to the structural imperatives
of Imperial rule: the maintenance of order and revenue. Only when
this straitjacket was loosened by nationalist politics and more
democratic institutions was there a serious effort to expand
services. This effort was hamstrung by new imperatives for the
protection of capitalism in Britain and in India - the financial
controls retained by the Imperial Government and reinforced by
the austerity measures by which the British and Imperial
Government attempted to cope with the inter-War Depression.
THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE
The I.M.S. dominated the official medical hierarchies and
played significant roles in private medical provision as well.
Its history falls into three sections. Before i860, the I.M.S.
recruited men with a wide range of medical experience and
training, and ad hoc arrangements slowly gave way to a more
formal bureaucratic organisation. From 1860 to 1914 the I.M.S.
was a structured organisation, drawing recruits from the medical
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colleges and schools established as medicine in Britain developed
its professional status. After 1914 there was a considerable
growth in the subordinate services, while the overall strength of
the I.M.S. declined. Recruitment of Europeans also declined, and
the I.M.S. 'Indianised' rapidly.
The origins of the I.M.S. were humble in the extreme - in
the provision of ship's surgeons by the East India Company on its
vessels bound for India. By 1614 the Company had a Surgeon-
General (John Woodall, a leading London surgeon) who chose,
instructed and equipped men as surgeons for the following 30
years, in spite of frequent complaints that he was corrupt and
sent untrained men on the ships (Crawford, 1914, Vol. I:Ch. 3).
Men were employed to work on one particular ship for one voyage
at a time: at a later date, some of the doctors were asked to
remain in India at one of the Company's 'factories' (warehouses)
if there was a special request from the merchants (ibid:ch. 6).
By the 1 6 7 0's, surgeons were hired expressly for service in
India, and over the following century there was a steady increase
in the numbers of medical men employed by the Company to tend to
their civil employees. By 1749, it would seem that there were 30
medical men known to the Company in India. It was about this time
that the Company began to employ a standing army, and medical
officers to accompany the troops into the field.
The growth in the numbers of medical officers led to the
establishment of a bureaucratic structure in India to organise
their appointments and to create a graded hierarchy of
appointments. From this time on, the civil posts, especially
those in the three Presidency towns of Bombay, Calcutta and
Madras, were reserved for the senior doctors, but all of them
were liable to recall to military employment if the need arose
(see further below). The Bengal Medical Service, established in
1763, began with 12 full Surgeons and 28 Mates, but by 1783 there
were apparently 140 altogether (ibid:ch. 14). The surgeons in
Madras numbered 15 in 1 767, with 13 Assistants, and by 1 784 the
83
TABLE 1
SIZE OF THE MEDICAL ESTABLISHMENT FROM TIME TO TIME
Period
Category c.1780 1835 1 854 1 882 c.1 910 1 928 1938
I.M.S. military -
European 608 191 207
Indian 0 205 149
civil -
European 172 264 1 96
Indian 0 90 115
Total 216 677 780 68fy 731 750 667
of which European 216 677 780 <c*5 694 455 403









Asstt. Surgeons 1 159
Sub-Asstt. Surgs. 31 26
Total 729 9 90 5256
TOTAL 1 406 1818 5923
Notes: The names of the subordinate categories changed from time
to time, starting as assistant surgeons or surgeon's mates, and
finishing as sub-assistant surgeons. These figures are not always
strictly comparable, sometimes being based on the establishment
(i.e. total number who could be employed), and sometimes on those
actually in post on a particular date.
Railway doctors, and those employed by local boards, are excluded.
Sources: for 1780 and 1882: Crawford, 1914, Vol I:Ch. XIV; for
1 83 5 and 1 85 0: i.gji.QJJi i.£l.£.Ci £ujbJ3J3 IJ3.di.aJ3
» C 533, 1852:40 8; for 1910 £j:iii.Sj3 ^£iii3Ji iJ2JJXJ3^i,
1921:1:115, and Crawford, op.cit.; for 1928, N.A.I. File 5 2-
96/33-H; for 1938, Bradfield, 1939:3-4.
establishment had risen to 30 full Surgeons and 19 Assistants. In
Bombay, there were apparently 27 members of the Medical Service
in 1779. These relatively small establishments expanded
dramatically over the following forty years - partly through
local recruitment of Europeans and Eurasians, and partly by
recruitment in Britain. By 1823 there were 630 officers holding a -
'covenant' (or a commissioned post) in the medical departments of -
the three Presidencies. The number of medical officers seems to
have stayed at about that level until the First World War, though
the various sources are not complete nor entirely comparable (see
Table 1).
Some idea of the complexity of employment patterns is
provided by a survey of staff employed in the Bengal Presidency
in 1876. In the seven Provinces of the Presidency (Bengal, North¬
west Provinces, Punjab, Oudh, Central Provinces, British Burma
and Assam) there was a total of 229 medical officers in civil
employ (though 12 of these were military doctors holding
'collateral charge' of the civil station where they were posted.)
At least 56 of these were not actually covenanted I.M.S.
officers, being retired doctors, or temporary or Warrant
Officers. These 229 controlled a staff of 245 Assistant Surgeons,
and 1131 'Hospital Assistants', who included 92 'native doctors'
and 6 called 'passed medical pupils' (Papers, 1881).
The bureaucratic nature of the service was reinforced by a
number of changes in the course of the first half of the
nineteenth century. The Medical Boards, consisting of the two or
three most senior surgeons in each Presidency, controlled
appointments, discipline and general policy. They were
established between 1785 and 1787, and over the next seventy
years, amendments were made in attempts to improve the efficiency
of this system and to,reduce conflicts between the members.
In spite of formal commitments to make appointments to the
Boards on merit, whenever the most senior surgeon was not
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appointed, controversy ensued. By the 1820's fixed lengths of
tenure were introduced. But Dalhousie, Governor-General from 1848
to. 1856, was dissatisfied with the state of the service, and on
leaving office he made a number of recommendations which were
followed over the next few years. In particular, the Medical
Boards, with their unclear precedence and responsibilities, were
abolished and replaced with posts of Director-General in each
Presidency, assisted by Inspector-Generals.
Until the 1850's, someone employed as a surgeon did not
necessarily either have any medical competence or spend most of
his time in medical activity. The early reports are clear that
claims to competence were not necessarily investigated, and
surgeons who had served on several journeys were allowed to
continue in employment even if they had originally been hired in
dubious circumstances. Since the post was a commissioned one, it
depended on nomination by a Director, which was either expensive
(the sale of nominations undoubtedly occurred) or dependent on
some personal link to a Director, thus limiting recruitment to
the relatively well-to-do. Not until 1809 was the purchase of
appointments made an offence. The Court of Directors was
unwilling to allow local recruitment on more than a temporary
basis, because the Directors did not want to lose the rights of
nomination, and this created problems in rapidly expanding
medical services during local wars. Nevertheless, local
appointments were made, including men who had served some kind of
apprenticeship in the Company's hospitals in India.
The beginnings of the expansion of the medical services, and
the establishment of a clear hierarchy, led also to more formal
arrangements for examining the men appointed as surgeons. In
London an examining Board for the East India Company was
appointed in 1773, and in the 1760's and 1770's the Bengal and
Madras Governments resolved that all assistant surgeons should be
examined on appointment, though they were unable to reject men
duly appointed by the Court in London. The London Corporation of
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Surgeons and its successor bodies granted certificates of
competence which were a basic qualification for service with the
Company from 1745 onwards, but the first clear statement of
regulations for admission date from 1822. The first competitive
examinations for entry to the I.M.S. were held in 1 855, an<^
continued (with a break of five years from 1 860 to 1 865) until
after the First World War.
One attraction of service in India was the income that could
be made outside the formal job of surgeon to the Company. The pay
of the surgeon was not high, relative to that of the other civil
appointments, and the surgeons had to supplement their incomes in
other ways if they were to retire handsomely to Britain. This
could come through supplementary incomes from work in the Company
hospitals (in the 18th century soldiers had to pay for hospital
services, and surgeons were paid for each patient they treated,
over and above their salary); from private medical practice; or
from non-medical activities. Private medical practice included
the treatment of 'native gentlemen' or members of the Moghal or
other Indian courts, but probably mainly involved the treatment
of 'non-official' Europeans and the families of officials.
Non-medical work was potentially very valuable, though also
risky if it involved trade and speculation. The range of non¬
medical work was large. It would seem that surgeons often held
other positions (notably that of Post-master) in the early 19th
century. Crawford notes several surgeons who made (and sometimes
lost) small fortunes in banking, trade or land ownership and
management; as late as 1 838 a leading surgeon took it for granted
that surgeons in civil posts would spend a large part of their
time in commercial activities. I.M.S. officers in military posts
were barred from commercial speculation in 1824; from 1841 the
surgeons in civil posts were also barred, though it would seem
that it took at least ten years before the prohibition was
enforced (ibid:ch.25).
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The I.M.S. was a military organisation: its members had
military rank, and could serve as regimental surgeons or in a
civilian positions. In the latter part of the nineteenth century,
a new recruit to the I.M.S. spent at least the first two years as
a subordinate doctor with a regiment or in an army hospital,
except in unusual circumstances. The rest of his career would
involve moves into and out of military service, depending on
choice and the balance of posts available. It was always clear
that officers of the I.M.S. were liable to recall from civil
duties if the Army required them, but in the relatively quiet
circumstances until 1914, this power was rarely used.
The balance between civil duties and military obligations
was one which continually taxed the administrative mind, with
various schemes for the division of the civil and military
services, or the amalgamation of the Army Medical Department (for
British troops) and the I.M.S. (for European and 'native'
soldiers employed by the Government of India). From the first
time that the issue was seriously discussed (in 1766) to the last
(in 1935) the considerations remained the same, even though the
work required of the two parts of the I.M.S. varied considerably
during this period. The primary concern was with the need for
European medical officers for service in case of war'; the
secondary concern was to ensure that recruitment of Europeans to
the 'ruling' services - the Indian Civil Service, the police and
the Army - was not inhibited by the absence of European medical
advice, especially for service wives.
The first of these meant that enough doctors had to be
available in India for calling-up at short notice. Even in
Britain, with all its doctors of various kinds, there were
difficulties in meeting war needs in this way, and in India the
authorities were convinced of the need to provide the war reserve
by having far more doctors available under their control than was
needed for normal military work in peacetime. But the only way to
employ such doctors, and to make the service attractive, was to
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allow them civil opportunities - trading, etc. in the early
period, or work amongst the civil population (official and
unofficial) after the middle of the nineteenth century. Before
the 1 840's and 1 850Ts, civil work was reckoned to be less medical
than commercial or administrative, and medical experience was to
be found primarily in military work. In the latter part of the
century the balance swung the other way, and the civil work
included the management of district, police, and jail hospitals,
provision of medico-legal services, the organisation of
vaccination and other sanitary work - and the superintendence of
the local jail (Crawford, 1914 vol 1:293-4). And there was an
increasing possibility of private medical practice to supplement
the various sources of official income. Not surprisingly, most
doctors applied for a transfer to civil employment as soon as
possible, and looked forward to steady progression through the
more distant districts up to the Provincial headquarters, or into
the clinical positions in the medical colleges and schools.
How significant was the 'military' nature of the I.M.S.?
Nationalist critics of the I.M.S. could point to the fact that
the numbers of doctors transferred to civil duties reflected the
state of military, and not civil, needs: this became important
politically after the First World War, when the balance between
European and Indian doctors on each side became a delicate issue.
Furthermore, the careers of individual doctors might be seriously
upset by military concerns: thus Ronald Ross's researches into
the role of mosquitoes in the spread of malaria were interrupted
by postings away from his laboratory. But this was a general
feature of official employment, not confined to the military, and
in looking for limitations to the role and effectiveness of the
I.M.S. its character as handmaiden to the Imperial State (as an
inducement to recruits to the other services) and the orientation
characteristic of 'western' medicine in general at this time are
more important than its military origins or hierarchy. In
particular, it is probably the case that most members of the
I.M.S. did see their careers in terms of their likely access to
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lucrative private practice, and providing medical services to the
Imperial services as a prime function; it would be surprising if
these men took public health or sanitary reform very seriously.
By 1860, then, a Medical Service had been established in
India which had most of the characteristics of a formal medical
bureaucracy. Appointments were made on merit, and the
examinations were open to Indians as well as Europeans - though
because they were only held in London access by Indian candidates
was restricted and only 55 had entered by 1913. Several of the
early Indian recruits resigned after a short career, and some of
them felt that they were not welcomed by other members of the
I.M.S. or by other officers - a criticism increasingly voiced
during the 1920s and 1930s. For the European doctors, at least,
promotions were based on seniority, and (as Table 4 below shows)
most doctors remained in the service until they retired.
Positions were well defined, and were expected to take up most of
the time of the employee, whose recompense was largely fixed in
the form of a regular salary, though it could still be
supplemented by private medical practice, especially in the
larger towns. By this time, too, as Chapter 4 demonstrates, the
responsibilities of the members of the I.M.S. were much broader
than merely the treatment of sick employees of the Crown.
Some idea of the changing nature of the I.M.S. in this
period can be seen from the summaries of qualifications and
medical schools attended, derived from Crawford's 'Roll of the
I.M.S.' (Tables 2 and 3) and information about the heads of the
medical services in each Presidency at different periods. In the
early years, the men who reached the top (usually with few formal
qualifications) often remained for many years, but by the 1860s
seniority rules, and promotion to higher positions partly by
qualification, meant that senior men occupied the top positions
for only a few years before retiring. As the century went on,
more 'top' positions were created, as new Provinces were
established, Sanitary Commissioner posts added to those of
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Inspectors-General of Hospitals, and posts of Professor at the
major Medical Colleges were regarded as of equal status. The
character of the I.M.S. thus changed quite substantially, and the
threatened loss of some of these senior positions under the 1919
Reforms was a major reason for the problems of recruitment of
Europeans to the I.M.S. after the First World War (Jeffery,
1979).
The impact of changing patterns of medical education in
Britain after about 1820 is fairly clear, though complicated by
lack of information on the earlier recruits and by the years used
by Crawford for grouping his data. Those recruited after 1800
were most likely to have qualifications from the Royal College of
Surgeons in London, usually gained before joining the service but
sometimes acquired during leave in England. Edinburgh, and the
other Scottish medical faculties and colleges, have always played
a substantial part in the training of members of the I.M.S., but
their position had declined from one of dominance by the 1 860's,
with the establishment of the London and Irish medical schools.
This is also reflected in the changing birthplaces of
recruits; in the first half of the 19th century, one-third of ail
recruits were born in Scotland, one-third in England, and nearly
10% in India (with European surnames). In the last half of the
century the Irish-born recruits (22%) outnumbered the Scots
(18%), the share of the English-born remained about 30%, but 25%
of recruits were born in India, including 6% with 'Indian' names
(Crawford, 1930:648-9). Other information on the backgrounds of
the recruits is very limited, though throughout this period, for
those where information is available, roughly one in six were the
sons of doctors, one in seven the sons of clergymen, and the rest
largely drawn from the military, other professions, business and
trade, or from the land (1 3%)(Crawford , 1 914 Vol.2:650-1 ).
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TABLE 2
ANALYSIS OF DEGREES AND DIPLOMAS HELD BY MEMBERS OF THE I.M.S.
Year of entry
Qualification 1764-1800 1801-1838 1839-1860 1865-1896 1897-1930.
London Surgeons 36 .6 51 .1 63 .5 39.3 31 .1
London Physicians 0 1 .8 1 1 .5 24.1 36.6
London Apothecaries 0 4.2 17.9 15.0 1 .5
Edinburgh degree 5.0 16.8 19.2 15.4 17.2
Edinburgh College 1 .8 4.4 14.3 31 .1 18.0
Other Scottish 4.3 6.9 17.2 16.7 16.2
Indian 0 0 0 .6 4.7 7.3
Other 0 1 .5 12.9 50.0 44.2
Total (N) ( 935) (1686) (1119) ( 995) (1049)
Notes: Percentages are of total recruits, but in the early period
some have no recorded qualification, and in all periods some had
sev eral.
Row 1 includes all qualifications granted by the London
Corporation of Surgeons and the Royal College of Surgeons of
London and later England;
Row 2 includes all qualifications from the Royal College of
Physicians of London;
Row 3 the Licentiate of the Society of Apothecaries of London;
Row 4 the MB and MD qualifications from Edinburgh University;
Row 5 the qualifications granted by the Edinburgh Colleges of
Physicians and Surgeons;
Row 6 includes degrees from the other Scottish Universities and
qualifications granted by the Glasgow Faculty of Physicians and
Surgeons.
























Other Scottish 1 .4 4.9 7.0 12.6 11.1
London 0 1 .1 13.5 32.8 39.0
Irish - 0.4 4.0 20.2 15.1
Provincial English - - 0.6 4.4 7.1
Indian - - 1 .3 7.4 17.1
Other 0.1 0.1 2.2 6 .0 10.2
TOTAL (N) (935) (1686) (1119) ( 995) (1049)
Source: Crawford, 1930:643-7
Unfortunately we do not know how far recruits to the I.M.S.
differed from those who established themselves in practice, or
who joined the growing Poor Law medical service, in Great
Britain. It would appear that in the later nineteenth century
service in India was preferable to service with the British army,
since those qualifying in the commo'n competitive examinations
chose the I.M.S. over the Army Medical Department, when they had
a choice. This probably reflected the attractions of private
practice possibilities in India which would not be available to
doctors serving in the British army or navy (ibid., Vol 1:527-9).
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TABLE 4
ANALYSIS OF 'FINAL RESULTS'
Year of recruitment
'Final result' 1652-1763 1764-1800 1801-1838 1839-1860 1865-1
of CJ C? <r a
fa to to to to
A. Service ended by death
or injury
Killed in action 3.0 1 .0 1.2 2.2 0.4
Suicide or violent death 1.4 2.0 1 .1 0.7 2.5
Died while serving 49 .8 59.7 51 .8 40.2 24.5
Invalided out 0.0 1 .7 1 .9 0.3 0.7
TOTAL GROUP A 54.2 64.4 56 .0 43.4 28 .1
B. Resigned or dismissed
Resigned 12.8 3.7 2.7 4.1 3.3
Dismissed etc. 7.3 6.2 6 .2 3.0 0.7
TOTAL GROUP B 20 .1 9.9 8.9 7.1 4.0
C. Retired 25.7 . 25.7 34.7 49.5 67 .0
TOTAL KNOWN CASES ( N) (240) ( 784) ( 1639) ( 1105) ( 991)
Unknown (N) (119) (88) (7) (0) (0)
Source: A reworking of the analysis in Crawford (1930:652-3).
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A final indicator of the changes in the I.M.S. around 1860
is in the 'hazards of membership'. For those recruited before
1838, and for whom information is available, more than half had
their careers ended by death (usually from disease) or by
illness; another 10% or so resigned or were dismissed, and only
one-third or less reached normal retiring age still in service.
For those recruited in 1839-60 a half retired in the 'normal'
way; and two-thirds of those recruited in the thirty years after
1865 reached 55 or 58 and retired (Table 4).
There was a 'decline' of the I.M.S. during the twentieth
century, as opportunities in India became less attractive, and
employment prospects in Britain improved. In India there was
pressure to open the civil posts of the I.M.S. to the
'independent' medical profession - those trained in the Indian
medical colleges and schools who had not taken up official
employment. Considerable political pressure was applied in London
on behalf of Indian doctors to this end in 1907. That year also
saw the extension of the involvement of Indians in the management
of the Indian Government, with the recruitments to the Imperial
councils under the Morley-Minto reforms. Although fierce rear¬
guard actions were fought in India and in London to reduce the
impact of these changes, they created a climate of uncertainty
about long term prospects. A third factor affecting medical
employment prospects was the establishment under Lloyd George of
improved Health Insurance schemes in Britain. The number of
British applicants to join the I.M.S. declined very rapidly.
The overall size of the I.M.S. declined after 1919; the
number of senior medical positions which it held by right was
steadily reduced as a result of the devolution of power to
elected Ministries in the Provinces; and the proportion of its
recruits who were Indian rose both as a result of policy (a
minimum quota for Indian recruits was established in 1919) but
also, and more importantly, because of a shortage of European
applicants. The main drawback of this situation, as the Indian
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Government saw it, was the deleterious effect this might have on
European recruitment to the key military and civil services.
Lloyd George reflected this view during Parliamentary discussions
of the I.M.S. in 1922, and there was considerable evidence that
Europeans would be unwilling to serve in small district towns if
the only medical advice available for their wives was from an
Indian doctor (Jeffery, 1979). The I.M.S. was easily cast as a
willing accomplice of the attempts to retain control over
medicine in European hands as part of wider Imperial concerns: as
an 'Imperial' service, the I.M.S. remained under the control of
the Government of India, not the more democratically responsible
Provincial Governments. Their consequent unpopularity in
Nationalist political circles undoubtedly accounted for the
decision in 1947 to abolish it as an independent service, and to
give to the local Governments in Independent India full control
of their medical civil servants.
The history of the I.M.S., then, can be seen in three
stages. In the first, prior to 1860, the service was organised in
an ad hoc way, recruiting its members (some with very little
medical training) from a range of backgrounds. Its formal
organisation was unclear, and the careers of its members were
as much non-medical (in trade etc.) as medical. This pattern
changes around the middle of the century, as medical training was
institutionalised in Great Britain and recruitment depended on
recognised medical qualifications. The organisation became highly
bureaucratic, and its members increasingly self-confident about
their medical abilities and concerned to spread their knowledge
and services to the Indian population. This pattern gave way at
the beginning of the twentieth century, as the number of Indian
recruits began to rise, the service was involved in political
disputes, and the power of its members was increasingly
threatened by doctors who were outsiders - in private practice
and in official employment. In the next sections I will consider
in more detail the changing patterns of medical expenditure
heavily influenced by the members of the I.M.S.
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PATTERNS OF EXPENDITURE
It is difficult to establish a clear picture of health
expenditures prior to the 1860's. Indeed, one indicator of the
way the Indian government became more fully 'bureaucratic' around
this time is its reform of accounting practices in 1867. Before
this time, most health expenditures were classified as military -
the employment of doctors by the Indian Medical Service and their
hospital subordinates, primarily for European and later for
'native' troops. However, some European civilians were allowed
access tothese services free (members of the senior Services)
and others used them on the payment of fees; and increasingly,
Indians outside the armed forces were allowed access to medical
services of one kind or another, often for overtly political
reasons, as the quote at the head of this chapter demonstrates.
Nonetheless, even as late as the 1900s, military medical
expenditures took nearly 40% of all health expenditures (see
Table 5).
Control over these expenditures was increasingly
decentralised as the 19th century went on. Until the 1 8 6 0' s the
Presidency governments in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were, with
the Government of India, the only significant financial bodies.
The Mayo reforms of 1870 established municipalities on a firmer
footing, and district and other local boards for rural areas date
from the end of the 1 8 80' s. These bodies saw health matters as
one of their major concerns, and spent much larger proportions of
their very small budgets on sewage removal ('conservancy'), water
supply, dispensaries and so on, than did the Provincial and
Imperial Governments (see Tables 6 & 7).
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TABLE 5
CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HEALTH EXPENDITURES
Decade
Category 1870-9 1880-9 1890-9 1900-9 1910-9 1920-9 1930-9
Rs millions (Annual averages)
Civil Medical 35.1 39.4
} 6.2 7.3 11.6 14.1 23.0 {
Civil Sanitary 17.0 17.6
Military 4.2 5.5 7.1 8.2 6.3 n.a. n.a.
Total Health 10.4 12.8 18.7 22.3 29.3 n.a. n.a.
Gross Revenue
Expenditure 560.0 760.2 938.5 1131.3 1440.8 2175.6 2104.9
(% Health) (1.8%) (1.7%) (2.0%) (2.0%) (2.0%) n.a. n.a.
(% Civil Health)(1.1%) (1.0%) (1.2%) (1.2%) (1.6%) (2.4%) (2.7%)
Sources: Siuiiuiiuul llXlXUXl lux JkiiisJa Ixlia, relevant years.
Military medical expenditures are not separately recorded after 1919.





Category 1870-9 1880-9 1890-9 1900-9 1910-9 1920-9 1 930-
Rs Millions (Annual Averages)
Water supply 1 .1 3.5 5.1 5.7 10.4 23 .0 17.2
Drainage 0.8 1 .4 2.2 4.2 6.3 9.8 8.3
Conservancy 4.5 4.4 7.4 10.9 14.8 25 .8 24.7
Hospitals etc }
Vaccina tion } 1 .7 1 .2 2.2 3.3 4.5 8.2 9.5
Sanitary } 1 .8* 3.1 3.8
Plague - - 1 .0 0.7 0.4 0.4
Other - - 0.4 1 .8 2.7 5.3 3.8
Total 8.1 10.5 17.3 26 .9 40.3 75.5 67.7
Grand Total 29.7 38.6 59.2 91.0 165.4 367.7 385.1
Health (27.3) (29.2) (29.2) (29.5) (24.4) (20.5) (17.6)
Notes: * 'Sanitary' appears as a separate category from 1915/6 and
the figure for the period 1910-9 is an average of five years only.
The periods covered in the other cases are financial decades
beginning 1st April 1880 etc and ending on 31st March 1890 etc.
'Health' includes medical and sanitary services.
Source: SlaJfc±a£i£,al AiUSiXACi JLciiLLSll Ijldii2, relevant years.
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TABLE 7
DISTRICT AND LOCAL BOARDS HEALTH EXPENDITURES
Decade
Category 1890-9 1900-9 1910-9 1920-9 1930-9
Rs. Millions (annual averages)
Sanitation,
Hospitals etc 2.8 4.3 6.7 15.8 20.6
Total 29.0 42.9 73 .4 134 .6 161 .4
(% 'Health') (9.3) (10.0) (9.1) (11.7) (12.8)
Source: iJa.SiLCACi HOC DxiiisJa India, relevant years.
Note: 'Health' includes medical and sanitary services.
It would be misleading to see these institutions of local
government as particularly democratic; civil servants often
constituted a sizeable proportion of the membership of the
councils, and they nominated a number of the other members. The
process of democratising these institutions followed policies at
provincial and national levels - the reforms of 1907 (Morley-
Minto), 1919 (Montagu-Chelmsford) and 1935. These changes were
accompanied by steady increases in the number of provincial units
- from the original three Presidencies to over a dozen
substantial units by the 1 9 3 0's. Only after the turn of the
century did nationalist politicians bring municipal politics into
prominence in the larger cities, and for most regions it was the
1919 reforms which were crucial in widening the area of
participation. But even in the 1930s, the chief medical advisers
to all these levels of Government were most likely to be members
of the I.M.S. - the District Medical Officers or Civil Surgeons
for the District or Local Boards, and for most municipalities,
and administrative medical officers for the Provinces.
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TABLE8
PERCAPITAIVILH ALTHEXPENDITURES,CU RENTD1870sPRICE Decade 1870-79880-891890- 919 0-091 10-191920-2993 -39
CategoryRupees(Annualaver ges,p rcapita) Central/0.0340.0560.10.22. 1 Provincial Municipality0.0A50. 8.120.18.32. 5 LocalBoard0.00.000. 1. 2.03. 6.08 Total0.07. 90.14.20.31.600.54 (Currentp ices) Priceind x1008711612920171160 Total0.070.100.12.150.15.220.34
(1870sprices) Sources:Tables5-7above;populationfig r sf rBr ti hIndiade vedfromDavis(1951),takingtheav rageofadjacentcensusy ars;pricei dexromthwholsealepricesind xinReddy(1972:172-3),withthe1948-9basetranslatedi odecadalaver geb sedon1871-2to1879-80as0 .
Tables 5, 6 and 7 suggest that civil health expenditures
prior to 1919 increased steadily in money terms, but remained a
fairly constant share of the revenue expenditures of the
different levels of government. After 1919 Central, Provincial
and Local or District Boards health expenditures rose
substantially in money terms, and more rapidly than the growth of
other revenue expenditures. In the municipalities, the growth in
health expenditure was slower than that of total expenditures.
Taking all the levels of Government together, it would seem that
health expenditures as a proportion of public expenditure rose
from about 4.2% in the 1910s to 5.5% in the 1 93 0s.
Table 8 attempts to summarise these changes, taking account
of changes in prices and the growth of population. There are
problems with some of these calculations: there may be some
doub1e-counting (Provincial Governments subsidised local
government institutions, but this probably came from a separate
budget head); the price index used may not reflect changes in the
costs of items in the medical budget; and the population deflator
used is that of the total population, when for some purposes
(e.g. for Municipalities) the population covered by that form of
institution might be more meaningful.
One additional factor complicating an assessment of changing
priorities is that the 1920's and 1 9 3 0' s were a period of world
recession. The dominant economic philosophy demanded that budgets
be balanced, and this placed the most severe restrictions on any
expansion of expenditures and also led to a decline in prices. It
is thus difficult to assess the extent to which democratic
participation changed expenditure priorities towards health
matters, since price changes may exaggerate the impact. But the
changes seem large enough to suggest that they reflect real
increases, so that 'real' per capita expenditure rose about 50%
between the 1910s and the 1920s, and by the same amount again by
the 1930s.
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It seems most likely that the new form of Government
introduced by the 1919 Government of India Act had a major effect
on the size of public expenditure and its distribution. Under
this Act (and over the objections of the medical civil servants)
large areas of health policy were made the responsibility of the
Provincial Governments, and transferred to the control of elected
Ministers. The British Government argued that had to be
transferred to the Ministers, and there was little chance that
ministerial control of public health could threaten Imperial
interests. The political disputes generated by this decision were
focussed on the attempts by the I.M.S., the B.M.A. and the G.M.C.
to stop Ayurvedic and Unani medicine getting any official support
(see Chapter 2 above) and to establish an Indian Medical Council
to ensure a continuing powerful role for the Imperial Government
(Jeffery, 1979). However, it is also probable that these reforms
had some financial impact, increasing public sector health
expenditures, in money, real and proportionate terms.
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CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have argued that the I.M.S., as a fully
bureaucratic institution, was clearly established by the 1860s
and dominated medical policy-making without any challenge until
the First World War. After the 1919 Reforms, and with a much
enlarged Indian membership, the collective character of the
I.M.S. changed, but it retained most of its influence. Major
constraints on the way it was organised were its roles as a
military reserve and as part of the welfare services provided for
European civil servants and military officers - and these were
its main bargaining counter. Take away the lucrative civil
medical positions, and recruitment from Britain would wither
away; take away British doctors from India and the Indian Civil
Service, the Indian Army and the Indian Police would complain;
and these were the backbone of Imperial rule. The orientation of
the I.M.S. reflected these priorities: there was little interest
in expanding medical services for the mass of the civilian
population, and public health measures ('sanitary work') played
no part in career advancement for ambitious doctors. But this
does not mean that these were the only concerns affecting medical
policy. Chapter 4 looks more closely at the implications of
I.M.S. domination in the three main areas of medical policy -




MEDICAL EDUCATION, PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES UNDER THE
BRITISH
"The munificence of this Government charity
[dispensaries], conferring such tangible and widespread
advantages, will doubtless be appreciated by our new
subjects."(General Report on the Administration of the
Punjab Territories for 1851-2 and 1852-3, 200)
The three legs of medical policy in India under the British
were education, public health and medical services. By i860 the
general outlines of provisions in each sector were established in
a formal bureaucratic pattern, which was to last for 60 or more
years and retains significance today; but after 1920, changes in
each sector made the greatest impact on post-Independence
provision. I shall deal with the three sectors in turn, first
with medical education, which provided the personnel for public
health and medical services.
MEDICAL EDUCATION
In this section I shall deal only with the education of
doctors. It is much more difficult to provide any kind of picture
of the development of training for other kinds of medical staff.
It is clear from the early reports that classes were not only
held for several grades of doctors but also for compounders
(pharmacists), sanitary inspectors (from the end of the 19th
century in Madras, later elsewhere) and for indigenous midwives,
or dais (see further below). Nurses, of various kinds, and later,
Health Visitors, were also trained: these categories will be
discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. Information on these
courses in the British period, the numbers attending, and the
destination of the students, is scarce, and reflects the strength
of the assumption that medical education was the most
significant, at a time when few doctors were assisted by more
than one or two trained staff. Despite the risk of reinforcing
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this 'doctor-dominant' view of health care, therefore, I have
little choice but to focus on the doctors.
The pattern of medical education in India under the British
reflects quite clearly the periodisa ti o n mentioned earlier.
Change in this pattern responded not only to changes in Britain
(in the organisation of medical knowledge, the social interests
of different groups in Imperial government etc.) but also to
wider political changes in India (the growth of Indian
participation in government, and the rising involvement of
Indians in higher education, in particular). Prior to 1860,
medical education in India, as in Britain, differed little from
apprenticeship systems, outside one or two centres where a
scientisation of medicine had been undertaken. Between 1860 and
1914 medical education was 'controlled' - the student body was
drawn from restricted social origins, and the I.M.S. had
virtually unchallenged sway over the terms of the education it
provided. In this period Indian medical schools and colleges were
probably not too different from those of Europe: the timelag
between the education of the I.M.S. man and the education he
passed on to his Indian students was probably of little
significance. By the 1920's medical education in India was caught
between conflicting pressures - of nationalism on the one hand
and the demands of a swiftly-changing, increasingly scientised
European medicine on the other. This was the period when student
numbers expanded dramatically, and control over the kind of
education offered became a significant political issue (Jeffery
1979). Key decisions were taken in this period, with considerable
influence on post-Independenee decision-making. The two main
examples are the decision to phase out the training of a
subordinate level of doctor, and to exclude 'indigenous' medicine
from the medical education of cosmopolitan doctors, and I will
discuss the circumstances of those decisions at the end of this
section.
In what follows, I will distinguish between medical
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and medical Js.fiJxfli).>Ls, although this distinction really only
applies clearly after about 1860, when the Indian universities
were established. At that time, recruitment to the medical
establishment was regularised, giving formal qualifications a
central place, so that the distinctions between grades were more
marked. Thus my usage will follow that of the latter part of the
nineteenth century and afterwards. 'College' will refer to -
institutions preparing students for the university qualifications
which qualified for entry to the I.M.S. or (after 1 892) to the
Colonial List of the General Medical Council in London. College
graduates thus had rights to practice in the U.K. and to register
for the examinations held by the British Royal Colleges. 'School'
refers to institutions providing only shorter courses, aimed more
closely at employment prospects in the subordinate medical
services. At some periods, some medical colleges and schools
shared premises, and the 'college' staff may have been involved
in teaching the junior classes. By the 1930s, those with college
degrees were called 'graduates' and the holders of school
qualifications were called 'licentiates', and this is current
usage. However, this is confusing for the period before 1914,
when the most common University medical degree was the Licentiate
in Medicine and Surgery (L.M.S.), so I will not use these terms.
Through their support of the Sanskrit college, founded in
Banaras in 1788, and the Madrasa in Calcutta, founded at the
beginning of the 19th century, the British in India supported
some classes in the indigenous systems if medicine, though
without any practical training (Hartog, 1931). But the Portugese
in Goa were probably the first to have taught medicine and
surgery of the 'Western' kind in a systematic way in India
(Jaggi, 1972:24-6). They established a three year course in 1801,
and extended it to four years in 1821. Until 1812, the only form
of medical education in British India was the training by
surgeons of assistants on an apprenticeship basis. Some of these
were later recruited to the subordinate (uncovenanted) medical
service (Crawford, 1914 Vol.2:103-5). In 1812 these schemes were
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extended and formalised, by attaching European and Eurasian boys
to the Calcutta Presidency General Hospital, a garrison hospital
and the General Dispensary, for training as compounders and
dressers (ibid:106-8). Similar arrangements dating from the same
time were made in Madras. Both arrangements were designed
explicitly with the aim of providing recruits to serve in
paramedical positions for the Company's Army, both 'native' and
European.
In 1822 medical education in Calcutta was raised in status
and changed in quality by the establishment of a Native Medical
Institution (N.M.I.). There was some general expansion of
educational provisions by the Company at this time. The members
of the Court of Directors in London seem to have had no great
enthusiasm for the N.M.I., expressing hostility to the extra cost
of paying for a Supervisor, and comparing the new arrangements
unfavourably with the system still in operation in Madras, where
the Company merely 'permitted' an apprenticeship system (Asiatic
Journal, 1826). The number of students at the N.M.I, was
originally limited to 20, but this limit was raised to 50 in
1826; they received a stipend during training; they were taught
in Urdu or Sanskrit, and European texts were translated into
these languages and also used at the Sanskrit College and the
Madrasa (Jaggi, 1972:28-9). Only one European doctor worked at
the Institution, assisted by a Bengali pandit and other
assistants, and dissection - the touchstone of 'modern' medical
education at the time - was carried out not on human but on
animal bodies.
The N.M.I, was one of the educational institutions caught up
by Bentinck's reforming zeal, when, as Governor-General, he was
responsible for introducting 'utilitarian' principles into
aspects of Company rule (Stokes 1959). He established a committee
which argued that the N.M.I, was not properly organised, because
students were not admitted at a single standard, the tuition,
period of training and examination were inadequate, and the
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practical anatomy was non-existent. A dispute between the
'Orientalists' and the 'Anglicists' on the committee was resolved
in favour of those who insisted that English be the medium of
instruction in future, and that only 'European' science be
taught. The N.M.I, and the medical classes at the Madrasa and
Sanskrit College were abolished at the end of January 1835, being
replaced with a Calcutta Medical College. Here the new
orientation was made clear: the course would cover "the
principles and practice of the medical science in strict
accordance with the mode adopted in Europe" (Crawford 1914 Vol.
2:436). However, it did not mean the end of medical education in
local languages: vernacular medical education (without
instruction in indigenous theories of medicine) restarted in
1 839, with teaching in Urdu and later in Bengali. Education on
similar principles was introduced in Madras in 1835 and in Bombay
in 1845, including vernacular classes for the training of
compounders and 'native doctors', or subordinate medical staff
(ibid:446-50) .
The process of removing the training of the inferior grades
from the medical college was slow. The Calcutta Medical College
transferred the Urdu classes to Agra and to Lahore in the 1850's,
and the Bengali classes to Sealdah in 1873. Madras Medical
College removed the vernacular classes three times, for short
periods after 1857 and 1882, and finally in 1903. Bombay
transferred its vernacular classes in 1878-81, to Poona,
Ahmedabad and Hyderabad (Sind). The colleges used these transfers
to gain respectability in the eyes of the British medical
authorities: Calcutta Medical College had already been
reorganised in 1845 to meet the requirements of the London
authorities, and Madras courses were recognised by the Royal
College of Surgeons from 1856 (Crawford 1914 Vol. 2:Ch. 43). With
the establishment of Universities the raising of status went one
step further - Calcutta, Madras and Bombay Universities, founded
in 1857, made the medical colleges their medical faculties. In
1892 the Indian universities giving medical qualifications
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(including Punjab after 1882) all received recognition from the
General Medical Council in London. The G.M.C. did not insist on
inspecting the medical colleges but were apparently persuaded
that there was little difference between the Indian and British
standards at this time. In order to maintain comparability with
British medical education, the Indian colleges periodically
raised their entrance requirements. When this happened,
recruitment to the medical schools was increased, and by the end
of the 19th century there were several medical 'colleges' in
Calcutta, usually homeopathic in orientation, who also began to
expand with those excluded from the official colleges.
University status did not make an immediate difference to
the organisation and nature of the medical colleges. To begin
with, the numbers taking the university qualifications was small:
only 99 passed the final L.M.S. examination at Calcutta in the
ten years from 1857-67, and two passed the B.M. degree
examination in the same period (Reports, 1870:58). In Bombay two
or three students passed the final L.M. examinations each year in
the mid-1860's, while only two candidates received Madras
University medical qualifications between 1857 and 1868 (ibid:6l;
100). In addition, considerable tensions remained between the
military medical authorities (who controlled the appointments to
the senior medical college and medical school posts) and the
educational authorities. For example, the Education Department in
Bombay complained in the 1860s about the poor state of the Grant
Medical College because the senior appointments were made to suit
the requirements of the medical administration, not the
scientific criterion of ability - and the medical storeskeeper




STUDENTS REGISTERED AS ATTENDING MEDICAL COLLEGES, SELECTED YEARS
University 1866/7 1876/7 1886/7 1896/7 1906/7 1916/7 1926/7 1936/'
Calcutta 139 176 172 46 8 425 1100 1616 1 47 0
Bombay 18 286 276 27 9 679 703 618 1 244
Madras 8 143 138 82 195 207 586 1016
Punjab - 47 68 238 243 232 488 545
Allahabad - - - - - 137 25 4 504
Delhi - - - - - 30 67 138
Patna - - - - - - 154 266
TOTAL 155 652 654 1067 1542 251 1 3783 5183
of which:
European/Eurasian 26% 9% 10% 4% 2% 3%
Native Christian 1 0% 6% OO 6% 6% 6%
Musiim 2% 6% 4% 7% 1 2% 11%
Hindu - Brahman } 43% 72% 23% 25% } 75% 72%
Non-Brahman } 37% 50% }
Parsi 1755 6% 16% 6% 2% d/o
Other 2% - 1 % 3% 3% 6%
Final university qualifications J
Candidates 30 154 404 512 1525 1549
Passed 22 \. 76 168 329 558 566
Notes: 'Students' excludes those attending other classes attached to the
medical college. Final university examinations were predominantly for the
L.M., or L.M.S., until 191*1, when most students took the M.B.B.S. examinations
(Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery).
Sources: j££i£ia!£ £X £X.U££Xi££, relevant years; X££££X.S, 1 870;
]j£X£i ££X i^£l£Xi£i X£££X£££, 1876-7.
In 1876/7 and 1886/7 Madras figures may include some school pupils.
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TABLE 2
PUPILS AT MEDICAL SCHOOLS, SELECTED YEARS
Province 1866-67 1876-77 1886-87 1896-97 1906-07 1916-17 1926-27 1936-37
Bengal 278 862 793 1482 1845 1119 2282 2409
Bombay 7 7 123 203 307 512 441 850
Madras 113 7 204 423 318 600 881 920
U. P. - 76 1 25 253 314 679 351 420
Punjab - 84 143 333 394 513 772 1324
Assam - - - - ft 178
Bihar - •X a £ Si¬ 257 387 212
Orissa - s X S ft * ft* ft 150
Central P. - 7 - - - 55 247 266
Sind - § § § § § 147
Other - - - - ' - - 296 301






Candidates 690 1693 3547
Passed 549 898 1961
Sources: fljjiujjij.e13j3i.fli He^iUJiU ui Education, relevant years, except for 1866/67
figures, from Jl.fiJ2.fixi.Sf 1 870; and 1 876/77 figures, from flifiiifiiififil IflfiiXfifii
1878.
Notes: These figures sometimes include pupils registered in courses at private
aided and unaided institutions, in some years including homoeopathic,
Ayurvedic and Unani schools. Burma is excluded throughout.
s - totals included in Bengal.
** - total included in Bihar.
@ - total included in Bombay.
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During the nineteenth century the numbers of medical
colleges and schools and their pupils grew, but not steadily.
Tables 1 and 2 show the figures for the most accessible years
(those of the Quinquennial Reviews of Education) but they do not
show the extent of fluctuations in numbers. Schools were opened
in Agra (1853), Lahore (1860), Nagpur (1867, closed about 1883),
Sealdah (Campbell, 1873), Patna (1874), Dindigul (1874,
transferred to Madura 1885, amalgamated with Tanjore 1887) Dacca
(1875), Cuttack (1876), Nellore (1876, closed 1897) Indore
(1878), Poona (1878), Ahmedabad (1879), Hyderabad (Sind) 1881,
Tanjore (1883), Ludhiana (Mission, for women, 1894), and
Dibrugarh (1900). Of these, Lahore became a medical college with
the founding of the Punjab University in 1882, and the inferior
teaching was transferred to Amritsar in 1920. King George's
Medical College, Lucknow, opened in 1912, was the other addition
to the ranks of the full-fledged medical colleges before the
First World War. A period of rapid growth during the First World
War was followed by decline in the 1920's, partly in response to
the pressures exerted by the General Medical Council in London
(Jeffery, 1979). Figure A shows the trends in total students
graphically.
However, the figures of those passing the final examinations
seriously underestimate the impact of medical education. The
heads of the medical schools and colleges addressed this as an
issue of the 'quality' of their students: in Madras in 1 867, for
example, while 32 passed out from the 'inferior' departments, 16
were 'dismissed for incompetence' (which suggests the military
character of the institution); and in Calcutta, 124 passed the
1st L.M.S. examination between 1860 and 1868, out of 317
candidates (ibid:55, 444, 417). Inspection of the number of
candidates from year to year suggests that many of those who
failed at one attempt did not succeed at later attempts. But it
is clear that these 'failures' are only part of the story. Many
students attended for a few sessions but did not complete the



















others left for other reasons. For example, during the 1870s the
Principal of the Madras Medical College complained that of the
small number of students studying for the L.M.S. or M.B.B.S.,
several left without attempting to complete the course, some to
go to England to complete their studies (Sanitary Commissioner's
Report, 1876). Similarly, in Calcutta in 1872 it was estimated
that only 8% passed the examinations, the remainder leaving to
practise without any formal qualification (Indian Medical
Gazette, 1872). In other words, the numbers of successful
graduates is probably the lower limit of an estimate of those who
gained enough medical education to establish a medical practice,
either directly or after more training elsewhere. An upper limit
of this can be provided by dividing the number of college
students registered in each year by five; and of school students
by four. The two limits are indicated graphically in Figure B.
Those who left without passing the final examinations had a
variety of career options, since at this time there was no bar on
their taking up appointments in Princely States, or setting up in
private practice, and no constraints on what they might prescribe
nor on what operations they might carry out. Unfortunately, we
know nothing about the careers of these 'M.B. B.S. failed'.
Thus, despite the main expressed intention behind the
establishment of medical education (to supply subordinate medical
staff for Government service), the impact of the training was
much broader. This was true for both the colleges and the
schools. The medical colleges had, almost from the start,
interpreted their role much more widely than just 'providing
subordinate medical staff'. There were two main reasons for this.
To begin with, from the beginning, medical colleges had accepted
substantial numbers of privately-funded students in addition to
those on stipends and bound to serve in the subordinate medical
services if requested. As early as the 1880s, they established
practices in the major towns and began to compete with European
doctors for the private market. Thus, of 142 graduates of the
Grant Medical College, Bombay, between 1870 and 1881, over half
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were in private practice in 1882 (Gumperz, 1965:234).
Secondly, the medical college Professors encouraged their
better students to gain British qualifications or to compete for
entry to the I.M.S. In 1 845 one of the Professors at Calcutta
Medical College took four students to England to complete their
medical training, and one of them joined the I.M.S. at the first
competitive examination in 1855. Graduates from the medical
colleges were likely to go to Britain for higher qualifications,
if they wanted to make a mark in their careers, and the medical
colleges seemed to be proud of such achievements, however
unpopular the Indian member of the I.M.S. might be with European
civil servants or, (especially just before the First World War)
with the British Medical Association.
The medical schools also saw the training of private
practitioners as part of their role. More of their students, of
course, were on stipends and were bound to work in Government
service (military or civil) for a period after completing their
course. In some periods the expectation that school graduates
were destined for public employment did affect policy. Entry was
cut back when a 'surplus' appeared likely, as in Punjab in 1871
(Kerr, 1979:296). But even so, private students were common,
especially in Calcutta. The Bengali department of the Calcutta
Medical College was regarded as a source of 'independent medical
practitioners' from about 1 865, which may explain why the share
of 'fees' in its financing was much greater than that of the
English or Hindustani departments - and why less was spent on the
Bengali classes than on the other two, in spite of the fact that
the Bengali department was the largest (Reports, 1870:65,452)
By the end of the nineteenth century, if not before, the
spread of employment of those leaving medical schools was as wide
as of the college graduates (Quinquennial Review, 1908:160).
Substantial numbers of Indian graduates had established
themselves in private practice in the main Indian towns, and were
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regarded as posing a real threat to the hakims and vaids and
also taking patients from the Government hospitals and
dispensaries. This latter was undoubtedly unintended, but at
least some senior members of the I.M.S. accepted it as an
inevitable (and desirable) result of their policy of medical
educa tion:
"The object (of medical education) was not merely to
secure a constant supply of subordinate medical officers
for the Government service but also to raise the
standard of medical knowledge and encourage the practice
of medicine and surgery on established scientific
principles. That private practitioners, possessing the
necessary qualifications, should be able to compete
successfully with public medical charities, is a
satisfactory result." (Bengal Administration Report,
1885:306-7)
When these same men began to take clients from the private
practice of I.M.S. members as well, the objections were more
substantial, and the I.M.S. jealously guarded its control over
the major hospitals, in order to prevent Indian doctors from
claiming the prestige associated with being attending doctors
there. Until the early twentieth century, of course, the I.M.S.
had admitted very few Indians into full membership, but during
the First World War considerable numbers were inducted on
temporary commissions and stayed on afterwards. Whereas in 1913
only 5% of the service was Indian, by 1938 their share had risen
to 37% of the civil posts. Thus the Nationalist claim (expressed
in the 1 930s) that the I.M.S. was unwilling to train Indians to
its own standard seems overstretched. It seems more likely that
teachers would prefer to encourage their students, for the
intrinsic rewards that this would bring them, but also because of
the social composition of the college students. As Table 1 shows,
the student body before 1914 was heavily weighted towards those
social groups seen as closest, in 'ethnic' terms, to the British.
The 'race and creed' data show that medical college students
were recruited from a relatively narrow social background, with
Christians (often European, and later, Anglo-Indian) and (in
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Bombay) Parsi students providing a large proportion of the
student body. Prior to the 1880s only sporadic evidence is
available about the ethnic origin of medical students. In the
1 8 4 0's roughly one in three or one in four of the Calcutta
Medical College students were Christian (Commercial Tarriffs 360-
4; Returns, 1852). In the 1860's one in four of the Calcutta "
students were Christian, and a proportion of these were either .
European or 'Eurasian'. As Table 1 shows, these groups were still
substantial as late as 1916/17, with a peak around 1911/12 when
they amounted to 15% of the student body, with 'Native
Christians' accounting for only 3% and Europeans or Eurasians
making up 12%. Parsis were heavily over-represented (in terms of
their share in the general population), with one in six students
in the 1880s and again in the early years of the twentieth
century. The dominance of these groups in the medical schools was
never so marked. In the colleges and the schools, while Hindus
were the largest group, but those classified as 'Brahman' were
much fewer than the rest, unlike the situation in the other
sectors of higher education in this period. The share of Muslims
only began to approach a due proportionate level in the 1 920's
and 1930's, when the reservation of places for Muslims began to
have some impact. It would seem that the over-representation of
Indian Christians and of Parsees was stable until the First World
War, and more marked than for other forms of higher education.
This suggests 'both the strong symbolic value of the degree as an
index of Westernization and the strong identification of these
groups with Westernization in this particular form' (Gumperz,
1 965:228) .
As medical education expanded rapidly, during and after the
First World War, so the proportion of the 'ethnically similar'
groups dropped dramatically, and this may have been one of the
reasons behind the changing attitudes of British medical
authorities to the issue of 'Indian medical standards' in the
1 920's and 1 9 3 0' s. The G.M.C. in London began to take more
interest in the quality of the qualifications it registered after
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1907, when it warned of a need to improve midwifery training. In
1920 the Indian universities were asked for more details of their
own arrangements, and the unsatisfactory nature of the replies
was used in 1921 as grounds for a threat to remove recognition.
This threat was used by the I.M.S. to maintain their control over
the medical colleges, to reduce the number of students admitted,
and to toughen up the conditions for passing the examinations. .
The Montague-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 had given the area of
medical education to the Provincial Governments, for elected
Ministers, though retaining control of 'medical standards' for
the Central Government. The assistance of the G.M.C. enabled
members of the I.M.S. to retain more of the lucrative medical
college jobs than they might otherwise have done, and to control
Ministers who wanted to change the pattern of medical education
in their Provinces. The number of medical undergraduates, which
had nearly trebled between 1908 and 1922, dropped steadily until
1927, only rising above the 1922 level in 1934. The pass rate in
the M.B.B.S. examinations dropped from over 50% in the period
1915—1921 to under 40% from 1925 up to the War.
In spite of the fact that midwifery training remained
inadequate (the basic problem was a shortage of midwifery cases
in the medical college hospitals) the G.M.C. continued to
recognise the Indian colleges (with the exception of Calcutta for
a few years after 1924) until 1930. It then refused recognition
until an Indian Medical Council was established (in 1933) and
was able to negotiate retrospective recognition (in 1936) for
most graduates in the intervening period. While the rhetoric of
the dispute was cast in terms of the acceptability (or otherwise)
of Indian graduates who wished to practice in Britain, the
implications were to affect the whole pattern of medical
education in and for India. The medical schools were excluded
from the terms of the Indian Medical Council, and this
recognition of their second-rate status fuelled campaigns for
them to be abolished or for them to be up-graded into colleges.
It was decided to do this in 1939, and this decision was
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reasserted after Independence and implemented in the 1950's.
There were other factors affecting the nature of medical
education after 1919. The effect of the world recessions
immediately after the War, and again after 1929, had severe
impacts on Government expenditure as the Government of India
attempted to balance its budget, and called in notable
businessmen (in this case, Lord Inchcape) to advise how this
might be achieved. This affected not only employment
opportunities in the public sector but also increased competition
in the private sector: reports on unemployment in Punjab and in
U.P. in the 1920's and 1930's claimed that only 15-20% of doctors
in private practice were making a decent living. Graduates began
to take jobs for which only a licentiate qualification was
required, and the clinching example came in 1 938 when 995
licentiates and 428 graduates applied for two poorly paid posts
in Aden.
As a result of these trends, the 1930s saw a major attempt
to dismantle the 'two-tier' system of medical education in India
by phasing out the medical schools. Where possible, it was
proposed that facilities should be upgraded, courses lengthened,
and schools turned into colleges; elsewhere, schools might be
closed. This policy was supported by the representatives of the
school-educated doctors, who hoped thereby to be able to gain the
benefits enjoyed by the college graduates; by British members of
the I.M.S., who saw this as a means of blunting criticism from
London of the ambiguous position of Indian medical education; and
by nationalists who felt that the second tier implied that those
receiving their care were second-class citizens. It was opposed
by those who felt that the school-educated doctors were more
suitable for a poor country, being cheaper to train and more
willing (because of their lower social origins) to work in rural
areas or in unpopular specialities such as public health
(Jeffery, 1979). As I shall show in Chapter 9, these debates have
recurred in the post-War period as well. By 1938, the decision to
destroy the medical schools had been taken in principle; the
intervention of the War prevented its full implementation for
another 15 years.
The doctors trained in these medical colleges and schools
were the backbone of the Government medical services, and, by
1900, they also provided a substantial number of private medical
practitioners. We know very little about the nature of the
services they offered. It is too simplistic too assume that they
practised what they were taught, or what their orders dictated.
Some of them collaborated actively with indigenous practitioners,
until the 'ethical codes' of the Registration Acts made that a
dangerous activity (Steinthal, 1984). Others were accused of
ceasing to practise Western medicine, under the stress of making
a living. However, those in Government service were part of a
structure which, nominally at least, was to provide curative
services and (after 1 86 5) preventive ones. I shall now turn to
consider the nature of these provisions.
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SANITARY POLICY
Prior to the 1860s there was little dicussion of sanitary
matters except in a sporadic way. Thus in 1810, when a group of
Dacca citizens proposed local improvements (such as the removal
of filth, or the repair of wells and drains) the Governor-General
rejected the proposal out of hand (Ahmed, 1980:134-5). The
Magistrate was supposed to carry out improvements, but in fact
spent most of his time on judicial and police work. By 1823 the
Governor-General was prepared to permit the surplus from town
taxes to be spent on urban improvements, but in Dacca at least,
most effort went into road-widening, the draining of marshes, and
into the clearance of land for (amongst other things) a race¬
course (ibid:147-8). Efforts depended on the energy of individual
officials appointed to the improvements committees: but they were
all abolished in 1 829 as a measure of economy (ibid:159).
However, one measure of preventive medicine was already
commonplace: vaccination against smallpox, with over one million
vaccinations a year being carried out by the 1860s.
The beginnings of preventive health measures in India are
usually dated from the Royal Commission appointed to enquire into
the sanitary state of the Army in India, which reported in 1863.
This Royal Commission was established, in part at least, because
the deaths of British soldiers during the Mutiny from disease
greatly exceeded those from injuries received in fighting. It
reported that it was impossible to separate the health of the
army from 'the sanitary condition of the "native" population'
close by, and that 'well-considered measures of water-supply,
drainage, paving, cleansing and general constitution in these
towns would be attended with most beneficial results to the
health of the troops quartered near them'. All the "native" towns
had some system of cleansing and dealing with human excreta and
other nuisances; and vaccination was already a part of the
general medical activities; nonetheless, the Commission
concluded, there was much more to be done (Sanitary Commission,
1863:77, 81; Statistical Abstract, 1870:53).
The Royal Commission report thus used a military argument to
raise the priority of sanitary work, and this gave sanitation the
official basis which it retained during the rest of the
nineteenth century. This left sanitary policy restricted to the
towns and military areas. This was foreshadowed in the report
itself, which reflected the terms under which it had been
established. Its proposed improvements were for the towns "in
proximity to military stations" (ibid:para.35). The Government of
India, after quibbling about the estimates of military mortality,
accepted the report and implemented the proposal to establish
Sanitary Commissions in each Presidency, with advisory but few
executive powers. The Sanitary Commissions were replaced after
two years by a single Sanitary Commissioner each, and by 1 868,
one for each of the Provinces. In the following twenty years
there was little evidence of real achievement, partly because of
the subordination of sanitary officers to medical ones, and
partly because of the restriction of sanitary concerns to
official circles. In addition, there was still considerable
technical dispute about the relationship between sanitary
measures and medical science. The relative importance of
different sanitary proposals was hotly debated, especially
(before 1880) with respect to the role of clean water in
preventing cholera (ifc-rca-H1973; Hume, 1 984).
The I.M.S. was by no means convinced of the necessity of
separating sanitary from medical work. Gordon argued in 1866 that
the Sanitary Commissioners would unnecessarily limit the
functions of the army medical officers, and the Indian Medical
Gazette waged a fierce war against the appointment of Major G.B.
Malleson (a layman) to be head of the Bengal Sanitary Department
in 1866 (Jaggi, 1973:98-9). It was clear that the Indian
authorities had little training in epidemiology, as understood in
Britain at the time, and this helped to render the sanitary
commissioners' work almost valueless. For example, in the 1870's
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the Bengal Sanitary Commissioner was attacked in the London press
for apparently doing little beyond collating vital statistics
which he was unable to analyse to any effect. Nonetheless, the
Commissioner claimed that there was no evidence linking the
spread of cholera to polluted water supplies, in spite of the
evidence which had by now convinced most doctors in Britain
(ibid: 102-3). K. Macleod, editor of the Indian Medical Gazette in
the 1880's and Professor of Surgery in Calcutta, was a staunch
supporter of the claim that clinical practice was the best
training for epidemiological and sanitary work, thereby
justifying the subordination of sanitary matters to the control
of doctors whose training in public health was non-existent.
The main effort of the Sanitary Commissioners was focussed
on the towns close to military stations - they were excluded from
any concern with the cantonments and the European 'civil lines'
themselves, which remained the responsibility of the army
(Harrison, 1980:173). Increasingly these towns had local
Municipal committees with formal responsibility for conservancy
and town improvements, with some of their members elected. Much
of the early focus of these committees was on conservancy - the
removal of faeces from residential areas. In Allahabad in 1870,
280 sweepers were employed to collect sewage, and 90 drivers to
take it out to be buried; in Calcutta in 1 867 a municipal railway
had been built to deal with the transport problem (ibid:182—3).
But the financial limits of these committees stopped them from
making a substantial impact on sanitation. Thus the proposals
made by Ranchodlal Chhotalal, the first non-official Indian to be
made Chairman of the Ahmedabad Managing Committee, were greeted
with considerable opposition. In 1883 Ranchodlal proposed better
water supplies and drainage, better hospitals and more planning
controls over housing; his vehement opponents attacked the
increased taxation needed to pay for them (Gillion, 1968:136-8).
Eventually, in 1891, an improved water-supply scheme was
implemented, but it was only in 1903, after the Municipality had
been ordered (by the Bombay Government) to take the advice of
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experts, that the drainage scheme was completed. Similarly, in
Allahabad, the water-supply scheme first mooted in 1883 was in
operation by 1891 but a drainage scheme to deal with the extra
water entering the city was not started until 1913 (Harrison,
1 980:1 86) .
This delay in the provision of drainage systems (common
throughout Indian towns, because of the extra expense involved)
meant that the introduction of clean water supplies actually
seems to have increased mortality rates. For six north Indian
towns, recorded death rates in the five years following the
introduction of filtered water supplies were higher than in the
five years before (Klein, 1973:651). The most likely explanation
is that the surplus water formed stagnant pools, ideal breeding
grounds for mosquitoes, thus increasing the spread of malaria,
though cholera deaths, and those due to dysentery and diarrhoea,
probably did decline.
Pressure from Britain was a major reason for the reopening
of sanitary issues in India in the late 1880's. Florence
Nightingale was a key influence in the pressure on the Indian
Government to improve sanitary arrangements in the villages,
which by common consent had been almost totally ignored up till
then. There was, at the time, no agency to implement the rules
which had been established for village sanitation.
Decentralisation had only really reached the Provinces in 1872,
under Lord Mayo's reforms, and the larger towns were given some
autonomy in 1882, with the Ripon reforms. A new extension of
local Government was set in train, with Acts in Bombay (1889) and
in other parts of the country, designed to promote district
authorities who would have sanitary measures as one of their
primary concerns. Training courses in Hygiene and Sanitation were
expanded, and graduates were brought into sanitary work over the
next ten years. But the extent of activity was severely
restricted, not merely by the shortage of funds available, but
also by the limitations which policy-makers believed were set by
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the "ignorance, prejudices, callousness, and superstitions of the
people" (Harvey, 1895:5).
It is possible to regard this view as a way of blaming the
poor and the sick for their own conditions, in order to escape
the responsibility for ameliorating the situations which were
accepted as the real causes of the high rates of morbidity and
mortality. But some doctors advanced more sophisticated arguments
to the effect that European methods of disease control were
inapplicable in India, because of social (e.g. caste) and
environmental (e.g. the monsoon) barriers (Arnold, 1985:6). It is
clear that the medical administrators were uneasy about their
record in the santary field, particularly when challenged in
international settings with responsibility for the cholera
epidemics which attacked Europe from time to time, and emanated
from Bengal (Jaggi, 1973:103). On the other hand, they were
undoubtedly correct in asserting that the cost of implementing
sanitary improvements throughout rural India would be beyond the
financial limits of Britain, let alone of the Indian Government.
Funding problems were probably exacerbated by the policy of
linking sanitary reform so closely to local governments with even
more inadequate sources of finance than the towns had.
There were also good grounds for supposing that attempts to
intervene in the provision of water supply, the control of
sewage, or other aspects of the everyday life of villagers, would
lead to great hostility and little success. There was the
experience of vaccination as a guide: frequent rumours of the
danger of the treatment, and general hostility to vaccinators,
was a recurrent feature of the life of the medical department.
This was partly the fault of the vigorous campaigns which tried
to eradicate inoculation, which was much better established as an
indigenous form of smallpox prevention, but which may have
increased the risk of transmission to the unprotected (Arnold,
1985:8). The experience of the response to plague measures (see
below) after 1896 reinforced this view. As alien rulers, with
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little understanding of the ways of life of their subjects, it is
likely that their sanitary measures would be unsuccessful, though
in moral terms this might not justify the pathetic attempts which
were actually made. Expenditures on preventive medicine were
always small, as a percentage of overall public expenditure or
relative to medical expenditures, and probably only water
supplies and some vaccination programmes made any serious impact
on morbidity and mortality before the Second World War.
This was despite the awareness of links between sanitary
provisions and the health of a population, especially in urban
areas where collective arrangements for waste disposal, water
supply and drainage were major concerns. As in Europe, the
history of town planning until 1900 was almost entirely a matter
of sanitary provisions, fuelled by the demand from the wealthy
that they not be infected with the diseases of the poor. In
India, this distinction took on a racial form, with the attempts
to protect the European, civilian and military, from 'native
diseases'. This lay behind the concern of the Sanitary Commission
and was manifest in the organisation of the reports of the
Sanitary Commissioners. But it achieved its most notable result
in the separation of city from cantonment, or the attempt to
place physical barriers between Indian and European, which had
been specifically deplored by the Royal Commission (Sanitary
Commission, 1863:79), but which accorded with theories of
contagion through bad 'air' (Harrison, 1980:174). Thus conditions
in the European areas were much better than in the Indian ones:
roads were paved and swept, water supply and drainage was
improved to a higher standard, and much earlier, and the degree
of crowding was infinitely lower. But in the European areas,
sewage removal arrangements differed little from those in the
rest of the city, at least during the 19th century, and
provisions for the Indians living there (servants, traders etc.)
were possibly even worse than in the towns (ibid:l82).
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After 1900, Improvement Trusts were established in many of
the larger towns, and (among others) Patrick Geddes was asked to
give advice on the development of the urban areas. While these
developments were prompted by the experience of the plague, and
out of a concern for the appalling conditions in the slums, they
only had power to control new building beyond the city limits. -
Any attempts to improve working class housing ran into .
overwhelming opposition, and had little support from the
municipal committees, since they were so expensive. Despite
Geddes' propaganda, only in Hyderabad (where the Nizam gave
considerable support) was there any substantial attack on
insanitary conditions (Meller, 1979:347).
Sanitary reform in India thus has to be seen as a qualified
failure. Even in the towns most directly amenable to British
influence and action, the conditions of life of most inhabitants
remained appalling, with very high mortality and morbidity rates
in the worst areas, and only the areas where most Europeans lived
showed the benefits of civic concern. It is this racial
distinction, and the much higher significance of State activities
in many Indian towns, which provide the main points of difference
between Indian and British experience in this field. Despite
having a more centralised, active and interventionist Government
than in Britain, and one which attempted to draw on British
experience, India gained remarkably few benefits. Capitalist
development, and the rapid unplanned increase of the urban
population, led to slums, over-crowding and urban squalor in
India just as in Europe.
PLAGUE
Plague was probably fairly common in India before the coming
of the British, and its association with rats was known (Anstey,
1936:72). But it seems to have disappeared from India in the
early nineteenth century, before being reintroduced from China
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through Bombay in 1896. Since its signs are fairly distinctive,
and it generated such horror and official inquiry, deaths from
plague might well have been fairly accurately recorded. If so,
the estimates of some 15 million plague deaths in British India,
and 18 million in the Princely States, between 1896 and 1921,
cannot be far off the mark (Census, 1921:350). The disease spread -
quickly, to most parts of the country, helped by the railways and
the growth of trade and commerce. The urban poor suffered most,
and then, panic-stricken, escaped into the rural areas, taking
the disease with them.
The special point to note about the treatment of plague by
the British derives from the fact that plague was reintroduced
into the country at a time when measures for its control and
prevention were understood, yet the response of the authorities
was almost totally ineffective. The immediate response of the
Bombay authorities was drastic: sufferers were compulsorily
removed to hospital, the infected were segregated, premises
evacuated, a sanitary cordon was attempted around affected areas
and travellers were medically inspected. These measures were
inadequately explained and few people accepted the rationality of
what was proposed. Some attempted to resist these measures
openly, either as traders rejecting bans on exports or the
movement of goods, as mill-owners rejecting steam-cleansing, or
as Jains and others destroying rat traps. Others merely avoided
the control measures, by concealing infected people and then
dumping their dead bodies anonymously in the street, escaping
around cordons, or refusing to leave infected areas for fear of
theft from their unprotected houses (Klein, 1973). When pushed
too far, they rioted.
The clash between Western medicine's arrogant self-
confidence and its failure to deal with the plague is well
indicated by the extent to which the medical authorities had to
compromise with Indian opinion. Originally, the authorities
demanded that all patients be treated by Western doctors, but
129
they were forced to accept that patients could use hakims and
vaids, and to deny any claim that plague inoculation would be
made compulsory (Arnold, 1985:10-11). By 1900, the Sanitary
Commissioner noted, the plague epidemic was treated as a
political emergency, not a matter of public health, and he argued
that this was due to the fact that the idea of public health was
alien to the sympathies and traditions of the people (Sanitary
Report, 1902:117-21). Dealing with the threat to trade and social
order became paramount: treatment and control measures had to
follow behind these imperatives, and the Imperial Government
withdrew from active attempts to intervene in the spread of the
disease, and merely 'responded' to calls for medical services
(Klein, 1973).
MEDICAL SERVICES
The Company began to set aside special houses for its sick
employees in the 17th century, but it was not until the end of
the eighteenth century that separate provision was made for the
'native' indigent sick, in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay (Jaggi,
1973:75-88). The practice of separate provisions was generally
maintained, though in some places non-official Europeans might be
allowed access to the hospitals designed for civil servants. In
the general hospitals, there were some wards for Europeans and
Eurasians separated from those for the rest of the population.
Medical theory in the early 19th century stressed the
desirability of removing the sick from their homes and
localities. Those in hospitals were more obviously under medical
control and observation (Arnold, 1985). But dispensaries were
cheaper, and more popular. They were often attached to the new
hospitals. The Calcutta Medical College had a hospital of its
own, and used several of the other Calcutta dispensaries for
teaching purposes in the 1 83 0's.
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TABLE 3
USE-RATES OF HOSPITALS AND DISPENSARIES BY PROVINCE, SELECTED YEARS
Year
Province 1 881 1891 1 901 1 911 1 921 1 931 1939
Bengal 1 .4 2.0 4.9 £ 6.1 + 1 2.2 + 13.0 15.0
Madras 4.6 7.9 11 .7 13.6 17.5 vO•t—OJ 39.6
Bombay 7.6 9.5 7.8 10.0 1 1 .7 16.5 24.4
Punjab 8.0 12.2 14.6 20.1 23.5 51 .9 56 .2
U. P. 3.5 6.4 7.7 9.0 12.4 14.2 14.9
C.P. and Berar 5.6 8.6 13.5 12.8 13.5 18.9 25 .4
Assam 1 .1 5.9 1 1 .9 *10.9 21 .3 25.0 20 .8
Bihar n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. } 8.6 16.3 18.5
Orissa n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 23 .2
N.W. Frontier'' n. a. n. a. n. a. 19.7 14.7 27.5 46 .4
Baluch istan'' n. a. n. a. n. a. 27 .7 39.8 69.7 78.5
Total (British India) 3.7 6 .0 8.6 10.8 14.1 22.0 26 .3
(N in millions) (7.3) (13.4) (19.9) (26.3) (34.9) (58.7) (77.7)
Note: Use-rates are reported hospital and dispensary out-patient
attendances (N) per 100 population recorded in that Province in the
Census of that year, or (for 1939) the closest year. British India
excludes Burma in this table.
£ Bengal figures in 1911 exclude the area of East Bengal, included
with Assam (*).
+ Bengal figures in 1921 and 1931 include East Bengal but exclude
Bihar and Orissa.
1. In the case of N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, the population used as
denominator is that of British territory jjjid the associated Agencies
and Tribal Areas, whereas for the other Provinces only the
population within British-ruled areas is assumed to use these
facilities.
Sources: For 1881 and 1891, Reports of the Sanitary Commissioner,
relevant years; for 1901 onwards, Statistical Abstracts, relevant
years.
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The extension of these facilities beyond the Presidency
towns was slow: not until the 1 830's was there much development.
Dispensaries, primarily for out-patients but with some inpatient
beds and operating facilities, preceded hospitals proper. In 1838
Lord Auckland, then Governor-General, sanctioned an increase in
Government dispensaries in Bengal and established them on a more
formal basis, specifying the grade of doctor to be in charge and
the total cost (Rs250-300 per annum) which Government was
prepared to bear, any excess to be found from 'native'
contributions (Sykes, 1847). By the early 1840's there were 17
dispensaries, in most of the major towns in the Bengal
Presidency, treating approximately 100,000 cases annually. Madras
was slightly slower to act: apart from two dispensaries in Madras
Town (one dating from 1828, the second from 1837) there was
little growth before the mid-1840's, and in 1848 less than 50,000
out-patients were seen, with a Goverment expenditure of Rs29,000
(Medical Reports, 1850).
However, growth in the following years was much faster in
Madras and Bombay than in Bengal, and the Punjab Government acted
even more decisively to establish medical facilities for the
general population. In Punjab, the Government was "deeply
sensible of the benefits which dispensaries are likely to confer
on our poorer subjects" (Punjab, 1849-50 & 1850-51:151) and
opened 33 dispensaries, treating over 70,000 cases a year by 1855
(ibid., 1 854-5 & 1 855-56:1 1 3). This pattern continued throughout
the period up to 1939: Table 3 shows that use rates per 100
population apparently differ fairly dramatically between the
Provinces, with Punjab rates (and later, those for Baluchistan
and the North West Frontier Province) usually well above the
others. Some caution must obviously be expressed about these
figures. Use-rates tended to rise in times of epidemic or famine,
and since these were not national calamities they will affect the
inter-Provincial comparisons. In addition, it would seem that in
some periods numbers were inflated, either to keep a dispensary
in existence or to demonstrate the assiduous work done by the
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dispensary doctor (Bengal Sanitary Report, 1880). Nevertheless,
these patterns seem fairly stable, and do seem to represent both
different levels of provision and different degrees of
'use' of Western medicine. They say nothing whatever, of course,
about any benefit which might have been gained from a visit, and
it is not possible to distinguish between multiple visits by a
small number of people, and occasional visits by a much larger
number.
To begin with, these facilities were restricted to the major
towns, but a spreading of dispensaries occurred with the
devolution of government after 1880. Thus in 1881 one quarter of
all out-patients attendances in Bengal were accounted for by the
Calcutta hospitals and dispensaries; this had declined to 13% by
1891, and to 6.5% in 1901, though Calcutta still dominated the
in-patient totals. As municipalities were established after 1870,
and district and local boards after 1890, there was a steady
increase of expenditure on medical matters, and the creation of
more dispensaries.
STATE INTERVENTION IN MEDICAL CARE FOR WOMEN BEFORE 1947
There are at least two ways to see the attempts by the State
to provide medical care for women and children and to explain
the relative failure of these attempts in India. The first
stresses the desire by the State to overcome the gross
inequalities in access to health care, as part of a humanitarian
attempt to reduce mortality and morbidity rates amongst the most
disadvantaged groups in the population; the failings to do so (in
this perspective) are usually explained by the resistance of the
local society to change in the desired directions. This view is,
of course, the one held by apologists for Empire, and appears
regularly in health reports and discussions by Government per¬
sonnel. An alternative view suggests that the extension of health
services is used by the State to gain access to the family, as
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part of an attempt to control the reproduction of the labour
force and the physical 'quality' of labour, and thereby to in¬
crease its degree of social control; failure is to be explained
in economic terms, on the grounds that there are insufficient
benefits to the ruling classes from such interventions except in
the case of the skilled working class and the members of the
State apparatus itself.
Under the British, it seems clear that elements of both
accounts are necessary. Once it was clear that women and small
children were indeed suffering high levels of morbidity and
mortality which the existing clinics were unable to deal with,
the consciences of prominent members of the British community in
India were sufficiently upset for several moves to be made to
overcome the situation. Viceroy's wives seemed to feel it their
duty to raise funds for the amelioration of the position of women
in India. Lady Dufferin established a fund in 1885 to provide
medical aid to the women of India; Lady Curzon established a fund
to pay for the training of indigenous midwives, in 1903; Lady
Chelmsford established a League to train Lady Health Visitors and
fund maternal and child health work, in 1 920; and in 1 924 Lady
Reading established a fund for the Women of India, which paid for
a hospital in Simla and a training college in Delhi.
The proposals for improving medical services for women took
the following major forms: the employment of women doctors and
the training of women medical students; the establishment of
women's hospitals and wards, staffed by women; and the training
and employment of subordinate female staff, notably health
visitors and indigenous midwives. The first two of these were
seen as of particular benefit to the respectable classes:(N.A.I.,
Home, Medical, 1887:32 A)
"having regard to the social habits and customs of this
country, where the seclusion of females among the
better classes is the rule, the need of trained female
native doctors and nurses is manifest and urgent."
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The respectable women were also expected to benefit from
schemes such as those introduced in U.P. in the 1 890s, in which
female doctors visited parda-nashin women in their homes (though
since European and Eurasian women were also visited in this way
it is not clear how the scheme worked in detail). By the turn of
the century there were about 3750 of such visits a year in U.P.;
twenty years later this had risen to over 7000 (Civil Hospitals
and Dispensaries, U.P., relevant years). This scheme was
obviously designed for the relatively wealthy in urban areas; for
the poor there were female dispensaries, and the attempts to
train the dai, both of which depended upon women doctors.
The employment of female doctors in India dates from 1869,
when the first American woman missionary doctor, Clara Swain,
arrived. Other missionary doctors arrived in the 1870s, and some
women returned to Britain to complete their medical training as
soon as this was possible. The first female doctor to be employed
by Government seems to have been Elizabeth Beilby, asked to
establish a woman's hospital by the Lahore Municipal Committee in
1885. More substantial hospitals under women doctors were opened
in Bombay (the Cama Hospital) in 1886, and in 1884 in Madras
(Balfour and Young, 1929: ch. 2). After 1885, the Dufferin Fund
brought in European female doctors on a more regular basis, and
began to organise the building of hospitals and the employment of
staff. The numbers employed grew very slowly, and it was clear by
about 1 907 that more support was needed from the Government if
salaries were to be increased and careers were to be properly
organised. In 1914 a Women's Medical Service was established,
with the assistance of an annual grant from the Government of
India. Salary scales and other conditions of service remained
much below those of the I.M.S. By 1928 there were 44 doctors in
the Women's Medical Service, compared with the 750 men in the
I.M.S. at the same time.
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The admission of women to medical training in India dates
from 1875, when Mary Scharlieb and three others were admitted to
the Madras Medical College, and gained a school diploma three
years later. In Bombay and Madras, women were admitted to the
medical colleges in 1883, over the objection of the medical
college staff (Jaggi, 1^72:93-110). In Calcutta, all women
students were provided with scholarships, and the Dufferin Fund
also prompted municipalities to provide scholarships for women to
be trained in medicine. The numbers of women in medical schools
and colleges rose steadily, though it is difficult to provide a
clear picture because the sources on the sex of medical students
are not always consistent. In some years, figures are tabulated
by institution, possibly meaning that women attending the 'male'
medical colleges.were classified as men. But the proportion of
women was always very low. The scope of female medical education
was boosted in North and South India by the opening of female
medical schools and the Lady Hardinge Medical College for women
in Delhi in 1916, but as late as the 1920's fewer than 20 women a
year were receiving the higher medical qualifications (MB BS or
LMS) in the whole of India, and less than 50 were passing out
from the medical schools with the lower qualification
(Quinquennial Reviews, relevant years). Growth in the 1920s was
faster: in 1928 there were 253 women studying in medical colleges
(121 at Lady Hardinge College) and 445 at medical schools or 7.6%
of the total. In 1937 the figures were 475 and 964 respectively,
and the proportion had risen to nearly 12$ (Balfour and Young,
1929:121-2; Quinquennial Review, 1936/7). The dominance of Indian
Christian and European or Eurasian women was overwhelming until
the 1930s: thus in 1926/27 nearly 2/3 of those at female colleges
and schools were from these groups, though this had declined to
1/3 by 1936/37 (Quinquennial Reviews, relevant years). Throughout
this period it seems to have been accepted that the proper work
of female doctors was solely concerned with women and children:
they were not expected to challenge the dominance of men over
provision for males or many areas of general surgery and
medicine, and Balfour and Young tactfully discuss some of the
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disputes over prcedence which emerged as members of the I.M.S.
attempted to control the women's hospitals as well as their own
(1929:43-5).
Female dispensaries, staffed only by women, began to be
established in North India in the 1890's. A major limitation to ■
the speed at which they could be expanded was the number of .
female doctors. By 1920 there were 76 medical women employed by
different levels of Government for the whole of U.P., and 35 for
Punjab; there were 108 in U.P. in 1 930 (Balfour and Young,
1 929:168; Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries, U.P., 1 930:
Female attendances at dispensaries and hospitals, throughout the
period for which data are available, show much lower consultation
rates for women than for men, not only as in-patients (well below
male levels) but also as out-patients. As Table 2 shows, at the
beginning of this century consultations by women at hospitals and
dispensaries were rarely above 50% of the level of consultations
by men. Where figures are available for children, they suggest
that girls (aged 12 or less) were taken for consultations about
50% as often as were boys. These figures exaggerate the access of
women to dispensaries, since some women would be represented at
the clinic by a male relative, who would consult on her behalf
(Balfour and Young, 1929:34). Consultations at female
dispensaries raised consultation rates by women, but the number




FEMALE PATIENTS TREATED IN HOSPITALS AND DISPENSARIES AS A
PERCENTAGE OF MALE PATIENTS, SELECTED PROVINCES AND CITIES
Province/City Yea rs
1 881 - 1890 1901-1910 191 1-20 1921-30 1931-40
Bombay City n. a • 58 87 62 42
Rest of Bombay n. a • 45 46 43 46
Calcutta 25 49 50 47 57
Rest of Bengal n. a • 32 30 32 38
Madras City 50 74 71 63 n. a .
Rest of Madras 43 43 40 45 n. a.
Punjab 31 47 54 64 n. a.
North-West P./U. P. 34
Source : Kynch , mimeo;; for 1881-90, Adm inistration Reports,
relevant years
Note: These figures are not all for the full decade, but are
annual averages for at least 7 years in each case, and exclude
children.
It is difficult to keep track of all the various attempts to
improve midwifery in India by training local midwives in improved
techniques. The earliest example from North India is reference to
a course held in Amritsa r from 1 866, still in good shape in the
early 1880's when 9 or 1 C were being trained every year. A class
was established in Bareilly in 1867, and a Lahore class, founded
in 1876, was expanded with scholarships etc. in 1883, and a new
lady doctor, appointed in 1885 (N.A.I., Home, Medical, 1887:76-83
A). These attempts were not widely copied; in Bengal there was
little support from the medical establishment, and the classes
(run by men) could have little practical instruction because of
the total absence of maternity ('lying in') cases in the
hospitals and dispensaries. Interestingly, the Civil Surgeon in
Bareilly argued in support of midwifery training on the grounds
that it might help to reduce infanticide; the passing of the
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Infanticide Act three years later heralded a far more intensive
intrusion into matters regarded locally as private, family
affairs, than was ever considered for purely medical purposes.
The closest to an attempt to get more direct access to maternity
cases was a proposal to pay women who were prepared to attend
hospitals to have their babies: this was not in order to reduce
the neo-natal mortality rate but to provide teaching cases for
the dai classes and for medical students (U.P., 1 88) : 3lZ).
Two points should be made about dai training. Firstly, the
scale of such training ebbed and flowed, along with the length of
the courses and the financial attractions offered. Thus before
the First World War between four and five hundred dais every year
were receiving certificates for successfully attending courses in
U.P. but in the 1 920's less than 50 a year were under training
(U.P., relevant years). Secondly, even its proponents admitted
that they had little success in training, and even less success
in supervising the trained dai (Balfour and Young, 1929:128-40).
The impetus for the development of much of the maternal and
child welfare work done in India came not from the State
apparatus but from private funds raised by leading British women.
The State did respond by contributing funds to these schemes, but
it was not really interested: witness the fierce rearguard action
needed for women to save the grant to the Women's Medical Service
from financial cuts threatened by the Inchcape Committee in the
1920's (Balfour and Young, 1929). The limits of State concern for
maternal and child health can also be seen in the debates
surrounding the attack on the quality of Indian medical
education, mounted by the General Medical Council in response to
nationalist pressures and the Indianisation of the Indian Medical
Service (Jeffery, 1979). The G.M.C. complained that even the
medical college hospitals were not seeing enough maternity cases
to allow the medical students to gain practical experience, and
it was this, rather than any other consideration, which increased
attempts to attract women to hospitals for their deliveries.
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Thus by the time the British left there was an infra¬
structure of health services directed specifically at women:
female dispensaries, staffed entirely by women, existed at least
in the District Headquarters towns, and there were also some
women trained to nursing positions, again largely staffing
clinics in the larger towns. There had been no concerted effort
to improve the availability of medical services to rural women:
the attempts to train dais were obviously sporadic, again urban
biassed (since they depended on female staff to do the training)
and they had little noticeable impact on the way in which
children were delivered in most of the country. Given the small
number of medical graduates practising in the rural areas, the
smaller number of female graduates, and a probable absence of
women providing Western drugs as pharmacists, Western medicine
made little impact on women under the British.
CONCLUSION
In none of the areas of medical provision was there a
coherent policy designed to attack the major causes of disease
and premature death. The nearest to such a policy comes from the
vacination campaigns which, if thoroughly pursued with the
confidence of the mass of the population, might have made a
substantial difference to the extent of smallpox. The British
felt themselves to be hamstrung by cultural barriers, local
prejudice, and financial constraints, but equally significant
were the dominant concerns of European and Imperialist medicine.
Surgery had the highest profile - it offered most possibilities
for private practice, and was the section where indigenous
medicine had least to offer. But it probably had the least impact
on the conditions of health and disease for the mass of the
population. I shall consider the overall impact of Imperalist
medicine in the Conclusion to Part A.
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CONCLUSION TO PART A
It makes little sense to see Imperial medicine in India in
terms of SX social control ££ humanitarian concern for an
ignorant and diseased populace. The picture is more complex. Both
aspects are important, and were often closely intertwined. Thus
some of the ways in which medical services contributed to social
control depended on humanitarian concerns: it is difficult to
attract people to hospitals and dispensaries if the services they
offered were irrelevant to people's perceived needs, or if the
services were offered in a hostile and disparaging manner.
Issues of social control were paramount in setting the
structural context within which the I.M.S. was working.
Undoubtedly, when issues of wide policy were discussed, the
I. M.S. referred to its role in keeping the troops healthy, the
civil servants content and the masses convinced of the benefits
of British rule. But these arguments were based on some weak
premises. Thus the troops were not particularly healthy, and it
was the British Army in India, served by the Army Medical
Department under the War Office, not the I.M.S. under the India
Office which was crucial to the defence of British interests in
India. The masses were not, in fact, desperate to 'accept'
Western medicine, and their use of dispensaries, or acceptance of
training in Western medical schools and colleges, was more a
matter of enlightened self-interest than a commitment to Western
science or Imperial rule. The problems with vaccination and
plague control brought home the extent to which Western medicine
remained alien to most of the Indian population.
But the structural context, and the alien nature of British
rule and provisions, do not explain why medical services were
chosen as part of the symbolic justification for Imperial rule,
nor why they took the form which they did. They form a set of
shifting limits within which members of a bureaucratic structure
acted according to their view of the purposes of Imperial rule,
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the proper role of medicine, and their own preferred careers ana
activities. Thus while it is inconceivable that medical services
could have been designed in such a way that they threatened
Imperial stability, this still left considerable leeway. A
successful rural health service, after all, could have
contributed far more to social order than the inadequate, almost
non-existent, structure which was provided.
In addition, there was considerable disagreement about what
should be done. None of the policy innovations went unchallenged,
nor were policy statements ever applied rigorously. In
particular, the relationship with indigenous medicine was one
over which uncertainties remained until the end of British rule,
Attempts were being made to find common ground at the same time
as official policy was to exclude indigenous practitioners
entirely from the Government ambit.
Another example was in the training of personnel, especially
for rural services. The Medical Degrees and Medical Registration
Acts from 1912 to 1919 seem designed to force India into a
•professional' model for the delivery of health services. But the
1920s saw a flowering of attempts to use a range of local people
as the bottom tier of the medical and sanitary services. Within
British India, schemes for village nurses and for schoolmasters
as medical workers were not merely proposed, they were
implemented by British doctors working within the Government
(McGuire, 1929; Hooton, 1928). Experiments like this were
welcomed by the Indian Medical Gazette in an editorial in
December 1924, where it was made clear that a number of
experiments were also taking place, with Government assistance,
in the voluntary sector; and Rockefeller Foundation support
helped a similar project in Travancore (Tampi, 1931).
The Imperial impact on health in India was thus contra¬
dictory. On the one hand, it seems that changes in famine policy
and food distribution helped to reduce mortality; increasing
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numbers of men (and later, women) were trained in medicine to the
international standards of the time; hospitals and dispensaries
attracted considerable numbers of patients; and issues of disease
prevention and public health provision were addressed. On the
other hand, many of these measures were restricted in their
impact to a relatively small sector of the population, firstly
the European civil and military servants and their families,
later the wealthier Indian inhabitants of cities and towns: if
19th century medical services were 'beneficial', then the mass of
the Indian population could not have benefited. The preventive
campaigns were never pushed fully through, and their impact was
limited. Both vaccination and, more powerfully, plague control,
demonstrated the failure of British health policy to come to
terms with local society. It seems unlikely that health measures,
££ had any marked influence on mortality and morbidity; but
they established a framework (of personnel, ideas, institutions)
which permitted more substantial post-Independence provisions,
whose impact is more noticeable.
Ramasubban argues that this pattern can be defined as a
'colonial mode of health care', characterised by segregation, and
by provisions for the enclave sector which kept pace with
'metropolitan' developments. The rest of the population "missed
going through the period of sanitary reform which swept through
most of Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries"
(1984:107). There is a danger that this picture seriously over¬
estimates a number of elements in the story. Firstly, it was
recognised that segregation could not be complete, and the
interests of colonialists were linked with those of the Indians
who surrounded them. Thus the most substantial urban improvements
(in water supply and drainage) were designed to improve the
living conditions of Indians. Secondly, provisions (in terms of
hospitals and dispensaries, or places in medical schools and
colleges) soon out-ran the needs of the Army and the European
civil population, and this was regarded with satisfaction, not
alarm. Thirdly, the most effective elements of European sanitary
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reform were also largely urban phenomena: many rural areas in
Europe are without centralised water supply,- drainage or refuse
disposal, for example. To blame the colonial government for not
transferring urban solutions to a largely rural India is to
under-estimate the extent of the problems involved. And fourthly,
the role of public health itself in Europe is overstated by this
view, since rising living standards and changes in personal
hygiene were largely independent contributors to the changes in
the level and kind of morbidity and mortality experienced by the
European population.
The failure of the colonial Government to make a substantial
impact on morbidity and mortality in India, then, did depend on
factors outside their control as well as the constraints imposed
by the nature of that Government. We should not dismiss these
arguments as self-interested excuses merely because they were
made by the Imperialists themselves. Most prominent amongst the
problems faced by health policy-makers was the poverty of the
Indian population (not all caused either by the depradations of
British conquest in the eighteenth century, or by
commercialisation and the sustenance of landlordism in the
nineteenth). Not only did this mean that the diseases which they
suffered were (and are) difficult to treat, and (with the
technology of the time) difficult to prevent. In addition, it
meant that the tax base for raising revenue to implement public
solutions was also limited. The Imperialist Government did not,
of course, place sanitary reform or medical services high On its
list of priorities; but in some ways they were higher in India
than in Britain. The British Government was inclined to leave
medical provision to charitable or voluntary hospitals; medical
education to independent medical schools; and sanitary reform to
urban councils. All these in India were seen as the proper
concern of the Imperial Government.
A further problem was provided by the radical differences in
understanding the causes of disease and the consequences of
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some aspects of the environment, held by the rulers and the
ruled. This was most marked in the case of plague, but was also
true for issues of 'conservancy', or water supply, or antisepsis.
Some, or even all the views on these issues put forward in the
nineteenth century may now appear to us to be wrong, without
altering the fact that it was and still is very difficult to
implement policies based on them in the face of uncomprehending
hostility. 'Health education' still labours to persuade, quite
apart from the technical problems of the solutions which were
offered (e.g. for water closets, or water purification). The
commitment to implement such policies may have been weak; and the
constraints (financial, political, or administrative) set on
health policies were undoubtedly considerable; but it remains an
open question how much difference would have been made by any
conceivable alternative structures or commitments, given the
extent of the changes in living and thinking patterns which were
necessary.
In the period after Independence, the 'alien' rulers were
replaced by Indian ones, albeit ones often rebuked as no less
alien in thought, speech and action than many of the British.
Part B will consider how medical policy after 1947 has changed
the inheritance of services left by the Imperialist power.
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INTRODUCTION TO PART B
The political impact of Independence in 1947 was much less
substantial than Nehru's rhetoric suggested. There were two main
reasons for this. Firstly, nationalist policies were focussed on
gaining power and removing the British, ana there was no agreed
programme for social and economic change beyond 'this. There were
ideologues in Congress, both Gandhians and socialists, with ideas
about creating a new society. But most of the Congress leadership
were more interested in operating the levers of power in a
Government not radically different from that being operated by
the British in the decade or so before they left - as Maddison
(1972) puts it, Congress were 'step-in-my-shoes Nationalists'.
Secondly, the circumstances of Independence, associated with
Partition, made it difficult to consider long-term goals.
Congress politicians gained power, in the Provinces in 1946 and
nationally in 1947, but the normal problems of making policy and
implementing it were made much worse by the conditions in which
Independence was gained. There were massive upheavals caused by
Partition which diverted resources and attention to dealing with
the refugee problems, and the maintenance of public order. Not
until 1950 did Patel (the Home Minister) manage the accession of
the Princely States to the Indian Union, and deal with the major
rebellion in Telengana and minor uprisings elsev/here. Inevitably,
the new governments were thrown back to relying on the
essentially colonial civil service - sometimes the very
individuals who had been responsible for imprisoning their new
leaders during the Quit India Movement five years previously.
Here I want to sketch out three key features of the post-
Independence State in India: the changing role of the world
economy; the management of the federal political structure; and
the role of the State in the economy and in planning.
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INDIA IN A WORLD ECONOMY
There was no sharp break with British economic interests
after 1947. The British had dominated those parts of the Indian
economy most closely linked to export markets and imported goods,
and there was neither wholesale nationalisation of those
interests nor a massive disinvestment, though there was a little
of both (Lipton and Firn, 1976). Furthermore, there was not much
new investment, either by British or by other companies, prior to
the 1960s. In part, this reflected domestic economic policy,
which was designed to protect Indian industries by, for example,
high tarriff barriers. But it was also due to Indian foreign
policy, which stressed balanced links with the dominant world
powers, and left some American companies uncertain whether to
trust the climate for investment in India. However, India's
international position weakened dramatically in 1958, when its
foreign exchange reserves ran very low, and again in 1964-5, when
a combination of bad harvests, the 1 962 War with China and the
1965 War with Pakistan depleted stocks still further. The U.S.
Government used this latter opportunity to encourage a
devaluation of the rupee, and shifts in policy with respect to
foreign investment, agricultural policy, and population control
programmes.
As Kidron (1966) and Alavi (1965) argued, the new patterns
of foreign investment took very different forms from the older,
Imperialist patterns. The new investment was in industrial
manufacturing, in the expanding areas of the economy,
technologically more advanced, more profitable, and serving the
internal market rather than an export market. Companies leapt
over the tariff barriers and established production operations
within India. New controls on foreign companies introduced in
1972 (the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act) have served to reduce
the equity shares of foreign companies, so that seme companies
(I.B.M. and Coca-Cola, for example) withdrew. In general,
multinational corporations have preferred collaboration
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agreements with Indian companies, with little foreign capital
input, since the early 1 970s.
Indian academics have been relatively loath to explain these
changes in terms of the dependency analyses derived from Latin
American writings (Blomstrom and Hettne, 1984). Discussions of
the State have been more concerned to delineate local class
alliances, and the implications of the changing production
relationships in agriculture (Thorner, 1983). In part this has
been because the Communist Party of India has muted its
criticisms of Congress in order not to damage Moscow's
relationship with the Delhi Government. But it also probably
reflects the relative unimportance of foreign trade, foreign
capital, and foreign aid, compared to many other 'peripheral
capitalist' societies. There have been short periods of crisis
when the Indian Government has been particularly weak, but India
is not an 'export-oriented' economy; the policy of import-
substitution has kept imports to about 10% of national income or
less. The indigenous capitalist sector was relatively well
developed at the time of Independence, having benefited greatly
from the War economy, and it maintained strong links with the
Nationalist movement which protected it from attack after 1947.
Even after the growth of foreign investment described above, in
1981-82 only about 10% of total value added in manufaturing and
mining was accounted for by foreign firms (Bardhan, 1984:44). And
while foreign aid in some years has accounted for a substantial
share of Plan expenditure, India has rarely had to borrow from
the I.M.F., and now has a relatively low level of international
public debt, with substantial reserves created by foreign
remittances.
THE MANAGEMENT OF A FEDERAL POLITY
The Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 established a
federal system of Government which the new Government of India
accepted, and amended very little. The structure was altered
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slightly by the inclusion of the old Princely India, and then (in
1956 and the early 1960s) the States were reorganised largely
along linguistic lines and their number was reduced. But the
Constitution of 1950 made little change to the division of
functions and financial powers. Running this system, however, has
left the formal struture unchanged but has led to a concentration
of power in the hands of the Central (or Union) Government.
The financial implications of this are exhibited in the
control exercised by the Central Government over State Government
finances. This has taken place through the workings of the
Finance Commissions (which have made 5-year distributions of tax
revenues); through Central Government control over the Reserve
Bank of India (the lender of last resort to State Governments);
and through the working of the Planning Commission (see further
below). In each case, the relative weakness of State Governments
has been a cause of complaint by them, and the final arbitration
of awards has been a matter of Central control.
The political aspects of these relationships have changed
through time. Prior to 1965, Nehru ran a Congress Party which
held power in almost all of the States, almost all of the time.
Within this party, the core of nationalist politicians from the
Independence movement, dominated by Western-educated groups,
especially lawyers, had a considerable degree of local autonomy.
Since then, a number of changes have concentrated more power in
the hands of the Central Prime Minister. Indira Gandhi, in
particular, used her patronage in the course of her disputes with
the Congress 'old guard', which split the party in 1969-70 and
again in 1975-76. While the political 'Emergency' of 1975-77
represents an extreme form of centralised power, or 'emergency
regime' (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1981) it should not be regarded as
an aberration. Chief Ministers of States have become aware that
they can not expect to remain in power unless they have the
support of the central Government and the Prime Minister, no
matter what local support they might think they control.
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These processes have had two consequences. The first is the
increased pressure on the State governments to meet the demands
of local pressure groups. Patrons within the party press claims
for resources to go to certain areas or for benefits (jobs,
contracts etc.) to be distributed in particular ways. The Chief
Minister who causes local resentments will find that his
opponents will approach the Prime Minister for his or her
removal. The Central Government, by contrast, has relatively
little patronage of this kind (posts, or contracts) to
distribute, and is less likely to be the target for concerted
>*■
pressure from within the country, than to be the focus of
persuasion from foreigners wishing to gain contracts and support.
The second consequence has been that in general policy terms, the
Central Government has been less willing to tolerate political
and administrative diversities (Dua, 1981:272-3).
The resulting pattern has been seen as increasingly
populist, in that policy-making has progressed with an eye less
to ideological coherence or overall rationality than to a desire
to meet interest group demands, often through an expansion in the
role of the public sector. Myrdal (1968:895-900) called this a
'soft' State - one which places few demands on the mass of its
citizenry, and attempts to offer services, employment and other
benefits without, for example, establishing a tax system or a
political structure which can call upon individual resources in
the kind of centralised way epitomised by Communist China. None
of the policies envisaged by the political campaigns to
'eradicate poverty' (Mrs Gandhi's 1971 slogan) or by the '20-
point programme' (evolved to legitimate the Emergency and revived
by Mrs Gandhi when she rerturned to power in 1980) involve a
direct attack on class privileges or call for the mobilisation of
individual resources. Land reforms are the obvious example of
this tendency: despite the fanfare of the abolition of zamindari
(the largest landholders) very little land has been appropriated
or distributed to the 'tillers of the soil'.
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THE CENTRALITY OF THE STATE
The third aspect of changes in the nature of the State in
India since Independence relates to the role it has taken in
economic decision-making. This has taken two interrelated forms:
the attempt to manage the economy through detailed controls; and
the use of Plans to provide an overall coherence to the economy.
Industrial Policy Resolutions of 19^8 and 1956 placed the State
at the centre of the commanding heights of the economy, reserving
key areas (power, heavy industry, capital goods) for the public
sector. Later decisions led to the nationalisation of financial
centres - the banks and the insurance companies. As a result,
there has been a massive rise in the numbers employed in the
public sector, not only in the organs of Government but also in
industries, services and financial institutions. These have been
the main means by which the Government has attempted to achieve
the goals set out in the five-year Plans.
Prior to the Second World War, there was really very little
conscious planning by the Imperial Government. Hanson (1966)
usefully describes the variety of planning proposals put forward
before the War, usually by academics and industrialists outside
the Government machinery. But in 19A2 the Government, as part of
its programme to convince Indians both that the British expected
to win the War and that things would be better for the Indians if
they did, established a Reconstruction Committee to make plans
for coping with the situation they predicted when the War was
over. This grew into a Planning and Development Department, with
specialised committees drawing up plans for the five years
following the War in the context of a fifteen year perspective
plan (never actually produced). The topics covered by these
committees covered a wide range, and included discussions on the
role of the State in reducing glaring inequalities of wealth, and
in the control of major industries. Hansen argues that by 19^5
this activity had produced a statement of intent - the 'Second
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Report on Reconstruction Planning' - which foreshadowed all the
fundamental objectives and methods used in the five-year plans of
the 1 950's (Hanson 1966:38).
The Planning Commission has provided the Central Government
with a powerful agency for affecting health (and other) policy in
areas which were constitutionally matters solely for the States,
because the Planning Commission has controlled the most
substantial part of uncommitted funds. In recognition of the
power that this control provides, the Planning Commission was
under Nehru's direct control. It has remained at the centre of
Indian political life ever since, except for a few spells when
planning fell into disfavour - especially the 'Plan holiday'
years 1966/7 to 1968/9, and under the Janata Government of 1 977-
79.
Although the First Plan (1951-2 to 1955-6) was really little
more than a listing of existing projects, and was not adopted
until after two of the five plan years were already over, the
other Plans have played a substantial role in public sector
expenditure patterns. The First Plan explicitly rejected the idea
of total nationalisation, but the Second Plan, with its emphasis
on heavy industry, also stressed that the public sector should
grow faster than the private sector, in line with the Industrial
Policy Resolution of 1956, and the nationalisation of life
insurance companies and the Imperial Bank of India. The Second
Plan ran into difficulties in 1958, as a result of a poor harvest
and a balance of payments crisis, and was only rescued by
considerable foreign assistance. The Third Plan continued most of
the emphases of the second, but was more heavily dependent on
foreign assistance. However, the planning process was challenged
during the Third Plan by the revelation through the 1961 Census
that the population growth rate estimates which underlay much of
the Planning framework were considerably below what actually
happened - 1.2% assumed against 2.1% actual growth rates
(Maddison 1972:114).
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By 1965 the planning process was knocked completely out of
step by a combination of the war with Pakistan (and a consequent
cut in U.S. assistance) and a severe drought. For the next three
years only Annual Plans were produced, and the Fourth Plan
(1969/70 to 1974/5) was much lower in profile and gave more
emphasis to rural development. The third 'crisis of planning'
arose in 1 97 2/3> when the rising price of oil imports and another
poor harvest raised the rate of inflation dramatically. The Fifth
Plan was delayed, only existing in draft form for several years,
and towards the end of the Plan period ( 1 977/8) the new Janata
Government attempted to replace the five year planning sequence
by a set of rolling plans in a longer perspective. Mrs Gandhi's
return to power in 1980 restored the Planning Commission to a
place nearer the centre of power, and the five-year planning
process was resumed. The Sixth Plan for the years 1979/80 to
1984/5 was finally published in 1981.
Most discussions of the planning process in India have
focussed on the overall context, and on the problems dramatised
by the crises of planning (see, for example, Streeten & Lipton,
1968; Bhagwati & Desai, 1970; Cassen, 1978; Frankel, 1982). It
has been argued that the Planning Commission has been dependent
on its closeness to the Prime Minister for its power - Nehru took
a considerable interest but his successors have been less
involved. The raising of the resources for the Plans has been out
of the hands of the Planning Commission and in the hands of
ministries of finance at the centre and the States, so that even
in the public sector there have been limits to the ability of the
Planning Commission to determine the patterns of expenditure,
while its planning for the private sector has been much more
difficult to implement. In general, the Plans have been
optimistic about the volume of resources which will be raised,
and about the external environment. In particular, the estimates
of a growth in National Income have almost always been
exaggerated and the major determinant of the growth of the
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economy - the productivity of agriculture - has received less
attention than it deserved.
The catalogue of criticisms is almost endless. One more
which has specific relevance to health sector planning is the
failure (before the Fifth Plan) to be concerned with
distributional aspects of development. Until about 1970, planning
was based on the premise that the benefits of increased economic
output would inevitably flow (or trickle) down to benefit the
mass of the poor. This assumption has come under increasing
attack (e.g. Chenery et al, 1974), and alternative planning
strategies have been proposed. One alternative strategy (a
concerted attack on those institutions which generate poverty,
especially in rural India, through land reform) has not been
seriously considered either by the Planning Commission or by the
rest of the Government of India. Instead, the response since 1971
has been to follow a 'basic needs' strategy; that is, to raise
the importance of programmes designed to provide basic services
to the mass of the population, the so-called Minimum Needs
Programme. This has potentially raised the importance of 'social'
expenditures (health, education, social welfare and so on) in
contrast to the earlier Plans for which the 'core' sectors were
always defined as those of heavy industry, power and minerals.
THE CONTEXT OF HEALTH POLICY-MAKING AFTER 1947
There are two major influences on health policy-making after
1947 which set a context of structures affecting how this
developed, and I shall describe them briefly here. The first is
the Report of the Health Survey and Development Committee, known
by the name of its chairman, Sir Joseph Bhore, established in
1943 as part of the reconstruction planning discussed above. The
second is the Central Council of Health.
The Bhore Committee published its four-volume report
(G.O.I., 1 946) in the tradition of British committee reports - a
154
detailed analysis of the available data, the evidence of expert
witnesses, and recommendations produced by a secretariat in a
clear and consistent pattern. However, this was not the only plan
for public health work available at the time. There was an
alternative set of proposals, emanating from the Congress Party
itself, which had established a National Planning Committee in
1938, much under Nehru's prompting. Nehru's socialism was
essentially Fabian, in spite of his visits to the Soviet Union in
the 1930's, and involved national planning for a mixed economy.
His more radical ideas were ground down in the intense
politicking of the first years after Independence, but still
retained enough vitality to lead to the establishment of the
Planning Commission in 1950 as the main institution for
implementing his vision of the future. But his interest in the
National Planning Committee (N.P.C.) seems to have evaporated.
Its reports, issued in 1938 and edited and published after the
War by its Secretary, K.T.Shah, were largely ignored. By
comparison with the Bhore Report, the N.P.C. report on Public
Health (N.P.C. 1946) was shorter, less well argued and costed,
and drew on far less detailed analysis of the existing situation.
Without the support of a secretariat, or any political powerbase
within the Congress Party, the N.P.C. Public Health report
disappeared with very few traces, and it was the Bhore report
which provided the framework for most health decision-making.
In many areas the two reports overlap. Both look towards a
socialised system of health services, in which the public sphere
dominates health provisions and eventually replace private
medical practice. Bhore expressed this in terms almost identical
to those of the Beveridge Report which foreshadowed the National
Health Service in the U.K. - that "no individual should be unable
to secure adequate medical care because of inability to pay for
it" (G.O.I. 1 946, Vol. 11:17). The Bhore and N.P.C. reports also
support the development of insurance-based services for
industrial workers, but accept that this is impractical for the
mass of the Indian population in the foreseeable future.
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Both reports pointed to the significance of nutrition and
general living standards as the major determinants of health, and
argued that preventive measures should be most important. Both
saw the integration of preventive and curative services, provided
by a full-time salaried cadre of workers, as the way to achieve
this, and they also called for Government doctors to lose their
rights to private practice. Bhore argued for this on unusual
grounds which came close to advocating a new medical police:
"Medical supervision of work and play, of the food that
people eat, of public provision for rest and
recuperation as well as periodical medical examination
and the rectification of faulty modes of life will be
some of the many new duties that the physician of the
future will be called upon to undertake. Our view
therefore is that the national health organisation will
tend to become a whole-time salaried service devoting
itself to the development of the health of the people."
(G.O.I. 1946 Vol. II: 28)
The crucial position of rural provision was also common
ground: in Bhore's words, "it is the tiller of the soil on whom
the economic structure of the country eventually rests" (ibid:
4). Bhore also accepted that services should be as close to the
people as possible. Both proposed a system of health centres in
the villages, linked to larger units at district level, though
they differed in the details of how many were to be provided for
a given size of population. The Bhore report specified in much
more detail not just desirable staffing levels over a 30-40 year
period, but also suggested a strategy for the shorter-term, the
first 10 years. Both reports called for a substantial increase in
the amount of public money allocated to health matters, but
stressed that a shortage of trained personnel would be a major
constraint.
Finally, both reports saw the need for health education - to
change the habits of mind and ways of life of the mass of the
population - and the need to engage the co-operation of the
villagers in the work which was needed. The example of Soviet
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health committees was cited by the Bhore report, based on an
article by Henry Sigerist on the Soviet health service, and
suggested that pioneer work at Singur, in Bengal, was proof of
the possibility of it working in India.
The differences appear particularly in the topics which
Bhore covered and the N.P.C. did not; and in one key area, that
of medical manpower, which both discussed. Bhore urged the
establishment of special campaigns against specified diseases, in
particular malaria, tuberculosis, V.D. and leprosy, whereas the
N.P.C. report was silent on these 'vertical' campaigns. The area
of dispute was over who were the priority categories of personnel
for training, and what was the proper role of semi-trained
villagers and indigenous medical practitioners. These manpower
issues will be addressed directly in chapter 9: here I will only
note that although Bhore was willing to float the idea of 'health
assistants' to relieve medical men of some of their curative and
preventive duties, he saw no role for part-time health workers,
who were the 'cornerstone' of the N.P.C. proposals.
THE CENTRAL COUNCIL OF HEALTH
Both sets of proposals, then, envisaged a much higher degree
of conscious planning of the future pattern of health services
than had been characteristic of the British period. But the
framework for health policy-making after Independence was
constrained by essentially the same Federal structure as that
created by the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, amended to a
small extent by the 1935 Government of India Act. This structure
gave primary responsibility in health matters to the States. The
Centre kept control over international aspects - quarantine etc.
- and over a limited range of all-India matters, including the
regulation of standards of medical education (to permit medical
personnel to practise throughout the country) and the control of
communicable diseases.
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There were two mechanisms by which the Central Government
could hope to integrate health policy in the States: through the
financial incentives it could offer through the Plans, and by
persuasion through the Central Council of Health (C.C.H.). The
C.C.H. (and, in Family Planning matters, for a while in the 1 970s
the Central Council of Family Planning, later combined with the
C.C.H. into a C.C.H.and F.W. [Family Welfare]) consists of health
officials and ministers which meets annually to discuss health
policy. It grew out of less formal meetings of a body established
in 1937, called the Central Advisory Board for Health. This did
not meet very often, and was replaced in 1946 by a Conferences of
Health Ministers. After the third Conference, in 1950, the
Central Council of Health was established, with membership of the
Central Government and all the States, chaired by the Central
Minister of Health. The States are usually represented by a
contingent including a Minister, some generalist civil servants
from the Health Ministry, and their main technical advisers from
their Health Directorates. They are supplemented by a changing
body of observers, usually including representatives from other
cognate Ministries, the President of the Medical Council of
India, a representative from the Planning Commission, someone
from the major International agencies (W.H.O.; U.N.I.C.E.F.) and
during the 1950's and early 1960's, people from the U.S. aid
agencies, not only from the U.S. Government but also from Ford
and Rockefeller Foundations. The agenda is largely set by the
Central Health Ministry, though States can propose items, but it
was made clear at the second meeting of the Council that, as far
as the States were concerned, the conclusions or motions passed
by the C.C.H. were only advisory and could not be binding on the
States (G.O.I. [C.C.H.] 1954). The weakness of Central control
which this exposed led some (including the Health Survey and
Planning Committee [G.O.I. 1962:46-7 & 463-476]) to reiterate
calls for an All-India cadre of medical administrators to replace
the I.M.S .
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The next six chapters are concerned with health policy¬
making after 1947. Once again the guiding themes will be drawn
from the critical literature on health services in the Third
World - a literature which is concerned to explain the
'inappropriateness' of health services through a political
economy of policy-making. The criticism of inappropriateness is
-
(
one which has been levelled for many years within aspects of
nationalist critiques of colonial rule, and since 1965 it has
become increasingly common in discussions of health service
delivery in the Third World (e.g. Bryant, 1969; Morley, 1972).
Since 1975 it has been the formal orthodoxy of the international
health establishment (e.g. Djukanovic and Mach, 1975; Newell
C e d. ] 1975; World Bank, 1980). However, the arguments I shall
mostly be concerned with have taken these criticisms one stage
further, by claiming that this mismatch between health 'needs'
and health services can be explained through an understanding of
class structures and the world economy (e.g. Navarro, 1975;
Doyal, 1979).
Essentially, the argument I will be confronting is as
follows. Health services in India, as in other parts of the Third
World, are poorly articulated with the health needs of the people
because they received a colonial heritage of health provisions
which was racially skewed and focussed on curative services in
the interests of larger colonial interests - particularly social
control. In addition, the dependency relationships established
under colonialism entailed wholesale borrowings of models of
health care which v/ere unsuited for local conditions, often
making health a 'commodity'. The class structure within medicine,
and which medicine served, did not disappear overnight with the
end of colonial rule but continued to subvert attempts to change.
An established medical profession used its power to maintain its
own rewards and its access to a world market, and its class links
helped to recreate the same imbalances which characterised
colonial medicine. International 'aid' ana the operations of
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multinational companies (especially in the pharmaceutical
industry) reinforced these tendencies, leaving a contemporary
situation in which, while the rhetoric changes, the reality is
one in which mortality and morbidity experiences for the mass of
the population are little different from what they were at
Independence.
To a considerable extent, these arguments rest on material
gathered from Africa and Latin America (e.g. Frankenberg and
Leeson, 1974; Navarro, 1974; Segal, 1972; Doyal, 1979). But
several authors have been prepared to extend these critiques to
the Indian case. Thus critics of the patterns of public
expenditure on health services in underdeveloped countries have
not only argued that relatively little is spent on health, but
also that urban, curative, tertiary services have received undue
support. The chorus of criticism has swollen since 1970, and
received the support of international institutions from 1975
onwards. For example, the U.N.I.C.E.F. / W.H.O. joint study
(Djukanovich & Mach, 1975) argued
'Owing to the high cost of sophisticated equipment and
other requirements, it tends to absorb, for the benefit
of a minority of the population, a substantial share of
limited resources ... curative services, and, more
generally, personal services, tend to receive undue
emphasis .. In many developing countries over half the
national health budget is spent on health care in urban
areas, the home of no more than a fifth of the total
population.' (pp. 15 & 18)
Writers on the Indian pattern of public health expenditures
have tended to assume that this picture also applies there. Thus
Cassen, in the most substantial discussion of India's population
in a social and economic context which has yet appeared, argues
'India's health system shares several features of the
pattern of health services in other developing countries
(including) a large share of health budgets devoted to
major hospitals in urban centres and a consequent
relative neglect of the rural health infrastructure.'
(Cassen, 1978: 201)
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As I will argue in chapter 6, the evidence for this claim is
very poor. But other aspects of India's health services have been
vigorously attacked by senior Indian commentators; indeed, it is
hard to find anyone with a good word to say about them. Only the
Government and official publications dwell on the positive
aspects of what has been achieved by the expenditures and
personnel described in Chapters 6 and 9. One example which gives
more credit than most is the report of a joint study group of the
Indian Councils of Social Science and Medical Research
(Ramalingaswami, 1980:5):
It is obvious that there are several achievements to our
credit such as reduction in mortality rates or increase
in expectancy of life at birth; the expansion of medical
research and education; the expansion of the health care
services including especially the establishment of the
Primary Health Centres; the excellence of our
specialised institutions; the control of communicable
diseases like smallpox, cholera, plague and malaria; the
provision of MCH services on a larger scale; the
initiation of a family planning programme; and the
investment of far larger funds than at any time in the
past. '
However, the report goes on to argue that the weaknesses are
greater still, and in Part B I will be looking at the evidence
for these failings. In general, there is a shortage of good
research on what happens in health service institutions in India:
we are rather better served with anthropological accounts of how
people organise their own health care in the absence of health
services, or when they are seen to be irrelevant (e.g. Carstairs,
1 956) .
Nonetheless, the following criticisms are often levelled at
health institutions and their workers:
1. Health services are not integrated with wider economic
and social development;
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2. Virtually no impact has been made on basic aspects of
disease prevention and health maintenance, such as nutrition and
environmental sanitation;
3. The most vulnerable social groups remain largely excluded
from health services provisions, whether vulnerability is
indicated by poverty, age, sex, geographical isolation or other
factors such as occupation which increase the levels of disease
and illness;
4. Health education is virtually non-existent; and
5. The goal of participatory involvement remains a chimera.
These points can be summed up in the words of the joint study
quoted above (ibid:6):
'The imported and inappropriate model of health services
in top-heavy, over-centralised, heavily curative in its
approach, urban and elite oriented, costly and
dependency creating. The serious shortcomings of the
model cannot be cured by small tinkerings or well-meant
reforms.'
As I have argued elsewhere (Jeffery, 1982), some o'f these
views stem directly from the perspective usually associated with
Ivan Illich, in the attempt to promote a move away from a
'doctor-centred' approach to health services and to return
'health' to the 'people'. Other criticisms are based on the
presumption that the health services being offered are, in
principle, desirable, but they are not reaching the groups who
need them most. It is possible to develop the distinction further
and argue that for some people, (Illich, 1975; Srivastav, 1975)
modern medicine itself is the culprit, while for others (Navarro,
1972; Banerji, 1983) it is the capitalist nature of Indian
society which distorts the potentially scientific contribution of
medicine. The Ramalingaswara i report cited earlier attempts, not
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very successfully, to bridge these divisions, while remaining
within an administrative framework which calls for yet more
'programmes' without providing an account of how the failures of
past programmes are to be avoided.
The following chapters are designed to illuminate these
arguments as they apply to India. Chapter 5 complements Chapter 1
by looking at the evidence for changes in health status over the
period since 19^7, and the different patterns which have emerged.
Chapter 6 is concerned to establish the patterns of public sector
expenditures in health. This picture is complicated by different
financial heads under which the expenditures take place - Plan
and non-Plan, Central and State - and by varying treatment of
health-related expenditures such as family planning, water supply
and sanitation. My underlying assumption is that these
expenditures are meaningful - that money is spent in the ways in
which accountants say it has been spent. As with all such
discussions, however, we cannot assume that the expenditures
achieve what they are supposedly designed to achieve - declining
birth rates may result more from educational expenditures than
from family planning, for example. But the purpose of the chapter
is to establish the framework of what has been spent.
Chapters 7 and 8 will look at two aspects of the politics
of medical policy-making - the role of internal pressures,
particularly the impact of the Indian Medical Association, and
the impact of international pressures, mediated in particular
through foreign aid, pharmaceutical companies, and medical
migration.
Chapter 9 focusses in more detail on policy with respect to
medical and paramedical personnel, on the grounds that decisions
about who to train and employ produce major constraints on
policy. In a sense, the different models of health care proposed
imply certain balances of personnel - 'appropriate' models
implying a broad-based pyramid, 'inappropriate' ones a top-heavy
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pyramid. Training decisions, while not always taken with these
models in mind, thus do tend to generate one or other model or
some balance of them: when the sacking of staff is difficult, ana
salaries take a substantial part of the budget, (as in India)
then decisions about personnel take on a central significance.
Chapter 10 looks at evidence on processes within health
sector institutions - what goes on in the hospitals, medical
colleges, and health centres, and in the 'field'. In other words,
to assess the impact and significance of health services it is
not enough to know how many health centres have been built, how
many staff have been employed, or how much money has been spent,
but we also need to have some idea of the social organisation of
these resources. The most common distinctions made here relate to
the extent to which the health services are active or merely
reactive - to what extent do they search for disease, or do they
merely wait for it to reach the health unit? The second kind of
question involves the differential access of different social
groups. Particularly in conditions of severe shortages, and where
there are no formal rationing mechanisms, resources flow to some
groups and away from others. This chapter describes the limited
evidence on these two issues.
The final chapter will consider some of the possible impacts
on the health of the Indian people of the matrix of policy which
has emerged, and evaluate the significance of the 'new




HEALTH AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA AFTER 1947
Many societies in the Third World have experienced ..
substantial declines of mortality since the Second World War (if
not before) and these have come at much lower levels of living,
and much more quickly, than was predicted on the basis of the the
historical experiences of developed countries. It tends to be
assumed that mortality decline in poor countries responds more to
improvements in living conditions than to other changes: yet over
this period, living standards, at least as measured by
conventional indicators of economic growth, have not improved
dramatically and in some cases have been stable or have declined.
The most frequent explanation for this pattern is the
availability now of powerful techniques to attack the
transmission of many of the common diseases of poverty, such as
malaria, cholera, or smallpox, whereas in the case of the
industrialised countries, these diseases gave way to the more
general improvements in living standards, hygiene, or in
environmental health provisions such as protected water supplies.
However, it has also been argued recently that there is a limit
to the possibilities provided by disease-specific health policies
- a limit set by poverty (Ruzicka and Hansluwka, 1982).
This chapter will argue that the available evidence does
suggest a steady decline in mortality in India since 1947,
despite the slow fall in a major component, infant mortality. The
expectation of life at birth has risen throughout this period,
and life expectancy at age 5 has risen more decisively still.
There seems little evidence that mortality might not continue to
fall over the immediate future. Yet this has happened when
poverty indicators show no overall decline (despite a rise in the
per capita national income); the degree of inequality in
consumption has not noticeably fallen; unemployment has risen ana
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so has landlessness; and indicators of nutritional status
continue to show a very poor general level. Because indicators of
specific infectious diseases show dramatic declines (especially
in malaria and smallpox, but also in plague and cholera) there is
a temptation to conclude that it is the specific programmes to
control these diseases which have caused the decline in
mortality. Yet this conclusion flies in the face of most
assessments of the pattern of Indian public health provisions,
which have pointed to their urban, curative bias, and to the
inadequacies of single-disease programmes in improving public
health.
To begin with, I shall consider the evidence on changes in
mortality in general, and on infant mortality in particular (as
the best available proxy for morbidity) for different groups in
Indian society. I will then consider the evidence for social and
economic development in India since Independence in 1947, with
particular emphasis on evidence for the differential impact of
such changes on men and women, on different regions, on urban as
against rural populations, and on different economic groups.
Finally, I will briefly assess some explanations for these
patterns. Material will be drawn particularly from the period
since 1970, the years in which statistics of mortality, nutrition
and living standards have become available in more reliable and
detailed forms. The general model behind this account is the same
as that for Chapter 1 - that health services not only respond to
a (distorted) disease reality but also modify that reality,
though rarely in a direct and clear-cut way. An understanding of
patterns of health and illness cannot be based on the impacts of
health services alone, but must be seen in terms of changes in




Most commentators agree that mortality rates have continued
to decline in India since Independence. The major debates are
about whether the timing of this decline is accurately
represented by the official estimates; whether the decline in
infant mortality follows that of general mortality or not;
whether the position of females has deteriorated, relative to
that of males; how mortality has declined in different parts of
India; and what can reasonably be held to explain the different
patterns of mortality decline.
•The simplest measure of mortality, the Crude Death Rate, as
estimated from Census returns, has declined about 40%, from about
27 per 1 000 population in 1941/51 to about 16 or 17 in 1971/81
(Ruzicka, 1984:14; Jain & Adlakha, 1984:51). Figures for Infant
Mortality Rates also suggest a decline, but a less rapid one, of
about 25%, from 183 in 1941/51 to 132 in 1970/75 (Visaria and
Visaria, 1981). A more sophisticated indicator of mortality
decline is life expectancy at birth; official estimates suggest
that this has risen from about 32 years in 1941/51, to 50 years
in 1970/75. Table 1 lists a number of alternative estimates of
changes in crude death rates and life expectancy at birth; table
2 lists official figures for infant mortality rates.
These estimates (and others like them) were derived from the
censuses of 1 941, 1 951, 1 961, and 1971, and (for 1 970-75) from
the Sample Registration Scheme (S.R.S.), and they have different
weaknesses. All calculations using the Census make a number of
assumptions about how people may have wrongly stated their ages,
or those of their children or parents. Use of the 1941 and 1951
Censuses is additionally problematic because assumptions have to
be made about who died or migrated during Partition. Visaria
(1969) argued that the life expectancy figures based on the
1951/1961 censuses overestimated life-expectancy at birth by as
much as 4 years; Dyson (1979) similarly cast doubt on the
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apparent decline in infant mortality implied by the 1961/1971
calculations. These uncertainties affect the estimates of
mortality decline, and account for the different figures in Table
1. The major component in high mortality rates in India has
always been the high level of infant mortality, and considerable
doubt has been cast on the rates predicted from the inter-censal
comparison (see Table 2).
TABLE 1
ESTIMATES OF MORTALITY DECLINE
1941/50 to
1951/60















Changes in Life Expectancy at birth
MALES
Official life tables +9.4 years




Official life tables +8.9 years
Visaria (1969)/Dyson (1979) +5.3 years
+4.1 years
+7.7 years
Source: Ruzicka (1984:14); for 1961/70 to 1971/80 the figure is
derived from the S.R.S. average for the 9 years 1970-78, reported
in Visaria & Visaria (1981), ana excludes Bihar and West Bengal.
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TABLE 2
OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF INFANT MORTALITY RATES
Rural Urban Combined
Mai e Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Totai
1941/50 — n. a. — — n. a . _ 1 90 175 182
1951/60 - n. a. - - n. a. - 153 138 1 46
1961/70 If n. a. If It n. a. If 130 128 1 29
1 97 2/73 141 152 1 46 86 87 87 132 141 136
1977/78 133 1 44 138 75 76 76 1 23 133 1 28
Source: Ruzicka, 1984:18; Visaria & Visaria, 1981. The first
three rows are derived from intercensal calculations, possibly
using survey data from 1 958-5 9 and from the S.R.S. data for 1968
onwards; the fourth and fifth rows are averages for the two years
quoted, and are derived entirely from S.R.S. estimates.
Dyson (1979) and Visaria and Visaria (1981) all argue that
the estimates of I.M.R. for the 1 96 0's are too low; Dyson, for
example, suggests figures of 146 (male) and 156 (female). There
are two main points at issue. In the first place, the inter¬
censal estimates produce higher male I.M.R.s than female ones.
This is implausible, since all the other evidence (from careful
studies such as the Khanna project in Punjab, or from the S.R.S.
figures from the 1970's) is that female death rates up to age 10
are higher than male rates, especially in the populous North
Indian States which dominate the all-India figures. Secondly, if
the S.R.S. estimates are reasonably accurate (as seems likely on
the whole) then they imply a rise in I.M.R. between 1961/71 and
1970-75. However, the Crude Death Rate in this period seems to
have fallen, which is surprising since the I.M.R. is a major
contributor to the overall death rate in India.
But if the Crude Death Rate has not fallen very much since
the mid-1960's, there is something wrong with either the Census
results or estimates of fertility. The Censuses seem to show a
similar population growth rate between 1961 and 1971 as between
169
1971 and 1981 - yet there is considerable evidence that the other
side of the equation (fertility) has declined. Jain & Adlakha
( 1 984) estimate that the Crude Birth Rate fell by between 8 and
14% between 1 97 2 and 1 978 (using two national surveys) and the
S.R.S. shows a decline in rural C.B.R. over the same period of
11% (Sample Registration Bulletin, 1982). If fertility declined
and mortality did not, population growth must have been lower
after 197 1 than before it. The only ways to square this circle
are by arguing either that mortality rates were higher in the
1960s than official estimates suggested, or that the 1971 census
under-counted the population by more than either the 1961 or 1981
Censuses did, or both. Thus population growth was probably higher
in 1961-71 than previously thought (not 2.2% but perhaps 2.4% per
year) and population growth between 1971 and 1981 was less than
previously thought (not 2.2% but perhaps 2.0% per year)(Jain and
Adlakha, 1984:52). (They note an additional complication: if the
number of births has dropped then the relative significance of
infant mortality in total mortality will also have declined.)
Taking all these points together, it seems likely that
mortality declined between 1945 and 1955 at much the same rates
as during the previous 20 years, but that there was an
acceleration between about 1955 and 1965, followed by ten years
when mortality may not have declined at all. There is evidence
that mortality decline has resumed since then, with 19B\-a C.X3.
rates recorded by the S.R.S. 2.0% lower than those of 1 975-7.
But these patterns of mortality decline are not common to
all parts of the country, to both sexes, or to all ages. In
general, mortality decline seems to have been faster in areas
with already low mortality rates (particularly in the south of
the country), faster in rural areas than in urban ones, more
rapid for men than for women, and for urban children (especially




The patterns of mortality and mortality decline by States
for the 1970s, the earliest period for which reasonably reliable
figures seem to be available, show considerable variations. In
general, Table 3 shows that the States of the Centre-North (U.P.,
Bihar, M.P. and Rajasthan) are ones where poverty and other
features of the social organisation (low literacy rates, and
poorer general social infrastructure) go together and help to
explain high mortality rates which are declining slowly. Much
lower mortality rates can be found in the relatively affluent
north-west (Punjab and Haryana), in Maharashtra, and in some of
the southern States (Kerala and Karnataka). But these States with
low mortality rates include some very wealthy ones (Punjab,
Haryana and Maharashtra) as well as Karnataka and Kerala, which
are much poorer. In addition, Maharashtra, Kerala and Karnataka
have high levels of inequality, indicated by their high 'poverty'
proportions, compared with Punjab and Haryana, and other health
indicators (such as nutrition data) do not seem to correlate very
closely with levels or speed of decline of mortality, at least in
the 1 970s. In general, very little of the variation in the
decline in mortality rates by States can be understood in terms
of conventional measures of income and inequality. It is also
clear from Table 4 that there is considerable stability in the
ranking of States: ranks at the beginning of the 1970's are much
the same as those at the end, and the range of variation about
the All-India mean changes relatively little.
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TABLE 3
ESTIMATES OF CRUDE DEATH RATES, PER CAPITA INCOMES, POVERTY AND
NUTRITION, FOR MAJOR STATES
Crude Death Rate Per Capita Income Poverty Nutritional
1971-3 %age Decline 1971 % age Rise Percentage Ranking
















































































































Sources: i&gJLsiX.aJkiiJU > Vol XVI, No.1, June 1 982,
for Columns 1 & 2; £ui,liJ2£ Q1 InL1Z&Z, Tor-
columns 3-5; C. Gopalan, 'Development and Deprivation', E^B^W^,
Vol XVIII, No. 51, December 1983, for column 6.
Note: Per capita incomes are in current prices; nutritional
ranking is based on the percentage of households with diets
inadequate in calories, protein or both, and is only available
for the eight States ranked.
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TABLE 4
CHANGES IN CRUDE DEATH RATES FOR MAJOR STATES, 1970/72 to 1978/80
C . D. R . 1 978/80 o c °fas /o 1 978/80 as %
1978/80 of 1970/72 of all India
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
SOUTH
Andhra 13.5 7 .9 82 74 105 92
fCarnataka 12.0 7.1 91 97 85 83
Kerala 7.0 6 .6 85 85 49 77
Tamil Nadu 13.4 8.7 78 95 94 101
EAST
Assam 12.1 7.2 67 73 85 84
Orissa 14.9 9.3 84 83 105 108
W. Bengal 12.8 7.0 n. a. 74 90 81
WEST
Gujarat 13.5 10.1 77 80 95 1 17
Maharashtra 11 .4 7.8 83 82 80 91
CENTRE-NORTH
Bihar 15.3 7.8 94 82 1 08 91
M. P. 16.3 9.3 91 87 115 108
Raj asthan 14.9 9.3 85 97 105 1 08
U.P. 18.6 11 .5 79 95 131 134
NORTH-WEST
Haryana 12.4 8.3 89 95 87 97
Punjab 10.5 8.0 85 91 74 93
ALL-INDIA 14.2 8.6 83 85 1 00 1 00
Source: jLafflflle JtefiiakEAtifliJ £iLLLeiLiJ3 June 1 982.
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Similar patterns appear if States are compared with respect
to changes in infant mortality, though Dyson's estimates show
some very surprising features, such as the low estimates for
Bihar and the very high ones for Gujarat. As Table 5 shows, the
rate of decline of I.M.R. varies substantially, with decline in
Kerala being the fastest, from an already low level.
DIFFERENTIALS BY SEX
It has been argued (I.C.S.S.R., 1975) that females have not
benefitted as much as males from the decline in mortality since
the 1940s. Here the evidence from different indicators, such as
the inter-censal estimates of life expectancy at different ages
(Table 6), the sex ratio (Table 7), and from S.R.S. estimates of
mortality at different ages (Table 8) is inconsistent. The sex-
ratio figures suggest a deteriorating relative position of
females, but the S.R.S. figures suggest that females, at least
those who reach the age of 10, are improving their relative
position. Sex differentials vary regionally. Table 5 shows the
variation in sex differential in infant mortality. The southern
and western States generally show male rates only slightly below
fern ale ones, or above female rates, whereas the northern States
show female rates considerably above the male ones. These figures
are not strictly comparable, since Dyson's figures are estimated
using a variety of sources and making a number of assumptions
about model populations, and he notes that figures for some
States seem to be unusual. However, the overall picture is
probably fairly reliable despite raising yet more problems of
consistency. It would seem that the decline in infant mortality
for females is almost exactly the same as the decline in the rate
for males over the 10 year period, yet most States (including the




INFANT MORTALITY RATES FOR MAJOR STATES, 1968 to 1978
c 1 96 8 1 972 1978 1978/68
Male Female Male Female Male Female M F
SOUTH
Andh ra 133 113 123 108 1 29 93 97 82
Karnataka 117 106 107 88 82 67 70 63
Kerala 75 62 64 61 38 40 51 65
Tamil Nadu 1 42 128 122 121 107 99 75 81
EAST
Assam 1 49 125 1 49 1 24 130 1 05 87 84
Orissa 1 92 179 1 26 136 128 139 67 78
West Bengal* 78 79 n. a. n. a. 83 73 106 92
WEST
Gujarat 193 222 1 34 1 22 1 1 4 1 23 59 55
Maharashtra 119 123 100 103 81 69 68 56
CENTRE-NORTH
Bihar* 88 93 n. a. n. a. 92 95 1 05 1 02
Madhya Pradesh 151 151 152 161 141 128 93 85
Raj asthan 199 229 1 1 1 137 1 24 1 34 62 59
Uttar Pradesh 210 259 186 220 154 1 80 73 69
NORTH-WEST
Ha ry ana 79 86 80 11 1 101 119 1 28 138
Punjab 110 125 108 130 104 101 95 81
ALL-INDIA 1 46 156 132 1 48 1 20 131 82 84
Source: 1968 figures are by Dyson, 1979; 1972 and 1978 figures
are from Registrar-General, 1983.
* Bihar and West Bengal figures are regarded as particularly
unreliable, both for 1972 (S.R.S.) and for the 1978 special
survey .







































































Source:For1941/51and61/71,R m&Schultz(79);f70 5- iJLDl.fi Ifi-gislXfillfifiS-U lf iif ,XVI,1,June982.
TABLE 7
SEX RATIO FOR MAJOR STATES, CENSUS YEARS





















































































Punjab J 850 858 864 867 '865 877886
ALL-INDIA 945 946 941 935 930
Source: Mitra, 1978:372-3; Tata, 1982.
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TABLE 8
AGE-SPECIFIC MORTALITY RATES IN RURAL INDIA
Age Year
1968/9 1973 1978 1978/1968
M F M F M F M F
0-4 59 68 53 61 49 58 83 85
5-9 6 7 5 6 4 5 66 71
10-14 3 3 3 3 2 2 66 66
15-19 2 4 3 4 2 3 100 75
20-24 3 5 3 5 3 5 100 1 00
25-29 3 6 3 6 4 5 133 83
30-34 4 6 5 6 4 4 1 00 66
35-39 6 6 6 6 5 5 83 83
40-44 8 8 8 7 8 7 100 88
45-49 13 9 12 9 11 8 85 89
50-54 18 15 18 13 18 13 1 00 87
55-59 25 19 26 21 27 21 108 111
6 0-6 4 42 39 45 36 44 33 1 05 85
65-69 56 52 57 54 5 8 49 104 94
70 & over 118 11 5 117 1 12 11 0 107 93 93
All ages 18 20 17 18 15 16 83 80
Sources: C a s se n 1978:115; SjJBXlX JSullxiix xvi , 1,
12, June 1982.
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If the information on trends in mortality is confusing, that
on morbidity and the causes of death, and how they have changed
since 1947, a>"e even poorer. I shall first discuss the levels and
changes in infant and child morbidity and mortality, and then
deal with adult morbidity and mortality.
INFANT AND CHILD MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
Infant and child mortality is by far the most important
source of death. In the 1970s about 30$ of all deaths recorded by
the S.R.S. were of infants, and another 20$ of children under the
age of 5 (G.O.I., 1983:43). This varies somewhat by State, with
Kerala at one extreme,- where only 18$ of all deaths are of
infants, and Uttar Pradesh at the other, with infant deaths 38$
of all those recorded.
Infant and child mortality can be divided into two major
groups - neo-natal (within the first month of life) and post-neo¬
natal mortality (after the first month but within the first
year). In very simple terms, most neo-natal mortality is a result
either of genetic defects (so that some analysts prefer to
combine them with sti11-births) or to infection or injury
received at the time of delivery. There are limits to the extent
that neo-natal mortality can be reduced, but in poor countries
most impact can be made by improving the mother's health during
pregnancy and the quality of midwifery services. In India,
evidence about neo-natal mortality is derived from the special
local studies (such as at Khanna, and at Narangwal, in Punjab) or
from the less reliable (but national) S.R.S. The latter source
suggests that in the early 1970s, neo-natal mortality was the
major part of infant mortality, taking over 50$ in both urban and
rural areas in each year (ibid:39). The one exception was Punjab,
where only 20$ of infant deaths were recorded as neo-natal. It is
not clear whether this means that the Khanna and Narangwal data
are entirely inapplicable to the rest of the country.
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The Khanna study suggested that neo-natal deaths were
largely a result of tetanus or septicemia, received because the
instrument used to cut the cord was not sterile (Wyon and Gordon,
1971). A study in Eastern U.P. in 1 973 also concluded that
tetanus was likely to be a major cause of neo-natal deaths
(Simmons et a 1., 1982). The main ways of preventing this are
either to inoculate the mother against tetanus before she gives
birth (the child is then protected) or by ensuring more hygienic
conditions at delivery. Both strategies have been attempted, but
there is really no evidence of their success, since they have
been introduced with some effort only since 1 977, and the
available S.R.S. and comparable data only go up to 1980. The
S.R.S. data show no trend for 1970 to 1977, but a decline in each
of the following years (Gopalan, 1985:160).
A secondary cause of early infant mortality is the poor
nutritional status of the mother. Gopalan (1985) summarises some
of the scanty information concerning maternal nutrition. Risks of
complications during pregnancy and delivery, and of delivering
low birth weight babies who are less likely to thrive, are
closely related to maternal weight and height. Using a weight
cut-off band of 38 kgs. (83 lbs.), and a height cut-off of 145
cms. (just under 4 ft.), he presents data which suggest that
around 20% of women in the reproductive age-groups are badly at
risk in pregnancy. The variations by State do not conform with
expectations however: Kerala, with low infant mortality rates,
has more 'at risk' women, calculated in this way, than does U.P.
The explanation for this seems likely to be that U.P. women give
birth more often, and higher parity children are generally at a
greater risk. One reason for this increased risk is that older
women, in all States, are lighter than younger women. Some of
this may be accounted for by nutritional improvement over the
past 30 years, since older women are also shorter, but this only
accounts for some of the difference. The experience of
childbearing is a significant nutritional drain on women who
start the process under-nourished. In part, this is because they
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seem able to breast-feed their babies relatively successfully, at
the cost of their own long-term survival. Again, there is some
regional variation - smaller, lighter women in the Calcutta
region were less able to breastfeed successfully than were those
around Bombay, in one study.
Factors like these would be expected to lead to high
maternal mortality rates. The evidence for this is very poor, but
a commonly-accepted estimate is that of a rate about 400 per
1 00,000 live births in 1 970-72 (ibid:164) , around 40 times the
level in Western Europe. There are no estimates of regional
variation or of variations by age or parity or social class. The
best proxy is differential age-specific mortality rates. During
the reproductive years, f em ale rates are higher than male rates,
and for some States and some years, are twice male rates (e.g.
in 1 980, in U.P. and M.P., ages 15 —30)(ibid:162). Kerala is one
of the few States where female rates are below male rates at all
ages, which is the pattern in most of the rest of the world.
Maternal nutrition, then, has an impact on infant and child
mortality, not just in the first month of life (small babies are
less likely to survive the traumas of birth) but also after the
first month, when mortality tends to relate closely to infection
and nutrition - often both working together. The most common kind
of fatal infection among infants is pneumonia, or
bronchopneumonia, which account for up to 2 5% of all infant
deaths in some years (Mitra, 1978:176-7; Arora et al., 1979:296).
The link with nutrition is most obvious in some of the other
causes of death - especially aiarrhoeal ana parasitic diseases,
which may account for another 15% of infant deaths, and a larger
share of deaths of children aged 1 to 5 (ibid.).
The proper measures of nutritional adequacy, and therefore
the most accurate estimates of the extent of malnutrition, have
been hotly debated in India in the past 10 years (Payne 1984).
This debate has considerable policy significance, since the
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Indian estimates of poverty level are based in part on the income
required in order to buy a diet which is nutritionally adequate.
(See further below.) One of the points at issue is whether or not
mean figures for nutritional requirements (in, for example,
calories) should be used. By this process at least 40? of the
Indian population is in 'absolute poverty', apparently unable to
get access to enough food to maintain themselves. Yet it is clear
that people do stay alive in these circumstances, and so it has
been suggested that the mean figures are unrealistic. There seems
to be considerable variation in people's ability to maintain
themselves on given food intakes; and nobody receives the 'mean'
amount, if only because food is not distributed 'fairly' within
the household.
The extent of individual variation is obviously crucial,
and there seems to be considerable evidence that individuals of
similar age, height, weight and patterns of activity may have
very different nutritional needs. If this individual variation is
recognised, and estimates of 'minimum requirements' are reduced,
then estimates of 'absolute poverty' can also be reduced, since
some of those 'absolutely poor' under the first procedure are
actually able to get enough food for their own metabolism to
maintain them in a relatively stable position. That is, some
people may be 'naturally small', and this can be seen as a
beneficial pattern of adjustment rather than an unhealthy result
of inadequate nutrition which weakens people and makes them more
vulnerable to infection and early death (Cassen, 1978:98). But
this alternative procedure underestimates the numbers not
receiving a nutritionally adequate diet, since some of those in
wealthier households will nevertheless not receive enough food to
eat; and others with enough food will not be well-nourished,
either because disease weakens their ability to use the food they
eat, or because they eat an unsatisfactory diet, or they may be
well nourished at some times of the year and not at others.
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This debate is, finally, rather arid. Nobody denies that
very many, perhaps most, Indians do not have enough to eat. As
Banerji argues, it is perhaps worth asking people to assess their
nutritional position in these terms (Banerji, 1982). Attempting
to refine estimates of malnutrition from the kind of data
currently available (household, or per capita) seems to be wasted
effort (Cassen, 1978:104). However, two points do emerge from the
more detailed evidence. The first is that children under the age
of two are likely to be under-nourished even in families with
adequate purchasing power: Cassen cites studies in Tamil Nadu,
Punjab, Kerala and Calcutta which provide evidence supporting
this conclusion. A combination of late weaning, unsuitable
weaning foods, and weanling diarrhoea probably accounts for this-
finding. The second point is that a large proportion of Indian
babies have birth weights low enough to suggest that they start
their lives malnourished (about 25% below 2500 grams); and that
this is because their mothers are undernourished, and do not eat
enough in the last few months of their pregnancies to allow their
babies to grow adequately in the womb (ibid:104).
There is dispute about the appropriate nutritional standards
to use in assessing the weights of Indian children. Some argue
that international standards are too strict, while others argue
that affluent Indian children can grow according to those
standards and they should thus apply to India. But whichever
standard is chosen, it is clear that under-nutrition of children
is widespread in India, with one estimate of 85% of all children
under 5 (Gopalan, 1985:160). The extent of ^undernutrition
varies by State: U.P. seems to be one of the worst, with one
study showing 14% of all children 'severely malnourished'
(ibid.). In general, Gopalan argues that this under nourishment is
a result of the inadequacy of breast-milk: there is little
evidence that poor Indian women outside the major cities and
their surrounding areas are using commercial alternatives. The
main explanation of poor breastfeeding is the nutritional status
of the mother.
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Female babies and young children get even less,
proportionately, than do boys. The greatest differences are
usually to be found in North India, where sons are valued much
more highly than daughters. Thus in U.P., one study found 42% of
boys only mildly malnourished or better (by an international
standard), compared to only 30% of girls. Even in Madras, where
son-preferences are usually reckoned to be weaker than in North
India, a recent study showed 30% of boys normally nourished (by
an Indian standard), but only 20% of girls (ibid.).
The major consequences of poor nutritional status come from
interactions with infection (Scrimshaw et al.,1968). The
specifically childhood illnesses which can lead to death in
poorly-nourished children are diarrhoea and dysentery, and
diseases such as measles. Donoso (1979) suggests that 'weanling
diarrhoea' (that which accompanies the shift from a breast-fed
existence to a mixed diet) reaches its peak in the second six
months of life but continues at a high rate until about the end
of the third year. Using Khanna and Narangwal data, he suggests
that most mortality from weanling diarrhoea occurs in children
aged from 6 to 18 months, and that about 1 million children in
India die every year in this way ( ibid : 1 05). While malnutrition
does not directly cause these deaths, malnourished children are
more likely to become ill (especially those in unhygienic
conditions) and having fallen ill, to die.
ADULT MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
Adult mortality is usually discussed in terms of a few major
specific infectious diseases, though it is worth remembering that
some 6% of adult deaths could well be from violence or accidental
injuries (Cassen, 1978:108). The format in which 'cause of death'
is returned from States and Union Territories has reflected this
focus: as Mitra (1978:148) points out, the 'meaningful,
operational and c1 assificatori1y significant' categories are
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cholera, smallpox, plague, dysentery and diarrhoea, respiratory
diseases, fevers, accidents and injuries, and all others (which
are occasionally further classified to distinguish whooping
cough, diphtheria and maternal deaths). As some of these diseases
(such as smallpox) reduce in significance, so one would expect
causes such as cancer or heart disease to become more prominent,
but information on the epidemiology of these diseases in India is
much more difficult to find. The Model Registration Scheme, which
reports on a sample of some 20,000 deaths a year, is more
sophisticated, but considerable numbers of deaths are not
classified beyond a very general category ('fevers', 'cough') and
some of the distinctions seem implausible, given the problems of
data collection involved (Cassen, 1978:108).
The problem of high mortality in India has been seen in
terms of separate major infectious diseases, and this perception
played a dominant role in the planning of preventive health
campaigns in the 1950s. The major killers of the British period
were seen as plague, cholera, smallpox, malaria, and TB - with
influenza an occasional mass killer, as in 1918-19. Of these,
plague had virtually disappeared as a cause of mortality before
1947, and influenza has not received special attention, but each
of the others has formed the focus of single-disease campaigns.
Similar single-disease campaigns were used by the British (most
notably for smallpox). But it was the campaigns against malaria,
particularly those run by the W.H.0. U.S.A.I.D., and the
Rockefeller Foundation in the 1930s and the 1940s, which provided
more substantial models, since these agencies were crucial in
providing funding and technical support to the Indian campaigns.
The literature describing these diseases in India assumes a clear
relationship between the patterns of mortality and morbidity of
the disease and the progress of these individual disease-control
programmes, and I shall briefly describe these in turn, though a
more general discussion will be provided later on.
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LhQl££3 Cholera has historically been particularly concentrated
in certain parts of India - West Bengal, Orissa, Bihar and
Eastern U.P. in the East, Tamil Nadu and Andhra in the South-
East, and Assam in the North-East. This pattern hardly changed
from 1 900 to 1 965, with 12 districts in these areas being
responsible for nearly 40% of all reported cases between 1954 and
1964 (Mitra, 1978:152-3). In the late 1960s some new focal areas
developed - especially in Maharashtra, Gujarat and Kerala, with
some declines in the older focal areas. Some mechanisms of the
spread of cholera from its 'home' in the Ganges delta have been
much reduced since 1947, partly by strong controls over pilgrims
attending religious fairs (vaccination is nominally compulsory,
and water supplies have been greatly improved). The numbers
reported dying from cholera are now much reduced (possibly under
0.5% of all deaths, or less than 60,000 per year)(Cassen,
1978:84), and there seems to be some support for Mitra's
suggestion that the virulence of cholera has declined, without
any clear picture of why this might be. However, because cholera
can be transmitted from individuals who may have harboured the
disease for a month or more with no symptoms, it cannot be easily
excluded from an area, and often returns in flood or famine
situations. The basic conditions for its transference -
insanitary water supplies and food-handling conditions - remain,
unaffected by the cholera control programmes, though now perhaps
being affected by the rural water supply schemes which have been
a feature of the 1980s.
The level of smallpox mortality was lew by 1 947, though
the disease was still common. Smallpox came in periodic waves,
and during the early 20th century the peaks of these waves became
further and further apart, and lasted for shorter periods. After
1947 the same general trend continued, with only 1950-51 and
1957-8 recording relatively high incidence. Vaccination
operations continued to reduce the incidence of the disease, but
vaccination was not compulsory nor sufficiently widespread (e.g.
for children) to prevent new outbreaks. Vaccination was stepped
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up after 1962-63, when a Smallpox Eradication Programme was
established, but this too had only an indifferent record until
much more substantial international assistance was provided
through W.H.O. after an outbreak of smallpox following the 1971
War with Pakistan. The new strategy involved focussing all
efforts at surrounding the areas where smallpox was common and
achieving a much higher coverage of the population there, rather
than spreading the effort throughout the country (Basu et al.
1979). At this point there was an apparent increase in the
numbers of cases, though this probably reflects the improvement
in the reporting mechanisms, with over 30,000 deaths recorded in
1974, as against only 2,700 in 1971 (Mitra, 1978:160). This seems
to have been- the last flourish, with no new cases reported since
July 1 975.
In the 1940s it was estimated that there were about 75
million sufferers from malaria every year, with about 800,000
deaths a year (or perhaps 5 per 1000 population). This excluded
those who died from its associated complications, such as
pregnant women, or for those weakened by the disease who more
easily succumbed to something else (Dutt et al., 1980:320).
Pyrethrum had been used to spray breeding areas and house sites
before the War, and after 1946 this changed to the use of D.D.T.
An early example was in Bombay State, where by 1949 an estimated
500,000 cases a year were being prevented. W.H.O. ran
demonstration projects in other parts of the country, and in 1953
a national organisation was provided, with W.H.O. and U.S.A.I.D.
assistance, for malaria control. The apparent success of these
campaigns, and changes in W.H.O. strategy, led to a greater
effort in 1958, and a new goal, of eradication.
These programmes increased the amount of reporting of fever
cases, and provided a mechanism for assessing how many of these
w ere due to malaria; and they also collected other data on
malaria morbidity. These data suggested a steady decline in the
numbers with malaria, a decline which continued until 1965, when
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very few cases were reported, and hardly any deaths. Since then
reports of cases of malaria have risen steadily, and more rapidly
since 1975. Until recently, mortality from malaria has risen much
more slowly, but there are increasing reports which suggest that,
for a variety of reasons, more cases of malaria are leading to
death (Gill, 1985).
The usual reasons proposed to explain the apparent failure
of the eradication programme are as follows. In 1 965 (the year
when lowest morbidity was reported) D.D.T. supplies were
interrupted. There was a shortage of foreign exchange, caused by
the reduction of aid from the U.S. as a result of the Indo-
Pakistani War of that year, and two poor harvests. Supplies were
further disturbed by the cut in the health budgets while defence
expenditure rose over the next few years, and by the disruption
to trade through the Suez Canal after 1967.
But there were also problems internal to the Health
Ministry. The emphasis on preventive campaigns was difficult to
sustain in the face of apparent success, and the policy focus
shifted to population control. In addition, by 1965 most parts of
the country were in a 'consolidation phase'. This meant that the
special campaigns were wound down, and anti-malarial work was
passed to the normal health services. But the rural health
programme was lagging well behind the desired pattern (Dutt,
1980:321; Sinha, 1976:946-7). Harrison (1978:241-6) graphically
describes the problems of maintaining the quality of work from
the lowest category of staff. Spraying had to be done
conscientiously, problems were posed by locked houses or
unwilling villagers, or villages were inaccessible just at the
time of year when spraying was most required. Blood-slides had to
be collected routinely, and accurately assessed in time for new-
cases to be treated before they had a chance to spread the
disease to others. But the programme was funded to very tight
constraints, so that all workers had large areas or populations
to deal with, there was no allowance for staff illness, desertion
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or recalcitrance, and managers were always under pressure to wind
down the campaign for budgetary reasons. While the control of
malaria has probably quite wide margins of error, considerations
such as these probably meant that there were several areas where
pockets of malaria remained, some on the borders with Pakistan,
where comparable anti-malarial campaigns were not being waged.
There were other areas where malaria returned, but was not
recorded, and remedial measures were not undertaken. In 1965
there were three substantial areas - one, the Rann of Kutch, a
scene of fighting - which still contained untreated areas, and
the disease has spread out from these areas since then. Anti¬
malarial activity since 1970 has been additionally hindered by
problems of resistance to D.D.T., exacerbated by the use of
D.D.T. for agricultural purposes: D.D.T. resistance was not the
cause of malarial resurgence (Chapin and Wasserstrom, 1983).
XuJ2£££.iLl.il2iS In 1947, tuberculosis was probably second only to
malaria as a cause of death, and while malaria mortality has
dropped sharply, there seems little evidence for changes in the
level or virulence of T.B. It is mainly an adult disease, and for
age groups over 15 it may cause as much as 50% of the deaths
attributed to 'cough', or at least 10" of all adult deaths,
according to the Model Registration Scheme data (Mitra, 1 978:178 —
9; Cassen, 1978:107-9). Khanna Study data suggests that T.B. was
the third most important separate cause of death after diarrhoea
and pneumonia, which are more important for children (Wyon and
Gordon, 197 1).
The decline of T.B. in Europe was probably a result of both
improved nutrition and spreading immunity, but it is unlikely
that either of these is yet having any impact in India (Cassen,
1978:88-9). T.B. thrives in areas with poor nutrition, dense
housing, and migration patterns which help to spread the disease
- and none of these have been affected by the single-disease
campaigns which have dominated public health in India since
Independence. The National Tuberculosis Control Programme has
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been able to show no signs of success. One reason is that B.C.G.
vaccination may be almost totally useless - and this has been the
mainstay of the preventive and protective activity. But in
addition, T.B. control requires that cases are discovered,
complete a long course of treatment, and that the treatment is
effective. However, there is a tendency for most T.B. sufferers
to receive general treatment for 'cough' in the first instance.
They often fail to complete the full course of treatment, because
they feel much better long before the treatment is completed. As
a result they relapse and pass on the infection to others. They
can be treated at home as well as in a sanitarium, however
crowded or insanitary the home, as Fox demonstrated in the 1950s,
but the problem of ensuring completion of treatment remains
intractable. Finally, the treatment itself is probably only about
75% effective. It seems unlikely that the control of T.B. in
India is imminent.
diseases The other diseases with a significant contribution
to mortality are probably the other digestive diseases
(diarrhoea, dysentery, gastro-enteritis) and other respiratory
diseases (pneumonia, bronchopneumonia and bronchitis). The Khanna
study reported heart disease and cancer among the 'top ten'
causes of death, but national estimates, or ones more recent than
the 1950s, are absent. It is very difficult to get any assessment
of quantitative significance of these other causes of death. The
most important point to note is that the main causes of mortality
in India remain those infectious and water-borne diseases
characteristic of poverty. The factors which have reduced the
significance of some diseases (like smallpox and malaria) as
causes of death have not altered the broad outlines of morbidity
and mortality in any marked fashion, because they have
contributed very little to changes in the living conditions of
the mass of the Indian population. It is to an assessment of
these conditions that I will now turn.
189
CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF LIVING
The living standards of Indians is a topic which has been
much discussed, on the basis of relatively poor data. It is
possible to conclude with qualified optimism, from the kind of
data presented in Table 9, that average income levels are rising,
that the amount of food available in the country per head is
rising (if the 'right' years are used for comparisons) and that
the inequality of income in India is less than in many comparable
countries. On the other hand, a slightly different set of
indicators will show that the proportion of the population living
'below the poverty line' is stable or increasing, that
unemployment, poor housing, and other indicators of poverty show
no improvement, and that the lot of India's poor is deteriorating
in other ways as well.
One way of reconciling these two extreme views is by looking
at regional variations, since much of the improvement in income
levels can be accounted for by rises in a few States - notably
Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat and Maharashtra - whereas in the Hindi
heartland of U.P., Bihar, Rajasthan and M.P., per capita income
levels in the 1970s probably declined by about 35% (Bardhan,
1984:93). The mechanisms of changes in levels of income or wealth
inequalities are, however, poorly understood, (ibid:94). There is
little agreement , for example, about the impact of new-
agricultural technologies on income inequalities or the level of
poverty, particularly in wheat-growing areas, let alone the
likely changes suggested by any emerging trends. I do not intend
























































































































Table 9 summarises some of the key indicators of changes in
national levels of living. National Income has risen rapidly (in
historical terms) with growth in five-year periods not less than
2.2® per annum, which is roughly the growth rate of population.
At constant prices, national income in 1982 was about three times
its level in 1950, and even per capita incomes were over 50%
higher. The economy is still heavily dependent on agriculture,
with successful crop seasons leading to higher economic growth,
and vice versa, and within agriculture output has risen, rapidly
in some crops (notably, wheat), more slowly in others (such as
rice), and has shown no growth trend for others (like the
pulses). Taking all sources of foodgrains together (making
allowance for changes in Government stocks, imports and exports,
but not changes in private stocks), per capita availability has
risen by about 12% between 1 950 and 1 982, but the situation has
fluctuated, and the peak levels reached in 1961, and again in
1978, has not been sustained. More importantly, the share of the
pulses (which are nutritionally very significant in the diets of
the poor) has declined to little more than half its earlier
level. Other indicators, particularly of urban consumption,
suggest more steady increases, as in electricity use or in man-
made fabrics, but the latter has been at the cost of cotton
goods.
Estimates of the distribution of increased incomes and
com sumption are derived largely from the successive rounds of the
National Sample Survey. The classic studies using this source
date from 1970, and draw on survey results from 1956-57 onwards.
The most recent figures are from the 1977-78 survey. In
principle, then, it should be possible to describe what has
happened to the Indian population over this 20 year period and
answer three questions: has the distribution of income become
more or less equitable? has the population below an appropriate
poverty line increased or fallen? and have the incomes of the
poorest groups risen or fallen in absolute terms? (Cassen,
1978:237).
However, using this material seems to pose more problems
than it solves. Firstly, collecting income information by survey
is never very reliable; then there are problems with the
representativeness of the sample at the top and bottom of the
ranges in particular; the estimates in current prices need to
take account of price changes, and these have affected different
income groups differently; and different indicators tend to give
different results (ibid:238-41). Thus only relatively large
changes in indicators can be accepted as convincing evidence to
answer the questions posed above, but most changes seem to be
small. For example, the poorest 2 0% of the population seem to
have about 7-8% of incomes and consumption in 1956-57 and in
1 975-76 (i'oid:240; Bardhan, 1 984:1-2). An indicator of the degree
to which rural consumption is concentrated amongst the relatively
wealthy, using N.S.S. data in current prices, is that the Lorenz
ratio fluctuates between 0.28 and 0.32 between 1956-57 and 1977—
78 (Cassen, 1978:240; Gupta and Datta, 1984:635). Similarly, some
estimates suggest that 40% of the population was below a fairly
low poverty line (Rs 1 5 per head per month in 1960-61 prices) in
1 960-61, 1 972-73, and 1 977-78 ( Cassen, 1 978:241 ,243 ; Bardhan,
1984:2). The only simple conclusion is that there is no clear
evidence of change one way or another, for the whole country.
Slightly more complex pictures emerge from a consideration
of regional variations. If the States are compared in any
particular year, then areas which have experienced relatively
fast agricultural growth tend to have lower poverty rates than
the more agriculturally stagnant ones. On the other hand,
poverty rates in States with faster rates of agricultural growth
are not falling faster than in those with slower rates of growth
(Bardhan, 1984:5). Thus Punjab and Haryana have poverty
proportions of only 12% and 23% respectively in 1977-78, but
these rates are not tending to decline (Tata, 1982:11). In
general, Cassen's conclusion seems as valid now as it was in the
mid-1 970's:
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'It seems that wherever one looks it is difficult to
find any evidence of a trend of improvement for the
poor. Their fate in rural areas .. is bound up most
importantly with the magnitude of the harvest and in
urban areas .. with the slow progress of manufacturing
and service trades employment. The data on expenditure,
income distribution, wages, prices and employment do not
show any very distinct trend.' (Cassen, 1978:249)
This conclusion is derived largely from estimates of income
and consumption. However, it is possible that in some respects,
the poor are now better off because they have benefited from
infrastructura 1 investment, or from special Government
programmes. Since 1971, when Mrs Gandhi's Congress Party won an
election campaign on the promise to 'eliminate poverty' there
have been claims that Plan expenditures have shifted towards
providing the population with the ability to meet their Minimum
Needs. There has undoubtedly been considerable progress in the
provision of physical amenities in Indian villages. Thus the
First Economic Census, carried out in 1977 in most of India,
lists the number of villages with basic amenities within, or
close to, their borders. In India as a whole, some 93 % of
villages have drinking water within the village for at least part
of the year, 33% have electricity for at least some of the time,
and banks, credit co-operatives, fair price shops, buses and
schools, roads and post offices are increasingly available to
villages (E. P.W. 1985:615-6). Some of the benefits offered by
this 'overhead consumption' (as Cassen calls it) will have gone
to the poor, and while we know that they are relatively
disadvantaged (for example in access to schooling) we do not know
whether this disadvantage has increased or declined over time.
The special programmes designed particularly to benefit the
poor date from the 1970s: the Small Farmer Development Agencies,
projects for Marginal Farmers and Agricultural Labourers, the
Crash Scheme for Rural Employment, and the Drought-Prone Areas
Programme, all come into this category. They were either short¬
lived, or replaced in 1980 by the Integrated Rural Development
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Programme. These programmes were designed to increase incomes or
production and their impact should have shown up in the M.S.S.
data. There is one additional programme which might have an
additional impact on the poor not measured by income or
consumption expenditure data - nutrition programmes which put
food into the mouths of small children and their mothers. The
amount of food which has been imported and transported to feeding
centres throughout the country since 1947 is impressive, but
again, it is only since 1970 that nutrition programmes have been
an integral part of the Plan process.
The Government of India has recently claimed that poverty
has decreased, as a result of its anti-poverty programmes,
concluding in the Mid-Term Appraisal of the Sixth Five Year Plan
that it could anticipate the results of the 1983 National Sample
Survey and that 57 million people had crossed the poverty line in
two years, 1980-82 (G.O.I., 1 9 8 3V.8). The basis of this claim was
that the expenditure on special poverty-alleviating schemes would
have all accrued to the poor, but this conclusion has been
strenuously denied (Sundaram ana Tendulkar, 1983; 1984). As with
other schemes supposed to benefit the poor, there are 'leakages'.
Much of the expenditure never reaches any supposed beneficiary,
but stays in the pocket of the bureaucrats able to control access
to these benefits, or is diverted into the pockets of those who
are not really poor. Thus one estimate is that in the country as
a whole about 15% of those affected by the Integrated Rural
Development Programme were above the poverty line, with the
figures for some States (notably Assam and Punjab) being above
33% (Rath, 1985:241).
What is the net result of the increases in national income,
the spread of social infrastructure, and the Government
programmes designed specifically to relieve poverty? Most
indicators of income and consumption suggest a picture of
fluctuations, with no discernible trends. Indicators of
unemployment suggest some deterioration; while those o.f
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productive wealth in its most common form (land holding) would
also suggest that larger numbers of people are landless or own
insufficient land to sustain themselves now than at Independence.
Thus it would seem that poverty, in the strict sense of the
ability to purchase a defined basket of goods, has probably not
increased. But insecurity of access to the resources necessary to
do so probably has increased, and dependence on the State for
subsidised employment or credit has become increasingly common.
CONCLUSION
What this material seems to suggest is that mortality has
continued to decline since Independence. It has not fallen
steadily, with the decade after 1965 probably a period when
mortality fell relatively little, if at all. It has not fallen
equally for all age groups, though if official estimates of
infant and child mortality before 1970 are corrected upwards,
then the variation by age becomes less significant. Mortality has
fallen more in the States which already had low mortality rates
than in those with higher ones. Male-female differantials are
inconsistent, with the decline in the sex ratio unaccounted for
by indicators of sex differentials in mortality decline or life
expectancy. It is difficult to account for these declines by
reference to the increases in per capita income, since there is
no evidence of this having benefitted the poorest sectors of the
population.
Two factors might help to explain the apparent paradoxes of
substantial declines in mortality, stable or declining per capita
foodgrains availability, no change in the proportion of the
population below poverty levels, and little reason to believe the
general health services provided by the State have been very
effective. The first is that protection from famine has continued
to be effective. There is a variety of measures, all of them
flawed because they 'leak' and leave the very poor in vulnerable
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and insecure positions. But they probably do prevent the poor
starving to death. The second factor is that public health
measures have been more effective than the credit they have
usually been given. In Chapter 6 I will assess in more detail the
evidence for the pattern of public health expenditures, to begin
the process of assessing this particular argument.
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CHAPTER 6
HEALTH POLICY-MAKING IN INDEPENDENT INDIA: STRUCTURES AND
EXPENDITURES
The most obvious feature of public sector health
expenditures in India remains how little, in absolute terms, is
spent directly on providing health services for the people.
Taking the budgetary categories of 'medical' and 'public health',
and ignoring problems of definition, generates a total figure of
about Rs20 per head in 1979/80, or about 2.7% of total public
expenditure (revenue and capital), about 1% of per capita
national income. Most discussions of the pattern of health
expenditure in India have gone little further than noting the
size, trends through time, ana inter-State variations (e.g.
Ramasubba n , 1 9 8 4).
In part this is because there is little material on the
distribution of these expenditures. The most readily available
sources are the Five Year Plans: these deal in 'outlays', or
proposed expenditures, and offer only a haphazard record of
actual patterns in the previous Plans; and they say nothing
whatever about non-Plan expenditures. As Table 1 shows, the Plan
has never accounted for more than 60% of public sector health
expenditures, but non-Plan expenditures are hidden in the budgets
and accounts of the individual States. The Reserve Eank of India
published summary statements derived from these accounts, and
this source provides most of the information on inter-State
comparisons. But this source does not go beyond the major budget
heads. Barnett attempted to fill in some of the gaps, and he
described this modestly as a short note and an initial analysis
(1977:2); more recently, Khan and Prasad (1985) have analysed
Sixth Plan expenditures, but only for Gujarat and Maharashtra. It
is not clear how much data and analysis of past, State-level and




First Second Third Plan Fourth Fifth 1979- Sixth
Plan Plan Plan Holiday Plan Plan 1980 Plan*
( 1 951-6)( 1 956-6 1 )( 1 96 1-66)( 1966-6 9)( 196 9-74)(1974-79) ( 1980-5)
TOTAL EXPENDITURES Rs Millions
PLAN 980 2,163 3,565 3 ,133 1 1 ,566 23 ,450 7 ,290 21 ,000
NON-PLAN 933 1,410 3 ,024 3,342 8,552 17,630 5,261 12,075
TOTAL 1 ,913 3,673 6 ,589 6 ,475 20,120 41 ,080 1 2,551 33,075
Plan percentage (51%) (59%) (54%) (48%) (57%) (57%) (58%) (63%)
ANNUAL PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES Rupees
Current prices:
PLAN 0.5 1 .1 1 .6 2.1 2.7 7.7 11.2 15.4
NON-PLAN 0.5 0.8 1 .4 2.3 2.0 5.6 7.8 8.8
TOTAL 1 .0 1 .9 3.0 4.4 4.7 13.3 19.0 24.2
1960-61 prices:
PLAN 0.7 1 .2 1 .9 1 .3 2.1 2.4 2.9 3.2
NON-PLAN 0.7 0.9 1 .7 1.4 1 .5 1.8 2.0 1.8
TOTAL 1 .4 2.1 3.6 2.7 3.6 4.2 4.9 5.0
Sources: Plan documents (G.O.I. 1956; 1961; 1967; 1968a; 1968b; 1973; 1978b;
1981a; 1983); Ovens in Lipton & Streeten (eds.) (1968); Reddy (1972:218); Barnett
(1977).
N.B. Sixth Plan total expenditure figures for the outlays; per capita figures
are based on the first two years expenditures only.
These figures are not strictly comparable and the classification of total health
expenditures changes in 1974 with impacts which are not known. Fifth Plan Plan
expenditures exclude nutrition.
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This chapter, then, is designed to answer two main
questions: what can usefully be said about how much money is
spent on public health in different categories, and what
processes within the Government affect its distribution? The
origins of health planning before Independence and the roles of
the Planning Commission and of the Central Council of Health have
been discussed in the Introduction to Part B. Here I will deal
with the nature of Plan expenditures in health ana the processes
by which Plan proposals are agreed and implemented; and the
pattern of health expenditures within an individual State
(Orissa) during the 1970s, with some comparative material on
Maharashtra and Gujarat.
As will become clear, although this account goes beyond that
previously available, it is by no means complete. For non-Plan
expenditures the gaps are most glaring, with few grounds for
assessing the typicality of Orissa, and no information from the
1950s and 1960s. In addition, the sources on Plan expenditures
are not adequate to provide the necessary detail for more than
occasional glimpses of the processes involved. Further, it is
utterly dependent on the reliability of Government accounting
procedures, ana describes the budget categories under which money
was spent - which may be very different from what the terms are
usually taken to mean. However, the exercise is worthwhile, if
only for the doubt that it casts on the unthinking acceptance of
the received view, of a major distortion of expenditure towards
'tertiary' services, which I outlined in the Introduction to Part
B.
Health policy in India is not a unified concern. There are
several Central Ministries which provide health services -
notably the Ministry of Education (its Social Welfare Department
handles most of the nutrition policy); the Minstry of Labour
(responsible for the Employees Social Insurance Scheme and for
overseeing other health srvices for industrial workers);
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responsibility for water supply and sanitation is not solely a
Health Ministry concern; and the Railways and Defence Ministries
also provide medical services for a large number of people. These
divisions in the Central Government are usually mirrored at State
level. The Planning Commission has been the major means by which
these divisions are supposed to have been overcome, but it has
not been able to resolve all the problems of co-ordination. In
what follows I shall be focussing on those aspects of health
policy which are the responsibility of the Health Ministries, but
some discussion of social insurance and nutrition is also
necessary.
Social insurance schemes in India abound, with some
restricted to individual industries, either in the private sector
(e.g. plantations), the public sector (e.g. coal mines) or for
Government servants (such as the Central Government Health
Scheme), and the largest one serving employees from a large
number of industries, the Employees' State Insurance Scheme
(E.S.I.S.). Some of these are covered by legislation (like the
Plantation Labour Act) while some employers run their own
schemes. Those covered by legislation are mostly the
responsibility of the Ministry of Labour, and are by now quite
substantial enterprises. For example, the E.S.I.S. covers over 7
million workers and 21 million of their dependants, or some 4% of
the total population; the railways employ 1.6 million people with
another 6 million dependents also entitled to some medical care.
The total budgets of these institutions are also substantial,
with E.S.I.S. paying out some Rs850 million directly and to State
Governments for medical care and expenses in 1981-82, and the
Railways medicare budget the same year being Rs540 millions
(G.O.I., 1 984:1 46, 2 46 ). Although the E.S.I. Commission is
usually represented at Central Council of Health meetings, it
seems clear that the development of facilities for industrial
workers proceeds quite separately from those of the Health
Ministry, with duplication of urban medical services common
(Jeffery, 1976). They have also tended to be restricted to
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medical provisions, narrowly defined: the current head of
E.S.I.S. has admitted, for example, that it is only recently that
it has taken any interest in public health matters (Singh, 1983).
The other problematic area is that of nutrition services.
Prior to the changes in orientation of the 1970's, nutrition had
a very low profile within Government. Food aid was regarded as a
famine prevention measure rather than a feature of routine
Government services. When nutrition became more significant, as
part of the Minimum Needs Programme, it was still provided as
part of Social Welfare, but often in the context of school meals
or feeding programmes, thus also involving Education (usually
part of the same Ministry). The current attempts to integrate
nutrition and maternal and child health services, particularly in
the Integrated Child Development Scheme (I.C.D.S.) pose difficult
issues in collaboration which do not seem to have been resolved.
In what follows, neither social insurance nor nutrition services
will receive the attention they perhaps deserve, because my focus
will be on the services provided under the direct 'Health'
umbrella.
PLAN EXPENDITURES IN HEALTH
Any account of the bare bones of planning gives little clue
to the significance of planning and the process by which Plans
are formed and implemented. The significance of Plan expenditures
varies from one sector to another, and has changed over the
course of the Plans. It is difficult to trace these changes even
in health with much accuracy because the categories used for
accounting for government expenditures in the States and the
Centre are not identical to the Plan categories; and in addition,
they have changed from Plan to Plan, and in a major revision of
accounting procedures in 1972. Nevertheless Table 1 probably
gives a reasonable picture of the changing balance between Plan
and non-Plan expenditures.
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However this picture is complicated by the different sources
of funding. In general, there have been three categories of
expenditures: those paid for entirely by the Central Government
and disbursed by its own agencies; those paid for (in whole or in
part) by the Centre but disbursed by State Governments; and those
funded and disbursed by the State Governments. To begin with,
central funds were disbursed only under very strict conditions,
tying the release of funds to specific projects. This procedure
was time-consuming and, as Hanson points out, came to replace the
process of proper planning. Procedures were liberalised in 1953,
though the category of 'centrally sponsored' remained problematic
- here the Centre provided the funds but the States were
responsible for implementation. In reality some of this Central
control was undermined by the ability of State Governments to
spend in a different pattern from that proposed by the Planning
Commission. There were only weak procedures to police State
expenditures, and State Governments were able to recover any
Central funds withheld by getting a miscellaneous development
loan at the end of the year - a loan which eventually became a
grant. Alternatively, States have reclassified some of their own
expenditures in order to take advantage of Central funds. Elder,
for example, suggests that in U.P. the State government
reclassified its malaria workers as 'family-planning-cum-malaria
workers' when central aid for malaria workers in 'maintenance'
areas was withdrawn in the late 1 9 6 0 ' s (Elder 1974:324). In
family planning, totally funded by the Centre but implemented by
the States, the desire of the Central Government to keep an eye
on State activities has led to the creation of Regional offices
in State capitals.
The ability of the Centre to offer to pay for a particular
part of public expenditure has remained a powerful inducement for
State governments to follow Central policy proposals, and any
attempt to reclassify a particular topic from Central to State
funding is always greeted by howls of protest. But the offer of
Central funding is not necessarily enough to ensure that a policy
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is followed. For example, in the implementation of the community
health workers schemes under the Janata Government after 1977,
several States (notably Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Kashmir) refused
to introduce the scheme, arguing that they had no need of it
because they had alternative ways of meeting the health needs of
the rural population. State Governments are also wary of the
conditional, time-bound support offered by the Central
Government. When Central funding runs out the States will be left
with a cadre of workers they aid not necessarily want, but they
would have no politically acceptable way to sack them. As early
as 1980 there were indeed moves to transfer some of the costs of
the Community Health Workers scheme onto State budgets. The
Central Government was not able to enforce its policy on the
States in this case, despite bringing political pressure to bear.
Similarly, the Centre is unable to prevent some policy
initiatives by State governments which contradict Central policy
if the State is prepared to pay for them - as in the recent
opening of short courses for training rural doctors in West
Bengal, or the opening of a new postgraduate teaching hospital
outside Lucknow.
Thus the Centre is able to overcome only some of the
consitutional restrictions on its making policy, in 'State'
spheres such as health, through the offer of Central funding.
Family planning has always been a completely centrally-funded
area, as were the campaigns against communicable diseases until
the Fifth Plan. On the other hand, nutrition and water supply and
sanitation have always been largely State funded. The pattern of
'outlays' (proposed expenditures) by these categories has changed
from Plan to Plan; in the health sector (excluding family
planning and water supply and sanitation) the role of the Centre




HEALTH OUTLAYS BY FINANCIAL CATEGORIES
Th i rd Plan Four th Fifth Sixth
Plan Holiday Plan Plan Plan
Rs Millions
Central 148 168 535 758 4,325
( %) (6.6) (12.0) (12.3) (9.5) (23.8)
Centrally Sponsored 55 11 1 1 ,765 1 ,770 3 ,638
m (2.4) (7.9) (40.7) (22.2) (20.0)
State/Union Territory 2,056 1 ,122 2,035 5,432 10 ,247
( %) (91.0) ( 80 .1 ) (46 .9) (68.2) •(56.3)
Total 2,259 1 ,401 4,335 7,960 18 ,210
Source: G.O.I. 1973 Vol. 2:232; G.O.I. 1 981b: 382.
N.B. This table excludes family planning (100% Central or Centrally
Sponsored in each Plan) and water supply and sanitation.
Unfortunately the pattern of actual expenditures probably
differs from the distribution of outlays, and data on this is not
readily available. As Barnett points out, during the course of
the Fifth Plan, the sectors which were Centrally funded were
allocated far more than the other categories, so that in the
1976/7 Annual Plan the State share had dropped to 5 4*.(Barnett
1977:8). This pattern of allocations has been repeated in the
Sixth Plan, as it was eventually adopted under Congress, but
detail on actual expenditures by financial category remains
elusive. In general terms, the evidence does support the argument
that Central dominance in health planning has increased,
especially since 1965.
THE PROCESS OF HEALTH PLANNING
There are three kinds of information available on how health
planning has taken place within the Government apparatus, none of
them ideally suited to the task at hand. The first are the Plans
themselves. They have the advantage that they represent official
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statements of policy objectives and some of the rationales for
chosen policies. They are readily available, and have provided
most commentators with much of their material (e.g. Ramanabha,
1 984). Their main disadvantages are that they are silent about
the processes by which these policies were chosen from amongst
competing possibilities being discussed at the time; they say
virtually nothing about how priorities led to the actual
distribution of allocations; and they offer relatively little
information, even retrospectively, about what actual expenditures
or their impacts were.
The second source of information is the minutes of the
discussions in the Central Council of Health on the Plan
proposals. For the Third and Fourth Plans in particular they
allow a glimpse into the processes by which proposals from the
Ministries of Health are modified in negotiation with the
Planning Commission. The disadvantage is that they are by no
means complete - similar material is not apparently available for
the Fifth and Sixth Plans.
The third source of material is the background papers
prepared for the Planning Commission by working groups; I have
been able to consult only some of these for the Fifth Plan. While
these reports allow more insight into the kinds of arguments and
claims being made by different sectors in health, they say very
little about how these competing claims were balanced.
These three sources still leave unanswered what impact these
expenditures had on health status (perhaps a Utopian request) but
also on some aspects of health personnel (especially nursing and
other paramedical personnel) and other parts of the health
inf rastructur e. The rest of this section, then, will attempt to
demonstrate why the formal claims of the Plans - to be moving
towards a rural-based health service, making full use of para-
and non-medical personnel to provide preventive and public health
services as a priority - have had such limited and uneven
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implementation. It must be remembered that non-Plan expenditures,
in fields like medical education ana medical provision in
particular, far outweigh Plan expenditures in those categories.
The formal claims of the priority to be accorded to rural,
preventive health care using lower-level personnel appear in all
the Plan documents, with greater or lesser force. All the Plans
call for a rural bias: rural areas 'should receive much greater
attention' (G.O.I. 1952:197); they are 'the most urgent need to
be met in the second five year plan'CG.O.I. 1956:534); the
expansion will reach 'progressively larger number of persons,
specially in the rural areas' (G.O.I. 1961:653); rural areas will
be the 'emphasis' (G.O.I. 1968b:309) or the 'accent' (G.O.I.
1973:234). Similarly the preventive bias was urged: in the First
Plan 'additional resources should be concentrated on preventive
work rather than curative facilities' (G.O.I. 1952:197); in the
Third Plan they were to receive 'increased emphasis' (G.O.I.
1961:651) and in the Fifth minimum public health facilities were
the 'primary objective' (G.0,1. 1973:234). The expanded numbers
of paramedical or non-medical personnel received a more muted and
changing emphasis: early proposals saw their rapid expansion as
'necessary', and the Second Plan was most forthright about the
need for 'accelerated and sustained action' on ancillary training
if 'even elementary services are to reach the mass of the people
in any adequate degree' (G.O.I. 1956:533). But the Third Plan
merely 'recommended' a new scheme for medical assistants, the
Fourth Plan talked only of doctors and the Fifth Plan of raising
the quality of training, career paths and so on. As we shall see
in Chapter 9, the Community Health Worker scheme was introduced
outside the normal process of Plan construction.
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TAELE 3
PLANNED OUTLAYS IN THE HEALTH SECTOR
Fi rst Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth



















dispensaries 17 .92 16 .02 18.12 14.32 16.32 10.322
Indigenous systems
of medicine 0.32 1 .82 2.92 1 .42 1 .02
Other programmes 14.42 2.72 3.32 2.42 1 .52
TOTAL HEALTH: 64.52 64.92 61.32 37.52 29.12 26 .02
FAMILY PLANNING: 0.52 1 .32 7.92 27.32 18.82 14.42
NUTRITION: - - n. a. n. a. 14.82 3.42
WATER SUPPLY AND
SANITATION : 35.02 33.82 30.82 35.22 37.32 56 .12
TOTAL HEALTH-RELATED
(RS MILLIONS) (1,400) (2,250) (3,415) (11,555) (27,376) (69,910)
Sources: Plan documents. Nutrition was not separated from health programmes in
the Third and Fourth Plans but was retrospectively identified (in the Fifth
Plan Draft Outline) as having been allocated Rs 594 million (5? of the health
related budget) in the Fourth Plan, of which Rs 370 millions was spent.
1. This figure is for 'Minimum Needs Programme for Rural Health'.
2. This figure is for 'Hospitals and dispensaries, medical education and
research, traditional systems of medicine.and homoeopathy, and other'.
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To some extent, these formal commitments are borne out by
the planned outlays contained in the Plan proposals, as can be
seen from Table 3, and the evidence on actual expenditures,
collated in Table 4. However, the major trend discernible in
planned outlays is the declining allocation to the control of
communicable diseases (of which malaria took the lion's share)
after the Second Plan and the concomitant rise in planned outlays
for family planning. To some extent the shift to family planning
is misleading, in that the family planning budget has paid for
infrastructure and staff at the primary health centre level, and
family planning workers are also increasingly expected to carry
out tasks in maternal ana child health. However, the simple
conclusion is correct: these trends represent a reduction in the
commitment to controlling disease and an increased commitment to
controlling the numbers of people - made particularly clear in
the Emergency of 1975-77.
One other notable feature of Table 3 is the small allocation
of Plan funds to the indigenous systems of medicine. There is
something of a rising trend until the Third Plan, and a decline
since then. The decline is partly because of the rising
significance of nutrition, family planning, and water supply, in
which the indigenous systems play no part. But the indigenous
systems have also received a declining share of Plan allocations
within the narrower 'health' category. Very little detailed
information is available on how this money is allocated and
spent, nor on the patterns of non-Plan expenditures. Since the
expenditures on the indigenous systems form such a small part of
the overall total I shall not consider it in more detail here.
However, I will return to this subject in Chapter 7.
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(A as 55 of 0) (67?)
[Deflated A as ? of 0]
760 1,052 n.a. 4,067 9,710
733 1,057 1,027 4,589 10,916
[870] [1,027] [3,805] [8,628]
(96?) (100?) (n.a.) (113?) (112?)
[83?] [n.a.] [94?] [89?]
TOTAL HEALTH-
RELATED: Outlay 1 ,400
Actual 980
[Deflated]
(A as ? of 0) (70?)
















Sources: Plan documents; G.O.I. 1975, 1978a, & 1983.
Note: Fifth Plan figures exclude nutrition.
•Deflated' rows refer to Actual expenditures (A) expressed in the prices
ruling at the time the respective Plan document was issued, i.e. in
Outlay (0) prices (1950/51 for the First Plan, 1955/6 for the Second,
1 960/ 1 for the Third, 1 968/9 for the Fourth and 1 973/74 for the Fifth).
The all-India wholesale prices index has been used as a deflator.
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There are several complications in interpreting these
figures as indicators of the priorities of the various layers of
Government. A major difficulty arises from the differential
impact of inflation. This becomes increasingly important after
1963, when relative price stability gave way to steady increases
in prices. This means that the apparent ability to meet spending
allocations which is noticeable for the Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Plans is probably misleading, since the Plan documents are based
on prices ruling when the Plan was drawn up, whereas the
expenditure figures are in current Rupees. The 'deflated' rows in
Table 4 are an attempt to indicate the impact of inflation,
though it is not clear whether the wholesale prices index is an
adequate deflator. An additional complication with the Fifth Plan
is that the Janata Government produced its Sixth Plan to start
before the original Fifth Plan period was completed, and the
Congress Government which was elected in 1979 retracted the
Janata Plan and replaced it with its own, starting at the end of
the old Fifth Plan period.
In some respects, it makes more sense to compare health-
related expenditure with other parts of the Plan. In general, the
health sectors have been less successful at spending their
allocations than have either the social services (education being
a major component) or the public sector of the Plan as a whole.
Another way of looking at the importance given to the health
sectors is to compare their percentage allocations in each Plan:
as can be seen from Table 5, while the share of outlay declined
over the course of the first three Plans it rose in the Fourth
(largely because of the boost to family planning outlays) and
maintained this level in the Fifth (affected by the allocation to
nutrition). Actual shares have been below this. It should also be
remembered that Table 1 showed that Plan expenditures on health-
related subjects have barely kept up either with the growing




HEALTH-RELATED PLAN OUTLAYS AND EXPENDITURES
(as Sage of total public sector Plan)
First Second Third Annual Fourth F if th 1 979- Sixth
Plan Plan Plan Plans Plan Plan 80 Plan
OUTLAY:
HEALTH 3.6 3.3 2.8 - 2.7 1 .7 - 1 .8
FAMILY PLANNING 0.03 0.07 0.4 - 2.0 1 .3 - 1 .0
NUTRITION - - - - - 1 .0 - 0.2
WATER SUPPLY etc 2.0 1 .7 1.4 - 2.6 2.5 - 4.0
ALL HEALTH-RELATED 5.6 5.0 4.6 n. a. 7.3 6.5 n. a. 7.1
EXPENDITURE:
HEALTH 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.1 2.1 1 .9 1 .8 n. a.
FAMILY PLANNING 0.01 0.05 0.3 1.1 1 .8 1 .3 1.0 n. a.
NUTRITION - - - - 0.0 n. a. n • a • n. a.
WATER SUPPLY etc 1 .7 1 .6 1 .2 1 .6 2.9 2.8 3.2 n. a.
ALL HEALTH-RELATED 5.0 4.6 4.2 4.7 6.9 5.9 6.0 n. a.
Sources: Plan documents; G.O.I.C 1 983: 1 1 3)
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THE PROCESS OF HEALTH PLANNING
♦
The final set of information about the planning process
comes from more detailed sources on the Third and Fourth Plans.
These come largely from the special sessions of the Central
Council of Health which discussed the Plan as it related to
health, and for these two Plans, also displayed some of the steps
in drawing up the Plan and allow for a comparison between the
distributions of expenditure proposed by different sections of
the health planning procedure - largely the Central Ministry of
Health and Family Planning/Welfare on the one hand and the
Planning Commission on the other - and the pattern of expenditure
which actually took place.
In general the procedure of detailed planning appears to be
as follows. Firstly there are discussions in which State
Ministries liaise with Central Ministries over proposals and
projects which are put to the Planning Commission. The Planning
Commission collates these proposals and evaluates them in terms
of a number of criteria - such as the foreign exchange
requirements which are implied, the overall volume of physical
and financial resources which is expected to be available, and
other decisions on priorities between sectors and States. These
major decisions are formally the responsibility of the National
Development Council, consisting of members of the Planning
Commission and chief ministers of the States, and usually chaired
by the Prime Minister. The Planning Commission then translates
these essentially political decisions into consistent policies
which form the final Plan, and then draw up annual plans which
provide the justification for State and Central Ministry budget
decision-making, and allow State governments to claim back
expenditures which fall within Plan allocations.
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In the case of health, the first stage appears to include
the establishment of working parties and expert groups (dominated
by doctors) looking at specific issues such as medical education
or the control of communicable diseases. Each group works
independently, and is thus tempted to expand the number of its
proposals as far as possible. Similarly, the Ministry of Health
as a whole is under pressure to submit an exaggerated list of
proposals to the Planning Commission, knowing that it is likely
to have its total cut, whatever is proposed. The eventual Plan
may lose much of whatever rationality it had, because of the need
to cut the total to a level acceptable to the Planning
Commission, and to divide it into topics and by State in ways
which derive from political decisions made in the National
Development Council. Looking at these processes, then, gives some
idea of the 'real' priorities - which parts of the Health
Ministry's proposals are cut and which aspects of allocations are
turned into expenditures over the following five years.
During the course of the Second Plan the Central Health
Ministry looked at the pattern of expenditures and singled out
medical education and family planning as areas where allocations
were not being spent fast enough. This kind of information was
fed into discussions on the Third Plan allocations. State V/orking
Groups were established, who submitted proposals to a Central
V/orking Group, which reported to the Central Council of Health in
1959. Their proposals form column A in Table 7 below. At the same
time the Planning Commission was preparing it's own Draft Outline,
which appeared in June 1960 (column E) and allocated only 437, of
the C.C.H. proposals. This Draft Outline was then discussed with
the States and the Central Ministries, and the size of the Plan
was increased as a result of political pressures of this kind,
beyond what many members of the Planning Commission felt was
reasonable. Two revised sets of proposals came out of this
process (columns C and D) before the Plan was finalised and
appeared in August 1961 (column E). The pattern of actual
expenditures is shown in column F.
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A similar sequence of events can be identified for the
Fourth Plan, though matters are complicated by the fact that the
original proposals for the Fourth Plan were shelved in 1966 and
reviewed only in 1968-9, because the Fourth Plan period was put
back by three years. Discussions began before the end of the
Third Plan period, in order to draw some conclusions from the
pattern of progress. Working groups, established by the Ministry
of Health in 1 963, laid out a set of priorities. They were: to
remove shortages of trained manpower and materials; to reduce the
birth rate; to supply safe water, drainage and sanitation to
cities and to scarcity rural areas; to promote integrated and
adequate health facilities and to narrow down inequalities; and
to expand services as far as possible to the entire population,
concentrating on domiciliary and preventive services
(G.O.I.CC.C.H.] 1965:21).
Once again, the simple process of adding up all the schemes
which the Health Ministry thought 'desirable' generated a figure
(Rs 27,280 million) far above that which the Planning Commission
were prepared to accept. The Planning Commission's figure (Rs
10,900) was divided as in column A of Table 8. (I have been
unable to discover the distribution of the Ministry of Health's
proposal.) The next two rounds of proposals (in September 1965
and October 1966) produced similar distributions of a smaller
total (Rs 9,600 million); the latter appears as column B of Table
8. The process restarted in 1969, in a much more restrained
context. The Health section of the Ministry re-established a
working group and sub-groups. The sub-group proposals called for
Rs 5,756 millions (excluding family planning, water supply etc.)
which the working group reduced to Rs 5,125 millions. The
Planning Commission cut the total to Rs 4,370 million and this
figure was cut again to Rs 4,340 by the time the final Plan was
agreed and published in 1970 (column C). Taking the health-
related sector overall, the discussions led to a slightly larger
total allocation (Rs 11,420 million). The actual pattern of
expenditures during the Fourth Plan appears as column D.
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TABLE 6

































nicable diseases 1 200 17 920 30 840 26 690 20 705 21 971 28
Medical education
training A research 750 1 1 460 15 390 1 2 570 17 560 16 668 1 9
Hospitals and
dispensaries 1370 20 460 15 500 15 630 18 617 18 495 1 4
Other health 910 13 300 10 170 5 230 7 210 6 124 4





















1053 31 1045 30
TOTAL 7030 100 3040 100 3270 100 3440 1 00 3A15 1 00 3531 100
Source: For columns A-




1 96 6 :
.C.H.
45.
) 1961 ; for column E G.O .1. 1961:651;
Key: M of H= Ministry of Health; P Comm= Planning Commission.
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TABLE 7


















cable diseases 1 ,250 12 870 9 1 ,270 11 993 9
Education, training
and research 2,250 21 1 ,780 19 980 9 860 8
Hospitals & dispensaries}
} 2,500
Primary Health centres }









Other health 550 5 460 5 440 4 437 4
TOTAL HEALTH: 6 ,550 60 4,920 51 4 ,340 38 3 ,460 32














1 1 ,420 100
4,738 43
10,977 100
Sources: G.O.I. (C.C.H.) 1 965 & 1 96 9; G.O.I. 1 964, 1 970, & 1 973.
Note: This table excludes nutrition, and differs from the figures in Table
4, which were revised in the light of later information but are not
available in a disaggregated form.
Key: P Comm= Planning Commission
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In the course of these changes there were some apparently
radical changes in distribution, with heavy cuts to education,
training and research, and in hospitals, dispensaries and health
centres being handed over to family planning and to water supply
and sanitation. This appearance is slightly misleading, since the
total for family planning includes some expenditures directly
relevant to the health sector - as in the training of Auxiliary
Nurse-Midwives, some of whom worked in 'health' or 'medical'
positions. Provision for the training of these personnel might
originally have appeared under the State total for Training, but
a reclassification under a Centrally-sponsored heading such as
family planning would increase the chances of implementation.
Some changes, then, might be little more than cosmetic.
Nonetheless, once again a detailed look at the process of
planning suggests the difficulty of sustaining the simple
criticism that the Government has not been concerned with
preventive, rural-based services. Although these services
obviously have quite a low priority within the State Ministries,
and even perhaps within the Central Health Ministry, the Planning
Commission priorities seem fairly clear-cut. Wherever possible,
the Planning Commission in both the Third and Fourth Plan
discussions emphasised preventive and public health programmes at
the expense of medical education or hospitals and dispensaries.
However, since the Planning Commission can only restrain
expenditures by State Governments (rather than being able to
insist on spending) the actual patterns of expenditure in each
case are different again. In the case of the Third Plan (Table 7)
the over-riding factor seems to have been the need to increase
expenditure on the malaria programme, which probably accounts for
most of the extra expenditure under this heading. In the Fourth
Plan (Table 8) declining Central control is indicated by the
under-spending on communicable diseases and on Primary Health
Centres, compared to hospitals and medical education and
research. (Training, i.e. of paramedical workers, also suffered.)
This is slightly obscured in Tables 7 and 8 in the percentage
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distributions, because of the inclusion of water supply and
sanitation, often the responsibility of a different Ministry, and
usually able to spend more than its allocation (see Table 4
above), but is more clearly evident if the actual cash
expenditures are compared with outlay figures. However, since
these are in current prices, and there are no estimates of any
differential impact inflation may have had, it is impossible to
distinguish 'price' from 'real' changes.
A further way of looking at the changes in health priorities
is to take an individual State and see how its health
expenditures have changed through time. Unfortunately there are
no good sources available for such an analysis. The Reserve Bank
of India publishes a breakdown of public sector expenditures
which is restricted to a division between major budget headings -
Medical, Public Health and so on. This shows a considerable,
fairly stable, spread of per capita expenditures for the
different States, ranging from very high figures in the
mountainous northern States and Union Territories (Nagaland,
Himachal, and Jammu and Kashmir) to very low figures in the
Ganges plain (Bihar and Uttar Pradesh). (See Table 8). This
pattern does not only reflect differences in the priority given
to health and other social services expenditure (e.g. the
relatively high figures for Kerala, a relatively poor State). It
also reflects the way in which States get access to financial
resources, partly from their own tax base but also in different
ways from the Central Government. As George and Gulati (1985:292)
show, 'low income' States like U.P. and Bihar have not received
Central funds sufficient to outweigh their poverty, but the
'special category' States (basically the hilly ones on strategic
borders, like Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Tripura etc.)
have received per capita payments between 2.25 and (in the case
of Nagaland) 9.5 times the national average.
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TABLE 8
PER CAPITA REVENUE EXPENDITURE ON MEDICAL, FAMILY PLANNING AND PUBLIC HEALTH
SUBJECTS FOR MAIN STATES
Current Prices 1970/71 Prices
1 972/3 to 1975/6 to 1 972/3 to 1 975/6
1974/5 1976/7 1974/5 1976/7
A: High Income States
Punjab 1 1 .9 16.8 8.4 9.6
Haryana 9.7 11.8 6.9 6.7
Maharashtra 1 1 .5 13.1 8.1 7.5
Gujarat 9.2 11 .6 6.7 6.6
West Bengal 8.4 12.8 5.9 7.3
GROUP A 10.0 13.0 7.1 7.4
B: Middle Income States
Tamil Nadu 9.4 12.6 6.7 7.2
Kerala 10.1 14.8 7.1 8.4
Orissa 6.6 9.0 4.7 5.2
Assam 7.6 9.4 5.3 5.4
Ka rnataka 7.5 1 1 .4 5.2 6.5
Andhra Pradesh 6.8 9.7 4.8 5.6
GROUP B 8.0 11.2 5.7 6.4
C: Low Income States
Uttar Pradesh 4.7 5.5 3.3 3.1
Rajasthan 10.9 13.8 7.8 7.9
Madhya Pradesh 7.3 8.3 5.1 4.7
Bihar 4.1 4.5 2.9 2.6
GROUP C 5.8 6.8 4.1 3.9
D: Special Category States
Himachal Pradesh 15.8 19.8 1 1 .2 11 .3
Jammu & Kashmir 14.4 17.0* 10.1 9.8*
Manipur 13.3 15.1 9.3 8.6
Meghalaya 19.0 23.9 13.6 13.6
Nagaland 59.2 76.4 40.6 43 .6
Tripura 10.9 13.7 7.8 7.8
GROUP D 16.4 20.2 11.7 11.5
Average of listed States 7.9 10.2 5.6 5.8
Source: For 1973/4 to 1976/7: G.O.I. 1979:23; for 1972/3, Barnett (1979:16)
Note: The categorisation of States is taken from George & Gulati (1985) and
group per capita figures are weighted averages using 1971 census weightings.
The expenditure figures have been deflated by the wholesale prices index to
give 1970/71 prices. The system of classifying budget data changes between
1973/4 and 1974/5, introducing an unquantifiable element of uncertainty into
these figures, which should be reduced by taking a three-ye.ar average.
* Figures for Jammu and Kashmir are only available for 1972/3 to 1975/6.
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Barnett attempted to move beyond these gross figures of
health expenditure to look at how health budgets and actual
expenditures in the States were distributed amongst more
meaningful categories, but he was able to gather material on only
a few States, mostly for budget estimates not expenditures, and
only for a few years (Barnett 1977). Tables 9-11 present data
from one State - Orissa - for a restricted number of years, 1971—
2 to 1978-9, using the annual administration reports for the
Health Ministry. These are not apparently available before 1971-
2, they appear several years in arrears, and they are no longer
being published ( C-. 0.0. [ H. & F. W. D. ]).
In the absence of reliable national figures it is difficult
to assess how typical Orissa is. As Table 8 shows, only U.P.,
Assam and Bihar had lower per capita public expenditure on
medical and public health categories. This reflects the poverty
of Orissa: most indicators of State Domestic Product place it
as one of the four poorest States (see, e.g. Panikar, 1980; Tata
1982). (It appears in Table 8 as 'middle income', mainly because
of the potential tax base provided by its large industrial
sector). On the other hand, Panikar quotes 1965 figures which
show that it has one of the most rural distributions of hospitals
and hospital beds of all States (only Kerala and West Bengal have
more rural hospital beds). I have drawn on Barnett's ana lysis to
make what comparisons are possible between States on the
distribution of expenditure. Table 9 summarises the main data for
Orissa. One problem with Orissa's data is that the source gives
no figures for indigenous medicine, included (for example) in
Barnett's figures for Maharashtra.
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TABLE 9
HEALTH-RELATED EXPENDITURES FOR ORISSA STATE, 1972-1979
(ANNUAL'AVERAGES IN RS MILLIONS)



























Paramedl. training 1.1 0.9 2.0 1.3 0.2 1 .5 1 .5 0.3 1.8
Medical relief 56.8 9.5 66.3 93.9 9.6 103.5 102.5 19.3 121 .8
Prevention/control
of disease 5.1 16.9 22.0 9.7 23.7 33.4 11 .6 23.0 34.6
Public health,



























(61 .3)( 38.7) ( 100)
130.3 81.5 211.8 143.3 89.4 232.7
(61 .5) (38.5) ( 100) (61 .6)(38.4) ( 100)
Sources: G.0.0.( H.& F.W.D.) for the relevant years.
Note: Administration expenses for the medical directorate are included in the
total for medical relief; for family planning in 'other'; and for the public
health directorate in public health, sanitation and water supply.
* Most expenditure under this sub-heading is carried out by different
departments and so does not appear in these sources.
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There are several points with respect to Table 9. Firstly,
expenditure on paramedical training is divided between that which
appears under the Medical budget, and is paid for by the State
Government, and that under Family Planning, paid for by the
Central Government. Not all of the latter is actually in family
planning, since the Central Government contributes to the
training of nurses and to retraining under the multi-purpose
worker scheme after 1977, but I have kept these two categories
distinct. Secondly, some other distinctions relate to budgetary
categories which might be much less distinct on the ground, as
for example in the separation of expenditure on medical college
hospitals (in the medical relief category) from the expenditure
on the medical colleges themselves (under medical education).
Thirdly, there are other departments in Orissa which undertake
most public health engineering works (water supply, sanitation)
and I have been unable to collect comparable data on their
expenditure, so this total is an understatement of Orissa
Government expenditure under this heading. This makes inter-State
comparisons very difficult. As Table 11 demonstrates, Barnett's
data on Maharashtra show very different distributions for 1972-5,
because there the Health Department includes such expenditure,
totalling nearly 30% of all health-related State expenditure
(Barnett, 1977).
It is difficult to disaggregate these data much further, so
only relatively simple conclusions can be drawn from these
tabulations. Three points are, however, obvious, especially from
a consideration of Tables 9 ana 10. Firstly, they show the
stability of the distribution of expenditures over this period -
not very surprising over a relatively short time. Secondly,
Table 9 reinforces the message of Table 2 above, that the role of
Plan expenditure is particularly crucial in family planning and
the prevention of disease (and, not shown in this table, in water
supply and sanitation); the distribution of Plan expenditures is
thus a poor guide to the distribution of total expenditures.
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TABLE 10
DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH-RELATED EXPENDITURE BY MAJOR CATEGORIES
ORISSA MAHARASHTRA
1 972/3 to 1975/6 and 1977/8 and 1 972/3
1974/5 1976/7 1978/9 1 97 4/1
SAGES SAGES SAGES SAGES
MEDICAL EDUCATION:
Undergraduate 7.9 6.1 5.8 }
Postgraduate 1 .0 0.9 0.8 } 6
PARAMEDICAL TRAINING 1 .5 0.7 0.8 }
MEDICAL RELIEF 51 .1 48.9 52.3 25
PREVENTION/CONTROL OF
DISEASE 17.0 15.8 14.9 14
PUBLIC HEALTH, SANITATION
AND WATER SUPPLY 5.6 5.2 5.6 28
FAMILY PLANNING:
Compensation 2.3 10.0 5.1 5
Paramedical training 0.6 0.3 2.1 }
Other 13.8 12.2 12.6 } 9
EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE
SCHEME 13
TOTAL (100) (100) (100) (100)
Sources: For Orissa, as Table 9; for Maharashtra, Barnett (1977).
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TABLE 1|
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURES BY LEVEL OF CARE,
ORISSA 1972/3 TO 1978/9
[Annual averages in Rs millions]




Medical 3.0 4.2 4.0
Family Welfare 2.4 2.8 3.0
Public health 5.8 9.1 10.2
Laboratory, statistics
and vaccine supplies etc 1.3 3.3 2.6
TOTAL 12.4 (9.4%) 19.4 (8.9%) 19.8 (8.5%)
TERTIARY CARE
Medical colleges:
Education 11.4 14.9 15.3
Medical relief 16.3 22.6 24.6
TOTAL 27.7(21.1%) 37.5 (17.2%) 39.9 (17.1%)
SECONDARY CARE
Hospitals, dispensaries 25.1 43.8 49.3
Paramedical training 1.9 3.8 6.8
TOTAL 27.0(20.5%) 47.6 (21.8%) 56.1 (24.8%)
PRIMARY CARE
P.H.C.s etc 24.8 36.0 40.4
Family welfare:
Services 14.2 25.8 26.1
Compensation 3.0 17.5 11.8
Disease control :
Malaria 12.6 17.5 17.8
Leprosy 3.6 7.0 9.1
Other 5.8 9.6 10.3
Health education 0.3 0.5 0.5
TOTAL 64.3(48.9%)113.9 (52.2%)116.0 (49.8%)
GRAND TOTAL 131.5 211.8 232.7
Sources: as for Table 9.
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Thirdly, Table 10 gives some idea of the significance of
compensation for sterilisation operations, which rose from 2% of
the total health-related expenditure in the early 1970's (in both
Orissa and Maharashtra) to 10% in the two years of the Emergency,
and is still running at over 5? of the total in 1977/8 and
1978/79, 'poor' years for sterilisations. Indeed, of the apparent
increase in per capita 'real' ( 1970/71 prices) Health Department
expenditures in the Emergency over the preceding years over 25?
can be explained purely as the increase in compensation payments.
Finally, it is also possible to recategorise expenditure by
whether it is essentially intended to provide 'primary',
'secondary' or 'tertiary' care. In brief, primary care is
designed to meet the major common health problems of the
population, whether curative, promotive, rehabilitative or
preventive in focus; secondary care provides more specialised
services, usually after some referral from a primary facility;
and tertiary services are the most specialised and least
accessible.
There are problems with this analysis: most discussions of
the categories are not conceptually clear-cut (see, for example,
Cole-King 197 o). It is particularly difficult tc allocate
expenditures on education and training, which may produce staff
who are to work in all three sectors. In addition, a facility
like a medical college hospital, which is nominally designed to
provide highly specialised referral services may actually provide
primary care services to the surrounding population. A further
problem is that expenditures nominally in one category might more
reasonably be located in another, as in cases where staff are
paid from one budget head (say, Primary Health Centres) but are
on secondment elsewhere (say, in a medical college). In general,
I assume that this will not involve large sums, and that
accounting controls are sufficiently tight to ensure that most
money is spent in the category to which it is allocated. Table 11
summarises Orissa Health and Family Welfare Department
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expenditures for 1972/3 to 1978/9 using this categorisation, but
ignoring the distinction between Non-Plan, State Plan and
Centrally Sponsored Plan expenditures in each case.
In terms of the discussion with which I started this
chapter, it would seem that some caution is necessary in
concluding straightforwardly (as Cassen does) that public
expenditures in health are concentrated on big urban hospitals -
though since 'large' is undefined, there is room for some dispute
on this. The actual total to be regarded as 'true' primary care
is also disputable: many would argue that family planning (in the
Indian context at least) is too coercive to be regarded as
'health care', and even those favourably inclined towards family
planning might acknowledge the dubious status of compensation
payments. Nevertheless, in an international context, these
figures seem to show that Orissan health expenditures are less




This chapter has been concerned with patterns of expenditure
and the administrative processes through which they arise.
Several conclusions which can be drawn from this analysis.
Firstly, in health planning it has been the Planning
Commission which has championed the preventive, public health
aspects of health expenditures. In both the 3rd and the 4th
Plans, the Health Ministry proposals would have given far more
weight to medical education (especially post-graduate education):
this would have had implications also for medical relief (through
the extra resources going to medical college hospitals), but the
Planning Commission radically altered the balance of Plan
proposed expenditures towards primary care. Why the Planning
Commission played this role is not immediately obvious, though I
would speculate that medical personnel have been dominant in
policy proposals within the Health Ministry but have had to
contend with more powerful economists and administrators when the
negotiations have been outside their own direct sphere of
influence. There is, also, as we shall see in chapter 8, the part
played by foreign sources of advice, backed up with assistance,
in reinforcing the pressures for preventive, single-disease
control programmes which were so significant in the 1960's.
Secondly, the balance between major categories of health
expenditure has shifted dramatically towards family planning.
This has happened partly because family planning spending has
been a channel under the closer control of the Central Ministry
of Health than other aspects of health expenditure, and partly
because of the ideological commitment to population control. The
shift is most marked (somewhat misleadingly so) in Plan
expenditures, and some parts of the family planning budget have a
rather ambiguous status (e.g. compensation, and paramedical
training). Nonetheless, this shift has been a real one.
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Finally, as we have seen in the case of<0rissa, the total
share of the State budget going to health-related issues seems to
have declined steadily over the course of the 1 97 0's.
Nonetheless, the distribution of health expenditure between
functional categories has remained remarkably solid, with at
least 40® in primary care, and on some definitions, nearer 50®.
In addition, the evidence about expenditures on indigenous
medicine (both under Plan and non-Plan budget categories)
suggests that this has remained very low.
However, there are two major caveats to the picture
presented in this chapter. The first is that figures for health
expenditures are meaningless without some realistic assessment of
what services they bought, and how effective they were. These
issues will be addressed in Chapter 9, dealing with health
personnel; and Chapter 10, which assembles material on processes
in health institutions. The second is that I have so far talked
about health policy as if it were a matter solely for Government
personnel. In the next two chapters I will look at the wider
context of health policy-making, by looking at the politics of
medicine in India and the international context.
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CHAPTER 7
THE POLITICS OF MEDICINE IN INDIA
So far I have presented medical policy-making in India as if
it takes place almost entirely within official circles, or in
Alavi's fourth level of the State. In this chapter I want to
focus on the messages which this official framework receives from
outside - from clients, politicians, and organised pressure
groups within India. I shall argue that these messages generally
tend to reinforce many of the preferences of those within Health
Ministries - in other words, they share a 'doctor-oriented',
'curative-services', view of health problems and solutions.
However, there are conflicts, particularly over the role of
people practising Western medicine without an Western medical
qualification. The conflicts between those who have supported
unregistered practitioners and those who regard them only as
'quacks' have been strenuous and remain basically unresolved. I
shall use these conflicts as a case study, because these disputes
illuminate political processes very clearly.
In general, I shall make two points in the course of this
chapter. The first is that health services are not central to
class interests in India, either as benefits to be fought over or
as important elements in the reproduction of a class-based
social structure. The main protagonists have been medical
practitioners, who have fought over the share of the cake that
they are able to corner, rather than in terms of the role of the
public sector or other 'ideological' concerns. The second point
is that the Indian Medical Association (I.M.A.), the main
representative body of doctors, has not been notably successful
in the campaigns that it has waged, either to protect its narrow
interests or to influence policy in other ways. In other words,
health planning has been relatively impervious to internal
pressures. To begin with, I shall discuss the routine pressures
from clients ana politicians, before looking at 'inter-system
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disputes' (between groups of Western and indigenous
practitioners) and the role of the I.M.A. and other medical
pressure groups.
THE POLITICS OF OFFICE
Those wishing to influence health policy have to contend
with the division of powers between the Centre and the States,
outlined in the Introduction to Part B and in Chapter 6 above.
These institutional forms set a framework for outside political
pressures, and I will begin by outlining this framework before
turning to discuss some of the forms these take.
The major changes of the immediate post-Independence period
were the end of the I.M.S. as an elite corps of medical
clinicians-cum-administrators, and the introduction of the
Planning Commission, controlling access to most 'additional'
funds. The Health Ministries, both Central and State, are still
divided (as under the British) into a 'secretariat', headed by
members of the Indian Administrative Service (the heirs to the
Indian Civil Service) and the 'directorate', headed by doctors
but including some nurse administrators. Almost all commentators
agree that the secretariat is dominant: it controls access to the
Minister, with files passing through it and finance depending on
it. Its formal dominance is reinforced by the ability of the
'generalist' administrators to talk as colleagues to the heads of
other Ministries in which they may have recently worked,
particularly those concerned with financial and planning matters,
whereas the doctors are restricted to a career within the one
Ministry. The doctors can use their technical skills as a
political weapon, either by claiming decisions as technical ones
or using their control over medical resources to get political
credit directly from politicians. However, every Ministry is made
up of three groups in potential conflict: the Minister, with
political advisers and supporters; the administrators; and the
doctors.
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The State Ministries also have to contend with the Central
Ministry, which exercises its power largely through persuasion
and the control over 'Plan' funding. Persuasion is exercised in a
variety of ways, the most public being the annual meetings of the
Central Council of Health. The issue of the role of the C.C.H.
was raised at the second meeting in 1954, when the Central
Minister (Rajkumari Amrit Kaur) complained that the decisions of
the first meeting had not been implemented. Several Ministers
immediately pointed out that since Health was constitutionally a
matter for the States the C.C.H. could not bind its members in
any way: all Ministers would need support from their State
Cabinets in order to get finance for any proposals, and a new
Ministry would be free to change any decisions (G.O.I.[C.C.H.],
1954:item 1). This has been the formal position ever since, and
it has rarely been challenged.
The abolition of the I.M.S. has meant that the Central
Health Ministry does not have its 'own' men in senior positions
in the State Ministries, in the way that the I.A.S. provides a
link between Centre and States. Attempts to establish an All-
India Health Service, as a replacement to the I. M.S., have been
discussed periodically since 1950. The States have generally
argued that they would not like to employ doctors who would look
to the Central Government for their promotion, since the States
would not have full control over their destiny (G.O.I.[C.C.H.]
1952:item 7). Additional problems raised have covered the need to
compensate doctors for a loss of private practice facilities, and
the difficulty of matching staff to the wide variety of clinical
or other posts which they might fill (G.O.I.[C.C.H.], 1 973:366 —
8). No such service has yet been created. As a result, the
medical advisers to the Central Government are all drawn from a
small Central Health Service. This is recruited to fill positions
in the health facilities provided by the Central Government for
its own employees or for a few hospitals and medical colleges,
mostly in Delhi. The last of the ex-members of the I. M.S. have
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now retired, and recent Directors-General of Health Services have
thus been taken straight from a senior clinical position (often
as a surgeon) with no experience of medical administrative work
in the rural areas or small towns.
The other agency attempting to co-ordinate State and Central
policies has been the Planning Commission. The Central Health
Ministry has been able to operate most effective control where it
has been able to offer financial assistance. The constitutional
division of responsibilities has largely restricted this to the
use of 'Plan' funds as a bait, which has depended on the Health
Ministry's ability to persuade funds out of the Planning
Commission. State Governments routinely call for innovations to
be funded by the Central Government or else they will not take
place; and the Central Government is forced to place its priority
subjects on the 'Centrally-funded' or 'jointly-funded' list as a
result. As Chapter 6 has shown, the Planning Commission has not
played a neutral role, since it has refused to fund some
proposals from the Central Health Ministry (for example, those
concerned with medical auxiliaries in the 1 950's, discussed in
Chapter 9) or it has offered funding for areas on which the
States have not wanted to spend money.
The other tactic used by the Central Government to affect
State policies has been to redefine issues which are
constitutionally its own, in particular family planning, to
include aspects of maternal and child health. These then become
eligible for direct Central funding. These various possibilities
have formed the substance of much discussion involving the
Central and State Ministries and the Planning Commission, not
just when a new Plan has been drawn up but also throughout the
life of a Plan. Changes have been made in the status of projects
during a Plan period, and it is thus very difficult tc state
whether a particular subject has been Centrally- or State-funded.
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CLIENTS AND POLITICAL PRESSURE
The clients of medical facilities are not usually well
organised to promote a particular point of view about the nature
of their medical services, and the Indian case is no exception.
'Patienthood' is usually a short-term, un desired status, and
generating an institutional base on the back of this kind of
experience is very difficult. Organisation is more likely as a
result of the experience of long-term, disabling disorders
(blindness, deafness) or by those demanding the encouragement of
new forms of treatment which offer a solution to life-threatening
disorders (heart surgery, cancer). It is much more difficult to
organise client pressure in favour of a particular form of health
service structure, or for changing the balance of expenditures or
personnel: organisations with this kind of focus are usually
dominated by medical personnel themselves, with their interests
as employees.
In India, there is also a weakness of all kinds of consumer
pressure groups which compounds the general case. Most consumer
pressure tends to be sporadic, local, and specific, and to
disappear very quickly. Typical examples would be the pressure
generated over the siting of a Primary Health Centre. In such
cases, politicians can mobilise local support in favour of a
decision which will favour one village over another, and
sometimes this support can be sustained through an apparently
unfavourable decision, using the courts and higher party
persuasion. An unknown number of P.H.C.s have been delayed in
their construction, or built in the 'wrong' place, as a result.
3ut the ability to maintain pressure to ensure that the P.B.C. is
properly funded, or staffed, or organised to make the most use of
its limited resources, is way beyond local political resources.
The major medical issues which enter into local political
debate are therefore strictly limited ones with some general
local appeal. Firstly there are issues which involve the
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expenditure of money in one locality rather than another - the
building of hospitals, dispensaries, P.H.C.s or sub-centres. That
is, given a higher decision about the amount of money to be spent
on health matters under different heads, then each State, and
each district within the State, and each town and village in the
district, will compete for the money to be spent there rather
than el sewhere. A politician is known for his comparative skill
in such battles, and electorates expect to be rewarded for their
loyalty to a successful politician by rewards from the health
budget as much as from the education, industry or railway
budgets. These kinds of allocative decisions are not restricted
to capital expenditures but can also be found in recurrent
decisions. Examples would include whether or not to fill vacant
posts, to move staff, to supply new equipment, to release funds
for drugs, or to redistribute equipment, vehicles, and so on.
Those living in a Minister's constituency can expect the major
social welfare schemes to be implemented according to the plan;
those living in the constituency of an opposition M.P. can expect
at best a second-rate service.
Secondly, there are individualistic pressures on
politicians. These take two forms: access to medical services on
behalf of clients; and interventions in the careers of
'suppliers', the medical and paramedical employees. There are two
main types of clients: those wanting to be patients, and those
wanting to be doctors. The supply of medical services is grossly
inadequate, as it is in most parts of the world, but there is no
formal mechanism to ration access to those services which are
provided. At the bottom of the medical hierarchy, the P.B.C. or
sub-centre, far from competition for scarce resources, the
facilities are often under-used. Patients routinely by-pass the
P.B.C., either using private practitioners who cluster round
about in competition, or going directly to district or medical
college hospitals. There are no 'professional' gate-keepers to
these services; there is no referral 'hierarchy'; and financial
rationing (charging what the market will bear) can only be done
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surreptitiously. In these circumstances, would-be patients search
for intermediaries to bolster their case for admission, or for
cheap or free access to essential treatments for their condition,
in the knowledge that the decision to admit one patient rather
than another is rarely made on technical criteria alone. Local
politicians write letters of introduction for their clients; or
telephone to hospital administrators in their support; or
accompany them to the hospital.
At the highest levels, politicians may use Parliament or the
State Assembly to marshal their attacks against doctors who have
failed to give in to their orders (see, e.g. Lok Sabha debates,
16 May 1972 and 31 July 1972). On other occasions doctors working
in the clinics and hospitals for Government employees may find
themselves criticised during budget debates. A politician may
propose a motions to cut the Health budget by a certain amount
because of the behaviour of doctors in a particular clinic or
hospital, and use the opportunity to try to settle scores in this
way. Delhi doctors are well aware of the vulnerability of their
position because of the number of 'V.I.P.s', not personally known
to the doctor, who are liable to demand favourable treatment for
themselves or their clients (interview notes; Delhi Medical
Association Annual Reports). As one doctor put it, in the Diamond
Jubilee Celebration Souvenir of the Delhi Medical Association,
"even the senior doctors ... are often blackmailed and even
humiliated by the incompetent bureaucrats and corrupt
politicians" (Jain, 1974).
Admissions to medical colleges are the other major medical
resource which doctors control. As I shall argue in Chapter 9,
the paramedical positions have not been particularly popular,
largely because there is a much weaker private market for their
skills, and less opportunity for emigration. The female
categories - nurses, A. N.M.s and L.H.V.s - have often been short
of applicants. Medical education, by contrast, has always been
over-subscribed manyfold. At some times, there has been a
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collective response: private groups (usually politically well-
connected) have established medical colleges in some States
(notably Karnataka and Bihar). Concerted pressure by Delhi
parents also led to the creation of a fourth medical college in
the capital in 1 972. The strength of this pressure can be
indicated in the amounts of money which parents are prepared to
pay as entrance (or 'capitation') fees to private colleges. Not
surprisingly, evidence of corrupt practice in the admissions to
government medical colleges are frequently made but rarely
substantiated. Formally, admissions are made on merit, and this
probably accounts for most entrants. However, many colleges have
a reservation of places for nomination by the Governor, and these
are the subject of considerable pressure, quite apart from any
candidates who may improve their chances in other ways.
In the case of the pressures concerning the appointments of
staff, the crude distinction between clients and suppliers breaks
down. Medical staff want 'desirable' appointments, defined
according to a number of criteria such as access to towns (the
bigger the better), or to a home area, or near a spouse's
appointment, and so on. Politicians use these preferences as part
of their political stock-in-trade, offering to medical staff
support tow arcs meeting these priorities in exchange for money or
political allegiance.
At the lower level certain posts may have a reputation for
'costing' a certain amount of money (Wade, 1934). At the higher
levels (posts such as those which can affect admissions to
medical colleges, or grant other kinds of power) the element to
be traded is more likely to include the granting of equivalent
favours back - a tacit agreement to help the condiaates of one
political party or faction when requested. The two kinds of
pressure thus interact: staff 'want some posts more than others
and politicians want some posts filled more than others, and more
importantly, by their own appointee rather than someone else's.
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In this kind of structure, staff perceive the desires of
some clients more powerfully than those of others. Some clients
have influence over postings while others do not. In general, the
wealthy have such influence, and their support (or at least, the
absence of any hostility) may seem likely to be crucial if the
member of staff is engaged in a dispute with a patient or a
superior, or threatened with an unwanted move or denied a wanted
one. 'Defensive' strategies thus mean that staff look over their
shoulders to their relationships to their wealthier clients, even
in the absence of financial incentives (e.g. through their
payments as private patients, whether legal or illegal). Thus,
for example, Banerji notes how female paramedical staff tend to
visit only the homes of the wealthier villagers: he explains this
partly in terms of their own comfort (more pleasant company,
better hospitality), but maintaining good contacts is also a
necessity for those who want some say over their career
possibilities (Banerji, 1972).
One exception to this kind of process is if staff members
can maintain good relationships with superiors on the basis of
their ability. However, in only one field can this be done with
any measure of certainty: the meeting of family planning targets.
Staff throughout the health ministry hierarchy are routinely
threatened with transfer or dismissal for the failure to meet
such targets, and offered support for promotions and desirable
transfers for success. This kind of pressure reached its heights
during the Emergency, but it has been part of everyday practice
for much longer (Vicziany, 1983).
In general, the higher-paid posts receive much greater
prominence. No-one is much concerned with the new appointment of
an A.N.M.; but the appointment of doctors in general, to higher
administrative or teaching medical posts in particular, are
issues which arouse considerable political dispute. Staff
themselves expect to spend time negotiating for good posts or
avoiding bad ones, and politicians spend a lot of time supporting
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candidates for posts or (if in power) responding to such
pressures. Indeed, pressures from clients and from employees,
either directly or mediated through other politicians, tend to
dominate the lives of Ministers. Dr Sushila Kayar, Central
Minister of Health in the early 1960's put it to me like this:
Q: As Health Minister what political pressures were you
under?
A: Mostly pressures from my colleagues on appointments -
I made some costly mistakes as a result of this, until I
realised what was going on. Then they wanted me to open
new medical colleges in their areas; they wanted me to
get people admission in medical colleges; and there were
pressures over the purchase of equipment. I managed to
ignore most of these. (Interview, 1976).
The prominence of doctors, and the absence of ideological
dispute about medical policy, are both enhanced in the process.
The relative absence of ideological dispute is all the more
surprising because of the opportunity offered by competing
medical systems, It is not, of course, totally absent. There have
been vigorous attempts by the proponents of the indigenous
systems of medicine to assert their claims to larger shares of
Government expenditure, Government employment, or official
appointments. These campaigns have had supporters as high as the
Central Cabinet: Nayyar reported that she had colleagues who
wanted equal treatment for indigenous systems of medicine, some
for 'political' reasons and some because of their convictions
(interview, 1976)(see further below).
The structure of constitutional divisions described above
also limits the forms of conventional political pressure, through
parliamentary activities. In the Lok Sabha, the major opportunity
for debate is usually the presentation of the budget of the
Ministry; opponents put down 'cut' motions, calling for the
budget to be reduced because of the failure of the Ministry to do
certain things. These debates in New Delhi are often dominated
by lists of inadequacies in the Central Government Health Service
(the facilities provided for Central Government employees, often
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also used by members of Parliament as well). Other topics usually
relate to claims for improved facilities in the politician's own
part of the country, or general complaints about shortfalls in
facilities. There are very rarely clear and consistent criticisms
of health policies from any particular angle, nor debates
sponsored by the opposition on medical topics. Only two
exceptions from this generalisation are significant: support for
the indigenous systems of medicine, produced on almost every
possible opportunity by some members and usually ignored; and
requests for more doctors to serve in rural areas (see Chapter
9). While the absence of informed political debate is noticeable
in the Lok Sabha (or Central Parliament), and could be explained
by the constitutional divisions, it also seems to be true for the
State Assemblies. Most political activity with respect to health
takes place outside the Parliamentary forum.
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
The main 'external' pressure groups which attempt to
influence health policy are occupational groups - representative
associations of public sector doctors, integrated practitioners,
Western doctors in private practice, indigenous practitioners and
so on. The avenues for occupational groups to affect policy are
varied, and favour some more than others. Allopathic doctors have
one great advantage, for some of their members are on the
'inside' in positions of influence, though divisions within the
occupation (between specialists and generalists, self-employed
and employees) mean that they are less able to use this advantage
than might have been expected.
Almost all medical and paramedical personnel have some form
of association to join, but those for paramedical staff are much
weaker than those of doctors, Western or indigenous. The most
political of the medical associations is the Indian Medical
Association (I.M.A.), but there are several other associations of
Western doctors. The most notable of these are the associations
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of specialists (surgeons, physicians etc.) and of doctors in
specified employment (by the E.S.I.S., coal mines etc.) There are
also other (less stable) groupings for the 'integrated' doctors
(those with a joint training) as well as for Ayurvedic and Unani
practitioners, and even one for those who practice Western
medicine without formal qualifications to do so (the Private
Medical Practitioners Association of India). By far the best
documented is the I.M.A., and in most of this section I shall
concentrate on its history, organisational form and mode of
operation.
Early organisations of doctors in India either restricted
their membership to European doctors, or were dominated by them,
and were often affiliated to the British Medical Association
(B.M.A.). A Bengal branch of the B.M.A. established in 1863 broke
up in 1867 over the reading of a homeopathic paper; several other
attempts to create Indian branches were short-lived, until
separate membership for officers in the Indian Medical Serrvice
became popular in the 1 890's (Johnson and Caygill, 1 973:1 98 — 209).
But there were also medical societies of a more academic nature.
In Bombay in the 1880's there was a Grant Medical College Society
(open to Indian and European doctors) and a Bombay Medical and
Physical Society (apparently restricted to members of the I.M.S.
and R.A.M.C.) which predated the Bombay branch of the B.M.A.
(1889) (Cursetji, 1934:255-62).
Indian doctors began to establish alternative societies,
(e.g., the Bombay Medical Union dating from 1883), which also
received fluctuating support. These societies often took an
active stance in political issues, presenting memorials and
sending witnesses to appear before Royal Commissions which
considered medical matters in London or in India. They lacked a
stable all-Indian organisation until regular All-India Medical
Conferences were held in the mid-1920's and the I.M.A. was
founded in 1928, as a coalition of local medical associations.
Its original membership of 200 doctors grew steadily to over
241
3,000 ten years later.
The I.M.A. was closely linked to the nationalist movement.
M.A. Ansari, a member of the founding Executive Committee, had
been President of the Congress Session of 1921. The address given
by Dr Sir Nil Rattan Sircar to the All-India Medical Conference
in 1928 made no secret of the speaker's view of the causes of
medical backwardness in India.
'The secret of this unfortunate situation is not hard to
discover. An alien trusteeship of a people's life and
fortune is almost a contradiction in terms. For among
the governing factors in all sanitary reforms and
movements are the social and economic conditions of
life, the environment, material as well as moral, and
above all the psychology of the people - and an alien
administration, out of touch with these living
realities, will either run counter to them and be
brought up against a dead wall of irremovable and
irreaemiable social facts or, wearying of fighting half-
understood obstacles in the path, grow timid and fight
shy of all social legislation even in the best interests
of the people's lives and health.' (Ray, 1929:5)
These sentiments were repeated by speaker after speaker at
this conference, with the most hostile comments reserved for the
Indian Medical Service, seen as dominated by racist sentiment.
B.C. Roy, also a prominent member of the Congress Party, used
similar terms in his Presidential address in 1929 when he spoke
of the 'determined and systematic efforts (which) have been made
in the past to keep us in a perpetual state of inaction and
stagnation' (Roy, 1964:276). For these doctors, the complaint
against the British was that they had not developed medicine in
India far enough. However, because of the link between cultural
renaissance and Indian nationalism, it was necessary for the
leaders of the I.M.A. to offer co-operation to indigenous
practitioners. Sircar's address included the assertion of his
view that 'we must put ourselves ££££££1, with the genuine
living representatives of the ancient medical art' (Ray, 1929:9);
and Roy wanted to open membership of the I.M.A. to those who
'honestly believe in their own system of medicine and practice it
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with real sincerity' (Roy, 1964:275-6). But there seems to have
been little support for these views, and they were pushed on one
side during the course of the disputes over the international
recognition of Indian medical degrees.
The proximate cause of the establishment of an all-Indian
Medical Association was the claim by the General Medical Council
in London that Indian medical degrees were no longer adequate as
sufficient evidence of a doctor's ability to practise in the
United Kingdom, and by inference, to be a member of the I.M.S.
(Jeffery, 1 97 9). The G.M.C. said that it would withdraw from this
position if an Indian Medical Council was established. But it was
clear that such a council would only be respectable in British
eyes if it had a membership largely nominated and official. This
led to the medical of the 1 920's and 1 930's. The
I.M.A. accepted the desirability of a national Medical Council,
to co-ordinate the work of the Provincial Councils, established
since 1912, but argued for the inclusion of licentiate doctors on
the all-India register, and for a larger elected, non-official
element, in line with more general nationalist arguments. The
early sessions of the I.M.A., and the editorials of its Journal,
are dominated by this issue until 1933, when the new Indian
Medical Council was established.
With the change in Congress policy in 1936, from opposition
to the reforms of the 1935 Government of India Act to a
willingness to contest elections and enter Assemblies, the I.M.A.
also became involved with the work of the new I.M.C. A major
actor in this arena was B.C. Roy, a member of the Council who was
by 1945 arguing against the maintenance of licentiate
qualifications though he maintained the view that they should be
registered along with graduate doctors (Roy, 1964:290-1). But
throughout these arguments it was clear that close association
with indigenous practitioners would be incompatible with
international recognition, and the desire to maintain this point
ensured that barriers between Western and indigenous doctors
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would be reinforced.
Medical politics were not the sole activity of the I.M.A.:
it has published a Journal since 1931, with the bulk of the
material being academic articles, and Branch meetings also have
academic sessions. But it is difficult to avoid the impression
that the political activities of the I.M.A. have been dominant.
THE I.M.A. IN INDEPENDENT INDIA
From its origin, the I.M.A. has been seen by both its
membership and the Government as the mouthpiece of the private
practitioners, particularly those in general practice. Prior to
1933 there was an attempt to ensure that Government servants did
not join, on the grounds that the I.M.A. would recommend its
members to vote for certain candidates (presumably Congress) and
that this made it a political body and therefore out of bounds to
Government servants (N.A.I. File 18—6/37 —H). This bar was dropped
when I.M.A. rules were changed to delete those clauses which
urged to support candidates sponsored by the I.M.A., but the
image of official disapproval has remained, and some doctors have
claimed that their I.M.A. activities have been a cause of
problems in their careers. The benefits offered by the I.M.A.
also tend to be directed towards private practitioners.
Membership of the I.M.A. has, at different times, meant
preferences in the allocation of telephone connections, cars, or
motor-scooters; Government doctors have separate access to these
scarce resources.
These are probably some of the reasons why the I.M.A. is
unable to attract a membership of more than about 35" of the
total number of Western doctors in the country. Membership at
Independence was about 10,000, reaching 18,000 in the mid-1950's,
rising to 26,000 in 1965 and 41,000 in 1975 (I.M.A.[Annual
Reports] various years). Most local Branch activities are
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organised with the convenience of private practitioners in mind,
taking place in the afternoons when most clinics are closed but
when doctors in employment may still have to attend to their
duties. In the 1960's the I.M.A. attempted to draw the
associations of specialists into a closer relationship,
preferably under its own Specialty Wing but this was largely
unsuccessful. Although doctors in employment have occasionally
sought the assistance of the I.M.A. and have acted togtether (as
in the agitation against 'quackery' and for improvements in
service conditions in 1969) they have resisted attempts by the
I.M.A. to establish a longer-term relationship.
Thus both Government and doctors seem to concur in seeing
the I.M.A. as representing only the general, private practice
fraction of Western doctors. Nonetheless, the I.M.A. has been the
largest association of doctors, and it has attempted to present
its views on medical policies in as many fora as possible. The
headquarters were moved from Calcutta to Delhi in 1948, to bring
the association nearer the centre of power, and the I.M.A. has
worked constantly to be 'taken into confidence' by politicians
and medical civil servants. It has representatives who attend a
wide range of committees - the Annual Report for 1973-4 lists 18,
all with some form of Governmental involvement. The most
prestigious of these are the meetings of the Central Councils of
Health and Family Planning/Welfare. The I.M.A. President is
usually invited to attend, but not as a full member.
However, I.M.A. officials generally complain that Government
does take them into 'confidence' in medical decision-making.
During 1960's a concerted attempt was made to improve the
effectiveness of the I.M.A. as an influence in decision-making. A
Public Relations Standing Committee was established in 1963,
stating its rationale as a result of the progress of modern
medicine and the enlightenment of laymen. It argued that the
I.M.A. should study proposed legislation and that its views
should be put forward in the press and 'through personal approach
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to the legislators or Health Department Officials, administrators
and others directly concerned' (I. M.A. [Annual Report]:1963/64).
The main objectives of the committee included communicating
medical news and information, and presenting a positive image of
the profession by preventing internal conflicts and 'presenting a
true, realistic picture of the medical men (sic) of today'
(ibid.). The apparent failure of this approach was increasingly
stated in the late 1960's, particularly over Government plans to
regularise the practice of medicine by unqualified personnel.
This led the I.M.A. to follow a strategy designed to generate
public support for their position, using Protest Days, marches,
and a more concerted attempt to use the Press as a vehicle for
its views. (See further in Chapter 9 below.) However, this
strategy was largely abandoned by 1975 (when the Emergency made
public protest illegal) and the I.M.A. returned to its former
methods of influencing events. I.M.A. office-holders visit
Ministers with Memoranda about policy proposals; they hold
conferences on topics such as Rural Medical Relief and invite
politicians to open or close the proceedings, and medical civil
servants to give papers or chair scientific sessions; and they
use other contacts (such as doctors who are also MP's) to improve
relationships with Government. I.M.A. office-holders still
believe that they do not have the kind of access and
relationships which can be turned into policy influence.
One reason for the political weakness of the I.M.A. is its
dependence on the very Government it is trying to influence. The
I.M.A. is not a wealthy organisation: it does not employ any
doctors full-time, and is dependent upon the committment of
working private practitioners to give up afternoons in office
work in the Delhi headquarters, or to attend meetings and
conferences during working hours. Many of its proposals for
action (such as the involvement of the I.M.A. in school health or
family planning activities) are only viable if they are
underwritten by Government funds. It is clear that only an
increase in income from this source would permit the I.M.A. to
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expand its H.Q. staff and employ doctors or other professionals
in an executive capacity. The major sources of patronage
available to the I.M.A. - access to priority allocations of
scarce goods - are provided by the Government. Its prestige
activities - conferences, buildings, overseas tours - also depend
on Government funds and permission.
Another source of its political weakness is its tendency to
internal disputes, mentioned above. These disputes can be
aggressively pursued: for example, the President of the I.M.A.
for 1970-71 was prevented from taking office because of a legal
dispute over whether Bombay was entitled to Branch status
separate from that of Maharashtra State. In several years legal
expenses in respect of litigation, usually connected with
elections to the 'prestige' offices of President and Vice-
President rather than the 'working' offices of Secretary or
Assistant Secretary, have taken over 51 of I.M.A. income. The
posts of Secretary and Assistant Secretaries have rarely been
contested and have stayed in the hands of a small group of Delhi
G.P.s. There have only been six holders of the post of General
Secretary since 1998, and several of them have only had
licentiate qualifications. Further disputes have been generated
over matters such as attempts by office-bearers to discipline
I.M.A. staff, whose cause has been championed by some I.M.A.
members. These disputes have largely been caused by factional
political divisions within the I.M.A., and have weakened its
ability to act decisively.
A third reason for political weakness is the limited spread
of doctors into rural areas. This probably made little difference
to doctors, other than causing them embamassment when they were
accused of being unwilling to go where they were most needed,
while political policy was largely the preserve of the urban
intelligentsia (as under Nehru). But with the changing structure
of Indian political life, described by some as a 'ruralisation of
polities', this has become much more significant (Rosenthal,
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1970). Doctors have been much less well placed than unregistered
practitioners to arouse rural public support or factional
followings, and these kinds of political resource have become
much more important to political success, except during the
Emergency of 1 975—77-
The I.M.A. thus demonstrates several of the general features
which Johnson considers typical of professional associations in
post-co1on i a 1 states, and which, he argues, makes it
appropriate for them to be regarded as essentially different from
their counterparts in the ex-colonial metropolises (Johnson,
1973). He argues that their activities tend to be limited in
range, their membership low, and advancement and prestige within
the association mostly sought by marginal practitioners.
Johnson's model includes two other criteria, to which the I.M.A.
has conformed less clearly. Johnson argues that ambitious young
doctors would use an organisation such as the I.M.A. as a route
to advance in public careers; and that international networks
would be of crucial significance. The first of these was true for
the period around Independence: several leading politicians were
active in the I.M.A. and then moved onto a wider political base,
the most notable being Dr Bidhanchandra Roy, an early President
of the I.M.A. and later an elected member of the Medical Council
of India. He became Chief Minister of West Bengal for many years
in the 1950s. Another example is that of Dr Jivraj Mehta, also
prominent in the I.M.A. and then the first Secretary of Health
and Director-General of Health Services in Independent India,
before becoming an ambassador. By contrast, in the 1960's such
links seemed to be waning. For example, in 1970 ten doctor -MP's
were invited to attend a meeting of a committee concerned with
monitoring legislative proposals, but only one turned up.
The role of international networks is also difficult to
substantiate. The I.M.A. is certainly proud of its membership of
international associations like the World Medical Association,
and the Commonwealth Federation, and hosting international
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conferences of such bodies is undoubtedly prestigious. In
addition, in a situation where foreign exchange is difficult to
obtain, attendance at conferences abroad could be a prized right.
However, this has been of fluctuating significance. On occasion,
doctors attending such conferences have had to pay all their own
expenses, and there has been little competition to go - rather,
doctors who happened to be in the right country at the right time
have represented the I.M.A., and have played no apparent further
part in its activities.
Many of the other medical associations share these
characteristics with the I.M.A. Associations of specialists have
not tended to be active in attempts to affect medical policies,
except for relatively technical issues, such as the conditions
for the import of medical equipment. They have also had to depend
on the Government for financial support. On the other hand, they
are more likely than the I.M.A. to be dominated by doctors in the
public sector, with official posts usually held by Professors
from the senior medical colleges; and factional disputes are less
likely to erupt into publie or legal arenas than is the case for
the I.M.A.
The general dependence on Government can also be illustrated
through the history of the Indian Academy of Medical Sciences
(I. A. M.S.). This was sponsored by Dr K. N. Rao when he 'was the
Director of Health Services in Andhra Pradesh in the 1 960's, and
taken up by him again when he was Director-General of Health
Services in New Delhi. The I.A. M.S. was to play a role somewhere
between the British Royal Colleges and the Soviet Academies of
Science, but Rao's strategy was entirely dependent on Government
sponsorship. He managed to achieve the formal establishment of
the I.A. M.S., but it was totally restricted to the granting of
honorific titles until 1975. In that year, Indian medical
qualifications were again 'aerecognised' by the C-.M.C., and in
retaliation, the Government of India insisted that British
qualifications would no longer be recognised in India. The
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Government chose to use the I.A. M.S. as a vehicle for providing
medical qualifications in India, separate from the University
sector, to provide an equivalent to British Royal College
qualifications since these were no longer to be recognised.
CONTROL OVER "QUACKERY": A CASE STUDY
One further way to understand the nature of medical
politics, the tactics of the various participants and the values
they are trying to establish, is to look at a case study. There
is no doubt that the primary issue -which has exercised the I.M.A.
since 19^7 has been policy towards practitioners unqualified in
Western medicine. Prior to Independence, the expressed attitudes
of doctor-politicians were not very hostile. In the 1930's, as I
have shown above, several Presidents of the I.M.A. called for a
rapprochement between allopathic and indigenous practitioners.
Even so, the hand of friendship was only offered to 'sincere', or
'genuine' practitioners who maintained a 'pure' practice of the
ancient arts. But I.M.A. policy since 19^7 has been consistently
to draw a clear line between allopathic graduates and licentiates
on the one hand, and all other practitioners, usually called
"quacks". Under pressure the I.M.A. has admitted that trained
vaids and hakims should be permitted to continue in their own
line, but it has protested vehemently against 'integrated'
practice (combining training and treatment from more than one
system) and the use of allopathic treatments by untrained
personnel. The Public Relations Sub-Committee expressed it in
this way in 1963:
"Quackery is rampant in our country. It would be the
duty of the Association to acquaint the public and
educate the illiterate masses about the same with a view
to elicit their co-operation in rooting out this
menace."
Unfortunately for the I.M.A., the public and many
politicians and civil servants do not see the matter in the same
way. Propaganda against travelling sellers of cures, usually
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totally fraudulent, has been undertaken by the Government, but
neither it nor most patients see established practitioners with
dubious qualifications, nor the use by vaids and hakims of
allopathic medicines, as the same kind of issue. Whatever the
overall doctor-population ratios might say, it is clear that in
many areas trained doctors are few and far between. The
Government has therefore argued that the unqualified practitioner
is entitled to earn his living in this way as long as he is not
an actual threat to his patients, at least until there are enough
trained doctors to replace him. This view is held despite the
existence of legislation designed:
(i) to restrict the spread of unqualified practice by
registering existing practitioners and then outlawing any future
additions to the register (following a Bombay Act of 1938 as a
model) ;
(ii) to prevent any medical practice by those unqualified in
modern medicine (enshrined in a clause of the Act which amended
the constitution of the Medical Council of India, in 1956); and
(iii) to prevent the prescribing of drugs contained on a
list of dangerous drugs (enshrined in the Drugs Act of 19*10).
The I.M.A. has frequently tried to insist that this
legislation be enforced, but it has usually been ignored. This
may be because, at the local level, the relevant agencies
(District Medical Officers, or the police) prefer to maintain
illegal practices for considerations, or as part of the network
of favours and obligations which are the everyday currency of
political life. However, when it has been proposed that policy
should change to over-rule aspects of this legislation, the
I.M.A. has managed to prevent most of these changes being
implemented. The 'bare-foot' doctor scheme of 1972-3, and the
proposal by the Kerala Government in 1 974—6 to establish a common
register for qualified and unqualified personnel, wets two cases
where sustained ' trade-union' action was successful, in
combination with other factors, in preventing a change. But
opposition to the schemes developed since 1975, again based on a
251
'bare-foot doctor', has not prevented the establishment of
Community Health Volunteers. The rural populism which
characterised the Janata Government led it to over-rule medical
opposition, and the new Congress Government of 1980 eventually
decided to maintain a commitment to implementing the scheme
(Joubert, 1985).
The associations of indigenous practitioners have also been
concerned with policy in this area. As Brass has shown, these
associations have been divided into two opposing camps - those
who have insisted on a 'pure' Ayurveda and those in favour of
some integration of Western and indigenous practice (Brass,
1972). Most education in Ayurvedic and Unani colleges prior to
the 1960s was 'integrated' with modern subjects, such as anatomy
and physiology, but this led to increasing stresses after 19^7.
Students in general tended to want more Western medicine, since
they were often taking courses in indigenous medicine as a
second-best option, having failed to get into Western medical
colleges. They then used their training to claim that they were
entitled to employment on the same pay and conditions as Western
graduates. But the political case for indigenous medicine rested
on its suitability to Indian culture, diet and climate, and on
its claim that it was providing services in the rural areas which
Western medicine was unwilling and unlikely to supply. The
contradictions in this situation were resolved by decisions in
the early 1960s which removed 'modern' science from the
curriculum of most indigenous medical colleges and followed the
'pure' line. This line which was also preferred by Western
doctors because it might lead to a clearer delineation of the
distinctions between the systems of medicine, and a clearer
ability to stop 'outsiders' (those without full Western
qualifications) from encroaching on Western territory (G.O.I.,
1 9611i) .
But this dispute has not died. There remain deep
contradictions between the representatives of 'pure' Ayurveda and
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the actual practices of most graduates of the indigenous
colleges. The practitioners routinely use aspects of Western
medicine, and usually insist on their right to prescribe any
legal drugs. The logical problems of attempts to synthesise an
integrated 'system' of medicine are usually regarded as
insurmountable; but at the level of everyday practice, many
practitioners and clients are willing to move between these
incompatible systems. In addition, the indigenous graduates have
been almost as unwilling to work in rural areas as have their
Western counterparts. The debates over high policy have thus
tended to be carried on at considerable remove from everyday
reality .
These processes have thus led to a v/eak form of medical
oligopoly. Not only do indigenous practitioners continue to
exist, they also have a measure of State patronage for their
colleges, with some public employment prospects for their
graduates. Most recently, graduates of indigenous medical
colleges have supposedly been employed as the third medical
officer at Primary Health Centres. In private practice they also
prescribe Western medicines with varying degrees of impunity, and
run successful clinics in urban as well as in some rural
settings. Since 1977, the Western doctors have also had to accept
the creation of a new group of healers, also with some State
patronage, in vast numbers. In I.M.A. terms, this is a
sponsorship of 'quackery' which they have been powerless to
prevent.
CONCLUSION
The I.M.A. has been generally unsuccessful in its campaigns.
Its office-bearers feel they are excluded from the informal
policy-making process, and formal attempts to influence policy
have been of limited success. It has not followed a clear-cut
policy of promoting private medicine: for a period during the
1970s it favoured a complete nationalisation of medical services
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as a way of dealing with the problems of over-crowding in
medicine. Other organisations of practitioners have been even
less successful, whether they have been paramedical practitioners
or those from the other systems of medicine. The main strength of
the Western doctors has come from their representatives within
the official hierarchy, where they have been able to trade on
their control over scarce, desirable resources - access to
hospitals and medical colleges. Health policy-making has thus
taken place in the absence of sustained ideological debate,
whether over the system of medicine to be supported, the role of
private medicine, or the distribution of resources between uses.
I shall now turn to look at international pressures on policy¬
making, which have involved some of these issues.
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CHAPTER 8
INDIA IN THE WORLD HEALTH ECONOMY
It was obviously impossible to understand health policy in
India before 19^7 without looking at the role of the British
Government. Indian health and health policy since 19^7 must also
be seen in the context of a world economy. This has had a number
of implications, some of them very general. For example, the
Indian economy has been influenced by its access to technology
and world markets which has not been true, until recently, of
China. The cultural implications of this access have been to
present a picture of a desirable future to the Indian elite,
which has influenced decision-making in a number of fields. And
the role of multinational corporations has been to affect the
generation of internal capital and investment decision-making.
However, as I argued in the Introduction to Part B, these forces
have not been as powerful or substantial in India as in many
other peripheral capitalist economies. In this chapter I shall
'bracket off' concern with the wider context (and I shall return
to it in the Conclusion) in order to focus in turn on three areas
where the links to health and health policy are more direct. The
first is health sector aid; the second is the migration of health
sector personnel; and the third is the operations of multi¬
national corporations, as employers, producers, and sellers -
particularly of pharmaceutical products.
HEALTH SECTOR AID
Health sector aid to India has not been the subject of much
discussion apart from the special area of family planning. The
most recent critic - D. Banerji - argues that donor agencies are
actively supporting moves to reintroduce compulsion in family
planning, in spite of the apparent shift in health sector aid
programmes after 1975 (Banerji, 1981; but see also Kocher, 1980).
The basis of Banerji's critique is a familiar one. He argues that
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health policy (in this case, maternal and child health and family
planning) must be understood in the context of an international
political economy. Health policies supported by the World Bank or
other capitalist institutions must, in this perspective, be seen
in the light of the interests which they serve, and Banerji
predicts that the new resources are not 'really' for maternal and
child health but merely a facade to cover the planned return to
compulsion in family planning. This argument, however, can only
finally be settled by the course of events in the next few years:
in this section I am concerned with the patterns of aid in the
period between 19^7 and 1980.
For the purposes of this chapter I shall define health
sector aid as 'international assistance to the health sector'. It
may or may not have any impact on health, and aid to other
sectors may have more impact (for example through raising female
literacy). 'Aid' and 'assistance' are of course contested terms,
but I shall use them for simplicity. The only substantial work on
health sector aid, using the same basic definition, has been
carried out in the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex,
(Cole-King, 1976; White, 1977) but this concentrated on assessing
patterns of activity by donors while I am concerned here with the
pattern for one recipient country.
Health sector aid has not attracted the same hostile attent¬
ion paid to other aspects of 'official development assistance':
the general aura of disinterestedness which surrounds the doctor
and nurse has carried over to the international aid which is
supposed to train, employ, equip or house them in underdeveloped
countries. Nevertheless, there is a growing body of critical
literature, dating from the mid-197C's, and many of the
criticisms have been accepted by key decision-makers, both in
donor agencies and in Health Ministries in the Third World.
There is a powerful argument against focussing attention on
health sector aid, since this may well have a far less signifi¬
cant impact on the health of Indians than other aspects of the
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world-economy. But health 'aid' should not thereby be ignored,
but be seen in a context set by other transactions - the focus of
the second and third sections of this chapter.
EEU1E1EEE QE EELL1U EEEIQE LIE
Few people have argued that all health sector aid should
cease; rather they have argued that the form it has taken has:
(a) led to increased dependency relationships;
(b) been an inappropriate use of techniques and models; and
(c) been informed by conscious or unconscious Halthusian
intentions.
Gish's pioneering work on flows of doctors and other medical
personnel between the U.K. and other countries provides one of
the earliest examples of the ways in which health sector aid
could be said to benefit the donor rather than the recipient
(Gish, 1971). Some of the doctors and nurses brought for training
to the U.S. and the U.K. stayed behind after their training and
helped meet manpower shortages there. A considerable literature
has developed which attempts to measure the benefits reaped by
countries receiving flows of doctors and nurses in this way, with
a number of proposals to tax these benefits for transfer to the
countries losing medical personnel (Gish, 1976).
It is clear that in the case of India, at least, this
'brain-drain' has been funded mainly by the doctors involved
themselves (relatively few Indian nurses are abroad) and not by
aid agencies. Nevertheless, some critics have argued that these
flows are only possible because of the professional links
maintained partly by foreign support for the training of medical
educators abroad. As a result, medical colleges in India have
remained oriented to Western models of medical training, at the
expense of appropriateness in terms of local patterns of disease
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and services (see Jeffery, 1979 and Chapter 9 below). In this way
'medical dependency' is reproduced: not only flows of trained
personnel but also orders for medical equipment and
pharmaceuticals tend to divert benefits back to the donor
countries (Doyal, 1979; Cleaver, 1977).
A major weakness of this kind of analysis is its focus on
the external partner in an aid or trade relationship. (For
general discussions of dependency theories, see Roxborough, 1979;
Foster-Carter, 1978; Worsley, 1980.) It sometimes appears as if
'metropolitan' countries are totally dominant, and need take no
account of class formations and State apparatuses within the
'periphery'. But there are good grounds for believing that
internal factors will affect the kind of assistance which is
acceptable or requested. Some countries, notably, in this case,
India, have developed considerable sophistication in manipulating
donor agencies.
As with other aspects of dependency analysis, there is a
need to specify the period under discussion: there may well be
differences between the immediate post-Independence period and
later on. In addition, the material benefits to the donor are
seldom quantified. It may well be that supporters of health
sector aid point to material benefits in order to persuade donors
to provide support, but the supposed benefits (e.g. a more
profitable environment for multinational investment) may not
materialise, nor may they affect the decisions taken after the
assistance has been sanctioned. While it is valuable to debunk
the claims that health aid is purely philanthropic, it is also
necessary to bear in mind the relative insignificance of health
aid.
One area of analysis which has not been much developed is
the part played by medical aid in the maintenance and
reproduction of the mode (or modes) of production in
underdeveloped countries. This is not perhaps surprising, given
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the lack of agreement about what characterises the mode of
production in these countries or the way in which several modes
of production might be said to interact (articulate) in any
specific historical example (Alavi, 1975 « 1981). In the case of
India, there is dispute at least between those who interpret the
situation as one where there is a post-colonial mode, and those
who see articulations between an expanding capitalist mode and a
semi-feudal mode (Thorner, 1983).
Without entering into those debates, it is possible to make
two relevant points here. The first relates to State structures:
most health aid is channeled through the State, and thus helps to
expand the resources available to the State and those who control
it. Health sector aid thus tends to strengthen the position of
ruling groups in general, as well as supporting particular groups
such as public sector doctors over those in the private sector,
and modern bureaucratic cosmopolitan medicine over informal,
indigenous or traditional systems. The second point relates to
the particular significance of medicine as an ideological form -
one of the ways in which poverty and exploitation can be
explained away ( or at least those responsible for it can deny
responsibility - see Frankenberg, 1981). The provision of
individualised medical (and other) services by the State helps to
defuse pressures for change in the underlying social structures
ultimately causing the patterns of morbidity ana mortality
(Jeffery, 1978). Health sector aid channeled through the
Government tends to support these processes.
There is also the argument that the funding of health
services from outside the community tends to weaken its capacity
to provide for itself, which can be seen as an important aspect
of development itself. However, if the alternative is that the
poorest groups are left with the job of managing their own
poverty then it is not clear that external assistance worsens the
situation (Briscoe, 1980). Some writers have argued that medical
services, even those organised originally from outside, can also
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have liberative effects, especially among the rural landless or
the urban slumdweller (Banerji, 1973). Indeed, some health
projects, especially the voluntary, innovative ones, threaten
established powerful groups. Perhaps this is possible because
health is rarely perceived as central to a pattern of domination;
but attempts to make significant changes in the health status of
the poor can easily lead to confrontation (Chowdhury, 1978).
(b) lj3^i>jMjj£iak£.nA&s
This criticism of health sector aid is the most familiar,
and is in some respects just a less 'political' version of the
dependency argument. Much medical aid in the past has been used
to establish large hospitals, to install expensive equipment, or
to train high-level personnel. The maintenance costs of such
large projects can swallow up a considerable proportion of the
budgets of poor countries; they have rarely served more than a
small proportion of the population (the elite, urban groups); and
they have been designed to cope in an expensive way with diseases
which bulk relatively small in the morbidity pattern of the
country as a whole (Bryant, 1969). Health sector aid has thus
tended to move resources out of primary care into secondary and
tertiary care; a'way from rural areas into urban ones; a'way from
preventive, community health and into hospital-based curative
facilities; and away from female healers and towards male ones
(Doyal, 1979). The legacy of inappropriate institutions - for
training, or hospitals, or in the skills of available staff -
makes change very difficult to achieve.
A further version of this critique applies hindsight to
large aid projects and argues that their failure can be explained
by the absence of any attempt to adapt to local economic, social
and cultural conditions (Newell, 1975). The most obvious example
of this is the malaria eradication programme, which was planned
on the model of experience in other parts of the world but which
failed to adapt adequately to Indian conditions, notably the
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inadequacy of its basic health services (Sinha, 1976; Aggarwal,
1978; Harrison, 1978). Another example would be the early
clinic-based approach to the supply of family planning services,
which was totally inappropriate to a largely rural country
(Banerji, 1972; Demerath, 1976). In both cases, Western
experiences were applied, on the assumption that narrow technical
issues determined success, and the failure to allow for local
cultural, social and economic patterns was ultimately disastrous.
The general case is that health sector aid has assisted a
wholesale borrowing of techniques and institutions from the West
in a naive 'modernisation' framework which has taken inadequate
note of the differences between donor and recipient society.
Some critics go further and argue that the Western solutions can
never serve underdeveloped countries, because they are not
effective in the West; while others take the more radical view
that these services are counter-productive in health terms,
because they generate dependencies which are antithetical to
people's ability to manage their own lives (Illich, 1976).
The major weakness of this kind of criticism is that it is
rarely located in a political economy of decision-making.
The assumption is that such errors are a result of ignorance (and
that knowledge will bring resolution) or because of the
particularly narrow form of medical education, which can be
balanced by the introduction of community elements into decision¬
making. However, it is perhaps this focus on technical issues
which has made it most acceptable to decision-makers, and it is
this critique which has had most influence in changing the
policies of donor agencies.
(c)
This set of criticisms most obviously applies to population
programmes, and specifically refers to the assumption (explicit
or implicit) that the cause of a country's poverty can be found
in the size or rate of growth of its population. The idea that
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world affluence was threatened by population growth in poor
countries provided a clear justification for assistance to family
planning programmes from the mid-1 960's onwards (Piotrow, 1973).
This was led by the Ford Foundation and U.S.A.I.D., who continue
to support these programmes on a substantial scale, but other
donors also became involved at different levels. Critics focus on
the potential for such programmes to become another way in which
the poor are blamed for their poverty. Resources which could be
used to assist them are instead put into programmes which the
poor do not want and which meet few of their perceived needs.
Concern for preventing births is not matched by concern for those
already born, and some critics interpret this as essentially
racist, and anti-feminist (Doyal, 1979). However, many writers
are also aware of the ambiguities involved: the ability of women
to control their own fertility in a safe way is increasingly
regarded as a basic right; and the extent of illegal abortions is
witness to the number of women who are having unwanted
conceptions, or are unable to 'space' their conceptions as they
would prefer. There is a fine line between providing services
which allow men and women to control the number of children they
have, ana forcing them to have fewer than they want.
ULALID AID ID IDD1A+ 1211=1111
Detailed investigation of a case study demonstrates some of
the problems with the analyses presented above. To begin with,
there is the problem of what economists call 'fungibility'. The
provision of aid for one project (say a new hospital) releases
local funds for other projects (say a new hotel). Since we cannot
know what would have happened in the absence of the aid, we
cannot know the extent to which the aid 'really' funds the
project to which it is linked on paper (Singer, 1965). It is
also difficult to classify health sector aid, since any
particular project may have both appropriate and inappropriate or
Malthusian features - such as training in the biology of human
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reproduction for paramedical workers. I shall have to assume here
that it does make sense to talk about the projects nominally
funded by health sector aid, and where the data exist, I shall
use crude classifications of aid on the assumption that this is
meaningful. Table 1 summarises the main sources of foreign
assistance to Indian publie sector health activities.
In quantitative terms the major donor has been the U.S.A.,
providing technical assistance to health and sanitation amounting
to $107 million between about 1950 and 1973 (see Table 2). After
the U.S. Government's 'tilt to Pakistan' in the Indo-Pakistani
War of 1971, the U.S. Government ceased new assistance to India.
However, a new loan to malaria control was negotiated in 1978,
and since 1980 new grants have been made to the area development
programmes in five States (see further in Chapter 11). The
earlier assistance was almost entirely on a grant basis, and
health took about 3 7% of technical assistance to India in this
period. In addition, a grant of $20 million made in 1969 was not
tied to specific imports or advisers, but was granted on the
understanding that of the extra resources made available to the
Government of India, 50% would be spent on improving the delivery
of rural health and family planning services.
The final category of U.S. assistance is PL-480 rupee
counterpart funds. Grain supplied as 'aid' by the U.S. was 'paid
for' in rupees; the Indian Government could only spend these with
the agreement of the U.S. Government. Nearly Rs1 ,000 million
(approximately $166 million) went in loans to the health sector,
and Rs1,250 million (about $200 million) went in grants. Contrary
to some of the expectations derived from the literature cited
above, the major share of the technical assistance and PL-480
funding was to malaria control and eradication (78% of technical
assistance and 475 of PL-480 funds) and water supply and sanit¬




MAJOR SOURCES OF HEALTH AID 1947-1979
1947-9 1950-4 1955-9 1960-4 1965-9 1 970-4 1975-9 TOTAL
v millions
U.S. Government
Technical aid 21 46 25 12 2 107
PL-480 70 136 160 366
Other 10 15 25
U.N.I.C.E.F. 0.3 8 10 20 26 40 30 134
W.H.O. 0.2 2 5 6 6 11 23 53
U.N.F.P.A. 5 37 42
World Bank:
Population 6 15 21
Water Supply etc. 1 69 70
Ford Foundation 3 4 3 1 10
Rockefeller Fndtn. 0.1 0.2 2 1 2 0 - 5
Swedish I.D.A. 2 9 11
Norwegian I.D.A. 4 24 28
U.K.(O.D.A.) 6 6
TOTAL 0.6 31 133 191 210 84 229 878
(excl. PL-480 0.6 31 63 55 50 84 229 512
Sources: For u.S. aid, see Table 2; u^k^i^c^e^e-. £xxxxxxx£ £xxxx£ xxx
ixxxxxjfcx> u.N. General Assembly Official Records, New York, 1950-1976.
(Because of changes in classification and the expansion of activities to
include education, the 1 970-74 and 1 975-79 figures are estimates); Xx£xxx
£xxxx£ q£ iixxxxxx xx £xx£x ixxxxxxxxi Xxx £xxxlx£xxx ixxxxixxxx, u.n.f.p.a.,
New York, 1 979; ixxxlx xxxxx xx £xx£j3 £xx£ ixxx* W.H.O., New Delhi,
1 968; ix'xxix ixxx xxxxx xx £xxi£ £xx£ ixxx^ 12ii£=l£2£, New Delhi, 1 973;
£xxxxxxx1 jlfixxxix, W.H.O., Geneva, 1 973-77; ixxxxi xxxxxjls , Rockefeller
Foundation, relevant years; £xx£ £XXX£X£XXX iXXXXl ££XXX£j Ford Foundation,
New York, relevant years. (Details provided change from year to year and the
absence of payments information from seven years means that there may be some
double-counting); Norwegian aid: personal letter, June 1985.
264
TABLE 2












Sources: ££££££l£ ££d 1
Office of Controller, U.S.A.I.D., 1 976:259; Shenoy, 1974:243.
" categories are not separately recorded.
Note: The lifi.e.S l££±£ Ui£££±Q££ £££ l£££hiiUiS reprints press
releases from the U.S.Embassy in several editions from the mid-
1950's onwards until 1969-70. This incomplete listing gives some
evidence on the timing of this assistance, and notes Rs29 million
to A.1.1. M.S., Rs134 million to primary health centres, anc R s 7 4
million to the training of medical educators before 31 March
1 966 .
J£13j2£ii Q£ <*££££££.£ ££d £££££££, Reserve Bank of India, lists
loans from 1969/70 onwards. A loan from U.S.A.I.D. for malaria
control was agreed in 1978, ana Rs120 millions ($15.4 millions)
was spent in 1979/80 under this head.
Technical PL- oCO
Assistance Grants Loans
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There has been something of a division of labour between
U.S. aid and that of the W.H.O.: while material supplies have
come from U.S. aid, technical advisers (many of them American)
have been provided under W.H.O.'s auspices. Indians were also
trained on U.S. government funds: for example, 249 between 1952
and 1960 were trained in health subjects, roughly 10% of the
total (Shenoy, 1974; Times of India, 1951-67).
U.N.I.C.E.F. has provided substantial assistance to Indian
health programmes, often in collaboration with W.H.O.,
particularly to maternal and child health services, tuberculosis
and leprosy control programmes, the production of vaccines, and
to the applied nutrition programme. Over the period 1947-70
U.N.I.C.E.F. provided over $64 million, mostly in the health
sector, though in recent years it has diversified its assistance
into education. This excludes emergency relief. India is also a
contributor to U.N.I.C.E.F., including $15 millions as a member
since 1950, so this is not 'net' assistance. A detailed breakdown
of U.N.I.C.E.F. assistance to India by purpose is not available,
but the largest share was in supplies and equipment - anti¬
malarial and anti-T.B. materials, milk for child feeding, jeeps
for primary health services and so on.
Since 1971, the U.N. Fund for Population Activities
(U.N.F.P.A.) has provided substantial assistance, with $43
million allocated up to 1979. Smaller grants have been handled by
W.H.O. or I.L.O.; larger awards have' been managed direct by
U.N.F.P.A. or by the U.N.Development Programme. Some of this
assistance has been firmly within the family planning programme
of the Government of India, such as $14 million for the expansion
of the sterilisation programme; others have been concerned to
strengthen training for paramedical workers who do more than just
family planning work, as in the grants of $20.5 million for
training indigenous midwives and paramedical workers, and for the
employment of nurse-midwives and female health workers.
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W.H.O. has also been a substantial donor, with a total of
over $40 million between 1948 and 1976. As with U.S. aid, this
assistance has been spread over most parts of the Indian
Government health programme, with substantial proportions going
to malaria control and eradication (13"), smallpox eradication
(24%) and tuberculosis control (85). Suport to communicable
disease control programmes (including technical advisers and
fellowships for Indians to study abroad) has taken roughly half
of total assistance, while education and training has taken 85.
While other countries in the region are increasingly encouraged
to send their medical personnel on W.H.O. fellowships to India
for training, 905 of Indian fellows study outside the region.
W.H.O. provided 1184 fellowships between 1948 and 1972, mostly in
public health (570), malaria eradication (83) and control of
other communicable diseases (161), but a further 208 were for
medical education and 162 for clinical subjects. This category
included a link between Baroda Medical College and Edinburgh
Medical School; Baroda has the distinction of a graduate
population about 505 abroad in 1976 (Bhatt et al., 1976).
W.H.O. has also been a source of technical advice, both
formally and informally. W.H.O. advisers attend and sometimes
contribute to meetings of the Central Council of Health, as did
U.S.A.I.D., Ford and Rockefeller advisers prior to the mid-
1960's. They have provided assessments of plans and projects; and
their support was crucial in the establishment of the malaria
control and eradication programmes in the 1950s, and the smallpox
eradication programme of the 1970s. Their 'non-political' status
has probably given their advice more acceptability than that of
the Americans, though in practice they worked closely with
U.S.A.I.D. in the heyday of American assistance, before 1966
(Meyer, 1 967).
With the exception of the U.S., health sector aid from other
countries or institutions has been less substantial and less
regular than the involvement of the U.N. agencies. The U.K. has
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in many years been the largest bilateral donor to India, but in
the field of health its contribution has been small. It has taken
four forms. Firstly there has been assistance known as
'maintenance aid', in which the Government of India imports what
it wishes from the U.K., funded by a sterling credit. Here the
influence of the British Government is small, but some of the
goods so imported (about $720,000 a year in the 1970s) have been
medical in nature (White, 1977). The second category is aid for
specific projects. In the 1 970Ts this amounted to very small sums
in the health sphere, for example $1 20,000 in 197*1, nothing in
1975, and $250,000 in 1976 (O.D.A., 1971; O.D.M., 1978). The
third area is technical co-operation, the funding of fellowships
in the U.K. ana the provision of technical advisers. In part this
has been handled through the Colombo Plan, with 50 fellowships a
year going to Indians in the sphere of health in the 1960's.
Other visits to the U.K. have been provided by the British
Council (10 or so a year in the 1 9 7 0' s ) and under Commonwealth
schemes (50 or so a year in the 1 9 7 0's) (Colombo Plan, 1969).
There was also a scheme in which the Post-Graduate Institute of
Medicine in Chandigarh was linked to the Postgraduate Medical
Federation at the Hammersmith Hospital in London. The fourth
category is an isolated grant of $6 million in 1977 to equip
operating theatres at Primary Health Centres and sub-divisional
hospitals, largely for sterilisation ope rations, which was a rare
example of British aid available for expenditures in rupees prior
to 1 97 9.
Other bilateral donors have provided specific assistance for
projects and for training abroad. New Zealand provided $2
millions for the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences
(A.1.1.M.S.) in New Delhi in the mid-1950's; and in the 1970's
and the early 1980s the Norwegian Government has provided
assistance to a post-partum family planning programme. The
Swedish Government provided $10 million to the W.H.0. for
smallpox eradication in India in the early 1970s, and co-financed
a major project with the World Bank. Other countries have been of
less significance. However, as Table 1 shows, whereas until the
1 960's the major part of health aid was provided by U.S. sources,
the inputs from other donors have become far more significant
since 1975. This can be in part understood as a result of the
changes in aid orientation discussed in Chapter 11.
Most private sector aid has not been handled by the
Government sector in India. The exceptions are the major
foundations, Ford and Rockefeller. The Rockefeller Foundation
began assistance in India in 1920, with aid to health programmes
in Mysore State, and provided $675,000 to the All-India Institute
of Hygiene and Public Health in Calcutta before Independence.
Since 1950 major grants have gone to the Virus Research Centre in
Poona (over $1.2 million by 1973); to the A.1.1. M.S. (over $1.2
million) and its rural training centre at Ballabgarh (over
$250,000) and to selected medical colleges - the Christian
Medical College at Vellore, Trivandrum Medical College, and the
King George's Medical College, Lucknow, in particular.
Rockefeller assistance has tailed off since 1967, whereas
Ford Foundation aid dates from 1959 and reached a peak in 1970.
This was concentrated on rural sanitation to begin with, but then
on population programmes run by the Government of India ($3.7
million) or by the research/action centre at Ganchigram (nearly
$1 million). An early and continuing interest has been to help
research in reproductive biology (nearly $2 million, with one-
third going to A.1.1.M.S.). Both Ford and Rockefeller have also
supported Indian Council for Medical Research (I.C.M.R.) research
fellowships, as well as offering research fellowships abroad.
Rockefeller reports list over 250 fellows in medical subjects who
completed their study programme between 1917 ana the end of 1968
- a list which includes most of the prominent nurses and doctors
in India in this period (Rockefeller Foundation, 1972).
The other private sector agencies are so numerous, and they
provide so little documentation of their activities, that it is
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impossible to summarise their involvement, but only to provide
indicators of their scale and form. For example, the Federal
German Republic has provided assistance through charitable
agencies to voluntary hospitals and other health facilities,
amounting to DM 66.4 million (roughly $23 million) between 1950
and 1980. The major U.S. sources have been C.A.R.E. and the
Catholic Relief Services, both heavy users of U.S. surplus food.
The Catholic programme handled around $30 million of PL-480 food
in India in 1978-9, while C.A.R.E. has handled over $830 million
worth of food in India from its inception up to mid-1979
(Catholic Relief Services, 1979; C.A.R.E., 1980). There is
considerable dispute about whether this should be seen as
nutritional aid or even as aid at all, on the grounds that major
beneficiaries have been U.S. farmers, and the import of food has
tended to have adverse effects on local food production. This
aid has been handled by the Department of Social Welfare, and not
the Health Ministry. The Catholic programme also provided nearly
$2 million of medical supplies. In 1973/4 roughly a quarter of
all British voluntary agencies' health sector aid went to India -
about $2 millions (Cole-King, 1976).
In quantitative terms voluntary aid, apart from food aid,
has not been very substantial, but at various times it has
supported the employment of foreign doctors and nurses, provided
basic supplies, and on occasion funded sizeable medical
investments, such as much of the advanced equipment at the
Christian Medical Colleges in Ludhiana and Vellore. It has also
helped to maintain a number of rural hospitals; the voluntary
sector (mostly church-related) in India accounts for a
substantial share of the hospital beds in the country, and many
of these depend on outside support. Finally, some of the main
innovative health schemes in India (see Chapter 11) have had con¬




HEALTH AID TO INDIA
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6.HEALTH EXPENDITURE 108 353 668 1,230 1,280
7.Line 1/Line 6 1% 8.8% 19.9% 15.5% 16.45







Sources: Lines 1 & 2: as Table 1; Line 3: XX XXXXXXXX XXX £XXXX££ >
Reserve Bank of India, various years: 'Utilizations of external assistance'.
Line 6: Reddy, 1972; Barnett, 1977; and R.B.I, (op.cit.) for figures after
1975.
Prior to 1965/6 an exchange rate of R s 4.7 6 = $ 1 has been used; afterwards the
rate assumed is Rs7.8=$1.
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A number of points can be made about the significance of
this pattern of aid. To begin with, while it has formed a small
part of total aid to India, at some times it has accounted for a
considerable part of public sector expenditures on health (see
Table 3).
The malaria programmes were heavily dependent on outside
assistance after 1952. Meyer reports that in the next six years
the U.S. contributed over half the cost of the control programme,
and nearly 4 0% of the cost of the eradication programme in the
next three years (Meyer, 1967). The loss of this aid was followed
by a considerable reduction in Indian expenditure on malaria
control. Similarly, the family planning programme has received
substantial aid, permitting a much larger programme than would
otherwise have been possible, even though population assistance
has not been the largest item of health sector aid. Aid to
medical education has not been substantial, but because it has
been concentrated on 'elite' colleges (notably A.1.1. M.S.) and
their hospitals, its impact has probably been much larger than
the figures would suggest. These institutions have trained a
considerable proportion of leading Indian doctors, both educators
and practitioners, and the concentration of funding has probably
meant that these institutions have been markedly different from
the other Indian medical colleges. Nevertheless, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the pattern is by no means the
straightforward disaster story which some might suggest. In
particular, it is clear that hospitals and medical education have
not taken the dominant role which might have been predicted.
Using crude indicators, the balance of aid to different sectors
can be seen in Table 4, which shows that some 75 5 of aid can be
roughly allocated to primary care (rural health services, water
supply and sanitation, communicable diseases programmes etc.)
27 2
TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH AID TO INDIA, 1947-79
Category General Population Total
health aid health aid health
U.S. $ millions
Primary care 555 85 640
(63%) (10%) (73%)
Secondary/Tertiary care 35 24 59
( 4%) (3%) (7%)
Medical education/research 30 5 35
(3%) (1%) ( 4%)
Paramedical training 15 20 35
(2%) (2%) ( 4%)
Administrative support 5 10 15
(1%) (1%) ( 2%)
Unallocated - - 94
(11%)
TOTAL 6 40 1 44 878
(73%) (16%) ( 100%)
Sources: as in Table 1 above.
The second general point is that, apart from the fields of
family planning and smallpox and malaria control/eradication, it
is difficult to show clearly policies which owe their origin or
nature to the impact of foreign aid. Population policies
supported by external agencies were clearly important in
expanding the size of the family planning programme and affecting
its nature, but it is also clear that local bureaucrats were able
to minimise the significance of many innovations which the
foreign advisers attempted to introduce into the family planning
programme (Minkler, 1977). But in the rest of the health sector,
it seems more reasonable to argue (as in the Introduction to Part
B) that very little in the health plans of Independent India was
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not fore-shadowed in the plans and structures established by the
British (Hanson, 1966).
A third point of some relevance is that the scale of health
sector aid to India has been totally inadequate for coping with
the scale of Indian health problems. Of course, health sector aid
is not necessarily the most effective way of dealing with health
problems, but, even so, it is clear that India has not been
treated very favourably in terms of assistance to match its
needs. Donor agencies appear to have shared the views of Indian
planners (see Cassen, 1978) and regarded health sector
expenditures as a social rather than economic area, and health
has never been seen as a core part of donor agency discusssions.
Ho w ever, the growth of the notions associated with the 'basic
needs' approach to development led to India's 'minimum needs
programme' in the Fifth Plan, at the same time as aid to health
took on increasing importance in the eyes of donors like the
World Bank. This shift has generated the new programmes in health
sector aid which I discuss in Chapter 11.
Finally, the pattern of assistance to India has probably
been affected by the constitutional distribution of functions
between the central government and the States. The Indian
Government has generally restricted aid to areas for which it is
responsible - the control of communicable diseases, family
planning, the maintenance of standards of medical education, and
medical provisions in the Union Territories. Most aid has been
distributed through the Plan, under the control of the Planning
Commission. One contribution to new possibilities of assistance
was the Janata Government decision in 1977 to include maternal
and child health in the central tasks of the Family Planning
section of the Union Ministry, then renamed 'Family Welfare'.
This recognised that much of the basic rural health service was
being funded under this head by the Central rather than the State
Governments, and also reflected the ambivalence about family
planning in the immediate post-Emergency period. It also,
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perhaps, opened the way to the new aided projects discussed
in Chapter 11.
Health aid must, of course, be seen in the context of
overall aid policies, which are undoubtedly perceived by donors
as an extension of foreign, industrial, and trading policies
designed to benefit the donors. This sets limits on what aid is
acceptable to donors, and provides a lever which can be used to
prevent other policies of which the donors might disapprove. But
it does not thereby mean that the aid which is provided is
precisely attuned to the meeting of the interests of capital,
broadly defined. It seems more reasonable to argue that the
institutionalised form in which aid is given and used is one
which permits some freedom for the exercise of professional
judgement. This judgement is amenable to reasonable analyses of
the major problems and the best ways of dealing with them. These
analyses and proposed solutions are of course limited by the
scientific and administrative paradigms which are part of the
learned environments of the 'experts' involved; but this does not
preclude learning from past mistakes, and it is difficult to
conceive of a situation in which such limitations could be
avoided. The limitations do, of course, have political
consequences: they rule out some solutions because of a narrow
definition of 'the medical', and these are likely to be the
solutions which imply radical changes in the organisation of
society. The exercise of professional judgement might only be
permitted because the appearance of autonomy is useful to 'global
capital' (Johnson, 1978).
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But even with all these caveats, it remains reasonable to
argue that the pattern of health sector aid to India after 19^7
suggests that major threats to health U£££ given priority; that
'appropriateness' ^jlj3 enter into decisions about the training
needed; and that the proposed solutions &£££ plausibly connected
to the problems identified. On the other hand, the scale and
timing of this assistance bears little relationship to the
developing needs of health policies and programmes, so that
assistance to malaria tailed off just when it was most needed,
and the resources put into smallpox eradication did not match its
importance as an Indian health threat. Similarly, donor agencies
were (are?) unable to redirect Indian priorities sufficiently to
ensure that local expenditures take over when assistance ceases.
This is perhaps an inevitable feature of the aid relationship,
though it also reflects the inability of the Indian Government to
control State expenditures in terms of its own stated policies
(see Chapter 6 above).
MIGRATION OF HEALTH PERSONNEL
Any discussion of the migration of health personnel from
India has to work with data which are highly unreliable. While it
can be argued that trained personnel who emigrate 'cost' India a
substantial amount, it is almost impossible to quantify this
loss, or to see when it occurred, or what trends now exist. There
are, in addition, conceptual problems. Since it is argued, with
some justice, that it is the very in appropriateness of medical
education which makes doctors able to migrate, it is too
simplistic to assert that those who do migrate would have made a
great contribution to health care in India had they stayed
behind. Rather, the migration of doctors and other medical
personnel must be seen as a symptom of failures to relate job
content and professional training to local needs, and this
failure imposes costs 'which are much broader than the specific
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loss of personnel through migration. However, the context for
such a discussion should be set by a consideration of what is
known of the extent, direction and trends in emigration.
HOW MAMY MIGRATE?
The historical roots of medical migration from India were
set almost from the beginning of medical education in India, when
a group of graduates from the Calcutta Medical College
accompanied one of their teachers to London for further
training (Johnson and Cay gill, 1973). The idea that local
education was 'incomplete' rather than 'different' was probably
fostered by the staff at the Indian medical colleges, who
measured their teaching against standards derived from their own
training. Until the First World War candidates for the I.M.S. had
to travel to London to take the admission examination, ana many
took additional qualifications while they were preparing for
this. At this period it is probable that few doctors travelled to
Britain, and most of them returned to India after relatively
short stays - but this has to be conjecture since there is no
reliable source of current residence information for doctors.
Other sources give some partial idea of the numbers involved; for
example 177 doctors with Indian names ana coming from India
received the 'Triple' qualification from the Scottish colleges in
1900-09, another 83 in 1910-19, 73 in 1922-29 ana 43 in 1930-36
(ibid:115) .
After the First World War, with travel tc Britain quicker
and cheaper, more doctors with Indian qualifications were
registering with the General Medical Council. Ey 1939, for
example, some 107, of all graduates from Indian medical colleges
in 1921-3 had registered with the C-.M.C. on the basis of their
Indian qualifications. But it is net clear how many of them
registered with the expectation of travelling (but not coing so),
nor how many more registered themselves on the basis of
additional qualifications gathered in Britain. There is also
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migration to other parts of the world. Indian doctors probably
followed some of the same routes as other Indian emigrants - to
Burma, Malaysia, the Pacific Islands and the Caribbean - but it
is presumed that relatively few aid so. How many went to other
parts of the Commonwealth is equally unknown.
How this situation changed with Independence is not clear.
As we have seen, major internat i ona 1 institutions (Ford,
Rockefeller, W.H.O., the Governments participating in the Colombo
Plan) began to introduce schemes to take doctors to Britain and
America for higher training. No formal count seems to have been
made of who went where and when, nor whether they returned. The
only evidence available is that from analyses of passport
applications (dependent on the occupation listed) and on surveys
of the stock in a recipient country at a particular point in
time. It would appear that no figures are available from passport
applications before 1560, when 1000 doctors were issued with
passports; this figure had risen to 2000 in 1970 (I.A.M.R. 1974)
Once again there are no guides to the numbers who use these
passports to travel abroad, nor for how long they do so.
Estimates of the stock of Indian doctors in different
foreign countries become more frequent and more reliable from
about the middle-1960's. For example, the changes in the law on
immigration to the U.K. meant that after 1962 doctors wishing to
enter the U.K. to work had to apply for vouchers; in the next six
years nearly 6,400 Indian doctors applied for vouchers and
roughly half of these were probably taken up (Johnson and
Caygill, 1973:69-70). This total is equivalent to roughly 20% of
the output of Indian medical colleges in this period receiving
vouchers, with perhaps 10% taking them up. In 1968 a U.N. survey
of medical personnel abroad estimated 9,000 Indians, 2/3 res of
them with higher qualifications. Their location was not
specified, but a further source - the scheme run by the Indian
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research to provide
temporary posts for returning migrants - suggests that of the
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doctors applying to join the scheme in the six years 1963-69,
almost 70% were currently in the U.K. with another 25% in the
U.S.A. The U.S. share was much larger towards the end of the
period, but we know very little about migration rates between the
two countries (Mejia et- al, 1979:293; see also l££hai£3l iiSHM &££
Vol. XV No. 3, March 1973). The earliest cata from the U.S.A.
concerns a survey carried out by the American Medical Association
in 1970, which reported 3,957 Indian doctors, followed by a
survey two years later which reported 6,303 (Mejia et al.,
1979:291). Data on doctors in training schemes in the 1970's
showed that India was the largest supplier of foreign medical
graduates to these schemes (see Table 5).
TABLE 5
ORIGIN OF FOREIGN MEDICAL GRADUATES ON TRAINING SCHEMES IN THE U.S.A
31 .12.72 31.12.74 31.12.76 31.12.77
















( 17.5%) (26.65) (27.55)
Source: Aq&LZZI QL AhS H£jiic,al iL5^£.£i,s£iGj3, Vol 226 8:939;
Vol 234 13:1356; Vol 240 26:2837.
WHERE DO THEY GO?
The combination of more-or-less reliable sources of
information suggests that the number of Indian doctors abroad in
197 0 was 1 2,000, and in 1 975 it was about 1 5,000 (Mejia e t a 1
1979:277; 291-2). The period of most rapid growth in the numbers
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abroad was probably the late 1960's and early 1 9 7 0 ' s , when the
numbers entering the U.K. and the U.S.A. were about 1,000 a year
in each case. However, there is very little evidence about the
lengths of stay, or the number of doctors who move from one
country to another, so that while about 40% of the Indian doctors
entering the U.S.A. in 1970 had not come directly from India, we
do not know if that was typical or not. Similarly, the data on
return flows to India is restricted to the information from the
C.S.I.R. scheme mentioned above, and then only for the late
1960's, when on average 220 a year entered the scheme. These
figures suggest that, if anything, the 1975 figure of 15,000
abroad quoted above is an underestimate.
Since 1975 the situation has probably changed considerably.
The main receivers of Indian doctors, the U.K. and the U.S.A.
have both made entry by Indian doctors much more difficult. The
General Medical Council in London withdrew recognition from the
degrees of Indian medical colleges granted after May 1975, so
that thereafter Indian doctors wishing to work in the U.K. would
have to pass tests of 'linguistic and professional competence'
unless their degrees predated this decision. There would thus
have been a phased effect on immigration of doctors from India:
in the early tests only about 40% of Indian candidates passed
(Mejia et a 1., 1979:278). In the U.S.A. new legislation was
introduced in January 1977 which was designed to restrict the
inflow of doctors there, ana the effect was probably more rapid
than for the U.K. As Table 11 above shows, the numbers of foreign
medical graduates in training schemes dropped sharply between
1976 and 1977, and Indian doctors were affected by the same
processes. It is likely that current emigration of Indian doctors
is smaller than 10 years ago, and also directed towards different
destinations - in particular the oil-rich nations of the Middle
East and Nigeria. The predominant form of such flows is also more
strictly limited, in that doctors are imported on fixed-term
contracts, which may or may not be renewed, but which imply no
longer-term rights of residence or citizenship.
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The emigration of doctors is not something which all medical
colleges contribute to. In part this probably reflects both the
social origins of the student body and the closeness with which
the medical faculty is able to tailor the education they provide
to standards current in the West. As Table 5 shows, Bombay and
Baroda contribute disproportionately to the numbers in the U.S.A.
WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF EMIGRATION?
The costs of this emigration have been variously assessed.
In percentage terms, it seems likely that in both 1970 and 1975,
about 10% of the stock of Indian doctors was abroad. In each
year, this would have represented about 1.2-1.3 years output from
the medical colleges; had these doctors remained, they would have
raised the doctor-population ratio from about 2 per 10,000
population to about 2.3 (Mejia 1979:166). India is the largest
contributor of emigrant doctors, but several indicators suggest
that the impact of this emigration on India is less than that on
many other 'exporting' countries. India is 22nd in a ranking in
terms of the impact of emigration on domestic stock of doctors,
and 29th in terms of the time it would take to replace the
emigrant doctors at current level of output (ibid). If t h'e
outflow in 1975-80 was reduced because the main importing markets
contracted, as suggested above, then the impact will now be even
less: the total stock of Indian doctors by 1980 was probably
above 210,000, of whom perhaps 17,000 were abroad.
If the impact is measured in terms of the loss of return on
the investment in each of these doctors, the calculations produce
rather different results. One estimate is that it costs $9,600
(Rs75,000) to educate a doctor, or a cost to India of $144
million for educating its doctors abroad in 1975 (Mejia,
1979:288). It is also possible to estimate the benefit lost to
India by a neo-classical economic analysis based on earnings
figures, which generated an estimate of $44,000 per emigrant
doctor to the U.S. for 1970 (U.N.C.T.A.D., 1975:8).
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However, any strictly financial calculation has to take into
account the remittances of these doctors back to India (unknown,
though remittances in general have been very significant to the
Indian economy since 1975) and the employment the doctors would
have had if they had not emigrated. In economic terms there is
probably a surplus of doctors in India, relative to the ability
to pay them at the levels currently accepted by employers and
doctors, so it makes little sense to attempt to value the
contribution the doctors might have made had they stayed. In
addition, the skills of these particular doctors were probably
even less appropriate to the tasks needing to be done in India
than the skills of those who stayed, so it is possible to argue
that Indians benefited mere from their absence than their
presence. Clearly, it would have been better if other forms of
personnel had been trained, or if the individuals emigrating had
paid a higher proportion of the costs of their training. But
these are all inter-related factors: the demand for medical
education (which led to the rapid expansion of medical colleges
in the 1 9 6 0's and early 1 97 0's) was in part fuelled directly by
parents who saw the chances of emigration for their children.
Emigration has also helped to reduce medical unemployment and to
keep medical salary levels higher than they might otherwise have
been.
In general, then, the emigration of doctors and other
medical personnel from India has had contradictory effects on
medical policy-making. Emigration has probably tended to reduce
medical unemployment, rather than to create shortages of valuable
skills; and it has had unintended benefits in terms of
remittances and a reduction in political pressures to increase
employment prospects in 'high-technology' medicine. Or: the other
hand, it has fuelled the demand for medical education,
contributing to the neglect of the other forms of personnel; it
has kept medical salary levels higher than they might otherwise
have been; and it has reinforced the pressure for medical
education to be organised so that doctors can continue to be
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acceptable abroad. The balance on this issue has probably been
altered quite dramatically by the barriers to migration which
have developed in the past 10 years, but it may be too late:
systemic inertia may now ensure that the costs continue to be
felt, while the benefits are of declining significance.
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES
Multinational drug companies are obviously powerful. Sixty
large pharmaceutical companies dominate the supply of drugs, with
about 6 0% of non-socialist country production in the early
1970's, and these companies are almost all based in one of seven
countries - France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, the U.K.
and U.S.A. (Lall, 1 977:22). They are often diversified companies,
with interests in a variety of chemical-based industries, and
they vary considerably in the range of products produced, in
their major markets, and in the kinds of strategies they follow
with respect to the Third World (Stoker, 1984:115-8). Three
factors, it is said, give these companies considerable influence:
the size of the major companies; their apparent dominance over
different sectors of the market for pharmaceutical products; and
the significance of drugs bills in health budgets. This in fluenee
affects the supply of drugs, the type of drugs available and
promoted, and the health policies of all countries, but
especially those of underdeveloped countries (Khaliq, 1976:5;
M u11e r, 1 982; Melrose, 1 982; M e d a w a r, 1 982).
The major criticisms of the activities of these companies
in underdeveloped countries are as follows. To begin with, it is
argued that the cost of drugs has been much higher than need be.
Companies are able to maintain high prices through patent
protection, which reduces competition; through aggressive
marketing and using brand names; through control over the supply
of raw materials; anc by policies which are designed to maximise
profits, such as transfer-pricing (shifting profits to low-tax
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countries). Secondly, the drugs supplied have usually been
designed with the disease-pattern, socio-economic conditions and
drugs market of advanced capitalist economies, leading to a
concentration on the drugs suitable for sale to the relatively
wealthy in urban areas, with far less emphasis on the provision
of low-cost basic drugs for common diseases. Thirdly, some
companies appear to be less concerned with the interests of
patients in the Third World than they are forced to be in some
developed countries, failing to show the same concern with
accurate prescription and warnings of side-effects and contra¬
indications. Fourthly, some companies have attempted to stop
Governments who have tried to alter this situation, as well as
making it very difficult for local companies to be established
( La 11, 1 977; U.N.C.T.C., 1 983).
A number of U.N. agencies (W.H.O., U.N. Conference on
Transnational Corporations, U.N. Industrial Development
Organisation) have attempted to influence the pattern of drug
development, production and marketing and to suggest ways of
limiting what they regard as undesirable patterns (U.N.C.T.C.,
1979). In particular, W.H.O. has led efforts to encourage
countries to draw up lists of essential drugs, to use generic
names, and to follow purchasing policies which will cut costs and
lead to drug purchases more closely related to dominant disease
patterns (W.H.O. 1977). Several agencies have argued for the neec
to produce more pharmaceuticals in Third World countries
themselves, on the grounds that this will lead to a reduction in
costs and a greater ability to match health needs and drug
supplies (U.N.I.D.O., 1980). W.H.O. also started efforts to
control the quality of drugs entering international trade, to
remove the possibilities for companies to export out-dated drugs
or those banned because of adverse reactions, and to standardise
marketing information (W.H.0. 1978). Finally, attempts have also
been made to encourage research, development and the training of
staff to produce more drugs to help in the control and treatment
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of six major diseases mostly found in tropical countries - like
malaria and leprosy (W.H.O. 1 976).
However, it has become increasingly clear since the early
discussions that different Third World countries are not all in
the same position with respect to pharmaceutical production and
marketing. Thus both U.N.I.D.O. (1978) and U.N.C.T.C. (1983) have
produced classifications of production situations, placing
countries in one of five or three categories respectively. In
both cases India is one of very few under-developed countries in
the highest category - and is by far the poorest in this
category. Indian companies can manufacture from bulk drugs most
of the intermediate products used in the country, and the local
chemical industry can make some bulk drugs from simple chemicals.
The pharmaceuticals companies also carry out research and
development activities of their own. As a result, Indian
companies import relatively small amounts of raw materials, and
are involved in exporting intermediate products, raw materials
and production plants to a number of other countries (U.N.C.T.C.,
1 983:88-92) .
This situation did not, of course, materialise overnight,
nor is it free from many of the problems identified for many
other countries. In the rest of this section I shall describe how
Government policy has contributed to the development of the
Indian industry, describe the current position of production and
ownership, and some of the problems which remain. Finally I will
assess the extent to which the pattern of drug production and its
ownership, drug marketing and consumption, has affected health
policy anc health in India since 19^7.
THE PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRY IN INDIA
The manufacture of medicinal materials for widespread use is
a relatively recent phenomenon, though for a long time
practitioners have produced medicines on a small scale for their
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own use and sometimes for sale. In India, raw materials were
shipped to Britain for processing in the 19th century, and the
first substantial production locally was in Government factories
in Madras and Bombay, for quinine and later for a wider range of
drugs (Stoker, 1984:295). Production by Indian capitalists is
usually dated from 1901, when P.C. Ray established Bengal
Chemical and Pharmaceuticals in Calcutta, and the Alembic company
was established in Baroda soon afterwards (Hathi, 1975:16). Few
foreign companies had production facilities in India before the
Second World War. It would seem that in 1939 only 13% of total
consumption was produced in India (Khaliq, 1976:131; Rangarao,
1975:3-4).
The disruption to trade caused by the War made a dramatic
difference. There was sufficient basic knowledge and capital
available in India that the decline in imports and the growth of
Government demand stimulated a large growth in local production.
By 1 943 this met some 70% of consumption, and the country was
nearly self-suficient in some areas like sera and vaccines
(Stoker, 1984:296). Production was largely in the hands of a few
large British and Indian companies, who were already established
before 1939, but there were also probably many small-scale firms
as well.
Pharmaceuticals production in India did not change much
immediately after the War, but after Independence the pace of
change has been much more rapid. There are three major processes
at work: technical change, associated with massive expenditures
in the West on research and development; support for public
sector production; and public policy with respect to the private-
sector (to affect the balance between public and private
production, the ownership of companies, and attempts to promote
the production of certain drugs and to control their prices). I
will describe each of these briefly in turn. First I will briefly
sketch the development of multi-national pharmaceutical firms,
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The modern pharmaceutical industry is largely a creation of
the period after 1945, since many of the drugs on which it is
based were only discovered or fabricated after 1930. The first
major group were the sulpha drugs, developed in the 1930's,
followed by antibiotics, (penicillin and then others), discovered
and produced in the 1 940's. By the early 1970's some 30,000 drugs
were estimated to be available, some of which were little more
than variants on others, and some 8,000 were regularly prescribed
(Stoker, 1984:88). Most of these are 'new', and have been
discovered in laboratories run by the larger firms, with their
production processes patented not only in the country of origin
but elsewhere as well. The research and development expenditures
for these drugs are often considerable, and companies point to
these costs to justify controlling production and prices through
patents in order to gain sufficient profits to recoup their
investment and pay for new research. However, critics suggest
that many 'new' drugs are really little more than minor
variations on existing patented drugs; and that the process of
technical change is artifically managed in the interests of
maintaining higher profits (L a 11, 1977:25). One particular
feature of the medical market in many parts of the world
reinforces the companies' ability to do this. Most drugs are
purchased on the advice or prescription of a doctor, and
pharmaceuticals advertising and marketing is thus focussed on the
doctor, not on the final 'consumer'. In general, the cost of a
drug is not very salient for doctors, and other considerations
(including the perception of 'quality') may be more significant.
The attempts by Governments to affect prescribing patterns are
also hindered by the desire of doctors to maintain clinical
freedom of choice, based on their own assessment of the drug
which will suit the individual patient.
The extent of technical change is thus probably exaggerated
by figures on the numbers of drugs, or by assessments of clinical
prescribing patterns. Nonetheless, technical change does favour
large producers over small, and helps to create a market which is
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divided into a very large number of small sub-markets in which
competition may be artificially restricted, and production runs
are small. All these make it difficult for many countries to
organise local production in order to replace foreign imports, or
to support local producers against the competition of foreign
multinationals.
In India, several factors have combined to make the impact
of technical change in pharmaceuticals production different from
that in other countries in the Third World. To begin with the
existing production capacity had already been developed during
the Second World War, both by Indian and by foreign producers.
Secondly there is the size of the market, in which the absolute
numbers of consumers with substantial purchasing power makes them
a profitable market, despite the fact that they may make up only
5% or so of the total Indian population. But in addition, the
existence of public sector drug companies, and of an active
Government policy towards foreign-owned companies in general and
pharmaceuticals companies in particular, have tended to reduce
the effect of this pressure.
The public sector has been involved in drug production in
India since the 19th century, but post-Independence India took
this involvement to a greater depth. In 1951 a Penicillin Enquiry
Committeewas established, which 'marked the beginning of
Government entry in the modern drug manufacture' (Rangarso,
1975:4). A Pharmaceutical Enquiry Committee reported in 1954 in
favour of the creation of large-scale public-sector manufacturing
of penicillin and ether drugs, in order to reduce prices and
conserve foreign exchange (Hathi, 1975:54). Following this
proposal there were considerable negotiations between the Indian
Government, Western firms and the Soviet Union, described by
Kidron (1965). It would seem that Western commercial interests
used diplomatic and other pressures to ensure that technical
advice for Hindustan Antibiotics Limited was purchased from them
at higher prices and with less control over technical data than
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the U.S.S.R. was offering. The reason announced publicly was
'technical superiority', but the extent of diplomatic pressure
exerted suggests that technical considerations were not the only
ones involved. However, the second publie sector company, Indian
Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited, was based on Soviet advice,
but completion of its major plant in Hyderabad was delayed until
1968 (Stoker, 1984:320-6).
Public sector production of pharmaceuticals has not been
impressive. The two main companies involved have had considerable
production difficulties, ana have been unable to produce as much
as they are licensed for. Profitability has been lower than for
most foreign and many private-sector Indian companies, with H.A.L
making a loss for much of the 1970's, whereas foreign-ownee
companies routinely make a higher profit than the averages for
Indian industry (Stoker, 1984:304). Nonetheless, by 1980 the
public-sector companies were producing about 262 of bulk drug
production, and 6.52 of formulations (U.N.C.T.C., 1983:88). But
it may be that Government production has had more political
significance, demonstrating that the Indian Government is
prepared to reduce its dependence on imports and on foreign-owned
companies. In addition, I.D.P.L. is now in a position to export
technology on a wide range of drugs, mostly to Middle Eastern
countries, as are several private companies, suggesting that a
significant technical barrier has been overcome (ibid:89).
The Government has also attempted to control the private
sector by influencing the terms on which foreign multinationals
are able to work in India. Thus in the 1 9 5 0's, high tarriff
barriers and other restrictions on the import cf finished goods
led most companies to establish manufacturing plants within the
country. However, this was mostly for formulations, with the bulk
drugs being imported: only after 1970 did the Government of India
award production licenses on condition that there was a
commitment to some production of basic drugs: as a result, the
foreign sector share of the bulk market rose from about 112 in
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1972 to about 40% in 1980 (Stoker, 1984:308; U. N. C. T. C. ,
1 983:88) .
In 1970 there were also changes in the protection afforded
by patents, with the period of patented protection reduced to 7
years and compulsory licensing of production by other companies
after three years. At the same time the Government also moved to
systematise the control of drug prices, introduced in 1962 at the
time of the war with China. A Drug Price Control Order was issued
in 1970, setting maximum prices for 17 bulk drugs and attempting
to control the prices of formulations by limiting 'mark-ups'. In
addition, the 1973 Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (F.E.R.A.)
stipulated that foreign equity must be reduced. Drug companies
were originally placed in the 'core' sector and excluded from
these controls (Stoker, 1984:309) but by 1978 policy had hardened
and most companies had to dilute their shareholdings, with only
two (Roche and Parke-Davis) being allowed as much as 74%, the
rest being restricted to smaller shares ( ibid:310-11). There is
no evidence that the expansion of shareholding has influenced
policy or made these companies more accountable to Indian
pressures, but companies regarded in this way as 'Indian' find it
easier to get licences for new production (ibid.).
These pressures on drug companies in general, and foreign
ones in particular, were strengthened by the Hathi Committee,
which reported in 1975. This committee proposed some unexpectedly
radical measures, including the nationalisation of all foreign
drug companies, the establishment of a National Drug Authority,
the phased abolition of brand names, and a change in the form of
drug price control (Hathi, 1975:84-5, 96, 104, 180-88, 257). The
Report provoked a heated debate over the next few years,
complicated by the change in Government in 1977. The most radical
proposals were watered down under strong lobbying from the drug
companies and the medical profession: there was no similarly
well-organised support for the proposals (Hasan, 1980). The one
partial exception is that the organisation representing the
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larger Indian firms (Indian Drugs Manufacturers Association,
I.D.M.A.) supported the nationalisation of foreign firms,
believing that this would improve their market position. The New
Drug Policy which emerged in 1978 took a markedly less forceful
line on foreign ownership (allowing the maintenance of equity
holdings above 40%), on the removal of brand names (making, the
process more gradual) and on the National Drug Agency (not
created, but replaced by a number of smaller statutory bodies
with fewer powers)(Stoker, 1 984:366). On the other hand, seme of
the price control, research and development, and production
policies were more far-reaching than Hathi had proposed (ibid.).
Political debate did not, of course,'cease with the issuing
of the policy document and the passing of a new Drug Price
Control Order in 1979. The introduction and implementation of
several elements of the proposals have been delayed, or seem to
have failed to have the desired impact. Thus legal moves by
companies have delayed the abolition of brand names, and foreign
companies have claimed that the New Drug Policy has led to a
decline in the growth of drug output, because of uncertainty and
poor profitability as companies have lost some elements of market
protection (U.N.C.T.C. 1983:50, 91). However, for my purposes I
want to concentrate on answering three questions:
a. how far do foreign companies now dominate Indian
pharmaceutical production?
b. how far does the structure of Indian drug production
hamper the development of appropriate health policies, and to
what extent can this be traced to the impact of the foreign
producers? and
c. what evidence is there of other ways in which drug
companies (Indian or foreign) have intervened in health policy
formulation, and with what effect?
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A: FOREIGN DOMINATION
A simple indicator of foreign domination (but one which is
nonetheless difficult to construct) is that of the share of
production. Estimates of total output are not very reliable,
because of the large number of very small companies whose
reporting is infrequent and likely to be inaccurate. However, the
best estimates of U.N.C.T.C. for the production of 'allopathic'
drugs and their distribution by major producing category, are
given in Table 12.
TAELE 12
PRODUCTION OF DRUGS IN INDIA BY COMPANY OWNERSHIP, 1979-31
(Annual averages, U.S.$ million)
BULK DRUGS FORMULATIONS TOTAL
Companies :
Foreign-owned 71 ( 22) 568 ( 43) 639 (39)
Local private 163 (52) 669 ( 50) 832 (51)
Local State 82 ( 26) 87 ( 7) 169 ( 10)
TOTAL 316 (100) 1324 (100) 1640 (100)
Source: U.N.C.T.C. (1983:88, 154).
The major weaknesses of this as an indicator is that it
takes no account of the sizes of companies in each sector, and it
gives no clue to the extent to which the nature of drug
production in all sectors has been influenced during an earlier
period when foreign companies were more dominant. Thus the
foreign-owned sector (in this case defined as companies with more
than 40fa of equity owned by one foreign company) includes only 26
firms, five of which are amongst the ten largest pharmaceutical
firms in India, with retail sales in 1 980 of Rs 127-1 millions, or
$163 million, about 10% of the total. The five largest Indian-
owned companies had sales of about Rs1 004 millions, or $129
million, about 8% of the total (U.N.C.T.C. 19 8 3:152). But there
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are very large numbers of small Indian producers - Stoker
suggests there are 3,000, not all of which are active (1934:317).
In addition, the foreign companies concentrate more of their
activities in formulations, where market conditions are more
favourable. Thus the market power exercised by the average
foreign company is likely to be much greater.than that of. the.
average Indian company. One further indicator of this (again, not
perfect) is profitability: in the mid-1970's 30 foreign companies
reported gross profits of 14.32 of sales, whereas a sample of 12
Indian companies reported gross profits about half that level
(Stoker, 1984:304). Finally, there are problems of definition,
with some companies defined on these criteria as Indian but with
a controlling share interest (say 252 or more) held by one
foreign company, and others sharing in production arrangements
with foreign companies (at least 26 Indian companies received
foreign know-how between 1962 and 1972, e.g. through technical
collaboration agreements [Stoker, 1984:341]).
Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that despite nearly
30 years of attempts by the Indian Government to control the
operations of foreign pharmaceutical companies, they are still
the most substantial element in the pharmaceuticals market. In
addition, they have set the framework for the industry in the
period when they were far more influential still. There are
several indicators of this. As the U.N.C.T.C. report puts it,
'the product mix of both kinds of firms [local and foreign] tends
not to reflect social priorities' (1983:89). Both kinds also have
fought to protect the competitive advantages provided by brand
names (ib i a : 91) ana in general product information is spread to
doctors by an active network of company representatives and by
company advertising, rather than by a more 'arms-length' method.
All these are typical of pharmaceutical company organisation in
advanced capitalist countries, and seem likely to outlast any
future declining direct influence of multinational corporations
in India.
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B:DRUG PRODUCTION: THE IMPACT ON HEALTH
The two major criticisms of drug production in
underdeveloped countries are that the drugs are too expensive and
that the wrong ones are produced and made available. As we have
seen, the control of the price of drugs has formed a growing part
of Government policies since 1962. However, it is not easy to
assess the success of these policies. Certainly, informed opinion
before 1970 was that Indian drug prices were high, but it seems
likely that they were not as high as in some other parts of the
world. In part this was a result of the system of import
licences, which reduced the possibility of transfer pricing.
Companies were forced to make at least a pretence of justifying
the prices they paid for raw materials - with Hoffman-La Roche's
ability to overcharge for Librium and Valium a notable exception
(Stoker, 1984:378-9). On the other hand, the policy of insisting
on production in India as far as possible may have increased
general price levels above what they might have been in a world
market. The position is complicated by the unknown, but very
large number of formulations, often very similar and probably
more expensive than they could be if they were all sold by
generic names.
The Hathi Commission claimed that prices had declined,
relative to world levels and their previous Indian levels, after
the introduction of the 1970 Drug Price Control Orcer (1975:174).
The industry has certainly claimed that prices have continued to
fall since the strengthening of these controls in 1979 (Stoker,
1 984:372). Unfortunately, the only drug prices index in India is
probably a poor guide to general price levels, being constructed
from common drugs which are out of patent protection. Thus the
apparent stability of drug prices shown in Figure 1 may be
misleading. Very generally, then, one could conclude that Indian
drug prices are probably not notably high, and may well be
relatively low, and that this should be attributed to direct































manufacturing capability in both the public and the private
sector, and probably to the size of the Indian market which
permits economies of scale and competition which are not always
possible elsewhere.
The picture for the product mix of. drugs is less-
satisfactory. As already noted, the U.N.C.T.C. argues that
remedies for the diseases which afflict the mass of the
population are not produced in the same quantity or variety as
those which suit the purchasing preferences of the relatively
wealthy (1983:89). Thus vitamin preparations, cough and cold
preparations, tonics, and 'health restorers' made up some 25% of
all sales covered in one survey in 1978 (Stoker, 1934:399).
Furthermore, most of the 'essential drugs' listed either by
W.H.O. or by Indian writers on the subject are produced in India,
but production is well below both installed capacity and
consumption (ibid:404).
In addition, as some have argued, the failure to implement
the controls over drug quality, laid down originally in the Drugs
Rules (introduced in 1945 on the basis of the 1940 Drugs Act)
means both that many drugs remain on the market despite little or
no evidence of their efficacy, and that the products of many
small Indian producers are of dubious quality (U.N.C.T.C.,
1983:89). All the legislation has said nothing about the efficacy
of drugs, being concerned only with the methods by which they
were produced, standards of hygiene etc. In general, the prime
concerns in the development of drug policy have been economic and
political - the harbouring of scarce foreign exchange, control
over the prices which affect the middle class market, and the
nationalistic desire to foster local industries. Policy has been
the concern of the Ministry which has included Chemicals, with
the Ministries of Commerce, Finance and Industry more closely
involved than the Health Ministry. It would seen) that drug
policies have been relatively uninfluenced by health policy
concerns.
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In sum, it would seem that drug production has hindered
health policy developments by failing to provide basic, crucial
drugs in the quantities and at the prices which could be
possible. This is as much the result of the structure of the
Indian market, and the location of Indian purchasing power, as it
is of conscious decision-making by individual companies or the
industry as a whole. There is, however, a glaring exception to
this generalisation: the activities of some American companies
during the establishment of the public-sector companies in 1956.
Several American companies- attempted to prevent the establishment
of sizeable basic drug production facilities outside their
control, and may thus have prevented the establishment of a more
appropriate structure of production. However, the record of the
Indian public sector is such that it is difficult to be sure that
much difference would have been made however soon it started
production, ana on whatever scale.
C:DRUG PRODUCERS: THEIR IMPACT 0!I HEALTH POLICY
There is very little evidence of attempts by drug companies
to affect health policy £££ ££• Evidence abounds of their
attempts to influence the more narrow sphere of drugs policy
itself - to restrict Government intervention, to limit the more
radical proposals, with the most obvious examples being their
opposition to controls on equity shares (and the extreme,
nationalisation) during the 1 970's (Stoker, 1984:356-71). Despite
the importance of Government purchasing in total drug sales, it
seems that most companies have been content to work to maintain
or increase the share of this market (through advertising and
intensive marketing) rather than to increase the size of the
total market by pressing for larger health budgets or a larger
share within them of drugs purchasing. Possibly the companies
have realised that since Government drugs budgets are totally
inadequate to meet the demands of most patients the best
contribution to overall sales is through affecting the
prescriptions written by Government doctors and purchased by
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patients from commercial pharmacists. Alternatively, they have
focussed on affecting the distribution of Government drug
purchases by bribing those who control the drug purchase
committees. But this has to be speculative, since there seems to
be very little evidence on this subject.
DRUG COMPANIES: AH OVERALL PERSPECTIVE
The major criticism of the operations of pharmaceuticals
companies in India is probably the least tangible: the creation,
or at least support in the maintenance, of a perspective on
health policy in which technical interventions in the bodies of
individuals (using drugs, or surgery) are regarded as crucial
contributions to the health of the nation. In looking after their
own interests they draw attention away from environmental,
social, political and economic contributions to improved health.
In this way, they have probably helped to generate a climate in
which Ayurvedic and Unani preparations have become seen in the
same way, helping to generate the growth of the indigenous
pharmaceutical companies along similar lines. Their liaison with
doctors is close, but they also spread their products through
networks of practitioners without formal qualifications in
Western medicine, by competing to offer these people profitable
opportunities. Some benefits have undoubtedly been produced by
these means: it remains unclear that they have outweighed the
costs.
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CONCLUSION: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
I have considered three areas of international impact on
health policy in India. In each case, there is evidence to
support the claim that the Indian experience does not neatly fit
the models derived particularly from 'dependency' analyses.
Health sector aid has been concentrated on primary care,
particularly the prevention and control of diseases; medical
migration has not been sizeable enough to place constraints on
health policy-making; and local production of pharmaceuticals has
permitted the establishment of controls over the operations of
multinational corporations so that their excesses have been
curbed. But in more insubstantial ways the international context
has tended to support a view of health services which has limited
their effectiveness: the dominance of medical education over that
for other medical personnel; the greater symbolic importance of
individualised drug-based therapies over environmental
improvement; and a health sector oriented to international
standards and relating rather poorly to the concerns of the mass
of the population. In the next two chapters I shall discuss some
of these effects in more detail, looking first at policy on
medical personnel.
CHAPTER 9
MEDICAL AND PARAMEDICAL PERSONNEL
The discussion of patterns of expenditure on health
services, which formed the basis of Chapter 6, gives little
impression of the impact of the money spent. This chapter, and
chapter 10, will discuss the zzsiltssig consequences: firstly in
looking at the numbers and kinds of health workers trained and
working in India; and secondly in discussing what is known about
what work they do, in what kinds of settings. The further
question - what impact has this had on the health of the
population - has been discussed briefly in Chapter 5, and I will
return to it in the Conclusion.
There are obvious problems in looking at the numbers of
people trained in different health skills: in particular, we
cannot assume that, for example, someone with more training (a
consultant cardiac surgeon, say) has more and greater impacts on
health than someone with less training (as a community health
worker, say) because these skills may be imperfectly learned, or
irrelevant to the major sources of illness, or based on
inadequate knowledge, or used unsatisfactorily. Similarly, new
buildings do not necessarily provide better conditions for care
or cure than do old ones.
This chapter will not address these issues, but will leave
them on one side for reconsideration in the conclusion. Here I
shall be concerned with how many people have been trainee, in
which categories, and at what times. To begin with, I shall
discuss the factors which seem to have affected the balance of
personnel trained - not just the policy debates but also the
constraints from outside the Government sphere; and then take
each category in turn to see what has happened to the staff so
trained - who has employed them, under what kinds of conditions,
and so on. The underlying reason for looking at these kinds of
data remains the a11empt to answer some of the questions outlined
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in the Introduction: to what extent can policy decisions about
health personnel be understood as the outcome of the interplay of
class-based interests? To what extent does it make more sense of
the material to include the role of ideas (existing models of
desirable patterns of health services) and of cultural factors
more generally (such as views on the polluting nature of
'nursing'), even if these in their turn depend in part on the
structure of Indian society? These issues will be addressed at
the end of this chapter.
THE BALANCE BETWEEN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES
It is clear that over the past 35 years India has seen a
dramatic expansion in the number of medical and health-related
personnel, and in the variety of specialised positions which have
been developed. But some categories have grown faster than
others, and a discussion of the contribution of policy to this
balance must be set in a broader context of the Government's
ability to control who has been trained. In addition, some
categories have not been trained at all, or not before the late
1 9 7 0's , and I will also consider the debates over these ' n o n'-
personnel.
To begin with, it is possible to see two different types of
health workers - those for whom there exists a private as well as
a public market (in particular, doctors) and those who are
virtually dependent on public sector employment - though the
categories are not clear-cut and unchanging. This relates to
different kinds of outcomes: for the first category the
Government has largely responded to pressure from potential
applicants, whereas for the second changes have resulted more
directly from Government recruitment policies. It might be
expected that, as a result, attempts to achieve a desirable mix
of health personnel woula not be very successful. In fact,
although the number of doctors trained has routinely exceeded the
planned expansion, the number of paramedical personnel has grown
much more quickly, though in a more discontinuous fashion.
Official plans, of course, assume that only trained
personnel are of relevance, and that those trained actually
practise what they have been taught. But substantial numbers of
people have acquired some form of training unofficially (e.g. as
assistants to doctors, or by correspondence course) or have
received one form of training (e.g. as an Army medical orderly,
or as a pharmacist) but practice in a different capacity (usually
as an independent practitioner). There are no worthwhile
estimates of the numbers involved here. The inclusion of the
training of personnel outside the allopathic system introduces
yet further complications. Training in indigenous medicine has
been solely for the equivalent of doctors - there are now several
degree and diploma courses for Ayurvedic and Unani practitioners,
but not for supporting personnel. This reflects the absence of
Government demand for such workers. However, many of these
graduates attended courses with substantial 'Western' components,
and even those from 'pure' indigenous courses may actually
practice using the allopathic pharmacopeia.
The major health policy documents since 19^7 have all
stressed the need to expand the numbers of allopathic personnel
rather than practitioners of the indigenous systems of medicine
(including homeopathy); and within the allopathic sector, to
increase the numbers of auxiliary personnel more rapidly than
doctors. No attempt has been made to define an overall desirable
number of indigenous practitioners, nor to set targets for
achievement in individual plan periods, and the discussions of
allopathic personnel make no reference to any form of integration
with indigenous practitioners until the late 1 970's. I shall
therefore deal with the indigenous sector separately, and here
focus on allopathic personnel.
From 1947 or earlier there was a formal commitment to the
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need to expand the number of 'non-medical' health workers. The
Bhore Committee called for the number of doctors in 1571 to be
four times the number in 1941, but it wanted one hundred times as
many nurses and health visitors, and twenty times as many
midwives. ( C-.O.I.[C.P.H.B.] , 1948:102). The rationale was spelled
out in the meeting of Health Ministers and Secretaries in 1948:
they can carry out a variety of tasks "under the direction and
supervision of doctors" such as inoculations, anti-malarial work
or sanitation; they are cheaper to train ana employ; ana they are
more suited to work in the rural areas (ibid). This emphasis was
repeated in the Five Year Plan documents. The First Plan
specified nurses, midwives and is 1 is (traditional birth
attendants) as categories which could be trained more rapidly in
existing institutions (G.O.I., 1951:203), while the Second Plan
noted that "shortages in personnel other than doctors have been
more marked and are likely to persist longer than in the case of
doctors" (G.O.I., 1 956:538). Similar sentiments are expressed in
the succeeding Plans.
The practice was slightly different from this. To begin
with, the discussion of the problems of training more doctors
always precedes that of the other categories. This symbolic
precedence was matched by a financial precedence: policy-makers
accepted the argument that medical education must be expensive,
in order to maintain 'standards' (see further below) , and
therefore financial allocations favoured the medical colleges
over paramedical training. The financial balance between the two
is difficult to establish very precisely. The Planning Commission
has usually included the two together (along with research),
distinguishing the outlays under the two heads only in the
Second, Fourth and Fifth Plans, and the Draft Plan for 1978-83-
In these Plans, Medical Education and Research was allocated
between four and seven times as much as Paramedical Training.
Actual Plan expenditures are only available for the Fourth Plan,
when an outlay imbalance of 6.5:1 in favour of the doctors (Rs653
million to Rs129 million) was translated into an expenditure
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imbalance of 10.8:1 (Rs790 million to Rs73 millionH C-.O.I. 1969;
G.O.I. 1975:22). These are, of course, only a partial guide to
actual public expenditure: Table 1 summarizes the figures for
Orissa for most of the 1970's and shows by how much medical
education dominates training concerns within the Government when
non-Plan expenditures are included.
TABLE 1
ANNUAL AVERAGE EXPENDITURES ON MEDICAL AND PARAMEDICAL EDUCATION
AND TRAINING, ORISSA 1972/3 to 1978/9
R s Millions
CATEGORY Non- State Central TOTAL ( % a g e )
Plan Plan Plan
Under-graduate CO•o 1 .1 - 11.9 (735)
Post-gradua te 1 .6 0.1 - 1 .7 ( 1 05)
Paramedical 1 .3 0.2 1 .3 2.8 (17 5)
TOTAL 13.7 1 .3 1 .3 16.3 (1005)
( % a g e) ( 845) CO ( 8%) (1005)
Source: 1 ASEiniSlZSiiail EzssnkZ, Orissa Department of
Health and Family Welfare, Bhubaneswar.
Note: Medical figures exclude expenditures on the Medical College
Hospitals. Paramedical figures include expenditures on Regional
Family Welfare Training Centres, which also train doctors.
While some reliance can probably be placed on the figures
for expenditures, the data for physical targets and achievements,
expressed as numbers in practice or in service and summarised in
Table 2, are much more uncertain. There are many problems
involved in estimating total numbers of doctors, nurses etc. in
the workforce: some of these are dealt with in more detail later
in this chapter. But in addition, it is rather suspicious that,
many of these targets appear to have been precisely met; ana in
some cases it is clear that planners have used 'likely' or
'estimated' figures for 'achievements', when they had virtually
no data to go on. Thus as late as 1972 the Directorate of
Manpower (sic) said that 'there are no stock estimates of health
visitors worked out on a systematic basis' (p46). There are other
inconsistencies between the figures procuced by different
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agencies, and the Planning Commission itself has provided
contradictory figures for 1950 and 1955. Therefore, Table 2
should be regarded as only a guide to rough magnitudes and
proportions.
TABLE 2
PLAN TARGETS AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN NUMBERS OF HEALTH PERSONNEL
(thousands)
BASE¬ FIRST SECOND THIRD ANNUAL FOURTH FIFTH
LINE PLAN PLAN PLAN PLANS PLAN PLAN
1 951 1956 1 96 1 196 6 196 9 1974 197 cJ
Ach. Tgt.Ach. Tgt. Ach. Ach. Tgt. Ach. Tgt. Ach
Doctors 56 . 65 77 70 81 86 102 138 138 176 178
Nurses 17 19 24 27 45 45 61 88 88 1 23 11 3
A.N.M.'s - - - 3 22 34 54 54 n. a. 58
L.H.V.'s 0.5 1 3 2 4 4 4 7 n . a . QU
Nurse-dais - 6 41 1 2 40 25 (no further figures)
S.I. 's 4 7 6 19 18 20 32 33 n. a .







figures for those estimated to be
1 e country. In some Plan periods,
i n
n 0
physical targets seem to have been set for some categories.
A.N.M.rAuxiliary Nurse Midwife, now Health Worker (Female)
L.H.V.r Lady Health Visitor, now Health Assistant (Female)
S.I.= Sanitary Inspector, including Health Assistants (Male)
Sources: Columns 2,4 & 5: G.O.I., 1961:653; Column 3: G.O.I., 1956:61
538; Columns 6, 9 <1 10: G.O.I., 1975:2 3, except for Col. 6 fo
L.H.V.'s, which is from G.O.I., 1 964, and for A.N.M.'s, midwives, an
nurse-dais, which come from G.O.I. (C.C.H.), 1573:24; Column 8: C-.O.I.
1969:291, except for midwives, which comes from DiLg&tiQLZitM Sl.
^3323333, 1 972; Column 11: 'AqlIu iteaiJfcJa ^231,3.21122 £22331
It is possible, through rather heroic assumptions, to
summarize Table 2 in terms of the proportions between different
personnel as in Table 3. 'What this suggests is that the balance
of personnel around 1980 was probably far more 'appropriate'
(less heavily dependent on doctors) than it was around 1950.
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TABLE 3
























(male and female) not applicable 70
Source: Table 2.
Note: For more detail on multi-purpose personnel, see further
below in the section on Feldshers. This total includes Male and
Female Health Assistants and Health Workers.
In dealing with the course of proposals and patterns of
health personnel I shall reverse the normal order and deal first
with Community Health Workers ana then health assistants or
paramedical workers (mainly male) under the heading of Feldshers,
then with nurses of various categories, and finally with doctors,
allopathic and then indigenous.
COMMUNITY HEALTH WORKERS
As early as the N.P.C. and Bhore Committee reports it had
been argued that the existing categories of personnel might not
suit the kinds of tasks which were regarded as the most
essential, and that some new categories should be trained. Two
kinds of proposals were mace: for what we w o u 1 a now call
community health workers; and for a medical auxiliary category
akin to the Russian fihl.fiJs.CihE•
The N.P.C. provided as good a description and justification
of the potential and role of a community health worker as any to
be found in the international policy documents of the 1970's.
Because of the dearth of trained medical personnel, the health
needs of India could "only be met by training specially a very
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large body of men to perform some of the simpler tasks" and "thus
the cornerstone of the scheme we recommend is a Health Worker."
(N.P.C. 1946: 43) The Health Worker was to be an intelligent
young man or woman selected from the village itself, sent for
nine months training in community and personal hygiene, first
aid, common ailments and simple remedies, and then returned to
his or her village to "spread the gospel" (ibid: 44).
"The health worker will be one of the villagers
themselves, only somewhat better trained than
themselves. He will not appear to the villagers as a
strange imposition of a strange system, but their kith
and kin who desires to help them."
The proposal involved retraining after five years, with the
prospect that in 20 years some of these workers would be of
degree standard. There were several problems with this proposal:
no thought was given to the problem of finding trainers; of
selecting candidates in villages divided along caste, class and
religious lines; of supervising his/her activities; nor of the
possible unavailability of women of suitable education and age to
meet the requirements and able and willing to attend a long
training course away from their home or marital village. Further,
the financial implications of the proposal were enormous,
involving more than double current total levels of health
expenditure just to pay salaries of health v/orkers.
However, the main reason why no attempt was made to
implement the proposal was the perspective used in the later (and
more official ana 'authoritative') Bhore report - which focussea
on 'top-down' planning based on health centres manned by doctors
and ancillary staff. In addition, several States were running
schemes to encourage doctors to settle in rural areas, using
subsidies for the establishment of dispensaries, or offering
honoraria. There were also arguments about whether to continue
the training of licentiate doctors (see further below) on the
grounds that they were more willing to settle in rural areas
(though there was no evidence for this); and supporters of
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indigenous systems of medicine also argued their case in part on
the same lines. The issue of rural medical relief was thus
sidetracked into discussions in three directions, and away from
the idea of a new category of worker at the village level. The
concept of the Health Worker fell because it was argued that the
villagers should not be offered an inferior standard of care from
that of the towns, and that medical standards in India should be
modelled on those of Britain and America (C-.O.I.CC.C.H.],
1 95.1:£4) .
For whatever reason, it is impossible to find new proposals
for village level health workers before the early 1970's. At this
time, international thinking on development in general was
critical of the previous belief that the benefits of economic
growth would 'trickle down' to the poor, in urban or rural areas.
There was increasing evidence that the efforts of the preceding
twenty years still left most villagers with little access to
State medical services, and it was increasingly argued that one
reason for this was the slavish adherence to mocels derived from
the colonial period and based on copying structures from the
West. In this period the Chinese resort to 'bare-foot doctors'
after 1966 received a great deal of positive comment and
analysis. The critique of the 'professional' model of health
services found a crusading voice in Ivan Illich, who counted in
his circle of supporters several well-placed Indians,
particularly V.Ramalingaswamy, the director of the All-India
Institute of Medical Sciences [A.1.1. M.S.] and J.P. Naik, the
Member-Secretary of the Indian Council for Social Science
Research [I.C.S.S.R.],
These ideas were brought together in the 1975 report of the
committee chaired by J.B. Srivastav (G.O.I. 1975a) on the future
of medical education - a committee originally established by the
Health Minister (Dr. Karan Singh) as a result of a bruising
strike of Delhi junior hospital doctors in 1974. The Srivastav
Committee report was presented at a very inauspicious time - the
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Emergency had just been declared, and grass-roots political
initiatives in general were unwelcome. Further, within a year the
whole of the health sector was to be dominated by the attempt to
make a dramatic breakthrough in the sterilisation programme.
While the Report was accepted, no moves were made to implement it
until the Janata Government was elected in 1977. The Janata
Manifesto mentioned community health workers, and the new Health
Minister (Raj Narain) adopted the proposal as a personal
commitment (Leslie, 1981; Joubert, 1985). Unlike the 1938 N.P.C.
proposals, the C.H.W. was to be offered training in the
indigenous systems of medicine as well as allopathy; and for
training purposes an additional doctor was to be appointed at
each Primary Health Centre. The course was reduced in length to
three months, and the stipend offered was based on the assumption
that this would be a part-time activity.
Much to the surprise of many commentators, the C.H.W. scheme
was indeed implemented with effect from late 1977. Progress was
slower than planned, and 'was delayed further when Mrs Gandhi was
re-elected in 1980. It took several months before the Congress
C-overr.ment was prepared to continue a scheme which was so clearly
identified with the opposition, particularly with Raj Narain.
Eventually just a change in title (from Worker to Volunteer, or
Village Health Guide), a new emphasis on appointing women where
possible, and a few other small changes were sufficient to permit
the scheme to continue, and efforts were made to complete the
training of C.H.V.s for all villages by the end of March 1984.
The chequered history of the C.H.W. has posed some problems
for orthodox Marxist interpretations of health policy in India.
It is relatively easy to explain the failure to use this means of
providing health care prior to 1977: it fits with a model of
health service provision which is dominated by the interests of
urban propertied classes, allied to the medical professions
desire for dominance over the medical division of labour and
protection from competition. How then can we explain the change
308
in policy? It certainly does not fit easily into a 'labour's
demands/capital's needs' view of reform: it is not clear that
'improving villagers' health' will safeguard capitalism, and
villagers themselves have never articulated a demand for this
kind of service. Attempts to dismiss the significance of the
scheme (as merely a smokescreen, or designed to buy off demands
for a doctor in every village) seem equally unacceptable (though
correct as a measure of realism about the uncertain importance of
the change). Joubert (1985) argues that this policy is populism
££.£ » and it seems that a confluence of forces have
come together to support the move, of which the emerging
'agrarian populism' and clientelism of the Indian State, the
potential for using these workers for population control, and a
changing international climate are the most important. I will
return to consider these points at the end of this chapter.
FELDSHERS
Proposals for feldshers emerged in the 1 9 5 0's and 1 9 6 0's.
The first meeting of the Central Council of Health, in January
1 953» considered whether to reintroduce licentiate training as a
way of solving the shortage of medical personnel in the rural
areas. The meeting resolved against licentiates but in favour of
medical auxiliaries, and the central government proposed a scheme
in 1954 to produce a cadre of people to live "in the midst of the
villagers" and trained in environmental sanitation but also able
to attend to minor ailments (G.O. I. [ C.C.H. ] 1954). The discussion
was heated, with the major objection being that these people
would set themselves up as doctors if they had any curative
training. While the proposal insisted that the medical
auxiliaries would be under the supervision of a doctor, it was
argued that in practice this was highly unlikely: the 'auxiliary'
would thus become a 'quack'. Nonetheless, there was majority
support, and Planning Commission promised money. But the
following year a revised scheme was announced, apparently as a
result of pressure applied through the Planning Commission, to
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reduce the curative training to the level of first aid only. At
this point, the representatives of several States reiterated
their belief that the new category would overlap with the
Sanitary Inspectors (G.0.1. [C.C. H. ] 1955).
A1 though the scheme did appear in the Second Plan, very few-
States seem to have followed up the proposal. There seem to have
been Health Assistants trained in Nagpur, and in Andhra Pradesh,
Bihar, and Rajasthan, (G.O.I.CC.C.H.] 1963:191) ana possibly in
U.P. (G.O.I.CC.C.H.] 1964:286) and some of these were given jobs
as medical officers in Primary Health Centres. The idea was
reintroduced in the ninth meeting of the C.C.H., in 1961, as a 3-
year course. Once again reference was made to experience in
Russia and other countries, and again it was suggested that the
new 'health assistants' should work under the supervision of
doctors and not be able to set themselves up as independent
practitioners - and the same criticisms were made as before. A
sub-committee reported favourably the following year, and the
matter was discussed again in 1963, when some opposition was
reported from the international agencies, who were more in favour
of Sanitary Inspectors (C-.0.I.[C.C.H.] 1964:284-318). By 1965
W.H.O. and U.N.I.C.E.F. were in favour of the scheme for training
health assistants (G.O.I.CC.C.H.] 1966a:70-72) but by 1967 a new
version of the scheme was being mooted - for B.Sc. courses in
Public Health and in Maternal and Child Health. Finally, in the
early 1 970Ts the attempts to integrate the different specialist
cadres - Sanitary Inspectors, Family Planning, Malaria and
Smallpox workers etc. - began to bear fruit with new proposals
which called for Multi-Purpose Health Workers (M.P.W.s )
( G.O. I. C C.C.H.C ] 1 973:368-9). After 1 975, when the M.P.W. schemes
were joined by the resurrection of the Community Health Worker,
and backed by international agencies, there was finally a
completely new look to health personnel training in India.
The exact course of these fluctuating proposals, and the
reasons fcr their almost total non-implementation prior to 1975,
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are not clear. However, what seems to have happened is that the
'problem' of rural medical relief was seen as the absence of
doctors. Discussion and effort thus went into schemes to persuade
graduate doctors to work in rural areas, and proposals to use
different personnel never received the same kind of support -
there was no existing cadre whose training could be expanded.
There was no political benefit to be gained from promising
villages an unknown, incompreh ensib1e , health assistant, but a
the claim to be able to provide a doctor evoked a strong
response. The final proposals evolved through two routes, both of
which did address themselves to the existing patterns of health
personnel - the indigenous practitioners, and the existing cadres
of 'uni-purpose' health workers (for smallpox, T.B., family
planning etc.).
Attempts to bring the indigenous practitioners into
Government service have a long history, which I have already
discussed in Chapters 2 and 7. More detail cn the post-1947
debates on the role of indigenous healers will be provided later
in this chapter. Here I shall concentrate on the major attempt
made to integrate indigenous healers as health auxiliaries, made
in 1972, during the first flush of the Congress Government
elected in 1971 on the 'abolish poverty' slogan.
The 1972 proposals arrived and disappeared very rapidly. As
late as the 1971 meeting of the Central Council of Health the
'Master Plan' to provide health services to rural areas foliowed
previous patterns in being based on improving facilities and
incentives to encourage staff to serve in rural areas
(G.O.I.tC.C.H.J 1972:41-71). After the 1971 elections a
completely new set of proposals was introduced, to give substance
to Mrs Gandhi's election promises. In 1972 the new Minister of
State for Health, D.P. Chattopadhyaya, proposed a 'National
Health Scheme for Rural Areas', first announced in the Lok Sabha
in May and passed at a conference (not a full meeting) of the
Central Council of Health in July. The Government apparently gave
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this scheme a very high priority, considering the rapidity with
which further meetings were held: in July the Planning Commission
approved pilot projects, and the sub-committee set up in July
reported in time for modifications to be made in November and a
public discussion in December.
The intention was that pilot projects should be started in
1972/3 and the scheme itself in 1973/4. Press comment suggested
that the Prime Minister had put her own weight behind this scheme
as "an earnest of [the Central Government's] desire to reach
(sic) social services to the rural communities" (Statesman
27/7/72). The scheme itself envisaged using the estimated 300,000
registered medical practitioners from the indigenous systems of
medicine, to train them for four months in simple treatments from
'Ayurveda/Unani, Homeopathy and Allopathy including first aid'
( J • I« H. A. 1973, 2:77) and then employ them at R s 1 5 0 / - per month,
providing them with a Medical Kit with simple allopathic,
homeopathic and Indian medicines. In this way it was argued that
medical relief and care could be provided to rural areas rather
like the way Russia and China had solved similar problems
( i b i d : 7 6 ) .
But it soon became clear that powerful forces were ranged
against the proposals. The Indian Medical Association predictably
called it a "cocktail" of systems which would legitimise quackery
and discriminate against doctors at a time when increasing
numbers were unemployed. The President of the I.M.A. used his
position on Planning Commission subcommittees to argue for
amendments to the proposal, (I.M.A. [Annual Report], 1971/2). The
Planning Commission itself began to suggest problems, such as the
difficulty of integrating different medical systems after a short
course of training, when there were no trainers who understood
all three; and once again it was argued that it would be
politically unacceptable to offer the rural population a level of
practitioner below that to be found in the towns (Hindustan
Times, 1/10/72). In addition, some States opposed the scheme:
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Punjab, for example, argued that it had sufficient allopathic
doctors, ana Rajasthan sponsored discussion of its 'problem of
increasing numbers of unemployed doctors'.
This coalition was sufficient to prevent the scheme from
being implemented, even in a pilot form. Although Mrs Gandhi
addressed gatherings of and in 1 97 3 and talked of
the need to use all available medical resources ( J ♦ I. M. A. 1 973,
6:211), C'nattopadhyay left the Ministry. Without his personal
support the proposal died, and the I.M.A. was able to call off
its proposed 'Black Day' of action, April 16th 1973. But this was
not the last attempt - similar proposals reappeared in 1977 - and
the alternative means of producing feldshers was implemented,
albeit slowly, over the next five years.
The alternative route to feldshers was through the
retraining of the existing paramedical staff. The previous 20
years had seen the expansion of a whole series of categories
linked to the so-called 'vertical' campaigns against specific
diseases or for family planning. In the mid-1 960's it was thought
that malaria would soon be conquered and this gave rise to some
discussion about what to do with the malaria workers. This
'problem' disappeared with the resurgence of malaria, but the
approaching elimination of smallpox reintroduced the issue in the
early 1970's. In addition, some argued that the separate
campaigns were hindered by their isolation one from another. They
were unable to call upon the workers from the other campaigns at
moments of urgency (in epidemics, or at seasonal peaks of
activity such as spraying against mosquitoes). In addition, there
was (if work schedules were conscientously followed) a great
duplication of visiting, ana time spent in travel was a major
source of 'unproductive' time. Thus, it was argued, the full
potential of the existing staff was not being realised. The
proposed solution was to integrate the different cadres to
provide the full range of preventive and public health services,
and, after 1977, to include basic curative training as v;el 1.
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I shall now turn to a more detailed consideration of the
expansion of nursing education, which in part complements what I
have just said, since the junior nursing cadres - Lady Health
Visitors and Auxiliary Nurse-Midw ives - provided the sources for
the female 'felashers' under the Multi-Purpose Workers Scheme.
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I shall now turn to a mors detailed consideration of the
expansion of nursing education, which in part complements what I
have just said, since the junior nursing cadres - La ay Health
Visitors and Auxiliary Nurse-Midwives - provided the sources for
the female 'feldshers' under the Multi-Purpose Workers Scheme.
THE SUPPLY OF NURSES
Compared to doctors, nurses have been systematically
relegated to a minor position in the organisation and funding not
only of training but also of employment. This is, of course,
common to many countries, but the problem is probably more
extreme in India. Nurses have a lev; status in the community. They
are mostly women. They are either drawn from marginal or
disadvantaged social classes because of the 'polluting'
connotations of their work, or from the one group who clearly
reject this conception of nursing activities - Christians, mostly
from Kerala. They have failed to exert forceful pressure to raise
their standing. As a result, key aspects of national health
policies (in particular, for maternal and child health) have
remained under-staffed and inadequate, despite a frequent
formally-expressed committment to increasing the number of nurses
and improving the conditions of their education and employment.
Nurse training was not well developed under the British.
Nursing for the Armed Forces was largely a male affair, with the
first nursing sisters arriving in Bombay in 1888. In 1914 nurses
were, for the first time, recruited in India for military
purposes and were formed into an Indian Military Nursing Service
in 1927 (Wilkinson, 1958:11). Nursing schools in Government Civil
Hospitals were established in the 1870's (in Madras) and the
1880's (in Bombay and Calcutta). In Bombay, Poona and Calcutta
the early nurse training was done by Anglican Sisters, ana
mission hospitals trained more nurses than Government hospitals
did, also using European or American nurses as trainers.
Nursing students in Government and mission hospitals were
originally 'Anglo-Indian', and later mostly Indian Christian
girls (almost the only groups willing to become nurses until
quite recently). Nursing education was increasingly standardised
after 1 909, when mission hospitals in North India established a
common examining board (ibid: 32). In the 1920's the first steps
were taken to establish a category of Lady Health Visitors, whose
focus was to be on public health work (Seal 1975:433). A Trained
Nurses Association of India was established in 1922, bringing
together two regional associations, and Acts to register
qualified nurses were passed, first in Madras in 1926 and by 1539
in most Provinces (ibid; Nandi, 1981:158).
At Independence, there were two categories of registered
nursing personnel - about 15,000 general nurses, who might also
have a midwifery qualification, and some 500 Lady Health
Visitors. There were also traditional birth attendants - jigis -
some of whom had received some training anc might be employee as
subordinate nursing staff (see further below); and an unknown
number of others doing duties which could be defined as nursing.
The Bhore committee recognised that the nursing situation in
India was totally unsatisfactory. It pointed out that conditions
for nurses were "deplorable" (G.0.1. 1946, .11:386), ana went on
to list what it saw as the main problems: no professional status
(by which it meant gazetted rank in Government service); low pay
for senior nurses; understaffed hospitals leading to overworked
nurses; deplorable living conditions, ciet and leisure
facilities; anc no pension rights. The Bhore report argued that
all of these were within the power of Government to remedy, but
even so, it was not hopeful that enough women would come forward
for training to meet its long-term goal of one nurse for every
500 population. In marked contrast to its view on doctors, the
committee proposed two grades of nurse - junior ana senior - with
the addition of nursing degrees as soon as possible, and
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specified the proposed curriculum, standards of training centres
and so on. Almost as an afterthought, the Committee refers to
male nurses, notes their role ana the difficulty of recruiting
men to nursing while pay rates were so low, and suggests that an
expansion of the number of male nurses for male wards will
release the female nurses for other work - presumably (though
this is not stated) female wards and out-patients.
One indicator of the low priority of nursing is the very
poor quality of information about how many nurses there are, or
what kind of work they are doing, and this makes it very
difficult to assess the significance of changes since 19^7. The
study carried out by the major organisation of voluntary
hospitals in India, the Co-Ordinating Agency for Health Planning,
notes that the Indian Nursing Council registered only 87% of the
general nurses trained between 1951 and 1971, 89% of L.H.V.s, and
62% of A.N.M.s but the Census errs in the other direction by
including 'untrained and unqualified self-styled nurses'
(C.A.H.P. 1975:9). In addition, double-counting is a serious
possibility, since recruitment to higher grades has often been
from the ranks of lower ones. Using the results of a 2% sample of
registered nurses, figures for graduation from nurse-training
institutions, and estimates of mortality, migration, and 'pre¬
retirement resignations' the C.A.H.P. study estimated a nurse
population in 1971 as in Table 4.
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Source: C.A.H.P., 1975:10, 14.
The C.A.H.P. study also provides one of the few estimates of
how nurses experience interrupted work careers if they marry.
Based on an admittedly small sample, they suggest that about 115
of all nursing personnel were not currently in work, for
'temporary' reasons, while another 2.55 regarded themselves as
'permanently' out of the nursing workforce (ibid.: 12 — 3). Medical
administrators resist the appointment of married nurses jointly
with their husbands if they are also employed by the Health
Department, because this reduces their freedom to use job
transfers as the main means of disciplining staff - but it is
also not clear how many nurses might return to Government
employment if service rules were to make their employment more
compatible with their marital obligations. In general, little
reliable information exists about the numbers of trained nurses
of different grades who are in employment, or might be available
for employment. The C.A.H.P. survey found most of its L.H.V. and
A.N.M. employed respondents working for the Government (97% and
85% respectively) but far more General Nurses in Church-relateo
(31%) or private (13%) employment. The Report also suggested that
estimates of 'unemployed' nurses, provided by the Ministry of
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Labour, were probably highly unreliable. These estimates included
large numbes of male A.N.M.s and L.H.V.s (!), and many employed
staff nonetheless register as unemployed, in the hopes of
bettering one's position (C.A.H.P. 1975:19-21).
The most basic level of nursing worker has remained the dai,
the nursing orderly and the ayah. Virtually nothing is known
about who they are, how many there are, what tasks they routinely
carry out, what education they have and so on. As we shall see,
there are relatively few trained nurses for hospital and health
centre work, and so much of this is carried out by these
untrained personnel. Only in the case of the dai has there been
any attempt to provide training. The Bhore Committee accepted
that this category, however undesirable, would inevitably remain
necessary for a period, and it described a successful training
scheme from the North-West Frontier as a model ( 11:398-402). The
Bhore Report did not propose the replacement of the indigenous
midwife by trained birth attendants from outside. Instead, it
suggested the improvement of the methods used by dais, by
offering help and advice particularly t'o the "younger women of
the dai community" (ibid: 402). Such women were indeed employed
in P.H.C.s as Trained Dais during the 1 9 5 0' s, and many are still
in post today - though once again there are no national
estimates. They were replaced by A.N.M.s in the 1 9 6 0 * s, but more
dais have been brought into Government service since 1977 as
assistants to A.N.M.s working in sub-centres.
This move has been part of the shift in orientation of
health services described above. In the case of the dais it has
involved attempts to train at least one from each village, to a
total of 1:500 population, over a 3 week training course held at
a local sub-centre. This target has been achieved, though the
longer-term goals of maintaining contacts and supervision are
less likely to be reached. The dais are not employed after
training (except for perhaps one to help the A.N. M.) , but they
are offered a small inducement to report women 'who are pregnant
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to the A.N.M. to allow for ante-natal visits. No assessment of
the dai training programme nationally has been published, but
reports from U.P. suggest that very few dais there, trained or
untrained, have any regular contact with any health personnel
(N.I.H.A.E., 1980; Jeffery, Jeffery and Lyon, 1984b). It is
probably a result of the fear that dais have that they will be
involved in family planning activities, which reduces contacts to
a low level. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.
For the more established grades of nurses, there have been
two main changes in the course of the last 40 years. One
substantial new category has been introduced - that of the
Auxiliary Nurse-Midwife - ana nursing colleges have been
established, and have trained staff for a number of positions as
nurse-tutors, public health nurses and so on. Table 5 summarises
the available data on numbers in each of the larger categories.
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TABLE 5
STOCK AND SUPPLY OF NURSING PERSONNEL
1951 1961 1971 1981
(Annual outturn)
General Nurses





A . N. M. s
17,000 35,000 72,600 115,000




(Annual outturn) (2,085) (5,036)
Source: For 1951, 1961 and 1971 figures, C.A.H.P., 1975:10-16.
For 1951 and 1961 I have tak'en the out-turn figures quoted there,
added to the estimates of-stock in 1950, and adjusted downwards
by 2.5? to allow for mortality (probably an over-estimate,
especially for A.N.M.s, a young group especially in the early
years), and rounded. C-.O.I. (1972) estimated the stock of
general nurses in 1971 at about 70,000, of L.H.V.s at 6,000, and
of A.N.M.s at about 45,500.
Note: Stock here refers to out-turn figures adjusted only for
estimated mortality.
A.N.M. training was introduced in 1952 as a way of expanding
the number of junior nurses, mainly for public health work: their
two-year courses accepted women with eight years of schooling.
By contrast, the general nursing course takes three-years, with a
minimum entry requirement of ten years of schooling. A.N.M.s are
also less well-trained than the Bhore-proposed 'junior
certificate' nurses would have been.) The numbers of A.N.M.s
qualifying rose steacily until 1970 but since then they have
varied from year to year according to the estimates by State
Governments of the number of jobs they will have to offer the
successful candidates. Thus in 1968 there were about 10,000
admissions but in 1970 this figure dropped to about 7,750 because
some States closed down training institutions, believing that
they had a surplus - and only about 500 new posts were filled in
the two years 1969-71 (C-.O.I. 1 972:49-52). The original target
wa s to provide one A.N.M. for every 1 0,000 people, and this was
approximately achieved in most States by the mid-1970's. Since
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1977, with the move towards multi-purpose health workers, the
A.N.M. has provided the bulk of the new category Health Worker
(Female); and current attempts to meet targets of 1:5,000
population (with 1:8,000 as an interim measure) have led to a
reopening of training schools.
Matters have been complicated still further by the role of
the Central Government, through the Family Planning programme.
The A.N.M. has family planning as well as health
responsibilities, and therefore some of the training schools have
been established and funded by the Central Government, and some
by the State Government. Some A.N.M.s (not necessarily those
trained in Central Government institutions) were then em ployed
under the family planning programme, on funds from the Central
Government, on slightly better terms than those under the
maternal and child health programme, on State Government funds.
Under the multi-purpose scheme, terms and conditions should be
equalised: even though the variation in background and training
of the A.N.M.s is small, this process has been long drawn-out.
For the male workers it is far from reaching a resolution.
In the field of public health nursing, there are two cadres
of nurses. The first, established in the early 1920's in Delhi on
the model of health visiting in the U.K., is the Lady Health
Visitor (L.H.V.). The second is the Public Health Nurse (P.H.N.),
an additional one-year qualification available to nurses or to
L.H.V.s, introduced in the 1 950's. The Shore Committee was
scathing about L.H.V.s, saying that none of them were "rencering
that type of service to the individual, family and community
which is considered necessary in health programmes today" (G.0.1.
1946, 11:394), and it called for the establishment of P.H.N,
training, but the category has not been popular. There were few
posts for P.H.N.s until the late 1 970s and no obvious benefits to
a staff nurse from undergoing the training. For example, before
1975 there were only two sanctioned posts for P.H.M.s in the
Orissa Government service, though there were apparently nearly 50
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women with the qualification available (I.I.M. 1980:34). The main
category of public health nurses h-as thus been the L.H.V., now
retitleb Health Assistant (Female) under the Multi-Purpose
Scheme. Their position has been very unclear, with two States'
Nursing Councils (in Madras and Kerala) apparently having no such
category. The Planning Commission has argued that the estimates
of stock are so unreliable that it has not given any (G.O.I.
1972: 46-7).
The first courses for senior nurses, and for degrees in
nursing began in the 1940's. A Nursing College was formally
established in Delhi in 1946, the inheritor of intensive training
programmes created during the Second World War as a result of the
demand for administrative nursing staff in military hospitals.
Courses for nurse-tutors and nursing administrators were also
held in Madras and Vellore before Independence, and after 1947
there has been a considerable growth in such courses. Those
trained on these courses have gone on to take up most of the
senior nursing positions, with holders of nursing degrees most
likely to progress within the administrative hierarchy. However,
there are strict limits on their chances of wielding any
significant power. There are very few high positions and in all
cases the nurses remain subordinate to doctors.
Policy towards the nursing categories has thus been
contradictory. On the one hand, with support from Western and
international agencies, there have been attempts to
professionalise nursing by lengthening training courses,
establishing nursing colleges, and providing new posts for career
nurses. On the other hand, the nurses have remained divided into
separate cadres (unlike the doctors) and have failed to gain any
substantial support in their everyday attempts to raise their
position and to overcome the 'polluting' legacy attached tc their
work. As women, most nurses remain very vulnerable to sexual
harrassment if they are unmarried or separated from their
husbands. Nursing education has remained unequal to the task of
providing women with the self-confidence which marks women
doctors, probably because the recruits have not come from high
enough social backgrounds. There has been no tradition of elite
women going into nursing. It remains to be seen whether there
will be any material change as female education improves, and the
value of female employment changes. This is, perhaps, the feature
which most sharply distinguishes nursing and medicine: nurses
have to be employed, whereas doctors can earn a living in their
own clinics as well as in Government or private employment. I
will now consider the difference this has made to policy on
medical education.
THE TRAINING OF DOCTORS
Medical education has been affected by three kinds of
pressures. To begin with, the Indian elite has attempted to
ensure that its doctors are the equal of those elsewhere in the
world, and able to supply them with medical services similar to
those available to the elites of other countries. Secondly, the
elite has demanded access to medical colleges for its sons and
daughters, and has therefore pressed for a steady expansion in
the numbers of colleges and their intakes. Thirdly, the medical
establishment has attempted to relate the numbers and kinds of
doctors being produced to their perception of India's needs.
These pressures obviously generate conflicts, and it is the
resolution of these conflicts which underlies the patterns which
have emerged.
The insistence on 'keeping up standards' was carried over
from colonial policy proposals from before the Second World War.
The major medical-political cause of the inter-tar period was
precisely on this issue - the maintenance of the recognition by
the General Medical Council in London of Indian medical degrees.
In order to achieve this the Government of India established a
Medical Council of India in 1933 which excluded from its
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registers the holders of 'inferior' qualifications (i.e. those
not recognised in London as adequate for British registration).
In this way the All-India council differed from its Provincial
counterparts, who registered all those with Western medical
qualifications. Even the political doctors of the Indian Medical
Association who opposed the founding of the M.C.I, were prepared
to work within it and to follow policies designed to maintain
international recognition. This had two consequences: an
acceptance of the long-term desirability of raising the standards
of licentiate qualifications to degree standard; and an
opposition to any involvement of indigenous practitioners in
Indian medical colleges.
The Government of India's leading medical advisers - British
and Indian - won general acceptance of the phasing out of the
medical schools in 1933. The existence of large-scale medical
underemployment was used to counter the arguments of those who
were unhappy about the inevitable consequence of reducing the
numbers of doctors trained every year. Over the following eight
years several medical schools were closed or up-graded to medical
colleges, but the process was not complete when the B'nore
Committee submitted its report.
The Bhore committee endorsed this policy in 1946, though not
without some dispute amongst its members. The final report argued
that the country should focus its limited resources on the
training of only one kind of doctor "and that the highly trained
type of physician whom we have termed the 'basic doctor(G.O.I.
1946, IV: 60). However, six members of the Committee argued that,
because of "the overall shortage of coctors", this policy should
not be implemented immediately but that the training of all types
of medical personnel should be expanded as fast as possible
(ibid). The majority view won the day ana the policy was finally
implemented during the first 10 years after Independence.
However, the issue has not disappeared: as I shall show later,
prominent non-medical policymakers have continued to argue the
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desirability of a lower level of medical personnel to meet rural
needs - and in the early 1980's the West Bengal Government
attempted to produce a three-year trained doctor for this reason.
Pressures for 'raising standards' were not abated by the
abolition of licentiate training, but were then channelled into
attempts to ensure the second basis of international recognition
- freedom for Indian medical colleges from any taint of Ayurveda.
The 19^8 Central Provincial Health Board meeting had a note from
the Government of India to the effect that they should consider
whether "the establishment of higher and more desirable standards
in existing colleges" was not more urgent than expanding the
output of doctors (G.O.I.tC.P.H.B., 19^8:98). This was part of
the response to the Chopra committee report, which was submitted
in 19^8 and which had proposed that all students of medicine
should be taught both the Western and Indian systems. However,
the 'modernisers' in Government - including the Prime Minister,
Nehru, and the Health Minister, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, followed
the advice of the allopathic doctors in the Ministry, especially
K.C.K.E. Raja and A.L. Mudaliar (G.O. I. [ T.H. M.C.] , 1 950 : 3 1 -3).
Raja, then Director-General of Health Services, reported to
the Third Health Ministers' Conference in 1950 that there was a
real danger of confusion, since the various systems were not
reconcilable, and he brought in the country's obligations to the
W. H.0. to support his argument that all medical practitioners
should have allopathic medical degrees first, and should then be
free to specialise or practise in an Indian system if they wished
(ibid: 1 5 — 30). This was a line also promoted by Nehru in his
speech to the conference, pointing to the British system as a
model (ibid:6-7).
A.L. Mudaliar, later to chair the major review of the
development of medical services in India in 1959, was prominent
in his support of the abolition of licentiate training before the
War. As a member of the Bhore committee, and chairman of its
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Professional Education Advisory Committee, he embodied a major
link between medical policy-making before and after Independence.
He was appointed chairman of two committees in 1948, one to draw
up plans for an All-India Medical Institute (eventually the All-
India Institute of Medical Sciences, or A.1.1.M.S.) ana the other
to strengthen existing teaching departments. He argued at the
first meeting of the Central Council of Health in 1 953 that the
undergraduate education at A. 1.1. M.S. should be "along the most
modern lines that are accepted in International circles"; and
"It is very important for us to realise that we must
look to international standards. .. VIhen it comes to a
question of helping in the cure of the sick and the
general welfare of the community you cannot afford to
forget international standards or lower your standards
below the international level. If you do that, you will
be the worse for it" ( G. 0.I. [ C.C. H. ], 1954).
The major issue which dominated policy in the 1950's was how
to produce more doctors without compromising on this minimum
level, defined as 'basic' by the Shore Committee - that is, an
internationally-acceptable M.S. E.S. degree.
The Shore Committee also established a tradition of defining
medical need in terms of a doctor-population ratio. This
procedure has a number of well-established weaknesses. It tends
to assume away the impact of the uneven distribution of doctors -
that is, the national average can be reached yet many areas may
have very few doctors while others have an apparent surplus. It
tends to ignore differences among doctors, (e.g. by
specialisation, or linguistic limitations) so that there may be
shortages of some kinds and surpluses of others. It also tends to
ignore the role of other medical personnel, by focussing on
doctors rather than (say) the provision of clinical care. In this
way it draws attention away from alternative providers of care
(trained or untrained in allopathic medicine) and from the
support staff (nurses, pharmacists) who may be needed if doctors
are to be as productive as possible. Finally, reliance on doctor-
population ratios also tends to ignore issues of the
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employability of the doctors who have been produced. All of these
problems have characterised the history of policy with respect to
































Sources: Row 1 I.A.M.R., 1 967; Rows 2 and 3 from l££hj}l££l
bbb££M££ XVI, 9-10, 1974 with 1 981 figures from u££lbb
>§J;Js£iJ5£Ji.£.§ ISSi; Row 4 from I.A.M.R., 1967, using 1965
intake figures to estimate female outturn percentage in 1971.
Table 6 summarises the available data on the numbers of
doctors trained and the expansion of medical colleges. The
sources for these data are fairly straightforward. The main
problems are posed by the establishment of medical colleges by
private associations in the 1 960's and 1970*s, which gave rise to
disputes about their standards and thus conflict over whether
they 'really' existed. The further complication posed by the
existence of medical colleges offering 'integrated' degrees - in
Ayurvedic or Unani medicine but with substantial components of
allopathic medicine - is sidestepped: these colleges are not
included in the above totals.
The expansion of medical education took place in two main
phases. Once the initial confusion of Partition had been
overcome, a dozen new medical colleges were established by up¬
grading medical schools - the last being those in Madhya Pradesh
in 1955. New medical colleges were also opened, in a steady
trickle of three or four a year up to 1962. Then, during the war
with China, the Armed Forces found great difficulty in recruiting
doctors on short-term contracts to supplement their own medical
services. They called for a dramatic expansion in the number of
medical students, and 46 medical colleges received Rs40 million
in emergency central government funding to admit 2000 more
students in 1 963 than in 1 962 (C-.O. I. [ C.C.H. ] , 1 96 4:560). The
M.C.I, was persuaded to consider reducing the length of an M.B.
B.S. course, and it was forced to waive its norms on staff-
student and bed-student ratios so that existing col-leges could
admit more students. In addition, 22 new medical colleges were
opened in the four years 1962-65.
For all the formal insistence on international standards, it
is clear that this rate of expansion was much faster than should
have been permitted if the available number of medical educators
had been a prime consideration. The Government had been aware of
likely shortages immediately after the Second World War, and had
established a scheme to send doctors abroad for higher training.
In the four years 1945-48, 183 were sent at Government expense,
and travelling fellowships were also provided for senior teachers
(G.O.I.tC.P.H.B.], 1948:100-1 ). In addition, the U.S. Government,
the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, W.H.0. and the Colombo Plan
have all provided fellowships, some of them specifically for
medical education purposes.
By 1953 official policy was to discourage overseas training,
and Mudaliar stated that it was time that India was self-
sufficient, with A.1.1. M.S. to play a major role in achieving
this (G.0.I.[C.C.H.], 1954). But, as the Secretary to the M.C.I,
pointed out in 1958, the expansion of medical colleges called for
320 new teachers every year (G.0.I.CC.C.H.1, 1959:41). Most
medical colleges still depended on part-time teaching by local
specialists, except in the pre-clinical posts. They found great
difficulty in recruiting staff, especially where there was no
possibility of private practice opportunities, as in the non¬
clinical departments. Thus in 1 956 only one medical college was
fully staffed in its Pathology Department, and there was a total
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shortfall of over 1900 teaching staff (G.O.I.CC.C.H.], 1961:96).
The Mudaliar committee estimated a shortage of 4400 teachers in
1960. In 1964 roughly 22% of all teaching posts were vacant, with
28% of pre-clinical posts empty (G.O.I., 1 972:1 4-5). These
shortages did not inhibit plans in the late 1960's to open new
medical colleges, using the Mudaliar Committee's proposed 'norm'
of one college for every 5 million population as justification.
(G.O.I.CC.C.H.], 1969:119). Of all medical teaching posts in
1970, 18% were vacant, but the vacancies were not evenly spread -
the Madhya Pradesh colleges were short of 363 teachers, (out of
an unknown total) and it is difficult to understand quite how-
medical education was carried on in these circumstances.
The main solution to these shortages was to increase the
pool of potential teachers by expanding post-graduate medical
education. Some Departments in existing medical colleges were
given extra funding to permit them to open courses at Master's
level, and several of these received substantial amounts from the
Rockefeller Foundation to train staff and to provide equipment.
In addition, new post-graduate institutes were opened in Punjab
(Chandigarh) and in Pondicherry as prestige institutes by
politicians jealous of the pre-eminence of Delhi's A.1.1. M.S.
Those in favour of the expansion of specialist training were able
to point to the shortages of medical teachers and to use the
argument that medical education in India should be available at
all levels at the standards of Britain or America. Thus, a sub¬
committee on post-graduate education preparing a Perspective Plan
for Health in 1962-3 managed to get the lion's share of the funds
for education and training earmarked for post-graduate education
(Rs750 million out of a total for all health workers of Rs1830
million) and to propose a Medical Education Grants Committe. This
Committee would have had access to foreign exchange, clearly
stated by the sub-committee as essential but inaccessible
( G.O.I.[C.C.H.] , 1 96 4:570-4).
These recommendations were not implemented (partly because
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of the collapse of the Planning system between 1965 and 1968),
but there was a steady expansion in the number of places and
scholarships for post-graduate students. By 1969, there were
6,000 places a year (as against 11,000 undergraduate places) -
but only about 3,500 of them were taken up. This did not inhibit
the expansion of post-graduate places by another 1,600 or so
during the Fourth Plan (G.O.I., 1 972:1 4). The apparent surplus of
specialists in medicine and surgery, noted during the discussions
preceding the Fifth Plan (G.O.I., 1971a: 25) finally led to a
curb on the expansion of post-graduate education.
The issue of foreign standards was highlighted by the
dilemmas posed by Indian doctors who travelled abroad to receive
higher training (see Chapter 8). Here it is worth pointing to the
attempt to encourage such doctors to return to India to fill
empty teaching posts. From 1958 a 'pool' scheme had been in
operation, by which doctors who returned received an honorary
post and a salary while they looked for more permanent positions.
This had very little appeal to doctors: those who came back to
the pool often returned abroad again on the grounds that they
were not being offered posts at the right level. Those who haG
received Indian training were often better placed to get higher
posts (because of their contacts and sponsorship by Professors
and politicians) ana resented the attempts by those returned from
abroad to leap over them. ( G. 0.1. [ C. C. H. ] , 1 967:40-1 ). In the raid
1970s the journal reported around 10 doctors a
month being offered places in this pool, of which only half took
up the offer, so the contribution to the return of Indian doctors
was fairly insignificant.
Control by the M.C.I, over the standards of medical
education was made more difficult by the establishment of new
'private' medical colleges. Most medical colleges in India were
rounded by the State, with stafiing and hospital provision all
part of the normal State health budget. In a few cases
(especially in Uttar Pradesh) the medical college was part of the
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University, and thus funded by the State education budget (in
Lucknow, Aligarh, and Varanasi). There are also private medical
colleges, some Christian foundations (Ludhiana, Vellore), some
established as part of medical nationalism before Independence
and based on colleges of physicians and surgeons in Bombay and
Calcutta, and some Municipal colleges in Maharashtra and Gujarat.
However, after Independence a new form of private medical
college was established, with funds being subscribed to
committees dominated by politicians, who expected to control
admissions to the college both for financial and political
rewards. Here admission was based largely on ability to pay,
rather than on merit, and there was strong pressure to cut costs
and standards in the interests of profitability. The Minister of
Health from 1959-62, Karmakar, argued in favour of these
colleges, saying that they would save Government funds. He also
argued that such colleges should be permitted to start in a
modest fashion and then be given time to improve, and that
prominent medical men could be used as teachers even if they were
not qualified to the level required by the M.C.I. During his time
as Minister over Rs6 million was given to five private medical
colleges in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Bihar and Kerala
(G.O.I.[C.C.H. 3 , 1964:155). A committee set up by the new Health
Minister, Sushila Nayar (who had been a physician to Mahatma
Gandhi), reflected a shift of power towards the medical
establishment. It reported in 1964 that no new colleges should be
established and existing colleges should be taken over by the
State, with Central Government assistance, to root out corruption
and low standards. Nonetheless, she reported pressures on her
from her Cabinet colleagues to open medical colleges in their
areas - pressures which she managed to ignore (interview, 1976).
But under her successors four more private medical colleges were
opened in Bihar, and three in Uttar Pradesh, from 1969-72
(G.0.I.[C.C.H.], 1965:125-8). In fact, the Government decided
that it would be too expensive to take all of them over, but
official disapproval was reiterated in 1971 (G.O.I.tC.C.H.],
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1 972:4) .
The M.C.I, is essentially unable to control this kind of
college and its standards. The M.C.I, can inspect a college after
it has been running for two years, and make recommendations, but
only makes a final decision when the first graduates pass out. At
that stage, it is the University degree which is recognised, not
the individual college. If the college has gained affiliation to
a University the M.C.I, has to threaten students from other
affiliated colleges with non-recognition of their qualification
as well. But by then it is too late, in practical political
terms, to act: students can organise to ensure that their degrees
will be recognised, and they have strong support from the
political heavyweights on the college managing committees.
Finally, it is not the M.C.I, which acts, but the Government of
India which receives proposals from the M.C.I, which it is free
to ignore. This has been the position since the 1933 Act was
passed. When Rajkumari Amrit Kaur was Health Minister in the
early 1950s she overruled the M.C.I, in its attempt to delay the
recognition of the degrees of 5 medical colleges, and she
retained this power 'when the M.C.I. Act was amended in 1 956 (Lok
Sabha Debates 10/12/56). When the M.C.I, attempted to withhold
recognition to nine medical colleges in 1974, again the
Government of India did not support it (£j,j3£JJ.S.k.SJ3 lis£.2 > 19 and
21/3/74).
The Guru Gobir.d Singh college, 'established' in Fariaabad,
just South of Delhi in 1971, was the most blatant example of
political profiteering. The sponsors were responding to unmet
demand for medical college places amongst the Delhi middle
classes. The Government itself had broken its own resolve to open
no new medical colleges by capitulating to student and parent
pressure in 1971, forcing Delhi University to open a University
medical college and then attaching it to one of the Central
Government hospitals in Mew Delhi, Safcarjang. But the Faridabad
college had no hospital facilities at all. The managing committee
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were all relatives of the Congress Party's Chief Whip in the
Punjab State Assembly, and the students went on hunger strike
when the promised facilities did not materialise. The issue was
resolved by the college moving (with all its pa id-up students) to
Faridkot in Punjab, and being allowed to continue in existence
(Lok Sabha Debates 19/12/72; UiD.diA5i.2i} liJBDD 28/4/73). Since 1973
there have been no new medical colleges opened in this way, but
proposals were made in 1984 to do so in Maharashtra.
Policy on medical education has thus not been entirely in
the hands of doctors, despite the nominal power of the M.C.I. The
subordination of the authority of the M.C.I, by politicians was
p.robably going on in the 1960s, but did not surface into public
debate. It also provided the manifest grounds for the General
Medical Council in London to refuse to recognise degrees from
most of the medical colleges established in India after 1947, and
for the final break in 1975 when the G.M.C. decided that it would
admit no Indian medical degree as sufficient evidence of
competence for practice in Great Eritain. The marketability of
medical skills, both within India and abroad, has been maintainec
by the restrictions on the growth of medical education. But those
restrictions have continually been challenged, and on several
occasions successfully undermined, as a result of the returns
available to those with medical qualifications.
PATTERNS OF EMPLOYMENT OF DOCTCRS
There is really very little reliable information available
on where doctors go, how they practise and what typical careers
are like. One source which is frequently used is the 1971 Special
Census of qualified personnel but this provides information on
less than half of the total estimated number of doctors available
in India at the time. There is no reasonable way of telling how
this sample relates to the whole population, nor whether it
includes or excludes some marginal practitioners (e.g. with
'integrated' degrees). In Table 7, I have therefore relied on
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more indirect estimates of the total stock of doctors, and their
distribution by employment category, and this represents the
result of a complex set of assumptions.
To begin with, different authorities provide estimates of
total stock which vary quite considerably, ranging from 51,000 to
56,000 in 1951, from 70,000 to 81,000 in 1961, and from 115,725
to 141,000 in 1971. In part these variations are a result of
different methods and sources: for example, the M.C.I, provides
estimates based on the numbers of doctors registered with it, but
since no annual fee is payable, there is a tendency for doctors
who have died or retired to remain on the list and M.C.I,
estimates tend to be high. The attempts to estimate the effects
of death, retirement and emigration have not produced clear
agreement among the other providers of estimates (the Planning
Commission, the Council for Scientific ana Industrial Research,
and the Institute for Applied Manpower Research). The figures in
Table 7 thus represent an approximate average of the estimates
which include doctors who may be abroad, but attempts to exclude
doctors who have retired or died.
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TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK OF DOCTORS
1 944 1 961 1 968 1971 1974 1 978
Public sector 13 ,000 29,000 39 ,000 43,000 45,000 50 ,000
Self employment 43,000 57 ,000 67 ,000 73 ,000 82 ,000
Private employment
Ji it 6 ,000 7 ,000 8 ,000 9 ,000
Abroad vc * 8 ,000 9 ,500 13 ,650 21 ,000
Rest
it 3 ,000 3 ,000 3,500 10,350 38 ,000
TOTAL 47,400 75,000 113,000 130,000 160 ,000 200 ,000
Sources: 1944 figures from G.O.I., 1946:12, referring to British
India; 1961 figures from Mathur, 1971; 1968 figures from
I.A.M. R., 1970; 1974 figures from I.A.M.R., 1974; 197o figures
from I.A.M.R., 1974, and Ramaiah and Bhandari, 1975.
Note: 'Rest' (Row 5) is a residual, including doctors who are
attempting to establish private self-employment, practising part-
time, in employment with pharmaceutical companies, in post¬
graduate training, temporarily out of the labour force, etc.
These estimates suggest that, despite some fluctuations,
about 25-30fa of doctors have been in public employment of one
kind or another - Central, State, or local Government, E.S.I.S.,
Defence, Railways, Coal Mines ana so on. In some places (such as
Delhi) (Jeffery, 1976) the share has been much higher ana I have
assumed that most of those in 'genuinely rural' areas have.also
been in public employment. The most dramatic feature of Table 7
is the rise in the number of those in the residual category. I
would not place great reliance on this figure, since the margins
of error in the other categories are considerable (there seem to
be no national figures even of employment in the pub lie sector).
It does seem unlikely that public sector employment, private
sector employment and emigration have, together, risen fast
enough to cope with the level of output of doctors since 1971-
Most of these doctors are probable self-employed, at varying
levels of income, along with the different elements of the
residual. Since demand for medical education remains unabated,
and there have been few accounts of serious unrest amongst the
' u n -' or 'under-'em ployed doctors, it may be that the market for
336
medical services has been growing faster than the growth in
national income. But there is little to suggest how this might
have been happening, beyond isolated reports of an expansion of
private qualified medical services in rural areas, reported from
some States.
INDIGENOUS PRACTITIONERS
Policy with respect to indigenous practitioners has already
been briefly discussed in Chapter 8. In general, policy has been
restricted to issues concerning the formal education of
practitioners, and the attempts to produce social closure of the
category by making all future indigenous practitioners undergo
training. The outcome of the battles between 'pure' and
'integrated' courses of training has probably been to slow down
the growth in the number of indigenous medical colleges and
schools, ana in their intakes. Table 8 presents some indicators
of the trends.
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Sources: 1962-3 figures from Brass, 1972:348; 1972-4 figures from
Gwatkin, 1974:50 and Djukanovic and Hach, 1975:85; 1977 figures
from G.O.I., 1 979a:47, 53 .
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These numbers are not mutually compatible, since more seem
to be added to the 'qualified' category than are trained every
year. Some people probably are counted two or three times,
because they are registered in more than one State (each of which
has different rules); others are able to be registered on the
basis of 'postal' education, usually in homoeopathic colleges,
not listed here; and others may have found different ways of
gaining access to the 'qualified' registers. The estimates of the
total numbers in practice also vary according to the principle
used. For example, the U.N.I.C.E.F./W.H.O. joint study quotes
figures which are said to include (amongst the 200,000 untrained
and unregistered) dais - but at 1 dai for .every 1,000 people (the
Government estimate in 1977) there would be 650,000 dais. Gwatkin
grosses up the 1961 census estimate in order to produce his
figure of 250-300,000 who would report the m)s elves as
practitioners, but notes that the Narangwal-based estimates would
expand that figure many-fold. Finally, estimates of the
proportion of the total who are 'qualified' vary from about 25-
3 35 (Gwatkin, 1974:90; Chuttani et a 1., 1973:996). All these
estimates depend critically on assumptions about who to include
as a healer: those who are registered, qualified, financially
dependent on practice, full- or part-time engaged in practice, or
known locally as someone with particular expertise. If all these
categories are included, the number of healers would be not less
than 1.5-2 million.
Very little is known about the whereabouts or employment of
indigenous practitioners from these different categories. Gwatkin
(1974:90) reports one estimate for 1972 of 255 of 'certified'
(qualified?) practitioners being in Government employment. This
seems to be unduly high, generating a figure of about 205 of all
Government doctors being 'integrated' or 'pure' indigenous
graduates. Beyond Government employment, jobs seem to be scarce:
other reports are concerned solely with those with their own
clinics, or working from their own homes (e.g. Alexander and
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Shivaswamy, 1971; Neumann et al., 1971).
CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have been concerned to trace out policy
with respect to different categories of medical personnel, and
the effects this has had in terms of the numbers trained and
their employment conditions. In general, the introduction of
grades similar to 'feldshers' and to community health workers,
in the late 1970s, was not the result of new ideas, but rather of
the combination of social forces which made it possible finally
to implement old ones. These social forces were rural populism
(personified by the Janata Health Minister, Raj Narain);
international agencies; and the pressures for job improvements on
the part of the employees of the erstwhile 'vertical' disease
programmes. These changes have had different impacts on men and
women: men have generally taken advantage of the new-
opportunities, and are establishing themselves as new kinds of
healers, formal and informal. Women have been much less affected,
either as nurses or as dais, and have usually been excluded from
the positions of community health workers. The other major
changes since 19^7 have been twofold. Firstly, there is the loss
of international recognition for Indian medical degrees, to a
considerable extent because of the impotence of the I.M.C. in the
face of political pressures to expand medical colleges and to
turn a blind eye to those who ignore its regulations. Secondly,
there has been the growing significance of the numbers of
practitioners with some legal protection for their status outside
the control of the Western medical profession, and the failure of
the attempts to 'close' the occupation of medicine.
The implications of these changes are as follows. India now
has an infrastructure of personnel which is in principle capable
of implementing health policies in every village of India. Its
peripheral workers should have supervision and support through a
graded hierarchy of male and female workers who have received an
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integrated training, able to deal effectively with some of the
major health problems - environmental hygiene, infectious disease
control, nutritional advice and support. However, the reality
seems to be significantly different from this. There are
potential difficulties caused by the employment of personnel
trained according to very different medical theories, but we know
nothing of how these work out in practice. But there are also
problems posed by the ethos of working styles, organisational




STRUCTURE AMD PROCESS IN HEALTH SERVICES
The purpose of this chapter is to look at how the health
services have developed ana the way they work. I will organise
this chapter by taking different levels of health services and
discussing their mode of working in the light of the most common
criticisms, starting with the medical colleges and then
hospitals, before looking at material which relates to the
Primary Health Centre and its peripheral workers, and the way the
'clients' perceive what they are offered.
MEDICAL COLLEGES
The major criticisms of medical colleges revolve arounc
their supposed inability to relate to the main health problems
facing the average Indian. This is usually explained by the
dominant ethos of college teaching staff, who are said to mimic
the staff of British or American medical colleges. Those colleges
are often accused of concentrating on hospital medicine, and
within that, on unusual conditions: this does little to prepare
the medical student for the everyday work of the general
practitioner. Indian medical colleges are said to compound these
problems of 'irrelevance' by focussing on the hospital medicine
of Britain and America, thus doubly distancing themselves from
the common problems of the mass of the Indian population.
It cannot be said that these issues have escaped the
attention of the higher medical policy-makers, nor that of the
Medical Council of India. However, as Chapter 9 has shown, the
concern with 'maintaining international standards' has usually
overwhelmed 'ensuring that doctors fit local conditions', as the
Central Health Minister, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, described the twin
goals in 1954 (G.O.I. [C.C.H.] , 1955). The presumption was that
these two goals were compatible: as she said in 1956
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' tt e must take full note of these developments [in the
rest of the world] as well as our own special needs and
then attempt to solve our problems in respect of medical
education to suit the conditions prevailing in the
country' (G.O.I. [C.C.H.] 1957)
The Medical Council of India has frequently revised the
medical curriculum to stress the significance of 'social and
preventive medicine' (S.P.M.), and to insist on periods of rural
residence for 'interns' (who have completed their medical
training but have to complete a year's experience for full
registration) and, latterly, of medical students as well. Notably
absent has been any sustained effort to ensure that these changes
are implemented in the actual practice of medical colleges, or to
monitor their impact. Similarly, there has been little attempt to
change the views of medical educators, or in other ways to raise
the status of staff in S.P.M. Departments or working in rural
posts. In this section I will begin with the attempt to change
the orientation of medical college students by the sponsorship of
social medicine, before going on to look at rural 'exposure' and
then the attitudes of medical college staff to these innovations.
SOCIAL AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE
One of the earliest attempts to change the 'social
orientation of medicine' in India came through the establishment
of departments of social and preventive medicine. For example, in
the Central Provincial Health Committee meeting of 1948 there was
a report on a survey of medical education which revealed that
'the emphasis laid on the teaching of .preventive
medicine and oublic health is quite inadequate' (G.O.I.
[C.P.H.C.] 1 94*9:97).
Similar sentiments were repeated in the meetings of the
Central Council of Health, in the speeches of Central Health
Ministers or in the resolutions adopted. The Medical Education
Conference held in Delhi in 1955 called for the strengthening of
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departments of Preventive and Social Medicine, as a way of
raising the prestige of preventive medicine in the health
services generally, and these recommendations were turned into
regulations of the Medical Council of India in 1961 (Taylor et
al., 1976:7).
There were two main fallacies in the discussions. The first
was in the claim that the cause of the low status of preventive
work can be traced to the colonial heritage; and the second was
the idea that this status could be raised by changes of a minor
kind within medical curriculum but without changes in career
opportunities and rewards for medical practitioners.
Throughout the world, the prestige rankings of medical
specialisms seem to show a common pattern. General surgery and
other surgical specialties are almost always near the top, while
public health, social and community medicine, or the preclinical
specialisms are usually at the bottom (Taylor et al, 1976).
Indian medical students surveyed in the 1970's consistently
ranked Preventive and Social Medicine at the bottom of a prestige
hierarchy, and showed little interest or knowledge in, for
example, Primary Health Care (Nichter, 1981:226; Ramalingaswam i G
Shyam, 1980). Madan (1980: 93) describes
'the received image of preventive and social medicine as
a "soft choice", something that only the second-rate
medical students specialise in'
which was held by most of the doctors he interviewed at the All-
India Institute of Medical Sciences. Banerji (197*1:2) argues that
this is not merely a matter of 'image': when the new departments
of social and preventive medicine were created after Independence
the teaching positions were taken by 'discards', those who fell
off the ladder to senior positions in more prestigious
specialities. One indicator of the low status of social and
preventive medicine is that in many medical colleges, posts are
held by women, who often find access to medical and surgical
specialities more difficult (Bhargava, 1983).
An exaggerated concern for curative specialties, in
particular those with the masculine glamour of the 'activist'
model of surgery (passive patients in a 1 ife-or-death situation,
rescued by dramatic knife-work) is not restricted to India.
Ho w ever, it takes on an additional pathos in a context where
'generalist' skills are repeatedly called-for, in policy state¬
ments by politicians and senior medical bureaucrats, as the most
pressing needs. Host doctors at the All-India Institute took the
view that national concerns might require social and community
medicine, but not all doctors should follow that model and that
they, in an elite institution, should be the first to be exempted
(Madan, 1980:94).
RURAL ORIENTATION
The 1955 medical education conference also called for the
establishment of rural field practice areas attached to medical
colleges, in order that undergraduates and interns would be
exposed to rural conditions and health problems. It took the
Medical Council of India nine years to respond by making three
months of such experience mandatory for interns, and revised
recommendations were drawn up in 1971 (Aggarwal et al., 1975:277-
8). In 1961 only half the medical colleges had active rural
internship programmes, and of the seven colleges in one study
(drawn from those with 'better' programmes) only two had a full 3
month programme (Taylor et al., 1976:43). When Aggarwal et al.
(1975:282-5) studied the situation in 1974, oQ% of the 47 medical
colleges who replied to their inquiry reported that rural intern¬
ship lasted less than 2 months, with one-third reporting less
than 1 month. Only three colleges were able to claim that they
were following the objectives of the rural internship programme
as defined by the Medical Council of India.
Following the Srivastava Committee report of 1975, proposals
were again made to ' R e-0 r i e n t Medical Education (ROME)', and in
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1978 medical colleges were each given responsibility for the
health care services provided by three P.H.C.s. Money was
provided under this scheme to build hostels for medical students
to use while receiving rural orientation as part of their
training. In most cases, responsibility for the P.H.C. and for
rural training has been vested in the Departments of Social and
Preventive Medicine. There have not been any consistent attempts
to evaluate the progress of this scheme. In Orissa, at least, it
would seem that there may be some difference in the way that the
P.H.C.s are organised, since they have a resident Associate
Professor from the Medical College, and occasional visits by the
Professor of S.P.M. But in no case does the work of the P.H.C.
figure largely in the training of undergraduates or of interns,
most of whom never spend a night in the ROME hostels.
Two assumptions have underpinned these efforts. The first is
that 'exposure' to rural conditions will lead to an awareness of
rural problems and a desire to help solve them. The second has
been that getting more doctors to work in rural areas is the best
way to solve rural health problems, and that persuasion is a
desirable way to achieve this, at almost any cost.
There have been some attempts to evaluate the effect of
rural 'exposure' on orientation to rural work. The most sustained
attempt, by Taylor and his colleagues (1976), was based on their
experience anc research linked to the Narangwal Project in
Punjab, but drawing material also from Mysore (Karnataka) and
other States. They argued that doctors were, if anything, given a
orientation towards rural work from their medical
college training. There was sorne evidence to suggest that views
before rural 'exposure' were more favourably inclined towards
rural work than afterwards, when the full extent of isolation and
working conditions were made manifest. In general, since the
dominant ethos of the medical college was based around urban
hospital work it is unlikely that two or three months spent in a
P.H.C. will make much difference.
3^5
The assumption that 'the medical problems of rural areas can
be solved by increasing the number of doctors prepared to work
there' is one which predates 19^7. The discussion is set by an
almost unchallenged further assumption that it is not possible to
direct doctors to rural areas. No such direction exists, nor has
it been tried, for non-medical personnel, and it was only
regarded as a serious possibility under the terms of the National
Service Act, passed in 1972. This Act provided that qualified
people under the age of 30 would be liable to be called for up to
four years to serve wherever required by the State. However, the
Act has not been implemented, in spite of occasional threats to
use it as a means to deal with the problems of filling empty
rural posts. As a result of the refusal to consider compulsion,
the only options open to the State have been financial incentives
(positive and negative), career incentives, and the attempt to
change the 'orientation' of the doctor towards rural life.
Positive financial incentives have been tried in a number of
ways throughout the period, either to encourage private practice
by paying a supplementary income or to encourage the acceptance
of a rural posting by offering a rural allowance. More
sophisticated proposals have involved additional educational
allowances for a doctor's children. None of them can be
demonstrated to have the slightest impact. Essentially, as has
been pointed out many times, doctors are drawn from the urban
middle and upper classes, ana expect tc live in a similar way
when they have qualified. This means not just a sufficient income
but access to social and physical infrastructure - such as
electricity supply, sanitation, schooling, ana so on. Inevitably,
the rural areas will have a lower standard of such provision than
the towns. The problem will not be solved, in the short-run, by
raising the quality of rural amenities, since some of these are
'positional goods', which gain their value not from their
intrinsic merit but because they are in short supply. Schooling
is the prime example: it is not enough just to improve rural
schools, because urban schooling improves faster, and it is the
differential advantages of elite schooling which count for
getting ahead, and this seems to weigh very heavily with young
married doctors. Additional pay can provide access to urban
schooling only if the children are sent to the towns for their
education, and this does not create the kind of willingness to
accept rural conditions which is supposed to result.
Negative financial incentives have been restricted to the
taking of 'bonds', in which medical students face the loss of
quite substantial sums of money if they do not honour promises to
work for the State Government in a rural posting for t w o or three
years after graduating. These have rarely had any impact. Often,
more doctors graduate each year than there are jobs in State
employment in rural areas. There are also a number of escape
clauses which allow most new doctors to avoid any financial
penalty for not taking up jobs (which often do not exist) or to
take up the post 'formally' but actually to avoid working in the
rural areas at all, or for more than a very brief period.
Career incentives have also been tried, particularly ivy
restricting access to post-graduate courses to those with rural
experience, or preventing promotion for those without it. These
constraints obviously only apply to those in Government service,
and suggest something of the difficulties faced by administrators
who attempt to control their medical personnel. There is no
realistic assessment of the success of these barriers: many
doctors cynically suggest that those with 'pull' can leap them
with ease, and that only those without contacts suffer their full
force, but evidence of a more substantial kind is lacking.
The vast majority of Indian doctors, then, leave medical
colleges with a preference for clinical (rather than public
health) work in urban settings, or abroad (rather than in rural
posts). Given the r e c o r a of doctors elsewhere in the world, it
would be very surprising if matters were any different. Indeed,
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the most surprising feature of the situation is that politicians
and social scientists have continued with the view that some
change in this orientation could be produced through exhortation
or 'rural exposure'. In turning to look at the conditions of work
in urban clinics and hospitals, I want to stress two more
features of medical work: the nature of hospital power
structures; and limitations to the autonomy of private clinical
practice.
HOSPITALS
There have been very few sociological studies of the working
of Indian hospitals. Two of these (Kirkpatrick, 1970; Minocha,
1974) focus on the nature of discrepancies between staff and
patients in patterns of expectations, deriving much of their
theoretical focus from American sociological discussions of
doctor-patient relationships and the nature of 'sick' roles. In
general, while doctors seem to want to approximate the kinas of
social relationships with patients which characterise medical
roles in Western Europe or North America, patients attempt to
bring very different patterns of expectations to bear (see
further below). The most pervasive of the patients' expectations
relate to the attempt to turn the relationship into a more
personal one (cf. Gould, 1965). Co-operation, flattery, or
providing a financial inducement are all used to improve the
quality of treatment received from doctors (Kirkpatrick,
1970:161). The financial payments may be open, such as consulting
the surgeon or physician privately before attencing the hospital,
or by making it clear that successful treatment will be followed
by a substantial inaa, or 'voluntary gift' (Mathur, 1975). Or the
payments may be covert, in the form of various kinds of bribes to
ensure access to the hospital, particularly where private
practice of hospital doctors is illegal.
Junior doctors seem tc find these social processes
unpalatable, complaining about 'illiterate, stupid, ignorant'
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patients, and attempting to restrict their relationships to a
formal, medical plane (Minocha, 1974:192-4; Mathur, 1975:100-9).
More senior doctors, by repute, are more willing to become
involved in these relationships, usually, it would seem, because
they cream most of the financial or other benefits to themselves
(Mathur, 1975:170-1; Venkataratnam, 1979:180). Junior hospital
doctors thus find themselves subject to pressures both from
patients and senior doctors which they are unable to affect.
Their patients rightly assume that their treatment will be
affected by the kind of relationship they have with the medical
staff, but the junior doctors they usually see and can influence
are not the ones who count. The senior medical staff obviously do
adapt their working behaviour to financial and other pressures
from patients, but expect their junior staff to obey unquestion¬
ing 1 y while gaining very little from what are seen as
'unprofessional' activities (Venkataratnam, 1979:253).
This situation can be described as one 'where 'professional'
values are adhered to, at least formally, by doctors, but in
practice the structural conditions necessary to implement them
are absent (Jeffery, 1977). While doctors have many of the formal
trappings of professional organisation (a Medical Council,
university- 1eve1 entry, a privileged positions in State
employment etc.) the State does not, in fact, guarantee
professional privileges. Further, in the private sector,
competition from 'outsiders' (indigenous practitioners, or
unqualified competitors from within the Western mode) is fierce,
leaving individual doctors subject to strong pressure to
safeguard their incomes at the cost of their ethical codes. Thus
doctors have no independent base from which alternatives to State
employment might emerge to enforce changes in public sector
employment conditions. There are, of course, private hospitals in
the larger cities, and successful private clinics. But these are
the exception, rather than the rule, and show little tendency to
become the dominant mode of private practice.
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It is difficult, then, to find any mechanisms by which
medical autonomy is maintained, beyond the very narrow field of
actual diagnosis. Decisions on hospital admission or different
kinds of out-patient treatment seem to be very vulnerable to the
personal characteristics of the patients. 'Extra-medical'
concerns enter into the heart of the medical encounter, in part
because career advancement or security is not under the control
of doctors alone. Doctors have failed to stake out and protect a
'professional' sphere, and collegial control is insufficient to
permit the development of collegial norms. The evidence for the
extent of this is limited; but there are few who doubt the
significance of wider political or financial interests in all the
important occupational decisions. With in this 'taken-for-granted'
understanding of the medical world it is difficult to show that a
particular doctor was promoted because of the quality of his or
her work, or where degree candidates were impartially examined. A
widespread cynicism is one result, a cynicism which also affects
those working in other Government positions, and it is those in
Primary Health Centres that I will turn to now.
PRIMARY HEALTH CENTRES
The concept of the Primary Health Centre was first
elaborated in the Report on health services in England produced
by a committee under the chairmanship of Lord Dawson of Penn in
1920 (Dawson Report, 1920). It was not taken up in a substantial
way in Britain until the 1 960's, but the idea had already spread
to other parts of the world, being discussed at a Far Eastern
Conference on Medical Relief in 1938, at which India was
represented. The Bhore Committee endorsed the idea of a- basic
unit of health service provision which would combine curative and
preventive services, but it was 10 years later, under the
Community Development Programme, that efforts were first made to
establish such centres for each Community Development Block, with
its population of about 80,000 people. The Bhore proposals had
called for a P.H.C. for 20,000 population by 1966, but by that
date many Blocks (now with populations nearer 100,000) had not
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been provided with the basic P.H.C. facilities.
To begin with, the P.H.C. building was often merely a
dispensary renamed, ana most of the activities were indeed
curative in focus; but as time has gone by, more and more staff
have been added, more P.H.C.s have purpose-built facilities
according to a national or State-wide design, and the focus of
their activities has shifted to include family planning as one of
the central tasks. The standard P.H.C. should have o beds for in¬
patients: more recently a quarter of all P.H.C.s have been
designated 'up-graded', eventually to have 30 beds and attached
specialist obstetricians and paediatricians. Originally each
P.H.C. was to have 5 or 6 sub-centres attached, with a female
health worker ( A. N.M. or Trained Dai); current targets call for
12 or 13 sub-centres (1 for 8,000 people), as a step towards 20
or more (1 for 5,000 people, or 1 for 3,000 in tribal areas). The
increasing problems of supervising such a large number of sub-
centres has led to new proposals for the up-grading of some sub-
centres, or the establishment of sub-P.H.C.s. In this way it is
hoped that, perhaps by the year 2000, the population served by a
P.H.C. will come down to about 20,000.
The most common criticisms of the P.H.C. programme have
shifted somewhat since the first P.H.C.s were established in
1952. Four main sets of problems have been voiced in the Central
Council of Health, or other national fora:
1. in the actual working of the P.H.C., clinical, curative
concerns have predominated over the intended bias towards
preventive work;
2. staff have been unwilling to work in P.H.C.s, leading tc
understaffing and/or,poor motivation;
3. the balance of expenditures has been heavily towards
salaries and wages, leaving very little for drugs, transport or
maintenance; and
4. there is little or no evidence of 'people's
participation' in the organisation of health services by P.H.C.s
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ana this is reflected in a general under-utilisation of
facilities.
In addition, a fifth issue has been identified but is less
often voiced in authoritative settings: the undesirable
consequences for health services of their integration with family
planning or contraceptive provisions.
Of these problems, the first two were identified as early as
the 1959 Central Council of Health meeting, when two basic points
were made: staff were unwilling to work at P.H.C.s; and there was
a danger, as the Health Minister put it, that the P.H.C.s would
"degenerate into glorified dispensaries" because they neglected
preventive work (G.O.I. [C.C.H.] 1960:30,99-102). At the 1967
Central Council of Health the major problem was expressed in
almost identical terms: a shortage of staff, caused by a
reluctance of doctors and nurses to serve in these posts because
of an absence of housing for them, poor schooling for their
children, the absence of incentives for rural work and low pay
scales in State Government Health Services (G.O.I. [C.C.H.]
1 968:22). The concern to improve conditions for P.H.C. staff has,
indeed, dominated all official discussions of the problems of
P.H.C.s.
• As staff have been appointed and the rate of vacancies
declined, however, other problems have been highlighted in
addition. In 1968 the Director-General of Health Services pointed
again to the greater load of clinical work and the lack of
attention to prevention (C-.O.I. [C.C.H.] 1969:27). In 196 9 the
insufficient drugs and transport budgets were noted (G.O.I.
[C.C.H.] 1970:110). However, only more recently has one point,
made in 1959 by the Director-General of Health Services (Barkat
Narain), been followed up: the argument that
'the people's participation is essential which can only
be secured by the new methodology of approach - call it
extension technique, health education or social
education' (G.0.1. [C.C.H.] 1960:101).
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It has been pointed out that the existing facilities are largely
underused and that a major reason for this is the predominant way
doctors work: they wait for patients to come to them, rather than
attempting to take their services to the people.
In this section I will follow through these themes by
looking at three 'levels' of P.H.C. work, dealing first with the
Primary Health Centre itself (or the 'headquarters'), then with
the work of field personnel - A.N.M.'s and male health workers,
and finally with the newly-created categories of trained dais and
Community Health Workers (or Volunteers, also known as Village
Health Guides). Table 1 gives the basic information about the
number of P.H.C.s and their sub-centres, as a way of setting the
context for this discussion.
TABLE 1
ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIMARY HEALTH CENTRES
1 956 1 96 1 1 96 6 1969 1974 1978
No. of blocks 1 564 3137 4724 5265 5123 5005
0 » with PHCs 67 2565 4631 4909 5283 5400
(per cent) 47, 82% 98% 93% 10 3 % 10 8%
No. of sub-centres 1649 22826 33509 381 15
Dr s. in post 5294
Sources: G.O.I., 1979:19, 65; G.O.I. [C.C.H.] 1970:51
Note: data as at 31st March in each year. Comparable data are not
available for each year.
At headquarters
The staffing at a P.H.C. has always focussed around a
doctor. To begin with, one doctor was to be attached, but by 1956
planned staffing levels were increased, so that each P.H.C. was
to be staffed by two doctors, one a generalist ana one
specialising in family planning. In 1978 it was decided that each
P.H.C. should have a third medical officer, specifically to deal
with the training of community health workers, and preferably a
graduate in one of the indigenous systems of medicine. However,
these posts have taken a long time to be filled. As late as 1972,
only about half the P.H.C.s had their full complement of doctors.
On March 31st 1978, it would seem that 61 P.H.C.s had no doctor
at all, 771 had only one doctor, and the remaining 4568 had two
or more. There were 115 P.H.C.s still to be established, though
some Blocks had more than one P.H.C. (G.O.I. 1979:66-7).
The P.H.C.s which are less fully staffed are, not
surprisingly, the more remote and less well equipped ones. In a
study which involved interviewing 39 P.H.C. medical officers in
the early 1960s, in addition to inadequate salaries, poor living
facilities, inadequate P.H.C.s and social isolation were reported
as the most important obstacles to the recruitment of doctors for
rural work (Takulia et a 1. 1967:49). In a study in central U.P.
in 1971-2, P.H.C.s were classified into three categories,
according to location (closeness to urban centres), facilities
(electricity, water supply) and local amenities (schools, markets
etc.KMisra et a 1. 1981). The 19 most accessible P.H.C.s in their
survey had 54 supervisory staff in post, whereas the 8 most
remote ones had only 10 supervisors. There is, ho w ever, a
distinction between 'in post' and 'present and working'. As Misra
et al. point out, those posted to remote P.H.C.s may devote all
their energies to achieving a transfer to a more desirable
P.H.C., which means that they may visit the district or State
headquarters for long periods to lobby or by other means persuade
senior staff to change their posting. The manipulation of leave
facilities, or the deputation of staff to other positions, are
both means by which posts may be 'filled up' but staff may be
almost permanently absent. A possibly extreme example, during the
post-Emergency collapse of the family planning programme, is
provided by a study in a P.H.C. in U.P. in 1977-78, when five
members of staff spent 755 of their time absent or on personal
business (Sutherland, 1978:42).
When staff are available, two things seem to be clear about
the work they do. Firstly, despite the emphasis given to public
health, preventive and promotive functions in job descriptions,
most time is spent on curative work. One study carried out in
1968 in Punjab and Mysore (Alexander et a 1. 1972:1852) weighted
staff-time by salaries and estimated that about 601) of staff-time
at the P.H.C. headquarters went on 'illness' services, 25" on
family planning and 12% on the control of communicable diseases.
The rest of the time was spent on maternal and child health, with
no time spent on environmental health. In Takulia's study, P.H.C.
doctors estimated a median of about 27% of their time spent on
preventive activities, with half the doctors saying lack of
interest was the main reason for spending little time on this
work (1967:37-39).
Even within this clinical focus, the quality of care seems
to be poor. 'Quality' is of course difficult to assess, and
relatively few studies have produced more than anecdotal
evidence. Most patients spend a very short time with the doctor;
two studies at the end of the 1960s estimated the median time
spent with the doctor at two minutes or less (Murthy and Parker,
1973; Seth, 1973). There is no reason to think that average times
have risen since then. Sutherland (1978:37) reported that in a
P.H.C. in Varanasi District (U.P.) in ante-natal consultations,
woman were never weighed nor were haemoglobin levels determined;
instruments were not sterilised ana blood pressure was not always
recorded. A number of other small-scale studies in the same
P.H.C. demonstrated inappropriate prescribing, little or no
advice given by the doctor, and a minimal level of care (ibid:
47) .
One reason for 'poor quality' is probably the shortage of
funds available with the P.H.C. staff for services to patients.
Stuaies of the patterns of P.H.C. expenditure are rare. One, by
Alexander et a 1. (1972:185 2) estimated that 10% of total annual
expenditures went on drugs fcr the headquarters and the sub-
centres, 745 going on salaries and allowances for staff. Satpathy
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(1978) estimated that of the total Chiraigaon P.H.C. budget of
Rs332,000 in 1977, 85® went on salaries, leaving 9.45 for drugs,
1.45 for transport charges, and 4% on all other items. There is
an interesting comparison with the pattern of expenditures on
medical care for the population insured under the Employees
Social Insurance Scheme; Singh (1984:28) reports that some 405 of
this expenditure goes on 'medicines', which are the fastest-
growing category of expenditure between 1975/6 and 1979/80.
The drugs budget for the population served by P.H.C.s has
grown very slowly, having been fixed at Rs20,000 per P.H.C. in
1965 (Reddi, 1983:273), irrespective of its population or out¬
patient coverage. Since 1980 the budget has increased more
rapidly, largely because of the sums allocated to an increasing
number of sub-centres and to C.H.VJ.s. Thus, in 1983, a common
annual drugs budget for a P.H.C. was Rs12,000, with a further
Rs3,000 for each sub-centre and Rs600 for each C.H.VJ. In a
'standard' P.H.C. there would thus be a total drugs bill of
Rs30,000 for 10 sub-centres, Rs60,000 for 100 C.H.W.s, as well as
the Rs12,000 at headquarters, giving a total of Rs1 02,000, or
about Rs1 per head of population nominally served per year. [Each
person insured under the E.S.I, scheme receives, on average,
medicines worth about Rs13 per year (Singh, 1984:28).] Da via &
Narayana (1983:48-60) report that in Orissa, delays in the
release of funds, in the acceptance of tenders, and in the
placing of orders, combined with an excessively long list of
permitted drugs and poor ordering and stocking arrangements,
meant that few P.H.C.s had a drug supply which matched the
demands on it. Recdi (1983:275-6), using material from Karnataka
and Andhra Pradesh, gives a similar picture. Reports of P.H.C.s
suggest that most prescriptions require the patient to purchase
the drug from the market, because only a very small range of
basic drugs is provided from P.H.C. stores. The only exception to
this general pattern - and a very significant one - is that the
drugs required for tubectomies or vasectomies are provided from a
special allocation and patients do not norm ally have to buy drugs
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themselves.
The second feature of P.H.C. work is that, because of its
clinical focus, it reaches a relatively small proportion of its
nominal clientele. As in other parts of the world, patients do
not travel far to consult a doctor except in emergencies, or in
chronic cases when patients may make very long trips
(Ramachandran and Shastri 1983:185). Most of the patients
attending a P.H.C. come from within 2 or 3 miles [805 or more in
three studies cited by Takulia from the mid-1960's (1967:28)]. In
a 'teaching' block associated with Banaras Hindu University
(Chiraigaon) in the mid-1970s Marwah et a 1. (1978) estimated
that no more than 7.3% of pregnancies m.ore than 2 miles from the
health centre were registered for ante-natal care, compared with
about 25% below that distance. Staff find it difficult to travel
far from the P.H.C. 'headquarters' to hold clinics in sub-centres
or in more remote parts of the Block because they have inadequate
vehicles and fuel allowances. Often doctors tour their Blocks, if
at all, on their own cycles or motor-cycles. Once again, the main
exception is that a special allocation for transport is made from
incentive money for family planning sterilisations. A P.H.C. with
a large number of sterilisations to its credit receives an
additional allocation for transport costs.
Even within the population which does use the P.H.C.,
according to Banerji (1973:2263) the 'poor and the oppressed' are
discriminated against. He suggests that these groups use the
P.H.C. less than wealthier groups. Other sources suggest a
different picture, in which use-rates may not vary very much by
socio-economic background (e.g. Seal and Bose, 1973:64;
Ramachandran and Shastri, 1983:181-3). However, there is little
evidence about the kind of treatment received at the P.H.C. - the
extent to which wealthier clients are able to 'jump' queues,
receive longer attention from the doctor, or gain privileged
access to the scarce drugs held in the P.H.C.
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Field staff
As I discussed in Chapter 9, the male and female field staff
have rather different histories, because the women were
originally family planning personnel while the men were em ployed
in the various 'vertical' campaigns (including family planning)
before the 'multi-purpose' reforms of the late 1970s. I shall
therefore deal with these two groups separately.
1 .Male Staff
Prior to the introduction of the Multipurpose Worker scheme
male health workers were organised in a bewildering range of
positions. The various National Programmes (Malaria, Smallpox,
Leprosy, T.B., Family Planning) all had separate hierarchies. In
addition, there were school health workers, Sanitary Inspectors
and subordinate public health staff. Each P.H.C. had a different
group of field staff, depending on local conditions, historical
accident, or State policy and provision, and these staff would be
paid from different budget heads and on different pay scales. As
a result of this complexity, the rationalisation into a multi¬
purpose system has not progressed smoothly, and in most States
substantial income differences remain, and workers still tend to
identify themselves with the single-purpose programme where they
began (Narayana and Acharya, 1980:96).
The male health staff have not been the subject of much
study, except for those in the Family Planning cadres (e.g.
Elder, 1974; Misra et al., 1981). These accounts accord with that
of Narayana and Acharya (1980:102-3) in suggesting little
commitment to health and family planning work plsx but rather
an economic orientation to work. In addition, these male para¬
medical workers are subject to conflicting lines of authority,
with many of them naming four or more direct supervisors. How¬
ever, they work very much on their own, with 7 5% saying that they
meet a supervisor once a week or less often (ibid.: 1 1 4 — 5). In
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this context, 'supervision' tends to focus on an assessment of
the written records kept by the worker. All his supervisors will
request reports on their particular area of concern, and record¬
keeping has come to be a major use of time by these workers. Thus
Alexander et a 1. (1972:1853) estimated that over 4 0$ of
expenditures could be regarded as 'administrative' (record¬
keeping, travel, liaison with other agencies etc.) ana a further
17-20$ 'non-productive' or 'personal'; unfortunately they do not
classify this information by staff category or distinguish 'head-
quarters' from 'field' operations.
A major issue in supervision is that of transfers and
promotions. This is a well-established feature of the Indian
bureaucracy at all levels, with frequent transfers explained as
the only way to prevent a number of corrupt practices. But for
these workers, a knowledge of the villages where they work may be
crucial, so the system of transfers every three or four years
militates against this. On the other hand, those able to stay for
long periods usually do so with the help of local political
influence, which may be unrelated to job performance.
The introduction of multi-purpose working was partly
justified as a way of reducing the time spent travelling between
villages, and so that any one visit could be used for several
purposes. Most workers seem to welcome the chance to reduce the
population they were expected to serve. However, while the family
planning workers welcomed the chance tc add health duties to
their work, the other workers were less happy about their
increased family planning responsibilities (ibid.:132). Workers
who 'motivate' a 'case' for sterilisation are expected tc spend
a lot of time with that person, going with them to the operating
site, to look after their needs and to make sure that they go
through with the operation, and that the worker gets the credit
for the 'motivation'. Since 1577 most sterilisations have been of
women, and these are more often provided by female workers, so id
is not clear how significant this has been in the everyday
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working patterns of most male workers since then.
Male workers have a number of problems in their work, most
notably with access to houses. In general, there has been
resistance to aspects of public health work such as the
collection of blood slides for malaria surveillance, or attempts
to ensure complete coverage of immunizations. On occasion
minority groups have resisted the entry of workers from other
sections of the population: Muslims, under-represented in the
health work-force, are most likely to restrict access. Some
workers also face difficulties because they come from
'untouchable' origins (ibid.: 126-7). But more general criticisms
have focussed on the capacity of the workers to maintain their
level of working at a sufficient level to produce results;
Harrison's account of the problems of maintaining motivation and
performance in malaria control has already been cited (1978). In
general, these are the key workers in most preventive campaigns,
and their achievements do not generate much confidence that these
campaigns will now begin to overcome the limitations which have
reduced their effectiveness so far.
2. Female Staff
The position with respect to female health staff is much
simpler than for the men. Essentially there are two cadres of
female staff - Auxiliary Nurse-Midwives and Lady Health Visitors
- who were originally employed as either family planning or
maternal and child health staff. Since reorganisation into a
multi-purpose scheme, they have all been reclassified as Health
Workers (previously A.N.H.s) and Assistants (previously L.H.V.s).
One early study of the work of A.N.M.s stressed several main
points which have been frequently repeated. Reid (1969:1,55)
argued that the range of duties expected was too vast; that it
was impossible for the worker to cover the geographical area
assigned to her and that the time spent in travelling was
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disproportionate (about 255); that the time spent on record¬
keeping (about 205) seriously interfered with the time available
for work; and that family planning work was the most difficult
aspect of their jobs. The estimates of Alexander et a 1. (1972)
cited above are in line with these figures.
An additional problem for these female workers is their
vulnerability in rural settings. They complain most bitterly
about housing provisions - not just their availability but their
security - and the dangers of travelling unchaperoned from
village to village (I.I.M., 1980). In many places they have the
reputation of being 'loose women', ana repute also suggests that
they come under heavy sexual harrassment, from their superiors or
from locals, if they are not protected by the presence of some
male kinsmen or a husband.
Finally, these are the workers most seriously affected by
the family planning campaigns. 'Motivation' of family planning
'cases' has always been a substantial element in their training
and work, with varying importance at different times. It is
overwhelmingly dominant during family planning 'drives' - around
the time of 'camps' (when special operating facilities are
established), during 1976-77, or during the annual one- or two-
month periods of special family planning periods. Despite recent
attempts to widen the job description to spent more time on
maternal and child health, it remains true that the only
criterion by which staff performance is seriously measured is
their ability to provide sterilisation 'cases', and this is
reflected in the amount of time and effort they spend in family
planning work (I.I.M. 1980:97-108). Under the Congress Government
of 1980 onwards, a number of health elements appeared in the 'New
20-Point Programme'. In the case of family planning, this meant
that 'sterilisation achievements' for each unit had to be
collected and checked and passed up the bureaucratic system so
that one month's figures could be on the Prime Minister's desk by
the 15th of the following month. No other national health
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programme has the same kind of central surveillance. Village
women are well aware of the significance of sterilisations to
health workers, and as a result are cautious of becoming indebted
to these staff and thus vulnerable to moral pressure to be
sterilised (Jeffery et al. 1985).
Village-level personnel
Health departments had no 'village-level' personnel before
1977. Prior to this, under the Community Development Programme,
Village Level Workers were supposed to be concerned with some
health matters, though it seems that they concentrated on
agricultural development. Eut they were not really 'village-
based' in the way that term has come to be used. 'Village-level'
now usually means that the person is a long-term resident in the
area; has no more than part-time employment; is subject to some
form of control by village institutions; is trained outside the
framework of formal training institutions; and is without a
marketable qualification. By contrast, the V.L.W. (and other
health staff) are usually prevented from serving in their own
village and are subject to regular transfers to prevent local
identification and interests developing. The two categories of
'village-level' health personnel (in the recent usage) who were
the focus of the 1977 policy were called community health workers
and dais, and were organised in different ways and for different
purposes, so I will deal with them separately.
i. Community Health Workers
Unlike all other health personnel, the C.H.V. was to be
nominated by the village and the P.H.C. Medical Officer would
merely select trainees from amongst those nominated. The
successful candidates would then undergo a three-month training
course, held at the P.H.C., when the trainees would receive a
stipend of Rs200 per month. On successful completion of the
course they would return to their own village. There they would
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merely be paid Rs50 per month as a retainer or honorarium, and
would be provided with drugs and dressings to the value of Rs50
per month. They would be expected to spend two to three hours per
day in health-related activities, but would not be under the
formal bureaucratic control of the District Medical Officer.
Dismissal could only follow a formal request from the village,
and this was discouraged by making the village institutions
liable to pay the training stipend if they wanted a replacement.
In general, the tasks to be carried out, ana for which training
was given, would be first aid, preventive medicine, and community
hygiene (N.I.H.F.W., 1978:1-3).
The scheme was introduced in 741 P.H.C.s in 1 977. Almost all
Blocks were to have been included in the programme by the end of
the Sixth Plan in March 1985. The programme has changed through
time: sometimes in response to findings based on research carried
out on the first Blocks covered, while other changes were
introduced when Congress returned to power in Delhi and in most
of the States in 1980. But the basic principles remain unchanged.
The programme has been politically very sensitive, with doctors
organised to oppose it on the grounds' that it increased
'quackery' and exposed villagers to second-class services.
Perhaps for this reason, there have been several social science
research studies, so we know a fair amount of basic information
about who the C.H.V.s are, how they were selected, and something
about perceptions by health staff and others of their work. We
are less well served with accounts of what the C.H.V.s usually
do, nor what may be the major factors which affect this.
Most C.H.V.s are relatively young (the modal age-group is
20-29 in most studies, in line with the official guidelines) and
with education to secondary school, with very few illiterates and
only 305 or so with only primary schooling ( N. I. H. F. W.
1 978:Appendix V[c ]). In the northern States of Bihar, U.P. and
Punjab, a sizeable minority (17-255) of the first two batches hac
some college education (ibid.). Most C.H.V.s are male, despite
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the evidence from voluntary projects that women are better suited
to the work, particularly in services for the priority categories
of mothers ana children (Hardiman, 1984). The percentage of women
in the first two batches was 6 ? , with a regional variation from a
high of 26% in West Bengal and surrounding Eastern States and no
women at all in Rajasthan, one each in Haryana and Madhya
Pradesh, and 4 (0.7?) in Uttar Pradesh (N.I.H.F.W. 197S:Appendix
V[b ]). Recruitment guidelines for later batches stressed more
strongly the desirability of choosing more women.
The method of selection actually followed was radically
different from the model outlined by the official documents, and
demonstrates very clearly the nature of village level
institutions and the political process in rural India. In
principle, the village councillors (the Panchayat) were to
nominate several candidates from each village, and the medical
officers were to assess their suitability in choosing amongst
them. In practice, matters were very different. In general
Panchayats seemed to prefer to nominate only one candidate - the
N.I.H.F.W. study ( i bi d : 4 1 ) noted that 47? of the 299 C. H. W. s from
the first two batches they studied said that there were no
competitors for the post, and Narayan and A c h a r y a (1980:176)
fcund 62? of the 127 C.H.W.s in their study had had no
competitors. It might be thought that the doctors would prefer to
select the more appropriate candidate from a range of options,
but it seems that the reverse is the case. Most doctors by now
prefer a 'least-risks' option, insisting that the Panchayat conies
up with only one name, on the grounds that the political problems
posed for the doctor by unsuccessful applicants make the task of
selection one the doctor would prefer to avoid. The
politicisation of selection probably went farthest in West
Bengal, where the Communist Party 'Government ensured that most
candidates came from their own mass peasant organisations
(Jobert, 1985:15). Far from the procedure being open, and
involving villagers in discussion about the nature of the
programme and the benefits of reliable candidates, in most places
it became merely a question of one more, minor, political favour
to be distributed,
ii. Dais
By contrast with the interest shown in the Community Health
Workers, there have been very few studies of the new schemes for
training traditional birth attendants and integrating their work
into that of the maternal and child health services. Marayana and
Acharya (1980:134-64) report that the training was generally
carried out in inaccessible language, and little more than a
stress on cleanliness and hygiene was actually understood by the
dais they interviewed. There was little evidence of any change in
the everyday practices of the dais, and after the training was
completed there has been little further support from the P.B.C.
staff.
P.H.C. staff (especially the A.N.M.s) tend to use the
trained dai as an intermediary with the village, to allow them to
find ante-natal or potential family planning 'cases', but very
few dais receive the kits or incentive payments to which they are
entitled (Jeffery et al. 1985; Gandhi and Sapru, 1980).
HEALTH SERVICES: THE LAY PERSPECTIVE
How do different patients, or potential clients, understand
the range of medical options open to them? Posing the question in
this way helps to avoid some of the difficulties thrown up by
asking about choices between medical systems, which is how this ;
kind of question is sometimes framed. There has been a rather
unproductive debate along these lines. 3anerji (1981), and
Djurfelat and Lincberg (1975), have argued that where Western
medicine is available, cheap, and of good quality, it will be
invariably preferred, despite its inability to deal effectively
with the major diseases of poverty. The continuance of indigenous
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medicine, in this perspective, is a result of the inadequacies cf
Western medicine. By contrast, Nichter (1981) and Van der Veen
(1981) have pointed to the continuities between the categories of
indigenous medicine and those of everyday thought - with prime
examples being the use of humoral concepts ('hot', 'cold',
'windy' etc.) in everyday discussions of the characteristics of
climate, food, personality or body type. In addition, they point
to the social context of indigenous therapy, which is usually
more sensitive to local social norms than are Western-style
clinics and hospitals. Thus Gould (1957) and Marriott (1956) note
how important for most patients is a personal relationship with
the healer - unlikely (and disliked by staff) in large urban
institutions. Carstairs (1956), Khare (1963) and Marriott (1956)
also point to contrasts in healing style, with indigenous healers
more confident in prognosis, less dependent on detailed
questioning for diagnosis, and more likely to refer to their
personal qualities as a sign of the likely success of their
treatment. Patterns of expectations derived from these models
tend to be used as yardsticks to understand and evaluate Western
medical practice, which tends to be very different.
Whatever else the discussion of this question in the past
fifteen years has shown, it is that nobody (neither in India, nor
el sewhere) 'chooses' a system of medicine, not for one episode of
illness, nor for all forms of illness, nor for one kind of
patient or another. The question is sometimes framed in that way
in order to demonstrate the superior attractiveness to the Indian
populace of one system or another, or to argue that those who
'choose' one system are more rational, educated or whatever than
those who choose another. But research results using this
approach have not produced clear-cut distinctions. Thus Madan's
early study in Ghazia'oad concluded that there were no significant
differences between those expressing a 'preference' fcr Western
over indigenous medicine, with respect to urban or rural origin,
age, income, or education (1969:1483-4). He also notes that for
some people, the most significant factor seems to be the free
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availability of Western medical services for those with some form
of occupational health insurance.
Leslie (1983) suggests that the layperson's search for
therapy in India can be characterised as a pluralistic one, in
which people guide their behaviour using sets of ideas which may
appear logically incompatible (such as those of 'humoral balance'
as well as a 'germ theory' of disease). Using this knowledge,
which they often accept is incomplete, people have to act, and
they do so in a pragmatic way. Specifically, they tend to assume
that most events have more than one cause, and that different
types of treatments may be appropriate to these different causes.
The decision about who to consult, or what treatments to use,
will be guided by the past history of patients, their
relationships with different available healers, costs and other
benefits involved in consultations, as well as by a theory about
what 'causes' illnesses of this kind, and what 'treatments' are
therefore most suited to treat them.
Thus very few people in India make an ideological commitment
to a system of medicine. They may, as Djurfeldt and Lindberg
(1975) suggest, make commitments to individual healers, who are
seen as especially useful for particular patients. But these
commitments are unlikely to depend on that healer's choice of
therapies, nor will they necessarily be passed onto whoever
replaces that healer. Many healers do not make rigid distinctions
between therapies, making use of medicines from more than one
system in conjunction, and most patients do the same. Further¬
more, it is difficult to trace out consistent patterns of
'hierarchies of resort', or tendencies to consult certain kinds
of healers first and then others, for some illnesses or some
patients. Gould (1957) described a pattern of consulting
indigenous medicine for 'chronic, no n-incapacitating
dysfunctions' and Western medicine for 'acute, incapacitating'
ones. But he himself later argued that this was too simple a
model (Gould, 1965) and others have similarly found great
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difficulty in linking diseases (as defined by Western medicine)
to healing choices. This is not surprising, since diseases are
mediated by social processes and perceived in social terms as
illnesses, with social meanings already embedded in them. What is
slightly more surprising is the evidence of a lack of fit between
diagnosis and treatment: that illnesses may be seen as 'caused'
by supernatural means but taken to 'somatic' healers, or vice
versa (K a k a r et a 1., 1972).
In general, then, someone ccnsultating a practitioner does
not necessarily accept the philosophical bases of the therapy he
or she receives. This is true even for the most complete
submissions to the moral authority of the healer, in hospital
wards. Thus Minocha (1979:166-98) discusses the mismatch between
patients and staff understandings of Western medicine. Patients
often mistook diagnostic and curative procedures, queried the
role of blood samples and the use of injections, and restricted
the information they passed onto the doctor, especially about
alternative remedies they had used or continued to take while in
the hospital. Kirkpatrick (1976) describes patients who remain
oriented to familial expectations rather than those of the
hospital staff, and who explain their illness in terms of a
diffuse variety of causes (based on karma) despite their
willingness to undergo surgery.
Western medical facilities often ignore cultural guidelines
in the way they treat patients, and this may mean that the
'healing process' is weakened, and patients fail to comply with
'doctor's orders'. Conversely, indigenous healers are much more
closely in tune with cultural guidelines, and are better able to
bring social and psychological forces into play to assist with
healing - though there is no evidence that they are any better at
getting patient compliance. But all systems of medical belief and
practice tend to be seen as 'efficacious' - to produce expected
results - and the conditions in which they are used make it
almost impossible to allocate success or failure decisively to
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the patterns of treatment chosen. In this sense, India is little
different from anywhere else. Nonetheless, it seems likely that
the balance of choices of healers and treatments will continue to
shift towards the Western-style. Western medicine has more money,
and symbolic and practical official support, ana ideological
barriers to its use are weak. But this will not mean an end to
medical pluralism, which in India (as elsewhere) seems to be well
established (Leslie, 1983).
CONCLUSION
Since 1947, medical institutions have come under
considerable pressure to orient towards the major health problems
of the mass of the population in rural areas. In some measure
they have responded to this pressure, notably in the"
establishment of single-disease control programmes, and in their
management through a structure of P.H.C.s. However, they have
failed to develop an ability to respond creatively to disease
problems. Field staff have followed bureaucratic guidelines to do
their work, but initiative has remained resolutely in the hands
of the people at the top. In the case of malaria control, it
meant that when the focus moved on, staff relaxed and malaria
returned; in the case of smallpox,- it meant that only when
external agencies took a direct interest did the programme meet
its targets. Most junior staff follow a 'least-risk' strategy,
filling their forms and keeping their noses clean, while
collecting enough money and political credit to protect
them selves against unwanted transfers.
None of the possible models for ensuring competent ana
motivated health activities are applicable in India. There is no
political party structure which might provide a local watch on
State officials to ensure that they carry out their jobs in a
satisfactory manner. There is no 'professional' structure, using
internalised norms to provide commitment. Senior staff may
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attempt to employ a 'coercive' model, using supervision as a way
of finding fault. It seems unlikely that this would be well
suited to health work, but it is not consistently employed.
Supervisors find their ability to implement this model
constrained by the ability of junior staff to call upon political
or financial resources to produce favourable support from higher
in the system. The legitimacy of the senior staff is further
undermined by the cynicism \v/ith which their motives and decisions
are usually viewed. How far these conditions are likely to be
changed by the 'new' models which underly current proposals,
derived in part from experience in the voluntary sector, forms
the subject of the final chapter.
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CHAPTER 11
CONCLUSION: MEW DIRECTIONS IN HEALTH POLICY?
The picture I have painted so far is one of a Government
aware of some of the key elements in appropriate health services
for India, given its poverty and disease pattern, but making only
stumbling attempts to move in the right directions. In this
chapter I will look at some of the evidence of new appraoches to
the health problems of India, and briefly contrast the situation
in India with that of its near neighbour, Pakistan. I will
conclude by assessing this case study in the light of the
theories of the State outlined in the Introduction.
There are two kinds of 'new approaches' to health service
delivery in India: innovatory schemes mostly outside the normal
Government provisions; and the impact of 'new' thinking in
Government, prompted partly by these 'voluntary sector' schemes
but also by international agency support. I have already
described the most eye-catching elements in the Government
schemes - the introduction of Community Health Workers, the
attempts to revitalise dai training schemes, and the shift from
uni-purpose to multi-purpose health campaigns. Here I shall focus
on the small-scale voluntary sector projects. Then I will
describe the new patterns in health aid and the contrast between
the Government programmes they support and the voluntary projects
which nominally draw on the same understanding of the
possibilities of health services.
There is obviously a watershed in thinking about health
sector organisation, and the role of international aid, around
a
1970. The old orthodoxy saw the role of aid to assist in
'modernisation', and the transfer of institutions and
technologies. 'Best practices' were regarded as'universal, and
the benefits would 'trickle down' to the mass of the population.
Thus the focus was on big metropolitan hospitals, for example, in
the belief that patients from a wide surrounding regions would be
referred there for specialised treatment. By 1975, a new
orthodoxy was established: recognising the need to relate
technology to economy and culture, it accepted that the existing
pattern tended to restrict benefits to urban, relatively affluent
groups, and it called for a new focus on primary care, on para¬
medical workers, on simplifying techniques for use in under¬
developed countries, and on spreading facilities to the mass of
the population. There were calls to link population programmes
more closely to maternal and child health programmes, to involve
communities more closely in the planning and control of health
services, and to recognise the value of indigenous practitioners.
This was accompanied by moves to liberalise aid terms, increasing
the grant element and reducing the tying of aid to foreign
exchange provision (World Bank, 1 975; O.D.M., 1 975). None of this
was very radical. In spite of an acceptance that the sources of
ill-health could be found in social, political and economic
arrangements as much as in environmental ones, the new arrange¬
ments nevertheless focussea on changing only the medical infra¬
structure. It is thus at least plausible that their impact on
iriay be marginal; but their impact on health sector aid
policies has been more substantial.
The Janata Government in 1977 claimed credit fcr
implementing a number of 'new' proposals which derived from plans
made under the Congress Government. These policies have been
continued by the new Congress government, if with less
enthusiasm. Foreign assistance has supported this shift. It is
arguable that key features of these 'new' approaches are their
concern with 'people's participation', 'integration', and the use
of auxiliary health workers. As I suggested in Chapter 10,
'people's participation' has been potentially on the agenda in
discussions of primary health centres since 1960, but it has only
become central (and more sophisticated) since 1977. This is
reflected in titles like 'Health By the People' (Newell, 1975) or
in phrases like 'putting the people's health into the people's
hands' (quoted in Jobert, 1985). In what follows I shall not
discuss the theoretical case for the benefits of such a move, but
instead, assuming that it is a 'good thing', ask a set of
questions derived from a broader study of participation in rural
development (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980). These are: what kind of
participation is involved - in implementation or in decision¬
making? what are the socio-political orientations of the organi¬
sations offering participation - conservative or reformist? and
what is the socio-political structure (homogenous or stratified)
and context of the communities being offered participation?
'Integration' has also been a key word in discussions of
health policy. The discussions in the 1950s and the 1960s related
to the integration of curative and preventive care, at the level
of the doctors, or the administrative structure; in the 1970s the
focus was on the integration of the different preventive health
campaigns, particularly for paramedical workers, who were later
also offered some curative tasks. In both cases, however,
integration has been restricted to health workers. The early
attempt (under the Community Development Programme in the 1950s)
to make health work part of the work of rural development is
reckoned to have led to little health work, perhaps because most
people do not place health high on their lists of priorities. The
new projects tend to attempt integration with non-health develop¬
ment again, either as an opening into the village (by addressing
the 'felt needs' of its members) or on the grounds that water
supply, or poverty, are the main causes of ill-health which need
to be addressed. I shall thus be concerned to distinguish the
kinds of integration involved in the new projects.
The use of auxiliary health workers is a final element. In
general, these are village level workers, drawn from the villages
'where they work. Cut projects have varied according to the
minimum education they demanded, from none at all tc several
years of schooling. There are also ideological variations, from
those committed to the use of untrained personnel as a way of
demystifying medicine, to those who see the virtues of
auxiliaries only in the context of shortages of trainee
personnel.
VOLUNTARY SECTOR HEALTH PROJECTS
There is a large number of voluntary-sector health projects'
in India. Most of these are hospital or clinic-based, and diffe-r -
from similar Government facilities only in the motivation of some
of the staff (many of these are Christian or Hindu missions) or
in the level of funding or staffing. But Rao (cited in Jobert,
1985) listed 50 which could be considered as 'new' in orientation
in 1978. They are not equally distributed around the country.
Pyle (1979) lists six in Maharashtra, four of which are also
listed in the fourteen stuaies included by Faruqee and Johnson
(1982). Other States with well-known projects include Tamil Nadu
(R.U.H.S.A.), Punjab (Narangwal) , A n d h r a Pradesh (Indo-Dutch
Project), Rajast'nan (Tilcnia S.W.R.C.) and Madhya Pradesh
(Project Poshak). They cover only a small proportion of the
population: the six projects in Maharashtra covered only about
500,000 people, or about 1 S of the State's population.
These projects vary considerably. Some are linked to the
Government, so that five of the Maharashtrian schemes were
jointly run, while others are entirely separate. Some derive much
of their income from abroad, while others are more nearly self-
financing. Some are designed for research (notably the Narangwal
project in Punjab) and are well-documented, but others keep very
few records. Some make 'people's participation' a central feature
of their organisation (e.g. Jam knee, in Maharashtra), while
others (like Narangwal) have other central concerns. Some are
attempting to integrate various kinds of health work (e.g.
Narangwal), while others see health programmes as part of more
general rural development (e.g. Tilonia).
—1 r-t I 1
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a. In implementation or in decision-making?
In keeping with the varying backgrounds, these voluntary
sector projects have had varying degrees of commitment to the
three elements which I distinguished above. Thus participation in
decision-making in Narangwal, in keeping with its research '
orientation, had very narrow limits. Thus G w a t k i n et a 1-. -
(1980:54-5) summarise the organisation as follows:
'Community leaders were consulted regularly during the
project's execution, and community organisations
provided support and assistance - buildings for village
health and feeding centres, for example - and financial
congtri'outions to the continued operation of project-
initiated day-care centres. Principal responsibility,
however, rested with the project leaders who determined
what service would be provided, recruited and supervised
project personnel, and covered well over 90% of project
costs v;ith funds raised from external sources.'
The project with the most contrasting emphasis is probably
that at Jamkhed, where villages only participate in the programme
if they are prepared to make fairly substantial inputs, and in
return, their priorities affect the programme. Tubewells,
farmers' associations and curative services have been provided at
least in part because of village demands. In addition, by 1978
75% of costs were being met from local resources (Harciman,
1984:131). Host of the other projects discussed have fallen
between these two examples, or have involved even less local
participation than in Marangwal. Thus in Padgha , Kasa and H i r a j
(three of the Maharashtra projects) r services are delivered with
no requirement of village inputs (Pyle, 1573:15-6). Similarly,
the larger projects included by Faruqee and Johnson (1582:22-3)
have limited participation to payment or the provision of some
basic material resources. In several cases, the attempt tc
involve villages by creating 'health committees' which have been
given no resources or power, has failed to produce any
substantial effect (ibid.). In Tilonia, there is a mix: the
staffing is by young professionals, who offer technical services
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to villages for payment, but who have also created a network of
social institutions with considerable local participation
(Franda, 1979:162-3). Size, and the decisions of the dominant
personnel in the project (usually charismatic 'founders') seem to
determine the degree of participation involved; and participation
in implementation seems to be dependent on participation in
decision-making.
b. Socio-political orientation.
The organisations offering participation have predominantly
a social reformist orientation. The more conservative
organisations (missions, or those close to right-wing political
parties like the Jan Sangh) have not tended to offer
participation beyond the chance to become a patient. On the other
hand, organisations with a more revolutionary outlook have not
been involved with local, small-scale projects of this kind. The
exception is that the Left Front Government in West Bengal, under
its Communist Party (Marxist) leadership, has attempted to
introduce its cacres into the Government health machinery through
the Community Health Volunteer scheme (see above). There have
been no reports of how much this policy has achived. Once again,
the least reformist projects are those closest to the Government
or with a research orientation. Thus Karangwal had no policy
objectives beyond the health sphere; Project Poshak similarly was
restricted to health and nutrition objectives. The Indo-Dutch
Project in Andhra attempted to stimulate sufficient local change
to allow the original organisers to withdraw leaving an operating
institution behind them, though they were not successful in this
(Faruqee and Johnson, 1982:68-9).
Other projects have attempted to produce changes in social
organisation, either working through the local institutions
(Panchayats) as in Maharashtra, or by effectively undermining
them, by establishing alternative institutions. Both Tilonia and
R. U.H. S. A. threaten 1c c a 1 power-holders because they offer
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alternative means of access to scarce public resources, such as
loans and grants, predominantly in non-health spheres. But even
the more narrowly health-based projects working with the
Panchayat may have much wider effects. In Jamkhed, for example,
Panchayats have been involved from the start, ana they did not
take much interest in the original proposals, seeing health
issues as non-threatening. But successful village health workers "
have developed political support and provide the possibility o-f -
alternative perspectives on political issues (Pyle, 1979:16-7).
The existence of political protection for these projects then
becomes vital if t'ney are to continue, despite the absence of
revolutionary rhetoric or intent.
c. Local social structures.
Most projects are working in areas which are social and
economically stratified, as is most of plains India. All the
projects which have a reasonable degree of documentation are
predominantly in these areas, and they are in States which are
marked by considerable inequality. (None of them are in Kerala,
for example.) The Palghar project in Maharashtra included 15
tribal villages, where inequalities are usually much less, but
there seems to be little discussion of the impact this has had on
project success in these areas. I shall discuss the wider social
and political context of these schemes at the end of this
chapter.
Initszzai.Igjs
The degree of integration of services is as varied as for
the indicators of participation. Almost all these projects have
attempted some integration, except for four of the projects
covered by Faruqee and Johnson (1982:18), which dealt only with
nutritional inputs and had few contacts with the local prima r y
health care services. For Narangwal, variations in integration




integration has been restricted to the health sphere. Narangwal
offered the different experimental groups health, medical,
nutrition and family planning services in different combinations.
As in several of the Maharashtrian projects, the focus has been
on maternal and child health services, because they are regaroec
as the most vulnerable sections of the population.
The most extensive integration is at projects like Jamkhed, -
R.U.H.S.A. and Tilcnia, where health services are offered as part
of a much broader package of assistance. Tilcnia is not primarily
a health project, though its health component is an important
one, whereas Jamkhed and R.UfH.S.A. see general social
development in terms more of its contribution to health goals. As
the Aroles, project directors in Jamkhed, put it in 1975 (quoted
in Haraiman, 1984:131):
'Local resources such as building, manpower and
agriculture should be used to solve local health
problems.'
The development of local resources is thus a health goal, but can
take on a priority for the project in itself. It is these non-
health developments which may have the greatest chance of
affecting the health status, particularly of the poorest groucs,
and which may bring the most 'integrated' projects into conflict
with powerful local groups and individuals.
2££2Q'J3J3£l
Finally, the use of auxiliary personnel is a feature common
to these projects, but with considerable variation in the tv r» of
personnel involved. In tlarangwal , most of th e experimental
I ^
programmes were run with A.N.M.s and L.H.V.s or their equivalents
as the lowest levels of auxiliary personnel, recruiting vm£c-e
women only for child care (creches). At the other e x t r e m e is
J a rn khed, whose village health w orkers have usually a e n
illiterate middle-aged women. Hardiman (1584:132) points out that
this was not part of the original planning for Jamkheq. t-ne
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project founders had intended to use A.N.M.s until they
discovered problems in recruiting and placing such women in the
project villages. Pyle (1979:20-1) reports that several of the
Maharashtrian projects discovered that village workers with less
education performing better than educated ones; and almost all
report better experience with women than with men. This is partly
because the focus of many of these projects has" been on maternal
and child health.
The use of women of this kind, in part-time work with
relatively little financial reward, is a feature common to most
of the innovative projects. There are variations in the tasks
they have been expected to perform: again, this seems to have
developed through experimentation, with the addition of more
tasks as workers have become more skilled. In Jamkhed, weekly
discussions are used essentially as in-service training, to
improve diagnostic and other skills. In general, projects have
been able to entrust increasing responsibilities to these workers
without any apparent loss of quality of care. However, it is in
improving the coverage of services that village workers are
usually reckoned to score heavily over workers who are more
highly-trained and expensive, but have less local knowledge anc
fewer social contacts with the population to be served. Extensive
home visits are basic elements which are almost impossible
without a cheap, committed local worker, and projects without
this kind of programme (such as Project Poshak) have reported low
coverage and high drop-out rates (Faruqee and Johnson, 1982:28).
The results of these programmes, with their differing
degrees ana types of participation, integration, and use of
auxiliary personnel, are interesting, though hardly clear-cut.
Thus Narangwal was successful in making a considerable impact on
local health indicators at relatively low cost, despite being a
project narrowly defined in 'health' terms, with little local
participation, considerable integration of health services but
with little contact with wider development programmes, anc
relying on well-motivated paramedicals not village health
workers. This may be partly explained by the fact that Punjab has
high mortality and morbidity indicators given its relative
wealth, and such an approach might not be suitable in poorer
parts of the country. The Jamkheh project, by contrast, also has
had a considerable impact on health indicators, by a programme
with very different emphases. Faruqee and Johnson (1982:44)
conclude that programmes should be tailored to local conditions,
and no one national model is likely to be suitable everywhere.
The other general conclusion frequently voiced is that these
projects owe their success in considerable measure to the
individuals who have founded them and committed themselves to
them. In particular, this creates a spirit within the
organisation which fosters much higher levels of commitment and
achivement by the employees than is common in larger
organisations, based on the enthusiasm of the directors and their
face-to-face contact with the field workers. This has two major
consequences: it becomes very difficult to expand the project
beyond a relatively small area, one which one or two individuals
can reasonable be said to cover; and any attempt to integrate
these new proposals within formal bureaucratic structures are
likely to be unsuccessful. Nonetheless, through direct example
and through a change within international agencies, some attempts
have been made to apply some of the insights from voluntary
projects to Government operations. The main vehicle for
introducing change has remained the additional funds made
available by the Planning Commission, and since 1 977 the major
source of relatively 'free' funds has been through international
aid, to which I now turn.
NEW PATTERNS IN AID
There are two features of more recent aid programmes which I
will briefly discuss. The first relates to assistance (largely
from U.N. I.C.E.F.) to the Integrated Child Development Scheme
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(I.C.D.S.); and the second to the 'Area Development Programmes'.
The I.C.D.S. has now been in existence for about 10 years.
It was designed as a pilot attempt to bring together the health
services (under Ministries of Health) and nutrition support
(under Ministries of Social Welfare and Education). Community
Development Blocks included in the I.C.D.S. have an additional
doctor attached to the P.H.C., and some additional paramedical
staff, who work with Social Education Officers in monitoring the
health and nutrition of the children who attend feeding centres
run by anganwadi (courtyard) workers - who are village nutrition
workers. I.C.D.S. Blocks can now be found in every District in
India, and they have a higher level of funding than do 'ordinary'
Blocks. However, problems of integration with health services
remain, with the medical staff often having no real contact with
their Social Welfare counterparts. Coverage with I.C.D.S. blocks
is scheduled to expand steadily over the next few years, but the
scheme does not have a high profile within the Health Ministry.
The first example of 'Area Development' in aid came in the
first India Population Project (IPP-1) in six districts in U.P.
and three in Karnataka in 1972. In that year the World Bank
agreed to provide loans in 'social infrastructure' with
substantial amounts going to water supply and sanitation projects
($70 millions being spent up to 1980) and in health and family
planning. IPP-1 received its funding from the World Bank,
amounting to $21 million in loans, and from the Swedish Govern¬
ment, of $11 million in grants. A further $12.5 million was
provided by the Indian Government as counterpart funds. It was
'new' in that the project was much bigger than most previous
ones. It focussed on rural health delivery, the training of
nurses, improved management systems, and the integration of
family planning with maternal and child health services. It was
intended to operate as an example to the rest of the country.
Relatively little has been published about the project, but it is
clear that it has formed the basis of a document which lays down
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guidelines for similar projects developed from 1977 onwards with
other donor agencies and known as the Model Plan.
There are now five projects, at different stages of
development, which follow the general pattern established by the
Model Plan. Each project is expected to last 5 years, and depends
on counterpart funds coming from the Government of India. One is
part-funded by the Danish Government grant of $35 million in
selected districts of Tamil Nadu and Madhya Pradesh; a second is
part-funded by the U.N.F.P.A. in selected districts of Bihar and
Rajasthan; a third, the Second India Population Project in parts
of U.P. and A.P. is part-funded by the World Bank for $46 million
in loans (originally the Swedish Government was to provide an
additional $23 million in grants); a fourth is part-funded by the
British Government in Orissa for $25 million; and the fifth is a
project part-funded by U.S.A.I.D. in districts of five states
(Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra and Punjab) for
$33 million.
The projects share a common core, derived from the Model
Plan, though they vary in detail. (For a comparison of three of
these proposals see Table 1). The main principle of the Model
Plan is to speed up the provision of services along the patterns
laid down in the plans of the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare in New Delhi; this means concentrating expenditures on
primary health in general, and on sub-centres (clinics manned by
a female Multi-Purpose Worker/Auxiliary Nurse Midwife, 1 for 5000
population eventually) in particular.
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table 1
area development project proposals
Tamil Nadu 5 States Oriss
(Danida) (U.S.A.I.D.) (U.K.
CATEGORY Ofto % %
Administration 5 1 2
Construction 25 54 39
Maintenance and utilities 12 * 4
Supplies, equipment and drugs 12 7 16
Transport « 3 6
Staff training, management etc. 11 8 3
Additional staff salaries 14 23 27
Nutrition 4 * 1
Communication & Media 4 2 1
Community Fund, Innovations etc 11 4 1
TOTAL (Rs mill) ( 144) (518) (295
Donor share 88% 62% 62%
Sources: &£££ anA Enmiix Esllnnn in Inn
Einlninln n£ Inail Enin, mimeo, October i 9 8 o; inin&nnini Ennni
Unniih nni Ennuiniinn Enninni = Enninni Ennnn, usaid, New Delhi,
August 1 980; £££££££^1 innn Ennnnnsann, Government of Orissa,
mimeo, 1979.
* categories are not separately recorded.
383
Much of the money to be spent under these projects will go
to the building of new sub-centres. Other funds will be spent on
improving the multi-purpose worker training; on improving
facilities at Primary Health Centres (e.g. with water supplies or
new operation rooms and equipment); and on support to family
welfare education through films and other simple audio-visual
aids. The main categories of worker supported will thus be the
lowest level - indigenous midwives, community health workers, and
multipurpose workers. (However, the aid agencies are not funding
the honoraria and supplies for the indigenous midwives and the
C.H.V.s, which is part of the Government of India support.)
Equipment support will be at a low level compared to salary,
training and construction support.
Because of the common core to these proposals there are many
similarities. However, there has been some acknowledgement of
local variations, and differences in approach amongst the donor
agencies, so that there are differences of emphasis between the
different projects. Thus the Danish proposal stresses more
community involvement than do the others; the British proposal
allows for an extension to the rest of the State after a few
years; and the American proposal stresses management training.
All accept as a basic principle that what is needed is more (and
better) of what is currently being provided.
In many respects, then, these projects are attempting to
meet the criticisms outlined above, and to implement some of the
lessons learned from voluntary projects. The bulk of the
expenditure is available in local currency, to be spent on
primary care, with a focus on training and employing female
health workers, and to improve maternal and child health care.
Nevertheless the limitations of the changes are also obvious. The
only community involvement is in the selection of candidates for
employment and training as community health workers and
indigenous midwives. Local involvement in planning and executing
the project is virtually non-existent, even in the Dutch
384
programme which has a 'community chest' to provide funding for
elements of felt need which are not covered by the programme.
In addition, while integration of services is an important
aspect of the proposals, there is some danger that it will be a
very lop-sided integration. To begin with, these are purely
'health' programmes, with no measure of integration with other
aspects of social development. (They do not even have any clear
relationship with the I.C.D.S.) But secondly, despite the primary
goal of the reduction of the high levels of maternal and infant
morbidity and mortality, the services to be financed have in the
past been used mainly for family planning purposes, and there are
few mechanisms to ensure that they will not be suborned in this
way in the future. These aspects of the World Bank-sponsored IPP-
2 were the main butt of the criticisms which led to the Swedish
Government withdrawing their proposed contribution, and lend some
support to the claim by Banerji (1981) that the international
agencies are lending their support to preparations for a return
to greater compulsion in family planning work. This is too
simplistic an analysis, because these donors have all expressed
public commitments against elements of compulsion, and would be
under considerable political pressure from domestic
constituencies to withdraw support if compulsion were to be
reintroduced. But the fact remains that they may be unable to
ensure their views are heard once the projects are completed. In
general, the Indian government has played a fairly forceful role
in negotiating the terms for this assistance: the donor agencies
have been forced to accept the terms on which they could offer
assistance, and the withdrawal of the Swedish contribution
suggests an inflexibility on the Indian side.
Finally, the projects have to depend on the existing health
structure to deliver most of the services and manage the various
programmes. As I argued above, two of the keys to success for the
voluntary-sector projects have been the emphasis on coverage
through home visits, and the significance of personal direction
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by a committed leadership. Neither of these can be provided by
the current Indian governmental structure, which has tended to
accept the new resources as yet further means of fuelling a
clientelistic structure - new jobs to be allocated, new contracts
to be awarded, new benefits available to be offered to favoured
villages or constituencies.
CONCLUSION
It is tempting to conclude, as the critics I discussed in
the Introduction to Part B have done, that health policy in India
is so closely dominated by national and international class
interests that there is little scope for major change. However, I
think this is too simplistic an analysis. In the first place, it
ignores the very real achievements of Indian health policy.
Health planning has shifted resources towards preventive
medicine, rural areas and paramedical workers. Substantial
preventive campaigns have been waged against malaria and
smallpox. Large numbers of P.H.C.s and subcentres have been built
and equipped, and staff have been appointed. In some parts of the
country, some of them have worked fairly conscientiously, even if
these have been the relatively favoured areas, and beneficiaries
have been disproportionately drawn from the higher classes and
castes. Paramedical staff may be trained and employed on the
cheap, but their numbers have continued to rise, and they are now
in place in numbers which mean that they could supply most of the
population with something approaching a reasonable health
service. Some of these services probably have helped to support
the decline in levels of mortality, halting and uncertain though
this has been.
Secondly, amongst the various legs which support class
domination, health policies, health sector assistance, ana even
the operations of pharmaceuticals companies, do not have high
priorities. More radical health sector proposals (like the
nationalisation of drug production) are of course fought hard by
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those whose interests would be directly affected. Further,
changes in the local distribution of resources which might be
needed if inequalities in health are to be overcome, or diseases
of poverty are to be significantly reduced, will also be fiercely
resisted. But very few health proposals come at all close to such
radical ideas. The more notable features of Indian health policy
are the extent to which it has shifted towards 'appropriate'
models; and the role of factors internal to the Government and
political party structure which have limited the implementation
of even these relatively modest proposals.
But the Indian Government has been relatively successful in
what it has achieved, if it is measured against those of its near
neighbour, Pakistan, with which it shared its historical legacy.
Prior to 1971 Pakistani health policy clearly allocated public
sector health resources to West Pakistan at the cost of East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In addition, per capita income levels
in Pakistan have been very comparable to those in India. So
reseource constraints have been at much the same levels. However,
the Pakistani Government has shown much less ability to
articulate a coherent health policy, or to shift resources
towards those sectors which it has identified as priorities -
such as preventive health campaigns using paramedical personnel
in rural areas. As in India, allocations to health services in
the Plans have been underspent, but have been at a lower level
than expenditures for other social services (Shepperdson, 1981).
In the Third Plan (1965-70) only 591 of the health allocation was
spent, without taking account of inflation. In addition, within
the health allocation, hospitals, and medical education have
tended to take more than they were allocated, but this pattern
was disrupted by the much bigger reversal in the malaria control
programmes than in India. Rural health programmes have been
allocated relatively little and have spent even less (ibid:13-
14). Shepperdson notes that "the allocation of development funds
continues to be mainly inconsistent with general policy
objectives such as the aim to expand rural services rapidly"
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( ibid:18).
The differentials in availability of health services are
much higher in Pakistan than in India. Not only are there far
fewer health personnel, the imbalance towards doctors is much
greater; in 1974 there were more doctors (10,000) than almost all
the other health personnel put together, with only dispensers
(8,000) showing any similar figure. Similarly, there were only
130 rural health centres (1:500,000 population) and 400 sub-
centres ( 1:1 50,000 populationHG.O.P., 1 975:298). Since the mid-
1970s allocations and expenditures for rural health programmes
have begun to rise, in real terms and proportionately. New
proposals, based on rural health centres for a population of
about 100,000, have been introduced, but staffing levels in 1980
even in Punjab (a relatively wealthy Province) were very low
(only 30% of doctors in post, for example)(A.D.B., 1981:50).
Finally, Shepperdson notes that the massive differentials in
health provisions from those for Government servants on the one
hand to rural peasants on the other have not declined during the
1970s (1981:8; see also Jeffery, 1972).
Compared to the Pakistani experience, then, Indian
achievements are considerable; compared to the ideals of the
planners and proponents of the 'new perspectives', India comes
off much less well. The explanations for these patterns seem to
me to derive from features of the social organisation which are
well captured by Alavi's discussion of levels of the State and
the degree of their integration. It is possible to draw contrasts
between 'tight' States and 'loose' ones, akin to Myrdal's
distinction between hard and soft States. 'Tight' States are
those in which there are consistencies among the different levels
of the State, and integration is close. In these States, whether
conservative (Iran, perhaps) or radical (China) the class
interests which dominate the State are closely in accordance with
the structural constraints in which they are set, and have a
bureaucratic and political party system which responds to those
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interests. 'Loose' States are those where integration is much
less clear, and contrasting pressures are able to operated with
some effect.
In India, the tightness of relationships between the levels
is less than in Pakistan. This can be attributed to a number of
decisions made by the Indian political elite soon after
Independence - the creation of powerful Planning mechanisms, the
retention of State control over aspects of the economy, the
elimination of zamindari - and to features of Indian social
organisation, such as the greater size and sophistication of the
Indian capitalist class, and the more secure base of the Indian
civil service. This has made possible a political party structure
more democratic in its organisation than many others, with a
diversity of parties and competition for local political
resources.
Thus, while Indian decision-making has been centralised, it
has not been consistent, or able to ignore the pressures for
rural provisions which socialist and Gandhian rhetoric has helped
to generate. Nor has it been unchanging. In the Introduction to
Part B I noted the 'break' in Indian polity and economy around
1964-6, with the death of Nehru and the coming of Mrs Gandhi to
power, and the crisis in Planning and the apparent downturn in
industrial growth. In policy terms, the break can be seen (in
retrospect) as a shift from 'top-down' socialism, to a populist,
potentially authoritarian regime. In health policy terms, this
has meant that the Planning Commission lost much of its
centrality, and control over key aspects of policy (such as the
numbers and 'quality' of medical colleges) has become much more
difficult to assert. I have termed the socialism 'top-down'
because, unlike Chinese communism, it involved no party structure
at the village or ward level which could either transmit its
demands up the political or bureaucratic structure, or act as the
channel for ensuring that higher-level decisions were taken. It
has been denigrated as 'Fabian', on the grounds that it was
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largely a matter of the intellectual classes, with no popular
roots. The absence of these roots made it vulnerable to the kind
of changes which have largely overtaken politics since 1965: a
populism which has been clearly at odds with the 'socialist*
inheritance in a number of cases, with the C.H.V. scheme the most
obvious example.
Thus in India, the thread which links these levels of the
State is a clientelist political structure. The State has what
coherence it receives from the flows of resources (usually called
'black' money) which move between capitalists, landlords and
their dependents, political parties (especially Congress) and
members of the Government machinery. These flows are essential
for the maintenance of the party structure, but they are also the
flows which ensure the protection of propertied classes. The
C.H.V. who gains his job through patronage has to repay that
patronage; the paramedical worker who wishes to get a favourable
transfer must please local elites and accumulate financial
resources which will eventually end up recycled through the
political machinery; and the creation of rural resources is part
of the currency of local politics, not the implementation of
clear-sighted solutions to underlying problems.
The balance of these forces varies throughout the country.
The contrasts between Bihar, where the levels seem most tightly
linked, West Bengal and Kerala, where most separation is
discernible, or Punjab and Haryana, where the situation seems
most fluid, have been noted (e.g. by Nag, 1983). Kerala and West
Bengal do have the makings of a localised party structure, based
on ideological party commitments and drawing support from the
poor and landless as well as the landed, though the effect on
health services organisation and achievements is more marked in
Kerala than in Bengal. If there are grounds for hope in the
Indian experience, it is the possibility that such local social
forces might be able to employ the resources which are finally
arriving at village level.
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